international border of the United States for the transmission of electric energy between the United States and a foreign country is prohibited in the absence of a Presidential permit issued pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 10485, as amended by EO 12038. In addition, exports of electricity from the United States to a foreign country are regulated and require authorization under section 202(e) of the Federal Power Act (FPA) (16 U.S.C. § 824a(e)).

On October 14, 1998, Wilson-7 filed an application with the Office of Fossil Energy (FE) of the Department of Energy (DOE) for a Presidential permit and an electricity export authorization. The application was supplemented by another application filed on November 18, 1998. Wilson-7 proposes to construct a DC transmission line of either 600 kV, 800 kV, 1,000 kV, or 1,200 kV DC from a location in the vicinity of Fort Hancock, Hudspeth County, Texas, adjacent to the United States border with Mexico, to Mexico and to other unspecified countries located south of Mexico. The electric energy to be transmitted to Mexico and/ or other countries will be generated by three (3) 2,000-MW gas-fired electric powerplants to be constructed by Vilson-7 in Hudspeth County, Ťexas.

The Wilson-7 application notes that there are no firm contracts in place for the sale of power to any foreign government or foreign private concerns.

Procedural Matters

Any person desiring to be heard or to protest this application should file a petition to intervene or protest at the address provided above in accordance with section 385.211 or 385.214 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211, 385.214).

Fifteen copies of such petitions and protests should be filed with the DOE on or before the date listed above. Additional copies of such petitions to intervene or protest also should be filed directly with: Mr. Frank H. Wilson, 62 Thicket Street, Irvine, California 92614.

Before a Presidential permit or electricity export authorization may be issued or amended, the DOE must determine that the proposed action will not adversely impact on the reliability of the U.S. electric power supply system. In addition, DOE must consider the environmental impacts of the proposed action pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). DOE also must obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense before taking final action on a Presidential permit application.

The NEPA compliance process is a cooperative, non-adversarial process involving members of the public, state governments and the Federal Government. The process affords all persons interested in or potentially affected by the environmental consequences of a proposed action an opportunity to present their views, which will be considered in the preparation of the environmental documentation for the proposed action. Intervening and becoming a party to this proceeding will not create any special status for the petitioner with regard to the NEPA process. Notice of upcoming NEPA activities and information on how the public can participate in those activities will appear in the Federal **Register**. Additional announcements will appear in local newspapers and public libraries and/or reading rooms in the vicinity of the proposed transmission line.

Copies of this application will be made available, upon request, for public inspection and copying at the address provided above. In addition, the application may be reviewed or downloaded from the Fossil Energy Home Page at: http://www.fe.doe.gov. Upon reaching the Fossil Energy Home page, select "Regulatory" and then "Electricity" from the options menu.

Issued in Washington, D.C., on December 4, 1998.

Anthony J. Como,

Manager, Electric Power Regulation, Office of Coal & Power Im/Ex, Office of Fossil Energy.

[FR Doc. 98-32904 Filed 12-9-98; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

DOE Response to Recommendation 98–2 of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Safety Management at the Pantex Plant

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board published Recommendation 98–2, concerning safety management at the Pantex plant, on October 7, 1998 (63 FR 53884). Section 315(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2286d(b) required the Department of Energy to transmit a response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board by November 20, 1998. The Secretary's response follows.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the Secretary's

response are due on or before January 11, 1999.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the Secretary's response to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC, 20004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Gene Ives, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application and Stockpile Management, Defense Programs, Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC, 20585.

Issued in Washington, DC, on December 3, 1998.

Theodore Wyka,

Deputy to the Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

The Secretary of Energy,

Washington, DC 20585

November 20, 1998.

The Honorable John T. Conway, Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.

Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter acknowledges receipt of your Recommendation 98–2, issued on September 30, 1998, and published in the **Federal Register** on October 7, 1998, dealing with Safety Management at the Pantex Plant. The Department accepts Recommendation 98–2 and will develop an Implementation Plan to the following approach:

(1) The activities undertaken in the Implementation Plan will be aimed at simplifying and standardizing activity level safety management processes for all work involving nuclear explosives at the Pantex Plant. Implementation Plan activities involving Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies will also be focused on simplification and standardization of practices and processes. Overall, the objective of the Implementation Plan will be to ensure practical and timely implementation of safety improvements and will better allow for tailoring of SS–21 principles.

(2) The Department recognizes the need to modify the existing change control process in order to improve process efficiency and consistency. An efficient process to tailor the amount of rigor involved in implementing changes while maintaining an adequate safety margin will be pursued.

