

| Date                     | Document                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | ADAMS Accession Number/<br>Federal Register Citation |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| March 23, 2011 .....     | Memorandum from Chairman Jaczko on Tasking Memorandum-COMGBJ-11-0002—NRC Actions Following the Events in Japan.                                                                                                                                                   | ML110950110                                          |
| April 29, 2011 .....     | Temporary Instruction 2515/184, Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs).                                                                                                                                           | ML11115A053                                          |
| May 26, 2011 .....       | Completion of Temporary Instruction 2515/184, Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines (SAMGs), at Region IV Reactor Facilities.                                                                                            | ML111470264                                          |
| May 27, 2011 .....       | Region I Completion of Temporary Instruction (TI)-184, Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines (SAMGs).                                                                                                                    | ML111470361                                          |
| June 1, 2011 .....       | Completion of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/184, Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) at Region III Sites—Revision.                                                                                           | ML111520396                                          |
| June 2, 2011 .....       | Completion of Temporary Instruction (TI) 184, Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines (SAMGs) at Region II Facilities—Revision.                                                                                            | ML111530328                                          |
| July 12, 2011 .....      | SECY-11-0093—"The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident".                                                                                                                                                                  | ML11186A959<br>ML111861807<br>(Enclosure)            |
| August 19, 2011 .....    | SRM-SECY-11-0093—Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan.                                                                                                                                                           | ML112310021                                          |
| September 9, 2011 .....  | SECY-11-0124, "Recommended Actions to be Taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report."                                                                                                                                                               | ML11245A127<br>ML11245A144<br>(Enclosure)            |
| October 3, 2011 .....    | SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned."                                                                                                                                                       | ML11269A204<br>ML11272A203<br>(Enclosure)            |
| October 18, 2011 .....   | Staff Requirements Memorandum—SECY-11-0124—Recommended Actions to be Taken Without Delay From The Near-Term Task Force Report.                                                                                                                                    | ML112911571                                          |
| July 26, 2011 .....      | NRDC's Petition for Rulemaking to Require More Realistic Training on Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines (PRM 50-102).                                                                                                                                          | ML11216A242                                          |
| September 14, 2011 ..... | Letter to Geoffrey H. Fettus, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. from Annette Vietti-Cook, In Regards to the NRC Will Not Be Instituting a Public Comment Period for PRM-50-97, PRM-50-98, PRM-50-99, PRM-50-100, PRM-50-101, and PRM-50-102.                | ML112700269                                          |
| October 13, 2011 .....   | Initial ACRS Review of: (1) The NRC Near-Term Task Force Report on Fukushima and (2) Staff's Recommended Actions to be Taken Without Delay.                                                                                                                       | ML11284A136                                          |
| November 30, 2011 .....  | INPO-11-005, Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station.                                                                                                                                                              | ML11347A454                                          |
| December 15, 2011 .....  | Staff Requirements Memorandum—SECY-11-0137—Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to the Fukushima Lessons-Learned.                                                                                                                        | ML113490055                                          |
| March 14, 2012 .....     | Summary of the Public Meeting to Discuss Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 8, Strengthening and Integration of Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities Such As EOPS, SAMGS, and EDMGS, Related to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Power Plant Accident. | ML12073A283                                          |

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of April 2012.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**Michael F. Weber,**

*Acting Executive Director for Operations.*

[FR Doc. 2012-9336 Filed 4-17-12; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 7590-01-P**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

**[Docket No. FAA-2012-0413; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-257-AD]**

**RIN 2120-AA64**

#### **Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, DC-10-15, DC-10-30, DC-10-

30F (KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, DC-10-40F, MD-10-10F, MD-10-30F, MD-11, and MD-11F airplanes. This proposed AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. This proposed AD would require adding design features to detect electrical faults, to detect a pump running in an empty fuel tank, and to ensure that a fuel pump's operation is not affected by certain conditions. We are proposing this AD to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by June 4, 2012.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:

- *Federal eRulemaking Portal:* Go to <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
- *Fax:* 202-493-2251.
- *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
- *Hand Delivery:* Deliver to Mail address above between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

#### Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov>; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Serj Harutunian, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; phone: 562-627-5254; fax: 562-627-5210; email: [serj.harutunian@faa.gov](mailto:serj.harutunian@faa.gov).

