

# Rotorcraft Flight Manual Supplement (RFMS):

(i) OEI performance information and emergency procedures, providing the maximum weight that will provide a minimum clearance of 15 feet above the surface, following failure of the critical engine in a hover. The maximum weight must be presented as a function of the hover height for the temperature and pressure altitude range requested for certification. The effects of wind must be reflected in the hover performance information.

(ii) Hover OGE performance with the critical engine inoperative for OEI continuous and time-limited power ratings for those weights, altitudes, and temperatures for which certification is requested.

**Note:** These OEI performance requirements do not replace performance requirements that may be needed to comply with the airworthiness or operational standards (14 CFR 29.865 or 14 CFR part 133) for external loads or human external cargo.

## (f) RFMS.

(1) The RFMS must contain, at a minimum:

(i) Limitations necessary for safe operation of the SAR system to include:

(A) Minimum crew requirements.

(B) Maximum SAR weight.

(C) Engagement criteria for each of the SAR modes to include MUH (as determined in paragraph (c)(3)).

(ii) Normal and emergency procedures for operation of the SAR system (to include operation of the hoist operator control), with AFCS failure modes, AFCS degraded modes, and engine failures.

(iii) Performance information:

(A) OEI performance and height-loss.

(B) Hover OGE performance information, utilizing OEI continuous and time-limited power ratings.

(C) The maximum wind envelope demonstrated in flight test.

(g) *Flight Demonstration*.

(1) Before approval of the SAR system, an acceptable flight demonstration of all the coupled SAR modes is required.

(2) The AFCS must provide fail-safe operations during coupled maneuvers. The demonstration of fail-safe operations must include a pilot workload assessment associated with manually flying the aircraft to an altitude greater than 200 feet above the surface and an airspeed of at least the best rate of climb airspeed ( $V_y$ ).

(3) For any failure condition of the SAR system not shown to be extremely improbable, the pilot must be able to make a smooth transition from one flight mode to another without

exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength.

(4) Failure conditions that are not shown to be extremely improbable must be demonstrated by analysis, ground testing, or flight testing. For failures demonstrated in flight, the following normal pilot recovery times are acceptable:

(i) *Transition modes (Cruise-to-Hover/ Hover-to-Cruise) and Hover modes:* Normal pilot recognition plus 1 second.

(ii) *Cruise modes:* Normal pilot recognition plus 3 seconds.

(5) All AFCS malfunctions must include evaluation at the low-speed and high-power flight conditions typical of SAR operations. Additionally, AFCS hard-over, slow-over, and oscillatory malfunctions, particularly in yaw, require evaluation. AFCS malfunction testing must include a single or a combination of failures (e.g., erroneous data from and loss of the radio altimeter, attitude, heading, and altitude sensors) that are not shown to be extremely improbable.

(6) The flight demonstration must include the following environmental conditions:

(i) Swell into wind.

(ii) Swell and wind from different directions.

(iii) Cross swell.

(iv) Swell of different lengths (short and long swell).

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on July 18, 2012.

**Kimberly K. Smith,**

*Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

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## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

**[Docket No. FAA-2012-0675; Directorate Identifier 2012-NM-120-AD; Amendment 39-17131; AD 2012-13-51]**

**RIN 2120-AA64**

### Airworthiness Directives; Gulfstream Aerospace LP (Type Certificate Previously Held by Israel Aircraft Industries, Ltd.) Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule; request for comments.

**SUMMARY:** We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Gulfstream Aerospace LP (Type

Certificate previously held by Israel Aircraft Industries, Ltd.) Model Gulfstream G150 airplanes. This emergency AD was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. This AD requires a one-time detailed or borescope inspection of the left- and right-hand inboard vent holes for debris or obstructions, and repair if necessary. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that an inboard vent tube hole was completely covered with sealant, which blocked airflow through the vent. Under these conditions, the rise of internal pressure during pressure fueling or due to thermal expansion is sufficient to damage the wing. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct compromised integrity of the wing structure.

**DATES:** This AD is effective August 13, 2012 to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by emergency AD 2012-13-51, issued on June 26, 2012, which contained the requirements of this amendment.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication identified in the AD as of August 13, 2012.

