

paragraph 1 or, as an option to a fixed value using laboratory tests, in paragraph 2, as follows:

(1) The applicant may demonstrate that the operation and operational capability of the installed electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions are not adversely affected when the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF environment defined below:

| Frequency | Field strength (volts per meter) | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|---------|
| | Peak | Average |
| 10 kHz–100 kHz | 50 | 50 |
| 100 kHz–500 kHz | 50 | 50 |
| 500 kHz–2 MHz | 50 | 50 |
| 2 MHz–30 MHz | 100 | 100 |
| 30 MHz–70 MHz | 50 | 50 |
| 70 MHz–100 MHz | 50 | 50 |
| 100 MHz–200 MHz | 100 | 100 |
| 200 MHz–400 MHz | 100 | 100 |
| 400 MHz–700 MHz | 700 | 50 |
| 700 MHz–1 GHz | 700 | 100 |
| 1 GHz–2 GHz | 2000 | 200 |
| 2 GHz–4 GHz | 3000 | 200 |
| 4 GHz–6 GHz | 3000 | 200 |
| 6 GHz–8 GHz | 1000 | 200 |
| 8 GHz–12 GHz | 3000 | 300 |
| 12 GHz–18 GHz | 2000 | 200 |
| 18 GHz–40 GHz | 600 | 200 |

The field strengths are expressed in terms of peak root-mean-square (rms) values.

or, (2) The applicant may demonstrate by a system test and analysis that the electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions can withstand a minimum threat of 100 volts per meter, electrical field strength, from 10 kHz to 18 GHz. When using this test to show compliance with the HIRF requirements, no credit is given for signal attenuation due to installation.

A preliminary hazard analysis must be performed by the applicant, for approval by the FAA, to identify either electrical or electronic systems that perform critical functions. The term "critical" means those functions whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane. The systems identified by the hazard analysis that perform critical functions are candidates for the application of HIRF requirements. A system may perform both critical and non-critical functions. Primary electronic flight display systems, and their associated components, perform critical functions such as attitude, altitude, and airspeed indication. The HIRF requirements apply only to critical functions.

Compliance with HIRF requirements may be demonstrated by tests, analysis, models, similarity with existing systems, or any combination of these. Service experience alone is not

acceptable since normal flight operations may not include an exposure to the HIRF environment. Reliance on a system with similar design features for redundancy as a means of protection against the effects of external HIRF is generally insufficient since all elements of a redundant system are likely to be exposed to the fields concurrently.

Applicability

As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to New Piper PA-46-350P and PA-46-500TP model airplanes.

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on one model of airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane.

The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. For this reason, and because a delay would significantly affect the certification of the airplane, which is imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and symbols.

Citation

■ The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113 and 44701; 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.17; and 14 CFR 11.38 and 11.19.

The Special Conditions

■ Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for New Piper PA-46-350P and PA-46-500TP model airplanes modified by installation of the factory optional Avidyne Entegra EFIS system.

1. Protection of Electrical and Electronic Systems From High Intensity

Radiated Fields (HIRF). Each system that performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operations, and operational capabilities of these systems to perform critical functions, are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to high intensity radiated electromagnetic fields external to the airplane.

2. For the purpose of these special conditions, the following definition applies:

Critical Functions: Functions whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on December 23, 2004.

David R. Showers,

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 05-294 Filed 1-6-05; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2001-NM-74-AD; Amendment 39-13861; AD 2004-23-06]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 757-200, -200PF, -200CB, and -300 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; correction.

SUMMARY: This document corrects two typographical errors that appeared in airworthiness directive (AD) 2004-23-06 that was published in the **Federal Register** on November 16, 2004 (69 FR 67047). The errors resulted in an incorrect reference to an amendment number and an incorrect reference to a service bulletin. This AD applies to certain Boeing Model 757-200, -200PF, -200CB, and -300 series airplanes. This AD requires inspection for damage of the W2800 wire bundle insulation, wire conductor, the wire bundle clamp bracket, and the BACC10GU() clamp, and repair or replacement with new or serviceable parts, if necessary. This AD also requires installation of spacers between the clamp and the bracket.

