

0064, Revision 2, dated June 14, 2012: At the applicable times specified in paragraph 1.E., "Compliance," of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-78-0064, Revision 2, dated June 14, 2012, except as provided by paragraph (k) of this AD, do a detailed inspection for cracking of the outer V-blade fittings at the latch beam end and hinge beam end of each thrust reverser half, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-78-0064, Revision 2, dated June 14, 2012.

(1) If no cracking is found, repeat the inspections thereafter at the times specified in paragraph 1.E., "Compliance," of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-78-0064, Revision 2, dated June 14, 2012.

(2) If any cracking is found, before further flight, replace the affected thrust reverser half with a serviceable thrust reverser half, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-78-0064, Revision 2, dated June 14, 2012. Repeat the inspections thereafter at the times specified in paragraph 1.E., "Compliance," of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-78-0064, Revision 2, dated June 14, 2012.

#### (k) Service Information Exception

Where Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-78-0064, Revision 2, dated June 14, 2012, specifies an initial compliance time "after the date on Revision 2 of this service bulletin," this AD requires compliance within the specified time after the effective date of this AD.

#### (l) Reporting Not Required

Although Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-78-0064, Revision 2, dated June 14, 2012, specifies to submit certain information to the manufacturer, this AD does not include that requirement.

#### (m) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the attention of the person identified in the Related Information section of this AD. Information may be emailed to: [9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov](mailto:9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov).

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding district office.

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used for any repair required by this AD if it is approved by the Boeing Commercial Airplanes Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO to make those findings. For a repair method to be approved, the repair must meet the certification basis of the airplane and the approval must specifically refer to this AD.

(4) AMOCs approved previously in accordance with AD 2006-26-06, Amendment 39-14864 (71 FR 77586, December 27, 2006), are not approved as AMOCs for this AD.

#### (n) Related Information

(1) For more information about this AD, contact Narinder Luthra, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM-120S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6513; fax: 425-917-6590; email: [narinder.luthra@faa.gov](mailto:narinder.luthra@faa.gov).

(2) Service information identified in this AD that is not incorporated by reference may be obtained at the addresses specified in paragraphs (o)(5) and (o)(6) of this AD.

#### (o) Material Incorporated by Reference

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(3) The following service information was approved for IBR on September 19, 2014.

(i) Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-78-0061, Revision 1, dated August 28, 2007.

(ii) Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-78-0064, Revision 2, dated June 14, 2012.

(4) The following service information was approved for IBR on January 11, 2007 (71 FR 77586, December 27, 2006).

(i) Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 777-78-0061, dated July 6, 2006.

(ii) Reserved.

(5) For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; Internet <https://www.myboeingfleet.com>.

(6) You may view this service information at FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221.

(7) You may view this service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html>.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 23, 2014.

**John P. Piccola,**

*Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 2014-18313 Filed 8-14-14; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2014-0219; Directorate Identifier 2014-NE-04-AD; Amendment 39-17939; AD 2014-16-15]

RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Turboshaft Engines

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Turbomeca S.A. Makila 2A and Makila 2A1 turboshaft engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections, and replacement of the splines of the high-pressure (HP) fuel pump/metering valve and the module M01 drive gear, if necessary. This AD was prompted by the failure of two HP fuel pumps that resulted in engine in-flight shutdowns. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the HP fuel pump, which could lead to an in-flight shutdown, damage to the engine, and forced landing or accident.

**DATES:** This AD becomes effective September 19, 2014.

**ADDRESSES:** For service information identified in this AD, contact Turbomeca, S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; phone: 33 (0)5 59 74 40 00; telex: 570 042; fax: 33 (0)5 59 74 45 15. You may view this service information at the FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 781-238-7125.

#### Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-0219; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI), the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is Document Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:**

Katheryn Malatek, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; phone: 781-238-7747; fax: 781-238-7199; email: [Katheryn.malatek@faa.gov](mailto:Katheryn.malatek@faa.gov).