We must receive comments on this AD by September 10, 2012.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:

• **Federal eRulemaking Portal:** Go to <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

• **Fax:** 202-493-2251.

• **Mail:** U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

• **Hand Delivery:** Deliver to Mail address above between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

For service information identified in this AD, contact Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation, P.O. Box 2206, Mail Station D-25, Savannah, Georgia 31402-2206; telephone 800-810-4853; fax 912-965-3520; email [pubs@gulfstream.com](mailto:pubs@gulfstream.com); Internet [http://www.gulfstream.com/product\\_support/technical\\_pubs/pubs/index.htm](http://www.gulfstream.com/product_support/technical_pubs/pubs/index.htm).

### Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov>; or in person at the Docket Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory

evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Tom Groves, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; phone: 425-227-1503; fax: 425-227-1149; email: [tom.groves@faa.gov](mailto:tom.groves@faa.gov).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

On June 26, 2012, we issued emergency AD 2012-13-51, which requires a one-time detailed or borescope inspection of the left- and right-hand inboard vent holes for debris or obstructions, and repair if necessary. Emergency AD 2012-13-51 also requires reporting positive inspection findings to the manufacturer. This action was prompted by a report from the Civil Aviation Authority of Israel (CAAI), which is the airworthiness authority for Israel, indicating that an unsafe condition may exist on Gulfstream Aerospace LP Model Gulfstream G150 airplanes. The CAAI advises that fasteners protruding from the lower wing surface were discovered during a post-flight inspection. Investigation revealed structural damage to (and separation of) ribs from wing planks.

Further inspection showed that the inboard vent tube hole was completely covered with sealant, which blocked airflow through the vent. This condition was also found on some airplanes in production. Under these conditions, the rise of internal pressure during pressure fueling or due to thermal expansion is sufficient to damage the wing. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could compromise the integrity of the wing structure.

Relevant Service Information

Gulfstream Aerospace LP has issued Gulfstream G150 Alert Service Bulletin 150-28A-146, dated June 22, 2012. The service information describes procedures for a one-time detailed or borescope inspection of the left- and right-hand inboard vent holes for debris and obstructions. The service

information specifies to contact the manufacturer if any debris or obstruction is found. The CAAI mandated this service bulletin and issued Emergency Airworthiness Directive 28-12-06-18, dated June 24, 2012 (referred to after this as “the MCAI”), to ensure the continued airworthiness of these airplanes in Israel.

FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

Since the unsafe condition described is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of the same type design, we issued emergency AD 2012-13-51 to detect and correct compromised integrity of the wing structure. The AD requires a one-time detailed or borescope inspection of the left- and right-hand inboard vent holes for debris or obstructions, and repair if necessary. The AD also requires reporting positive inspection findings to the manufacturer.

We found that immediate corrective action was required; therefore, notice and opportunity for prior public comment thereon were impracticable and contrary to the public interest, and good cause existed to make the AD effective immediately by individual notices issued on June 26, 2012, to all known U.S. owners and operators of Gulfstream Aerospace LP (Type Certificate previously held by Israel Aircraft Industries, Ltd.) Model Gulfstream G150 airplanes. These conditions still exist, and the AD is hereby published in the **Federal Register** as an amendment to section 39.13 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39.13) to make it effective to all persons.

Interim Action

We consider this AD interim action. We may consider further rulemaking

when additional information is available.

FAA’s Determination of the Effective Date

An unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD. The FAA has found that the risk to the flying public justifies waiving notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule because we received a report indicating that an inboard vent tube hole was completely covered with sealant, which blocked airflow through the vent. Under these conditions, the rise of internal pressure during pressure fueling or due to thermal expansion is sufficient to damage the wing. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct compromised integrity of the wing structure. Therefore, we find that notice and opportunity for prior public comment are impracticable and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.

Comments Invited

This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety and was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment. However, we invite you to send any written data, views, or arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include the docket number FAA-2012-0675 and Directorate Identifier 2012-NM-120-AD at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this AD because of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://www.regulations.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this AD.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this AD affects 58 airplanes of U.S. registry.

