evidence and cross-examination of witnesses is not obligatory. See Gilbert Ross, M.D., 61 FR 8664 (1996); Philip E. Kirk, M.D., 48 FR 32,887 (1983), aff'd sub nom *Kirk* v. *Mullen,* 749 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1984); *NLRB* v. *International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, AFL–CIO,* 549 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1977).

Accordingly, the Deputy Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, pursuant to the authority vested in him by 21 U.S.C. 823 and 824 and 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.014, hereby orders that DEA Certificate of Registration AJ1551399, issued to Kenneth Leroy Jones, M.D. be, and it hereby is, revoked. The Deputy Administrator further orders that any pending applications for renewal of such registration be, and they hereby are, denied. This order is effective March 6, 2000.

Dated: January 18, 2000.

Donnie R. Marshall,

Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 00–2528 Filed 2–3–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

[Docket No. 99–31]

Richard Eaton Leach, M.D. Revocation of Registration

On August 5, 1999, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) issued an Order to Show Cause to Richard Eaton Leach, M.D. (Respondent) of Lake Charles, Louisiana, notifying him of an opportunity to show cause as to why DEA should not revoke his DEA Certificate of Registration AL8792106, and deny any pending applications for renewal of such registration as a practitioner pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(3). The Order to Show Cause alleged that Respondent is not currently authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Louisiana.

By letter dated August 19, 1999, Respondent filed a request for a hearing, listing a Lake Charles, Louisiana address. The matter was docketed before Administrative Law Judge Gail A. Randall. On September 1, 1999, Judge Randall issued an Order for Prehearing Statements. On September 23, 1999, the Government filed a Motion for Summary Disposition, alleging that Respondent is currently registered with DEA to handle controlled substances in Louisiana, however he is not currently authorized by the State of Louisiana to handle controlled substances. In addition, the Government requested that Judge Randall stay the proceedings pending her ruling on the Government's motion. In an order dated September 24, 1999, Judge Randall stayed the proceedings pending her ruling on the Government's motion and gave the Respondent an opportunity to file a response to the Government's motion.

Both the Order for Prehearing Statements and the September 24, 1999 order were mailed to Respondent at the address listed on his request for a hearing, however according to Judge Randall, both were returned to DEA with the notation ''moved left no address, unable to forward, return to sender.'' Then, according to Judge Randall, the two orders were sent to Respondent's registered location in Jonesville, Louisiana. The Order for Prehearing Statements was returned to DEA with a notation ''return to sender, not at this address,'' and the other order has not been returned.

On October 22, 1999, Judge Randall issued her Opinion and Recommended Decision finding that Respondent has waived his opportunity to reply to the Government's Motion for Summary Disposition. He is no longer receiving mail at his registered address nor at the address listed in his request for a hearing. Further he has failed to inform Judge Randall of any viable address. In her Opinion and Recommended Decision, Judge Randall also found that Respondent lacks authorization to handle controlled substances in the State of Louisiana; granted the Government's Motion for Summary Disposition; and recommended that Respondent's DEA Certificate of Registration be revoked. Neither party filed exceptions to her Opinion and Recommended Decision, and on November 22, 1999, Judge Randall transmitted the record of these proceedings to the Deputy Administrator.

The Deputy Administrator has considered the record in its entirety, and pursuant to 21 CFR 1316.67, hereby issues his final order based upon findings of fact and conclusions of law as hereinafter set forth. This final order replaces and supersedes the final order issued on January 3, 2000. The Deputy Administrator adopts, in full, the Opinion and Recommended Decision of the Administrative Law Judge.

The Deputy Administrator finds based upon the evidence in the record that Respondent's license to practice medicine in Louisiana was indefinitely suspended on February 27, 1998. Additionally, by a letter dated April 20, 1998, Respondent was informed that his state license to possess, distribute, or prescribe controlled substances was suspended due to the loss of his medical license. No evidence was presented by Respondent to dispute that he is not currently authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Louisiana. Therefore, the Deputy Administrator finds that Respondent is not currently authorized to handle controlled substances in Louisiana, the state in which he is registered with DEA.

The DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he conducts his business. See 21 U.S.C. 802(21), 823(f) and 824(a)(3). This prerequisite has been consistently upheld. See Romeo J. Perez, M.D., 62 FR 16,193 (1997); Demetris A. Green, M.D., 61 FR 60,728 (1996); Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51,104 (1993).

Here, it is clear that Respondent is not licensed to handle controlled substances in Louisiana. Since Respondent lacks this state authority, he is not entitled to a DEA registration in that state.

In light of the above, Judge Randall properly granted the Government's Motion for Summary Disposition. The parties did not dispute the fact that Respondent is currently unauthorized to handle controlled substances in Louisiana. Therefore, it is well-settled that when no question of material fact is involved, a plenary, adversary administrative proceeding involving evidence and cross-examination of witnesses is not obligatory. See Philip E. Kirk, M.D. 48 FR 32,887 (1983), aff'd sub nom *Kirk* v. *Mullen,* 749 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1984); *NLRB* v. *International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, AFL–CIO,* 549 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1977).

Accordingly, the Deputy Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, pursuant to the authority vested in him by 21 U.S.C. 823 and 824 and 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104, hereby orders that DEA Certificate of Registration AL8792106, previously issued to Richard Eaton Leach, M.D., be, and it hereby is, revoked. The Deputy Administrator further orders that any pending applications for renewal of such registration be, and they hereby are, denied. This order is effective March 6, 2000, and is the final agency action for appellate purposes pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 877.