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:****Discussion**

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to the specified products. The NPRM was published in the **Federal Register** on May 12, 2014 (79 FR 26905). The NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

Two uncommanded in-flight shutdowns on Makila 2A/2A1 engines have been reported. The results of the technical investigations concluded that these events were caused by deterioration of the splines on the high-pressure (HP) fuel pump drive link, which eventually interrupted the fuel supply to the engine.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to further cases of uncommanded engine in-flight shutdown, and may ultimately lead to an emergency landing.

**Comments**

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. We received no comments on the NPRM (79 FR 26905, May 12, 2014).

**Conclusion**

We reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this AD as proposed.

**Costs of Compliance**

We estimate that this AD affects 8 engines installed on helicopters of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it will take about 2 hours per engine to comply with this AD. The average labor rate is \$85 per hour. Required parts cost about \$750 per engine. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD on U.S. operators to be \$1,360.

**Authority for This Rulemaking**

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

**Regulatory Findings**

We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:

- (1) Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866,
- (2) Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
- (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska to the extent that it justifies making a regulatory distinction, and
- (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

**List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39**

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

**Adoption of the Amendment**

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

**PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES**

- 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

**§ 39.13 [Amended]**

- 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

**2014-16-15 Turbomeca S.A.:** Amendment 39-17939; Docket No. FAA-2014-0219; Directorate Identifier 2014-NE-04-AD.

**(a) Effective Date**

This AD becomes effective September 19, 2014.

**(b) Affected ADs**

None.

**(c) Applicability**

This AD applies to Turbomeca S.A. Makila 2A and Makila 2A1 turboshaft engines with a high-pressure (HP) fuel pump, part number (P/N) 0 298 91 806 0 or P/N 0 298 91 805 0, installed, that have not incorporated Turbomeca modification TU 59.

**(d) Reason**

This AD was prompted by the failure of two HP fuel pumps that resulted in engine in-flight shutdowns. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the HP fuel pump, which could lead to an in-flight shutdown, damage to the engine, and forced landing or accident.

**(e) Actions and Compliance**

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

(1) Within 25 flight hours (FHs) or 6 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs earlier, clean and visually inspect the splines of the HP fuel pump/metering valve and the module M01 drive gear for wear, corrosion, scaling, pitting, and chafing.

(2) Thereafter, reinspect every 100 FHs since-last-inspection.

(3) If the HP fuel pump/metering valve or the module M01 drive gear fails the inspection required by this AD, replace it with a part eligible for installation before further flight.

(4) After the effective date of this AD, do not install any HP fuel pump, HP fuel pump drive shaft, module M01 drive gear, or module M01 77-tooth gear onto any engine, or install any engine onto any helicopter, unless the HP fuel pump/metering valve and the module M01 drive gear passed the inspection required by paragraph (e) of this AD.

**(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)**

The Manager, Engine Certification Office, FAA, may approve AMOCs to this AD. Use the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19 to make your request.

**(g) Related Information**

(1) For more information about this AD, contact Katheryn Malatek, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; phone: 781-238-7747; fax: 781-238-7199; email: [Katheryn.malatek@faa.gov](mailto:Katheryn.malatek@faa.gov).

(2) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2014-0059, dated March 10, 2014, and EASA AD 2014-0059R1, dated April 15, 2014, for more information. You may examine the MCAs in the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov/> [#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2014-0219-0003](#).

(3) Turbomeca S.A. Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 298 73 2818, Version F, dated March 5, 2014, which is not incorporated by reference in this AD, can be obtained from Turbomeca S.A., using the contact information in paragraph (g)(4) of this AD.

(4) For service information identified in this AD, contact Turbomeca, S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; phone: 33 (0)5 59 74 40 00; telex: 570 042; fax: 33 (0)5 59 74 45 15.

(5) You may view this service information at the FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 781-238-7125.

**(h) Material Incorporated by Reference**

None.

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on August 6, 2014.

