35814

1. A minimum threat of 100 volts rms per meter electric field strength from 10 KHz to 18 GHz.

a. The threat must be applied to the system elements and their associated wiring harnesses without the benefit of airframe shielding.

b. Demonstration of this level of protection is established through system tests and analysis.

2. A threat external to the airframe for both of the following field strengths for the frequency ranges indicated. Both peak and average field strength components from the Table are to be demonstrated.

Frequency	Field strength (volts per meter)				
	Peak	Average			
10 kHz–100 kHz	50	50			
100 kHz–500 kHz	50	50			
500 kHz–2 MHz	50	50			
2 MHz–30 MHz	100	100			
30 MHz–70 MHz	50	50			
70 MHz–100 MHz	50	50			
100 MHz–200 MHz	100	100			
200 MHz–200 MHz 400 MHz–700 MHz	100 100 700	100 100 50			
700 MHz–1 GHz	700	100			
1 GHz–2 GHz	2000	200			
2 GHz–4 GHz	3000	200			
4 GHz–6 GHz	3000	200			
6 GHz–8 GHz	1000	200			
8 GHz–12 GHz	3000	300			
12 GHz–18 GHz	2000	200			
18 GHz–40 GHz	600	200			

The field strengths are expressed in terms of peak of the root-mean-square (rms) over the complete modulation period.

The threat levels identified above are the result of an FAA review of existing studies on the subject of HIRF, in light of the ongoing work of the Electromagnetic Effects Harmonization Working Group of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee.

#### **Discussion of Comments**

Notice of proposed special conditions No. 25–00–01–SC for the Raytheon Aircraft Model 4000 airplanes was published in the **Federal Register** on March 14, 2000 (65 FR 13703). No comments were received, and the special conditions are adopted as proposed.

#### Applicability

As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Model 4000 airplane. Should Raytheon Aircraft Company apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design features, these special conditions would apply to that model as well under the provisions of  $\S 21.101(a)(1)$ .

## Conclusion

This action affects only certain design features on the Raytheon Aircraft Company Model 4000 airplanes. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane.

## List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

## **The Special Conditions**

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for Raytheon Aircraft Company Model 4000 airplanes.

1. Protection from Unwanted Effects of High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF). Each electrical and electronic system that performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operation and operational capability of these systems to perform critical functions are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to high intensity radiated fields.

2. For the purpose of this special condition, the following definition applies:

*Critical Functions.* Functions whose failure would contribute to or cause a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 22, 2000.

#### Donald L. Riggin,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 00–14156 Filed 6–5–00; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

#### DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

#### **Federal Aviation Administration**

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 94-ANE-16-AD; Amendment 39-11758; AD 2000-11-10]

## RIN 2120-AA64

# Airworthiness Directives; Rolls-Royce plc RB211 Series Turbofan Engines

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT. **ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) applicable to certain Rolls-Royce plc (R– R) RB211 series turbofan engines. That AD currently requires the removal from service of intermediate pressure (IP) compressor stage 6-7 rotor shafts that exceed reduced cyclic life limits. This amendment requires further reduction of cyclic life limits and introduction of new reduced cyclic bands for rework. This action is prompted by additional stress analysis conducted following failure of an IP compressor stage 6 disk. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent an uncontained engine failure due to rupture of an IP compressor stage 6-7 rotor shaft.

**DATES:** Effective August 7, 2000. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the rule is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of August 7, 2000.

ADDRESSES: The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from Rolls-Royce plc, Technical Publications Department, P.O. Box 31, Derby, DE24 8BJ, UK, telephone 011– 44–1332–242424. This information may be examined at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), New England Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jason Yang, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803– 5299; telephone (781) 238–7747, fax (781) 238–7199.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) by superseding AD 94–18–03, Amendment 39–9016 (59 FR 46536), applicable to R–R RB211–22B and –524 series turbofan engines, was published in the **Federal Register** on August 31, 1999 (64 FR 47447). That action proposed to require the removal from service of IP compressor stage 6–7 rotor shafts that exceed reduced cyclic life limits.

#### Conclusion

Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. No comments were received on the proposal or the FAA's determination of the cost to the public. The FAA has determined that air safety and the public interest require the adoption of the rule as proposed.