DATES: Effective December 21, 2004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elias Natsiopoulos, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,

Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 917-6478; fax (425) 917-6590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Airworthiness Directive AD 2004-23-06, amendment 39-13861 (69 FR 67047), applicable to certain Boeing Model 757-200, -200PF, -200CB, and -300 series airplanes, was published in the **Federal Register** on November 16, 2004. The AD requires inspection for damage of the W2800 wire bundle insulation, wire conductor, the wire bundle clamp bracket, and the BACC10GU() clamp, and repair or replacement with new or serviceable parts, if necessary. The AD also requires installation of spacers between the clamp and the bracket.

In "PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES" of the regulatory text of AD 2004-23-06, an incorrect citation of the amendment number appears. The reference should read, "2004-23-06 Boeing: Amendment 39-13861." Additionally, as published, the applicability of the regulatory text of the AD specifies: "Applicability: Model 757-200, -200PF, -200CB, as listed in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-27-0089, Revision 1; and Model 757-300 series airplanes, as listed in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-24-0090, Revision 1; both service bulletin revisions dated February 27, 2003; certificated in any category." The correct reference for Model 757-200, -200PF, -200CB airplanes is Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-24-0089, Revision 1, dated February 27, 2003. In all other places, the AD references the correct service bulletin number.

No other parts of the regulatory information have been changed; therefore, the final rule is not republished in the **Federal Register**.

The effective date of this AD remains December 21, 2004.

§ 39.13 [Corrected]

On page 67049, in the first column, reference to "2004-23-06 Boeing: Amendment 39-2004-23-06. Docket 2001-NM-74-AD" is corrected to read as follows:

2004-23-06 Boeing: Amendment 39-13861. Docket 2001-NM-74-AD.

■ On page 67049, in the first column, the "Applicability" paragraph of AD 2004-23-06 is corrected to read as follows:

Applicability: Model 757-200, -200PF, -200CB, as listed in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-24-0089, Revision 1; and Model 757-300 series airplanes, as listed in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-

24-0090, Revision 1; both service bulletin revisions dated February 27, 2003; certificated in any category.

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Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 27, 2004.

Kevin M. Mullin,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 05-285 Filed 1-6-05; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2004-19221; Directorate Identifier 2004-CE-28-AD; Amendment 39-13935; AD 2005-01-11]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. Models PC-12 and PC-12/45 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Models PC-12 and PC-12/45 airplanes. This AD requires you to check the airplane logbook to determine whether any main landing gear (MLG) actuator (part number (P/N) 960.30.01.103) with serial numbers (SNs) 830E through 881E is installed. If any MLG actuator with one of these SNs is installed, you are required to replace the MLG actuator with a P/N 960.30.01.103 actuator that has a SN other than 830E through 881E. The pilot is allowed to do the logbook check. If the pilot can positively determine that no MLG actuator with one of these SNs is installed, then no further action is required. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Switzerland. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the MLG actuator caused by an incorrect heat treating process, which could result in loss of hydraulic extension/retraction of the MLG. This failure could lead to loss of control during ground operations.

DATES: This AD becomes effective on February 22, 2005.

As of February 22, 2005, the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulation.

ADDRESSES: To get the service information identified in this AD,

contact Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., Customer Liaison Manager, CH-6371 Stans, Switzerland; telephone: +41 41 619 6208; facsimile: +41 41 619 7311; e-mail: SupportPC12@pilatus-aircraft.com or from Pilatus Business Aircraft Ltd., Product Support Department, 11755 Airport Way, Broomfield, Colorado 80021; telephone: (303) 465-9099; facsimile: (303) 465-6040. To review this service information, go to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html or call (202) 741-6030.

To view the AD docket, go to the Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, Washington, DC 20590-001 or on the Internet at <http://dms.dot.gov>. The docket number is FAA-2004-19221.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Doug Rudolph, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone: (816) 329-4059; facsimile: (816) 329-4090.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

What events have caused this AD? The Federal Office for Civil Aviation (FOCA), which is the airworthiness authority for Switzerland, recently notified FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on all Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Models PC-12 and PC-12/45 airplanes. The FOCA reports that some components of main landing gear (MLG) actuators (part number (P/N) 960.30.01.103 with serial numbers (SNs) 830E through 881E) were incorrectly heat treated during manufacture. Components in this condition can decrease the specified fatigue life of the actuators.

It is possible that these components could have been removed and then installed in other Pilatus Models PC-12 and PC-12/45 airplanes.

What is the potential impact if FAA took no action? Failure of the MLG actuator could result in loss of hydraulic extension/retraction of the MLG. This failure could lead to loss of control during ground operations.

Has FAA taken any action to this point? We issued a proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an AD that would apply to all Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Models PC-12 and