Dated: January 18, 2000.

Donnie R. Marshall,

Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 00–2529 Filed 2–4–00; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

[Docket No. 99–33]

Brett L. Lusskin, M.D.; Revocation of Registration

On August 10, 1999, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) issued an Order to Show Cause to Brett L. Lusskin, M.D. (Respondent), of Hallandale, Florida, notifying him of an opportunity to show cause as to why DEA should not revoke his DEA Certificate of Registration AL0133102, and deny any pending applications for renewal of such registration as a practitioner pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(3). The Order to Show Cause alleged that Respondent is not currently authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Florida.

By letter dated September 8, 1999, Respondent, through counsel, filed a request for a hearing, and the matter was docketed before Administrative Law Judge Gail A. Randall. On October 7, 1999, the Government filed a Motion for Summary Disposition, alleging that Respondent is currently registered with DEA to handle controlled substances in Florida, however he is not currently authorized by the State of Florida to handle controlled substances. On November 1, 1999, Respondent filed a response to the Government's motion arguing that Judge Randall does not have sufficient evidence to support the allegation that Respondent lacks authorization to handle controlled substances in Florida.

On November 15, 1999, Judge Randall issued her Opinion and Recommended Decision finding that Respondent lacks authorization to handle controlled substances in the State of Florida; granting the Government's Motion for Summary Disposition; and recommending that Respondent's DEA Certificate of Registration be revoked. Neither party filed exceptions to her Opinion and Recommended Decision, and on December 14, 1999, Judge Randall transmitted the record of these proceedings to the Office of the Deputy Administrator.

The Deputy Administrator has considered the record in its entirety, and pursuant to 21 CFR 1316.67, hereby issues his final order based upon findings of fact and conclusions of law as hereinafter set forth. The Deputy Administrator adopts, in full, the Opinion and Recommended Decision of the Administrative Law Judge.

The Deputy Administrator finds that Respondent currently possesses DEA Certificate of Registration AL0133102, issued to him at an address in Hallandale, Florida. The Deputy Administrator further finds that on May 7, 1998, the Medical Board of the State of Florida (Medical Board) issued a final order indefinitely suspending Respondent's medical license. In an Opinion filed on March 31, 1999, the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District, granted Respondent a new hearing before the Medical Board but declined to stay the suspension of Respondent's medical license.

In his response to the Government's motion, Respondent argued that he is retired from the active practice of medicine, and therefore, his continued registration poses no risk to the public interest. Additionally, Respondent noted that he has filed an Amended Complaint with the Agency for Health Care Administration and expects a hearing in the near future.

In her Opinion and Recommended Decision, Judge Randall found that the Government presented credible evidence that Respondent's Florida medical license was indefinitely suspended, and the suspension has not been stayed. Respondent has presented no evidence to the contrary. As Judge Randall noted, ''[a] pending rehearing of the Medical Board's decision does not alter the Respondent's status in Florida. The outcome of a rehearing of the Medical Board's action is speculative, and the decision of the Medical Board is final until otherwise overturned.''

Therefore, the Deputy Administrator finds that Respondent is not currently authorized to practice medicine in the State of Florida and as a result, it is reasonable to infer that he is also not authorized to handle controlled substances in that state.

DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances in the state in which he conducts his business. See 21 U.S.C. 802(21), 823(f) and 824(a)(3). This prerequisite has been consistently upheld. See Romeo J. Perez, M.D., 62 FR 16,193 (1997); Demetris A. Green, M.D., 61 FR 60,728 (1996); Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51,104 (1993).

Here, it is clear that Respondent is not licensed to handle controlled substances in Florida. Since Respondent lacks this state authority, he is not entitled to a DEA registration in that state.

In light of the above, Judge Randall properly granted the Government's Motion for Summary Disposition. The parties did not dispute the fact that Respondent is currently unauthorized to handle controlled substances in Florida. Therefore, it is well-settled that when no question of material fact is involved, a plenary, adversary administrative proceeding involving evidence and cross-examination of witnesses is not obligatory. See Gilbert Ross, M.D., 61 FR 8664 (1996); Philip E. Kirk, M.D., 48 FR 32,887 (1983), aff'd sub nom *Kirk* v. *Mullen,* 749 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1984); *NLRB* v. *International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, AFL–CIO,* 549 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1977).

Accordingly, the Deputy Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, pursuant to the authority vested in him by 21 U.S.C. 823 and 824 and 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104, hereby orders that DEA Certificates of Registration AL0133102, issued to Brett L. Lusskin, M.D., be, and it hereby is, revoked. The Deputy Administrator further orders that any pending applications for renewal of such registration be, and they hereby are, denied. This order is effective March 6, 2000.

Dated: January 18, 2000.

Donnie R. Marshall,

Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 00–2530 Filed 2–3–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

Charles W. Marshall, D.P.M.; Revocation of Registration

On July 28, 1999, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), issued an Order to Show Cause to Charles W. Marshall, D.P.M., of Chicago, Illinois, notifying him of an opportunity to show cause as to why DEA should not revoke his DEA Certificate of Registration BM2648472 pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), and deny any pending applications for renewal of such registration pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 8231(f), for reason that he is not currently authorized to handle controlled substances in the State of Illinois. The order also notified Dr.