

Aerospace Modification 10455A or 10455B (reference British Aerospace Service Bulletin ATP-71-15, dated December 11, 1998) has been accomplished, certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent chafing within the engine nacelle, which could result in flammable fluid leaking into a zone that contains ignition sources, accomplish the following:

Repetitive Inspections and Corrective Actions

(a) Prior to the accumulation of 3,000 total flight hours, or within 1 month after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform the actions required in paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) of this AD in accordance with British Aerospace Alert Service Bulletin ATP-A71-14, dated November 4, 1998. Thereafter, repeat the inspections required by paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD at intervals not to exceed 1,500 flight hours, until accomplishment of the actions specified in paragraph (b) of this AD.

(1) Perform an inspection of the access panel, part number (P/N) JD713J0037-000, to detect chafe damage. If any chafe damage is detected, repair the access panel in accordance with the service bulletin at the time specified in paragraph (a)(1)(i), (a)(1)(ii), or (a)(1)(iii), of this AD, as applicable.

(i) If the damage has reduced the skin thickness by 10 percent or less: Repair within 600 flight hours.

(ii) If the damage has reduced the thickness of the skin by more than 10 percent, but less than 20 percent: Repair within 100 flight hours.

(iii) If the damage has reduced the thickness of the skin by more than 20 percent: Repair prior to further flight.

(2) Perform an inspection of the fuel manifold drain hose, P/N JD007J0983-000 (C37351), to detect chafe damage. If any chafe damage is detected, either replace the fuel manifold drain hose with a new fuel manifold drain hose, P/N JD007J0983-000, in accordance with the service bulletin at the time specified in paragraph (a)(2)(i), (a)(2)(ii), or (a)(2)(iii) of this AD, as applicable; or accomplish the replacement specified in paragraph (b) of this AD. Replacement of the fuel manifold drain in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by this AD.

(i) If there are signs of worn or polished strands in the outer braid, but no strand is broken: Replace within 1,500 flight hours.

(ii) If five or less strands are broken: Replace within 300 flight hours.

(iii) If more than five strands are broken or any sign of fuel leakage exists: Replace prior to further flight.

(3) Install a protective spiral binding, P/N EFWRAP-125, on the fuel manifold drain hose.

Optional Terminating Action

(b) Replacement of the fuel manifold drain hose, P/N JD007J0983-000 (C37351), with a new, improved drain hose, P/N JD007J2377-000 (C44311), in accordance with British Aerospace Service Bulletin ATP-71-15, dated December 11, 1998, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, International Branch, ANM-116.

Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the International Branch, ANM-116.

Special Flight Permits

(d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 17, 1999.

D. L. Riggins,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 99-21845 Filed 8-20-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 99-NM-101-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 757 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness

directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 757 series airplanes. This proposal would require a modification of the reverse thrust lever assemblies and replacement of the spring bumper assemblies of the thrust reverser sleeves with new assemblies. This proposal is prompted by an FAA review of the thrust reverser system on all transport category airplanes including the Boeing Model 757 series airplane. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent operation with an energized sync lock or malfunctioning sleeve locking devices, which could result in the deployment of a thrust reverser in flight and subsequent reduced controllability of the airplane.

DATES: Comments must be received by October 7, 1999.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 99-NM-101-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kathrine Rask, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-1547; fax (425) 227-1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket Number 99-NM-101-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 99-NM-101-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

Discussion

Following a 1991 accident caused by deployment of a thrust reverser in flight on a Boeing Model 767 series airplane, the FAA initiated a special certification review of all transport category thrust reverser systems and airplane controllability in the event of deployment of a thrust reverser in flight. As a result of that review, Boeing developed, for certain Boeing airplane models, an additional thrust reverser locking system and conducted a safety assessment to determine the probability of deployment of a thrust reverser in flight. The safety assessment evaluates every possible combination of failures for the thrust reverser system that could result in deployment of a thrust reverser in flight, and considers the probability and detectability of each failure. The safety assessment for the Model 757 series airplane identified two failure conditions that, because they are latent failures, would significantly affect the reliability of the thrust reverser locking system and, in combination with other failures in the thrust reverser system, could result in deployment of a thrust reverser in flight and subsequent reduced controllability of the airplane. The two failure conditions are described below.

- Failure of the reverse thrust switch actuator causes the switch to remain in a powered position. The failure causes the thrust reverser sync lock to remain energized while the airplane is operated on the ground, during the takeoff roll, and possibly during the first two minutes of flight. This failure would not prevent normal operation of the thrust

reverser; however, it would not be detected until the next sync lock integrity test was conducted.

- The spring bumper assembly pushes on the thrust reverser translating sleeve causing adequate sleeve movement, if the sleeve is unlocked, to activate the auto-restow system in flight or provide a visual indication of an unlocked sleeve during the ground walk-around inspection. If the spring bumper assembly fails, it is likely that a malfunctioning sleeve locking device would not be detected for several flight cycles.

Should either of these failure conditions occur but remain undetected for an extended period, in the event of other failures in the thrust reverser system, the thrust reverser locking systems may not prevent deployment of a thrust reverser in flight.