We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:

ESTIMATED COSTS				
Action	Labor cost	Parts cost	Cost per product	Cost on U.S. operators
Inspection .....	Up to 18 work-hours × \$85 per hour = up to \$1,530 .....	\$0	Up to \$1,530 .....	Up to \$88,740.

We have received no definitive data that would enable us to provide cost estimates for the on-condition actions specified in this AD.

#### Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: "General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

#### Regulatory Findings

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

- (1) Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866,
- (2) Is not a "significant rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
- (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
- (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

#### Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

### PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

- 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

#### § 39.13 [Amended]

- 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

**2012–13–51 Gulfstream Aerospace LP (Type Certificate Previously Held by Israel Aircraft Industries, Ltd.):** Amendment 39–17131; Docket No. FAA–2012–0675; Directorate Identifier 2012–NM–120–AD.

#### (a) Effective Date

This AD is effective August 13, 2012 to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by emergency AD 2012–13–51, issued on June 26, 2012, which contained the requirements of this amendment.

#### (b) Affected ADs

None.

#### (c) Applicability

This AD applies to Gulfstream Aerospace LP (Type Certificate previously held by Israel Aircraft Industries, Ltd.) Model Gulfstream G150 airplanes, certificated in any category, serial numbers 201 through 290 inclusive.

#### (d) Subject

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel.

#### (e) Unsafe Condition

This AD was prompted by a report indicating that an inboard vent tube hole was completely covered with sealant, which blocked airflow through the vent. Under these conditions, the rise of internal pressure during pressure fueling or due to thermal expansion is sufficient to damage the wing. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct compromised integrity of the wing structure.

#### (f) Compliance

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

#### (g) Inspection and Repair

Before further flight: Do a one-time detailed or borescope inspection of the left and right-hand inboard vent holes for debris and obstructions, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Gulfstream G150 Alert Service Bulletin 150–28A–146, dated June 22, 2012. If any debris or obstruction is found, before further flight, repair in accordance with a method approved by either the Manager, International Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA; or the Civil Aviation Authority of Israel (CAAI) (or its delegated agent).

#### (h) Reporting Requirement

- (1) Submit a report of positive findings of the inspection required by paragraph (g) of

this AD to Gulfstream Aerospace CMP, fax 800–944–1775 or 912–963–0265, at the applicable time specified in paragraph (h)(1)(i) or (h)(1)(ii) of this AD. The report must include the inspection date and results, a description of any finding, the airplane serial number, and the number of flight hours and landings on the airplane.

(i) If the inspection was done on or after the effective date of this AD: Submit the report within 10 days after the inspection.

(ii) If the inspection was done before the effective date of this AD: Submit the report within 10 days after the effective date of this AD.

(2) A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid OMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2120–0056. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated to be approximately 5 minutes per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, completing and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Comments concerning the accuracy of this burden and suggestions for reducing the burden should be directed to the FAA at: 800 Independence Ave. SW., Washington, DC 20591, Attn: Information Collection Clearance Officer, AES–200.

#### (i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, International Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the International Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in the Related Information section of this AD. Information may be emailed to: [9-ANM-116-AMOC-REQUESTS@faa.gov](mailto:9-ANM-116-AMOC-REQUESTS@faa.gov).

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding district office. The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.

#### (j) Special Flight Permit

Special flight permits, as described in Section 21.197 and Section 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199), are allowed provided the criteria in this paragraph are met. A general visual inspection must be done to detect fuel leaks, skin distortion, protruding fasteners, and loose fasteners of the left- and right-hand lower wing skins. A special flight permit is not allowed if there is any finding from the inspection. If there are no findings from the inspection, a special flight permit is allowed, provided the total wing tank fuel quantity of

the airplane (i.e., total of both wing tanks) is limited to 3,500 pounds or less.

#### (k) Related Information

(1) For further information about this AD, contact Tom Groves, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; phone: 425-227-1503; fax: 425-227-1149; email: [tom.groves@faa.gov](mailto:tom.groves@faa.gov).

(2) Refer to MCAI Israeli Emergency Airworthiness Directive 28-12-06-18, dated June 24, 2012; and Gulfstream G150 Alert Service Bulletin 150-28A-146, dated June 22, 2012; for related information.