#### **Economic Analysis**

There are approximately 1,300 engines of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The manufacturer has advised the FAA that there are 228 engines installed on aircraft of U.S. registry that will be affected by this AD. It will take approximately 24 work hours or \$1,440 per engine to accomplish the proposed rework actions, if rework of the rotor shafts is selected. Otherwise, to maintain the record of the cyclic life of IP compressor stage 6–7 rotor shafts has minimum economic impact on U.S operators. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be less than \$330,000.

#### **Regulatory Impact**

This final rule does not have federalism implications, as defined in Executive Order 13132, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Accordingly, the FAA has not consulted with state authorities prior to publication of this final rule.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action: (1) Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action and is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption **ADDRESSES**.

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

## Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

## PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

## §39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by removing amendment 39–9016 (59 FR 46536, September 9, 1994) and by adding a new airworthiness directive to read as follows:

**2000–11–10 Rolls-Royce plc:** Amendment 39–11758. Docket No. 94–ANE–16–AD. Supersedes AD 94–18–03, Amendment 39–9016.

#### Applicability

Rolls-Royce plc (R–R) Model RB211–22B and –524 series turbofan engines, not incorporating new intermediate pressure (IP) compressor stage 6–7 rotor shafts assemblies with redesigned stage 6 disks in accordance with R–R Service Bulletin (SB) No. RB.211– 72–9993, dated August 26, 1994. These engines are installed on but not limited to Boeing 747 series and 767 series, and Lockheed L–1011 series aircraft.

Note 1: This airworthiness directive (AD) applies to each engine identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For engines that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (e) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

#### Compliance

Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished.

To prevent an uncontained engine failure due to rupture of an IP compressor stage 6– 7 rotor shaft, accomplish the following:

#### **Corrective Action**

(a) For IP compressor stage 6–7 rotor shafts that have not been reworked in accordance with SB RB.211–72–9594, Revision 8, dated January 14, 1999, Revision 7, dated September 16, 1994, Revision 6, dated August 12, 1994, or Revision 5, dated February 12, 1993, remove the rotor shafts prior to exceeding the life limits established in Table 1 of this AD under sub-title "Pre SB72–9594" and replace with serviceable parts.

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	P	re SB72-959	94		Rework bands		P	ost SB72–959	94	Po	st SB72–961	8
Engine mark and mod standard	Life limits through 12/31/00	Life limits after 12/31/00	Life limits after 12/31/01	Rework bands through 12/31/00	Rework bands after 12/31/00	Rework bands after 12/31/01	Life limits through 12/31/00	Life limits after 12/31/00	Life limits after 12/31/01	Life limits through 12/31/00	Life limits after 12/31/00	Life limits after 12/31/01
RB.211–22B–02 Pre SB72–5787 and Pre SB72–8700	11000	10000	9000	8000–11000	7500–10000	7500–9000	18000	17600	16600	N/A	N/A	N/A
RB.211–22B–02 Pre	11000	10000	3000	0000-11000	1300-10000	7300-3000	10000	17000	10000	11/1		11/7
SB72–5787 and												
Post SB72-8700	11000	10000	10000	8000-11000	7500–10000	7500-10000	17310	16960	15960	N/A	N/A	N/A
RB.211–22B–02 Post SB72–5787 and Pre SB72–												
8700	11000	11000	11000	8000-11000	8000-11000	8000-11000	18000	18000	18000	N/A	N/A	N/A
RB.211–22B–02 Post SB72–5787												
and Post SB72–	44000	11000	11000	0000 44000	0000 44000	0000 44000	47040	47040	47040	N1/A	NI/A	N1/A
8700 RB.211–524B–02 RB.211–524B3–02	11000	11000	11000	8000–11000	8000–11000	8000–11000	17310	17310	17310	N/A	N/A	N/A
RB.211–524B4–02 Pre SB72–5787	7500	7250	6250	6000-7500	4750–7250	4750-6250	13500	13500	12750	17500	17500	17500
RB.211–524B–02 RB.211–524B3–02	7500	7250	6250	6000-7500	4750-7250	4750-6250	13500	13500	12750	17500	17500	17500
RB.211–524B4–02 Post SB72–5787	8500	8200	7200	6500-8500	5700-8200	5700-7200	15000	14700	13700	19000	19000	18000