Explanation of Relevant Service Information

The FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Service Bulletin 757-76-0009, Revision 1, dated December 3, 1998, which describes procedures for a modification of the reverse thrust lever assemblies. This modification improves the reliability of the reverse thrust switch and changes the failed state of the switch, such that failure of the reverse thrust switch actuator does not result in latching of the relay and consequent energizing of the sync lock or opening of the isolation valve.

The FAA has also reviewed and approved Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0012, dated August 31, 1989, which describes procedures for replacement of the spring bumper assembly of the thrust reverser sleeve with a new spring bumper assembly with an improved service life. Such replacement ensures that a malfunctioning sleeve locking device will be detected within one flight cycle.

Accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletins is intended to adequately address the identified unsafe condition.

Explanation of Requirements of Proposed Rule

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletins described previously.

Explanation of Applicability

Certain airplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-76-0009, Revision 1, may not need to be modified in accordance with that service bulletin.

Certain Model 757 series airplanes powered by Pratt and Whitney Model PW2000 engines that are affected by Boeing Service Bulletin 757-76-0009, Revision 1, were delivered with reverse thrust switches that open the thrust reverser hydraulic isolation valves. On these airplanes, failure of the reverse thrust switch actuator causes the hydraulic isolation valve to remain open while the airplane is on the ground and during the takeoff roll. Such a failure would be detected through various engine indicating and crew alerting system (EICAS) messages within one flight. Therefore, because the failure would not go undetected for an extended period, the reliability of the thrust reverser locking system is not significantly affected, no unsafe condition exists, and these airplanes are not subject to the modification described in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-76-0009, Revision 1.

Certain other Model 757 series airplanes powered by Pratt and Whitney Model PW2000 engines that are affected by Boeing Service Bulletin 757-76-0009, Revision 1, have a redesigned switch function arrangement on which the reverse thrust switches energize the sync locks. (This redesign transfers control of the hydraulic isolation valve from the reverse thrust switches to the autothrottle switchpack switches.) On these airplanes, failure of the reverse thrust switch actuator causes the reverse thrust switch to remain in a powered position, which results in the thrust reverser sync lock remaining energized while the airplane is on the ground. Because there is no indication of such a failure, except from the sync lock integrity test, these airplanes would therefore be subject to the unsafe condition described previously.

The FAA knows of operators of Boeing Model 757 series airplanes powered by Pratt and Whitney Model PW2000 engines that have incorporated the redesigned switch function arrangement. However, the FAA cannot define the extent of incorporation of this modification in the affected fleet; therefore, this proposed AD is applicable to all airplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-76-0009, Revision 1 (in addition to those listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0012). If an operator of Boeing Model 757 series airplanes powered by Pratt and Whitney Model PW2000 engines can determine that the reverse thrust switches, as defined in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-76-0009, Revision 1, open the thrust reverser hydraulic isolation valves, that operator may request an alternative method of compliance in

accordance with paragraph (c) of this proposed AD.

Cost Impact

There are approximately 308 airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet.

The FAA estimates that the proposed modification of the reverse thrust lever assemblies would be required to be accomplished on 169 U.S. registered airplanes. It would take approximately 8 work hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed modification at an average labor rate of \$60 per work hour.

Required parts would cost approximately \$29 per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of this proposed modification on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$86,021, or \$509 per airplane.

The FAA estimates that the proposed replacement of the spring bumper assemblies would be required to be accomplished on 92 U.S. registered airplanes. It would take approximately 10 work hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed replacement at an average labor rate of \$60 per work hour. Required parts would cost approximately \$5,178 per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of this proposed replacement on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$531,576, or \$5,778 per airplane.

The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this

action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

Boeing: Docket 99-NM-101-AD.

Applicability: Model 757 series airplanes, as listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-76-0009, Revision 1, dated December 3, 1998, or Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0012, dated August 31, 1989; certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent operation with an energized sync lock or malfunctioning sleeve locking devices, which could result in deployment of a thrust reverser in flight and subsequent reduced controllability of the airplane, accomplish the following:

(a) For airplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-76-0009, Revision 1, dated December 3, 1998: Within 2 years after the effective date of the AD, replace the reverse thrust switches and actuators with improved switches and actuators, and modify the reverse lever links and thrust control levers in accordance with the service bulletin.

Note 2: Modifications accomplished prior to the effective date of this AD in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 757-76-0009, dated November 8, 1990, are considered

acceptable for compliance with the applicable action specified in this amendment.

(b) For airplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0012, dated August 31, 1989: Within 2 years after the effective date of the AD, replace the spring bumper assemblies of the thrust reverser sleeve with improved assemblies in accordance with the service bulletin.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

Note 3: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.

Special Flight Permits

(d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 17, 1999.

D. L. Riggan,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 99-21846 Filed 8-20-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 98-SW-78-AD]

Airworthiness Directives; Eurocopter France Model AS 332C, L, and L1 Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Eurocopter France Model AS 332C, L, and L1 helicopters. This proposal would require a one-time inspection of the length of the main gearbox epicyclic module upper casing bearing attachment bolts (attachment bolts), and if they exceed a certain length, replacing the epicyclic module to preclude a potential interference between the attachment bolts and the 2nd stage