**Colleen M. D'Alessandro,**

*Assistant Directorate Manager, Engine & Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 2014-19228 Filed 8-14-14; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

**Federal Aviation Administration**

**14 CFR Part 39**

[Docket No. FAA-2013-1068; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-196-AD; Amendment 39-17923; AD 2014-15-20]

**RIN 2120-AA64**

**Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier, Inc. Airplanes**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

**ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of failure of the high pressure shutoff valves (HPSOVs) causing the timer and monitor unit (TMU) to become inoperative since the HPSOV and the TMU are on the same circuit breaker. This AD requires a wiring modification to segregate the HPSOV power supply from the TMU. We are issuing this AD to prevent an inoperative TMU, which could result in the loss of the automatic de-icing mode, and lead to an increased workload for the flight crew and loss of control of the airplane.

**DATES:** This AD becomes effective September 19, 2014.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of September 19, 2014.

**ADDRESSES:** You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov/>; or in person at the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room

W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC.

For service information identified in this AD, contact Bombardier, Inc., Q-Series Technical Help Desk, 123 Garratt Boulevard, Toronto, Ontario M3K 1Y5, Canada; telephone 416-375-4000; fax 416-375-4539; email [thd.qseries@aero.bombardier.com](mailto:thd.qseries@aero.bombardier.com); Internet <http://www.bombardier.com>. You may view this referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:**

Cesar Gomez, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe and Mechanical Systems Branch, ANE-171, FAA, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone 516-228-7318; fax 516-794-5531.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

**Discussion**

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. The NPRM published in the **Federal Register** on January 2, 2014 (79 FR 76). Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), which is the aviation authority for Canada, has issued Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-2013-27, dated September 25, 2013 (referred to after this as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

There have been several in-service reports of the failure of high pressure shutoff valves (HPSOV) causing the Timer and Monitor Unit (TMU) to become inoperative since the HPSOV and TMU are on the same circuit breaker.

An inoperative TMU would result in the loss of the automatic de-icing mode and would lead to an increased workload for the flightcrew. In the case where additional failures occur during a critical flight phase, the significantly increased workload could lead to loss of control of the aeroplane.

This [Canadian] AD mandates a wiring modification to segregate the HPSOV power supply from the TMU.

You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov/>; #!documentDetail;D=FAA-2013-1068-0002.

**Comments**

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. The following presents the comment

received on the NPRM (79 FR 76, January 2, 2014) and the FAA's response to the comment.

**Request To Use the Latest Service Information**

Horizon Air requested that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 76, January 2, 2014) to allow compliance for Bombardier Service Bulletin 84-36-04, Revision B, dated January 2, 2014, or Bombardier Service Bulletin 84-36-04, Revision A, dated April 17, 2013.

We agree with the commenter's request to reference the latest service information. We have revised this AD by referencing Bombardier Service Bulletin 84-36-04, Revision B, dated January 2, 2014, throughout this AD. We have also revised paragraph (h) of this AD to give credit for actions done before the effective date of this AD in accordance with Bombardier Service Bulletin 84-36-04, Revision A, dated April 17, 2013, as well as Bombardier Service Bulletin 84-36-04, dated March 13, 2013.

**“Contacting the Manufacturer” Paragraph in This AD**

Since late 2006, we have included a standard paragraph titled “Airworthy Product” in all MCAI ADs in which the FAA develops an AD based on a foreign authority's AD.

The MCAI or referenced service information in an FAA AD often directs the owner/operator to contact the manufacturer for corrective actions, such as a repair. Briefly, the Airworthy Product paragraph allowed owners/operators to use corrective actions provided by the manufacturer if those actions were FAA-approved. In addition, the paragraph stated that any actions approved by the State of Design Authority (or its delegated agent) are considered to be FAA-approved.

In the NPRM (79 FR 76, January 2, 2014), we proposed to prevent the use of repairs that were not specifically developed to correct the unsafe condition, by requiring that the repair approval provided by the State of Design Authority or its delegated agent specifically refer to this FAA AD. This change was intended to clarify the method of compliance and to provide operators with better visibility of repairs that are specifically developed and approved to correct the unsafe condition. In addition, we proposed to change the phrase “its delegated agent” to include a design approval holder (DAH) with State of Design Authority design organization approval (DOA), as applicable, to refer to a DAH authorized to approve required repairs for the proposed AD.