	P	re SB72-959	94		Rework bands		P	ost SB72-959	94	Po	st SB72–961	8
Engine mark and mod standard	Life limits through 12/31/00	Life limits after 12/31/00	Life limits after 12/31/01	Rework bands through 12/31/00	Rework bands after 12/31/00	Rework bands after 12/31/01	Life limits through 12/31/00	Life limits after 12/31/00	Life limits after 12/31/01	Life limits through 12/31/00	Life limits after 12/31/00	Life limits after 12/31/01
RB.211-524B-B-02												
RB.211-524B4-												
D-02 Pre SB72-												
5787	7500	7500	7400	6000-7500	6000–7500	5500-7400	13500	13500	13500	17500	17500	17500
RB.211-524B-B-02												
RB.211–524B4–												
D-02 Post SB72-												
5787	8500	8200	7200	6500-8500	5700-8200	5700-7200	15000	14700	13700	19000	19000	18000
RB211–524B2												
RB211–524C2												
RB211–524D4												
RB211–524D4X												
Pre SB72-5787	7500	7500	7300	6000-7500	6000–7500	5800-7300	13500	13500	13500	17500	17500	17500
RB.211–524B2												
RB.211–524C2												
RB.211–524D4												
RB.211–524D4X												
Post SB72-5787	8500	8250	7250	6500-8500	5800-8250	5800-7250	15000	14500	13500	19000	18750	17750
RB.211–524B2–B												
RB.211–524C2–B												
Pre SB72-5787	7500	7500	7300	6000–7500	6000–7500	5800-7300	13500	13500	13500	17500	17500	17500
RB.211–524B2–B												
RB.211–524C2–B												
Post SB72-5787	8500	8200	7250	6500–8500	5800-8200	5800-7250	15000	14500	13500	19000	18650	17650
RB.211–524D4–B												
RB.211–524D4X–												
B Post SB72-	0500	0500	7750	0500 0500	0500 0500		45000	45000	45000	10000	40000	40000
5787 RB.211–524G	8500	8500	7750	6500–8500	6500-8500	5750–7750	15000	15000	15000	19000	19000	19000
RB.211–524G RB.211–524G–T												
RB.211–524G–1 RB.211–524H												
RB.211–524H–T												
Post SB72–5787	8500	8150	7150	6500-8500	5750-8150	5750-7150	13950	13950	13950	N/A	N/A	N/A
1 031 3012-3101	0000	0150	/ 130	0300-0300	3730-0130	3730-7150	13930	12920	13930	IN/A	INA	

## TABLE 1—Continued

(b) Remove from service IP stage 6–7 rotor shafts that have been reworked in accordance with R–R SB RB.211–72–9594, Revision 8, dated January 14, 1999, Revision 7, dated September 16, 1994, Revision 6, dated August 12, 1994, or Revision 5, dated February 12, 1993, prior to exceeding the new, reduced cyclic life listed in Table 1 of this AD under the sub-title "Post SB72– 9594" and replace with serviceable parts.

(c) Remove from service IP compressor stage 6–7 rotor shafts that have been reworked in accordance with R–R SB RB.211–72–9618, dated August 7, 1992, prior to exceeding the new, reduced cyclic life limits listed in Table 1 of this AD under the sub-title "Post SB72–9618" and replace with serviceable parts.

(d) IP compressor stage 6–7 rotor shaft rework in accordance with R–R SB RB.211– 72–9594 can only be accomplished when the cyclic life of the part falls within the rework bands established in Table 1 of this AD. To accomplish rework of IP compressor stage 6– 7 rotor shafts prior to reaching the lower limit of the rework bands specified in Table 1 of this AD, the part must be artificially aged to the cyclic life which defines the lower limit of the applicable rework bands in Table 1 of this AD.

**Note 2:** For example, if the lower limit of the rework band is 8,000 cycles, and the part is reworked at 7,000 cycles, the part must be artificially aged by adding 1,000 cycles to the cycles since new recorded on the part; i.e., on return to service the cycles since new on this part would be 8,000 cycles.