#### (l) Material Incorporated by Reference

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(i) Gulfstream G150 Alert Service Bulletin 150-28A-146, dated June 22, 2012.

(ii) Reserved.

(3) For service information identified in this AD, contact Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation, P.O. Box 2206, Mail Station D-25, Savannah, Georgia 31402-2206; telephone 800-810-4853; fax 912-965-3520; email [pubs@gulfstream.com](mailto:pubs@gulfstream.com); Internet [http://www.gulfstream.com/product\\_support/technical\\_pubs/pubs/index.htm](http://www.gulfstream.com/product_support/technical_pubs/pubs/index.htm).

(4) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221.

(5) You may also review copies of the service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at an NARA facility, call 202-741-6030, or go to [http://www.archives.gov/federal\\_register/code\\_of\\_federal\\_regulations/ibr\\_locations.html](http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html).

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 13, 2012.

**Michael Kaszycki,**

*Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 2012-17955 Filed 7-26-12; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2012-0356; Directorate Identifier 2011-SW-067-AD; Amendment 39-17128; AD 2012-14-14]

**RIN 2120-AA64**

#### Airworthiness Directives; Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH Helicopters

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH (ECD) MBB-BK 117 A-3, MBB-BK 117 A-4, MBB-BK B-1, MBB-BK 117 B-2, and MBB-BK C-1 helicopters equipped with a certain external-hoist system (hoist system). This AD requires deactivating the entire hoist system or deactivating the hoist system cable cutter function on the hoist system operator control handle (operator handle). This AD was prompted by an uncommanded activation of the hoist cable cutter function on an MBB-BK117 C-1 helicopter. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent uncommanded cutting of the hoist cable and subsequent injury to persons being lifted by the hoist.

**DATES:** This AD is effective August 31, 2012.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain documents listed in this AD as of August 31, 2012.

**ADDRESSES:** For service information identified in this AD, contact American Eurocopter Corporation, 2701 N. Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052, telephone (972) 641-0000 or (800) 232-0323, fax (972) 641-3775, or at <http://www.eurocopter.com/techpub>.

You may review the referenced service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas 76137.

#### Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov> or in person at the Docket Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, any incorporated-by-reference service information, the economic evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the

Docket Operations Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations Office, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

#### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

George Schwab, Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety Management Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, TX 76137; telephone (817) 222-5110; email [george.schwab@faa.gov](mailto:george.schwab@faa.gov).

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

##### Discussion

On April 4, 2012, at 77 FR 20321, the **Federal Register** published our notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), which proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to ECD Model MBB-BK 117 A-3, MBB-BK 117 A-4, MBB-BK B-1, MBB-BK 117 B-2, and MBB-BK C-1 helicopters equipped with a certain hoist system. That NPRM proposed to require deactivating the entire hoist system or deactivating the hoist system cable cutter function on the operator handle. The proposed requirements were intended to prevent uncommanded cutting of the hoist cable and subsequent injury to persons being lifted by the hoist.

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has issued EASA AD No. 2011-0126, dated July 1, 2011 (EASA AD 2011-0126), to correct an unsafe condition for the ECD Model MBB-BK 117 A-3, MBB-BK 117 A-4, MBB-BK B-1, MBB-BK 117 B-2, and MBB-BK C-1 helicopters equipped with a certain hoist system. EASA AD 2011-0126 requires deactivation of the affected external hoist system by pulling and securing the related circuit breakers, or by removing the hoist boom.

After EASA AD 2011-0126 was issued, it was discovered that pulling the circuit breaker WARN ANN II degraded the annunciator system's redundant power supply, so that pilots could not be warned of a second helicopter system failure. Prompted by these findings, EASA issued superseding EASA AD No. 2011-0131, dated July 8, 2011 (EASA AD 2011-0131), to require pulling only three circuit breakers (CABLE CUTTER, WINCH CONT, and WINCH BOOM), while circuit breaker WARN ANN II remains inserted.

EASA advises that since EASA AD 2011-0131 was issued "a corrective action has been developed to establish an adequate safety level, while a terminating action is under