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

##### Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposal. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include "Docket No. FAA-2012-0413; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-257-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD because of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://www.regulations.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We

will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

#### Discussion

The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a regulation titled "Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements" (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 ("SFAR 88," Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).

Among other actions, SFAR 88 (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001) requires certain type design (i.e., type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.

In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address the failure types under evaluation: single failures, single failures in combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for further action.

We have determined that the actions identified in this proposed AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

A fuel pump may cause an ignition source in a fuel tank when it has internal electrical faults, or when the pump overheats due to prolonged dry running in an empty fuel tank. Electrical faults inside fuel pumps may cause arcing and burn through the pump housing into an empty fuel tank. If a pump is not shut off in a timely manner when the tank is emptied, the dry-running pump may cause excessive heat and become an ignition source inside the tank.

#### FAA's Determination

We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design.

#### Proposed AD Requirements

This proposed AD would prohibit operation of an affected airplane as of 60 months after the effective date of the AD, unless the following design features and requirements have been approved by the FAA and installed on the airplane.

- A protective device for each electrically powered fuel pump that will detect electrical faults and shut off the pump automatically when such faults are detected.
- Additional design features that will detect any fuel pump running in an empty fuel tank, notify the flight crew, and automatically shut off each pump within a specified time if not manually shut off by the flight crew.
- Revisions of the airplane flight manual to include procedures for manual pump shutoff.
- Means to ensure the detection of a fuel pump running in an empty tank that has previously been shut off.

#### Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this proposed AD affects 180 airplanes of U.S. registry. We estimate the following costs to comply with this proposed AD, based on the costs of similar STC installations:

## ESTIMATED COSTS

| Action                           | Labor cost                                    | Parts cost | Cost per product | Cost on U.S. operators |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------|------------------|------------------------|
| Installing design features ..... | 65 work-hours × \$85 per hour = \$5,525 ..... | \$55,000   | \$60,525         | \$10,894,500           |

**Authority for This Rulemaking**

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: "General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

**Regulatory Findings**

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

*For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:*

(1) Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866,

(2) Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and

(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

**List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39**

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

**The Proposed Amendment**

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator,

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

**PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES**

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

**§ 39.13 [Amended]**

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

**The Boeing Company:** Docket No. FAA–2012–0413; Directorate Identifier 2011–NM–257–AD.

**(a) Comments Due Date**

We must receive comments by June 4, 2012.

**(b) Affected ADs**

None.

**(c) Applicability**

This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model DC–10–10, DC–10–10F, DC–10–15, DC–10–30, DC–10–30F (KC–10A and KDC–10), DC–10–40, DC–10–40F, MD–10–10F, MD–10–30F, MD–11, and MD–11F airplanes; certificated in any category.

**(d) Subject**

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28, Fuel.

**(e) Unsafe Condition**

This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

**(f) Compliance**

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

**(g) Criteria for Operation**

As of 60 months after the effective date of this AD, no person may operate any airplane affected by this AD unless an amended type certificate or supplemental type certificate that incorporates the design features and requirements described in paragraphs (g)(1) through (g)(4) of this AD has been approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, and those design features are installed on the airplane to meet the criteria specified in 14 CFR Section 25.981(a) and (d), at amendment level 25–125.

(1) For all airplanes: Each electrically powered fuel pump installed in any fuel tank that normally empties during flight—such as center wing tanks, auxiliary fuel tanks, and tail tanks—must have a protective device installed to detect electrical faults that can cause arcing and burn through of the fuel pump housing and pump electrical connector. The same device must shut off the pump by automatically removing electrical power from the pump when such faults are detected. When a fuel pump is shut off resulting from detection of an electrical fault, the device must stay latched off, until the fault is cleared through maintenance action and the pump is verified safe for operation.