#### **Alternative Method of Compliance**

(e) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Office. Operators shall submit their request through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Engine Certification Office.

**Note 3:** Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the Engine Certification Office.

# Ferry Flights

(f) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with § § 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the aircraft to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

#### **Incorporation By Reference**

(g) The actions of this AD shall be done in accordance with the following R–R Service Bulletins:

Document No.	Pages	Revision	Date
RB.211–72–9993 Supplement Modification Acceptance Total pages: 8		Original Original Original	August 26, 1994. August 26, 1994. August 26, 1994.
RB.211–72–9594	6A 7 8–8A 9	2	January 14, 1999. January 14, 1999. January 14, 1999. May 8, 1992. August 12, 1994. January 14, 1999. May 8, 1992. August 12, 1994.

Document No.	Pages	Revision	Date	
Appendix Supplement Total pages: 38 RB.211–72–9618 Total pages: 6	16–18 19–20 21–26 27 1–4	7 Original 4 6 7 5 Original	November 13, 1992. August 12, 1994. September 16, 1994. February 12, 1993.	

This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Rolls-Royce plc, P.O. Box 31, Derby, DE24 8BJ, UK, telephone 011–44–1332– 242424. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

#### Effective Date

(h) This amendment becomes effective on August 7, 2000.

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on May 23, 2000.

#### Thomas A. Boudreau,

Acting Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 00–13566 Filed 6–5–00; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

# DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

# Federal Aviation Administration

## 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 99–NM–358–AD; Amendment 39–11761; AD 2000–11–13]

#### RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Fokker Model F.28 Mark 1000, 2000, 3000, and 4000 Series Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT. **ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Fokker Model F.28 Mark 1000, 2000, 3000, and 4000 series airplanes, that requires a one-time review of the maintenance records to determine if tripping of the fuel boost pump circuit breakers has been recorded, repetitive inspections to detect fuel leakage from the fuel boost pump wiring conduits, and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment also requires replacement of the three

single wires inside the metal conduit of the fuel boost pumps with new wires protected by a polyamide sleeve, which terminates the repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the fuel boost pump wiring from chafing, which could result in electrical arcing and a possible fuel tank ignition source.

**DATES:** Effective July 11, 2000. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of July 11, 2000.

**ADDRESSES:** The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from Fokker Services B.V., P.O. Box 231, 2150 AE Nieuw-Vennep, the Netherlands. This information may be examined at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Norman B. Martenson, Manager, International Branch, ANM–116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–2110; fax (425) 227–1149.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Fokker Model F.28 Mark 1000, 2000, 3000, and 4000 series airplanes was published in the **Federal Register** on February 8, 2000 (65 FR 6046). That action proposed to require a one-time review of the maintenance records to determine if tripping of the fuel boost pump circuit breakers has been recorded, repetitive inspections to detect fuel leakage from

the fuel boost pump wiring conduits, and corrective actions, if necessary. That action also proposed to require replacement of the three single wires inside the metal conduit sleeve of the fuel boost pumps with new wires protected by a polyamide sleeve, which would terminate the repetitive inspections.

#### **Comments Received**

Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to the comments received.

#### **Type Certificate Holder**

One commenter requests that the Discussion and Explanation of Relevant Service Information sections be revised to refer to Fokker Services B.V. as the current type certificate holder, rather than the now defunct airplane manufacturer. The commenter advises that Fokker Services B.V. is conducting the Fuel System Safety Program mentioned in the Discussion section, and is also the issuer of the relevant service information. The FAA acknowledges the accuracy of this information; however, since these sections are not repeated in the final rule, no change is made to the AD.

#### **Statement of Unsafe Condition**

The same commenter requests that the statement of unsafe condition be corrected in several areas of the proposed AD. The commenter notes that electrical arcing has only been observed between the metal conduit and the fuel boost pump wiring, and states that the description of the unsafe condition should be revised to remove the statement that such arcing "could result in a possible fuel tank ignition source." The commenter states that since no arcthrough of the metal conduit has been observed, and the conduit is submerged in fuel during all phases of flight, it is very unlikely that the arcing could serve as an ignition source for the fuel vapors inside the fuel tank. The commenter