(3) Roles, responsibilities and authorities will be clarified so that the Pantex contractor is accountable for the adequacy of nuclear explosive operations and safety documentation at the Pantex Plant. In doing so, the Pantex contractor will have the ability to call on the technical expertise of the National Laboratories.

(4) The Department recognizes the need to clarify the independent role of the Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies Groups. The Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies should focus on a scope of work established by line management and approved by the

appropriate Department of Energy Authorization Official.

- (5) The Department will develop and implement options necessary to sustain a technically competent Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Group talent pool.
- (6) The Department recognizes the need to pursue the safety management enhancement sought in Recommendation 98–2 consistent with the development of the Pantex Integrated Safety Management System as part of the Implementation Plan for Recommendation 95–2.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application and Stockpile Management, Defense Programs, is the Responsible Manager for the preparation of the Implementation Plan. He will work with you to develop an acceptable plan, meeting our mutual expectations.

Yours sincerely,

Bill Richardson.

[FR Doc. 98–32902 Filed 12–9–98; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

DOE Response to Recommendation 98–1 of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Integrated Safety Management and the Department of Energy (DOE) Facilities.

AGENCY: Department of Energy

ACTION: Notice

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board published Recommendation 98–1, concerning integrated safety management and the Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, on October 6, 1998 (63 FR 53646). Section 315(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2286d(b) required the Department of Energy to transmit a response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board by November 20, 1998. The Secretary's response follows.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the Secretary's response are due on or before January 11, 1999.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the Secretary's response to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C., 20004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Ellen Livingston-Behan, Senior Program Advisor to the Secretary of Energy, Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C., 20585.

Issued in Washington, DC on December 2, 1998.

Theodore Wyka,

Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

November 20, 1998.

The Honorable John T. Conway, Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 625 Indiana Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20004

Dear Mr. Chairman: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board)
Recommendation 98–1, issued on September 28, 1998, recommends improvements to the Department's program for resolving the findings of its independent internal safety oversight organization. I agree that such improvements will enhance our ability to ensure safety. Thus, the Department accepts Board recommendation 98–1.

The Department is committed to having an effective internal, independent oversight function as part of an overall safety assurance approach that also includes line management self-assessments. The Department's policy on line environment, safety and health oversight clearly establishes our expectations that robust, rigorous and credible contractor selfassessments together with Department line management oversight provide the primary basis for ensuring safety. Concurrently, the Department's Office of Oversight is responsible for independent safety oversight. Its findings are communicated to line management through inspection reports (such as safety management evaluations), topical and issue reviews, special studies, and accident investigations. Adequate and timely resolution of safety findings is the responsibility of line management, which has overall responsibility for performing work safely, gathering and considering safety feedback, and making necessary improvements. By acting on the Board's recommendation, we expect to further clarify these roles and responsibilities, and promote effective communication between line management and the independent oversight organization. Both are essential to the effective resolution of identified oversight

The Department has completed a preliminary analysis of the issues raised in the Board's recommendation, and has identified the following as the foundation and focus of our implementation plan.

- The plan will describe a consistent, disciplined framework for developing and implementing corrective action plans in response to oversight findings, tracking and reporting status of corrective actions, verifying the completion of corrective actions, and resolving differences or issues that may arise relative to corrective actions. Department directives will be revised to implement the necessary framework.
- The role of the Office of the Secretary in resolving differences or issues that may arise in response to independent oversight findings will be clarified through enhancements to existing Department directives.

I have asked Ms. Ellen Livingston-Behan, Senior Program Advisor to the Office of the Secretary, to serve as the responsible manager for this recommendation. As the principal point of contact with the Board for this recommendation, she will work with you and your staff to develop an acceptable implementation plan that meets our mutual expectations. If you have questions, please contact her at (202) 586–9500.

Yours sincerely,

Bill Richardson

[FR Doc. 98-32903 Filed 12-9-98; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Office of Science; Office of Science Financial Assistance Program Notice 99–04: Human Genome Program— Technological Advances

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy

(DOE).

ACTION: Correction.

In notice document 98–31367 beginning on page 64944, in the issue of Tuesday, November 24, 1998, make the following correction:

On page 64945, in the third column, under the heading "Program Funding", in the second line the dollar amount should read "\$5,000,000".

Issued in Washington, DC, on December 3, 1998.

John Rodney Clark,

Associate Director of Science for Resource Management.

[FR Doc. 98–32901 Filed 12–9–98; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy

RIN 1904-AA67

Agency Information Collection Activities: Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request

AGENCY: Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of submission for review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and request for comments.

SUMMARY: In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104–13, the Office of Codes and Standards (OCS) in the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EE) has submitted the following proposal(s) for the collection of information to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and approval.