(2) For airplanes with a 2-person flight crew: Additional design features, if not originally installed by the airplane manufacturer, must be installed to meet 3 criteria: to detect a running fuel pump in a tank that is normally emptied during flight, to provide an indication to the flight crew that the tank is empty, and to automatically shut off that fuel pump. The prospective pump indication and shutoff system must automatically shut off each pump in case the flight crew does not shut off a pump running dry in an empty tank within 60 seconds after each fuel tank is emptied. The airplane flight manual supplement (AFMS) must be revised to include flight crew manual pump shutoff procedures in the Normal Operating Procedures section of the AFMS.

(3) For airplanes with a 3-person flight crew: Additional design features, if not originally installed by the airplane manufacturer, must be installed to detect when a fuel pump in a tank that is normally emptied during flight is running in an empty fuel tank, and provide an indication to the flight crew that the tank is empty. The flight engineer must manually shut off each pump running dry in an empty tank within 60 seconds after the tank is emptied. The Limitations section of the AFMS must be revised to specify that this pump shutoff must be done by the flight engineer.

(4) For all airplanes: The empty-tank shutoff system design must preclude the undetected running of a fuel pump in an empty tank after the pump is commanded off automatically or manually.

**(h) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)**

(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the attention of the person identified in the Related Information section of this AD.

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding district office.

#### (i) Related Information

For more information about this AD, contact Serj Harutunian, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles ACO, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; phone: 562-627-5254; fax: 562-627-5210; email: [serj.harutunian@faa.gov](mailto:serj.harutunian@faa.gov).

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 6, 2012.

**Ali Bahrami,**

*Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,  
Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 2012-09267 Filed 4-17-12; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2012-0335; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-252-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier, Inc. Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** We propose to revise an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes; all Model CL-600-2C10 (Regional Jet Series 700, 701, & 702) airplanes; all Model CL-600-2D15 (Regional Jet Series 705) airplanes; and all Model CL-600-2D24 (Regional Jet Series 900) airplanes. The existing AD currently requires replacing certain water accumulator assemblies having a certain part installed on the pitot and static lines of the air data computer (ADC). Since we issued that AD, an error was discovered in one service document number, and we have determined that credit for accomplishing actions in another erroneously cited service document should be removed from that AD. This proposed AD would correct the erroneous service document number and remove the other erroneously cited service document from that AD. We are proposing this AD to prevent pitot-static tubing from becoming partially or completely blocked by water, which could result in erroneous airspeed and

altitude indications and consequent loss of control of the airplane.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by June 4, 2012.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- **Federal eRulemaking Portal:** Go to <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
  - **Fax:** (202) 493-2251.
  - **Mail:** U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
  - **Hand Delivery:** U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
- For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact Bombardier, Inc., 400 Côte-Vertu Road West, Dorval, Québec H4S 1Y9, Canada; phone: 514-855-5000; fax: 514-855-7401; email: [thd.crj@aero.bombardier.com](mailto:thd.crj@aero.bombardier.com); Internet: <http://www.bombardier.com>. You may review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221.

#### Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov>; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

#### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Cesar Gomez, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe & Mechanical Systems Branch, ANE-171, New York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 11590; telephone (516) 228-7318; fax (516) 794-5531.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

##### Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include "Docket No.

FAA-2012-0335; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-252-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://www.regulations.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

#### Discussion

On September 28, 2011, we issued AD 2011-21-07, Amendment 39-16830 (76 FR 64801, October 19, 2011). That AD required actions intended to address an unsafe condition on the products listed above.

Since we issued AD 2011-21-07, Amendment 39-16830 (76 FR 64801, October 19, 2011), an error was discovered in the document number specified in paragraph (i), "Credit for Actions Accomplished in Accordance with Previous Service Information," of that AD. The citation in that paragraph should have read "Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-34-147, Revision A, dated November 3, 2009." Additionally, we have determined that "Bombardier Service Bulletin 670BA-34-147, dated April 1, 2009," was incorrectly included in AD 2011-21-07 and should be removed from paragraph (i), "Credit for Actions Accomplished in Accordance with Previous Service Information," of that AD.

#### FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

#### Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this proposed AD affects 1,041 airplanes of U.S. registry.

We estimate the following costs to comply with this proposed AD: