that the cessation of imports after the issuance of the finding is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation or dumping. Furthermore, deposit rates above *de minimis* levels continue in effect for two of the eight known Japanese polychloroprene rubber producers and/or exporters. As discussed in Section II.A.3. of the *Sunset Policy Bulletin*, the SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63–64, if imports cease after the order is issued, we may reasonably assume that exporters could not sell in the United States without dumping and that, to reenter the U.S. market, they would have to resume dumping. Therefore, absent argument and evidence to the contrary, and given that shipments of the subject merchandise ceased soon after the issuance of the finding and that dumping margins continued after the issuance of the finding, the Department, consistent with Section II.A.3 of the *Sunset Policy Bulletin*, determines that dumping is likely to continue or recur if the finding were revoked.

Magnitude of the Margin

In the *Sunset Policy Bulletin*, the Department stated that, in a sunset review of an antidumping finding for which no company-specific margin or all others rate is included in the Treasury finding published in the **Federal Register**, the Department normally will provide to the Commission the company-specific margin from the first final results of administrative review published in the **Federal Register** by the Department. Additionally, if the first final results do not contain a margin for a particular company, the Department normally will provide the Commission, as the margin for that company, the first ''new shipper'' rate established by the Department for that finding. (*See* section II.B.1. of the *Sunset Policy Bulletin*.) Exceptions to this policy include the use of a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration of duty absorption determinations. (*See* sections II.B.2 and 3. of the *Sunset Policy Bulletin*).

Because Treasury did not publish weighted-average dumping margins in its finding, the margins determined in the original investigation are not available to the Department for use in this sunset review. Under these circumstances, the Department normally will select the margin from the first administrative review conducted by the Department as the magnitude of the margin of dumping likely to prevail if the finding is revoked. We note that, to date, the Department has not issued any duty absorption findings in this case.

In its substantive response, DuPont argues that because Treasury did not publish company-specific margins or a ''new shipper's'' rate in this finding, the Department, consistent with its *Sunset Policy Bulletin*, should report the company-specific margins and ''new shipper's'' rate calculated by the Department in the final results of the first administrative review.

The Department finds no reason to deviate from our *Sunset Policy Bulletin* in this review. We determine that the original margins calculated by the Department are probative of the behavior of the Japanese manufacturers and exporters of polychloroprene rubber. (*See Polychloroprene Rubber From Japan; Final Results of Administrative Review of Antidumping Finding;* 47 FR 14746 (April 6, 1982). We will report to the Commission the company-specific and ''all other's'' rate contained in the Final Results section of this notice.

Final Results of Review

As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of the antidumping finding would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at the margins listed below:

Manufacturer/exporter	Margin (percent)
Denki Kagaku Kogyo, K.K.	0
Denki Kagku Kogyo, K.K./Hoei Sangyo Co., Ltd.	55
Suzugo Corporation	55
All Other's Rate	55

This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to administrative protective order (APO) of their responsibility concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations. Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable violation.

This five-year (''sunset'') review and notice are in accordance with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

Dated: December 1, 1998.

Robert S. LaRussa,

Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.

[FR Doc. 98–32539 Filed 12–7–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P

48 FR 9678 (March 8, 1983); *Polychloroprene Rubber From Japan; Final Results of Administrative Review of Antidumping Finding;* 49 FR 10694 (March 22, 1984); *Polychloroprene Rubber From Japan; Final Results of Administrative Review of Antidumping Finding;* 49 FR 46454 (November 26, 1984); *Polychloroprene Rubber From Japan; Final Results of Administrative Review of Antidumping Finding;* 61 FR 29344 (June 10, 1996); and *Polychloroprene Rubber From Japan; Final Results of Administrative Review of Antidumping Finding;* 61 FR 67318 (December 20, 1996).

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A–401–040]

Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Stainless Steel Plate From Sweden

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of final results of expedited sunset review: stainless steel plate from Sweden.

SUMMARY: On August 3, 1998, the Department of Commerce (''the Department'') initiated a sunset review (63 FR 41227) of the antidumping finding on stainless steel plate from Sweden pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (''the Act''). On the basis of a notice of intent to participate filed on behalf of the domestic industry and substantive comments filed on behalf of the domestic industry and a respondent interested party, the Department determined to conduct an expedited review. As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of the antidumping finding would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at the levels indicated in the Magnitude of the Margin section of this notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott E. Smith or Melissa G. Skinner, Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th and Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482–6397 or (202) 482–1560, respectively.

EFFECTIVE DATE: December 8, 1998.

Statute and Regulations

This review was conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews are set forth in *Procedures for Conducting Five-year (''Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders*, 63 FR 13516 (March 20, 1998) (''*Sunset Regulations*''). Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to the Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the

Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3—*Policies Regarding the Conduct of Five-year (''Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders; Policy Bulletin*, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (''*Sunset Policy Bulletin*'').

Scope

The merchandise subject to this antidumping finding is stainless steel plate from Sweden, which is commonly used in scientific and industrial equipment because of its resistance to staining, rusting and pitting. Stainless steel plate is classified under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) item numbers 7219.11.00.00, 7219.12.00.05, 7219.12.00.15, 7219.12.00.45, 7219.12.00.65, 7219.12.00.70, 7219.12.00.80, 7219.21.00.05, 7219.21.00.50, 7219.22.00.05, 7219.22.00.10, 7219.22.00.30, 7219.22.00.60, 7219.31.00.10, 7219.31.00.50, 7220.11.00.00, 7222.30.00.00, and 7228.40.00.00. Although the subheading is provided for convenience and customs purposes, the written description of the merchandise remains dispositive.

On July 11, 1995, the Department determined that Stavax ESR (Stavax), UHB Ramax (Ramax), and UHB 904L (904L) when flat-rolled are within the scope of antidumping finding. On November 3, 1995, the Department determined that stainless steel plate products Stavax, Ramax, and 904L when forged, are within the scope of the antidumping finding. On December 30, 1997, the Department determined that merchandise rolled into hot bands in Sweden from British slabs is subject to the finding.

This review covers all known manufacturers and exporters of stainless steel plate from Sweden.

Background

On August 3, 1998, the Department initiated a sunset review of the antidumping finding on stainless steel plate from Sweden (63 FR 41227) pursuant to section 751(c) of the Act. We received a Notice of Intent to Participate from the Allegheny Ludlum Corporation, Armco, Inc., J&L Specialty Steel, Inc., G.O. Carlson, Inc., and Bethlehem Lukens Plate (collectively ''the petitioners'') within the applicable deadline (August 18, 1998) specified in section 351.218(d)(1)(i)) of the *Sunset Regulations.* The petitioners claimed interested party status under section 771(9)(C) of the Act, as domestic manufacturers of the subject merchandise. We received timely and complete substantive responses to the notice of initiation on September 2, 1998, on behalf of the petitioners and one respondent interested party, Uddeholm Tooling AB, and their American subsidiary, Bohler-Uddeholm Corporation (''Uddeholm''). Uddeholm claimed interested party status under section 771(9)(A) of the Act, as a foreign manufacturer and exporter of the subject merchandise. We received a waiver of participation from the other known Swedish manufacturer of stainless steel plate, Avesta Sheffield AB, and their American subsidiary, Avesta Sheffield NAD (''Avesta'').

Using the value of exports information submitted by Uddeholm and the value of imports as reported by the United States Customs Service in its annual reports to Congress on administration of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws,[1] the Department determined that exports by Uddeholm accounted for significantly less than 50 percent of the value of total exports of the subject merchandise over the five calendar years preceding the initiation of the sunset review. Therefore, on September 22, 1998, the Department determined that respondent interested parties provided inadequate response to the notice of initiation, and, the Department determined to conduct an expedited review (*see* memo concerning adequacy of respondent's submission dated September 22, 1998) in accordance with section 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2) of the *Sunset Regulations.*

Determination

In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department conducted this review to determine whether revocation of the antidumping finding would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping finding and, shall provide to the International Trade Commission (''the Commission'') the magnitude of the margin of dumping likely to prevail if the finding is revoked.

The Department's determinations concerning continuation or recurrence of dumping and magnitude of the margin are discussed below. In addition, parties' comments with respect to continuation or recurrence of dumping and the magnitude of the margin are addressed within the respective sections below.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (''URAA''), specifically the Statement of Administrative Action (''the SAA''), H.R. Doc. No. 103–316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103–826, pt. 1 (1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103–412 (1994), the Department issued its *Sunset Policy Bulletin* providing guidance on methodological and analytical issues, including the basis for likelihood determinations. The Department clarified that determinations of likelihood will be made on an order-wide basis (*see* section II.A.3. of the *Sunset Policy Bulletin*). Additionally, the Department normally will determine that revocation of an antidumping order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above *de minimis* after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the subject merchandise declined significantly (*see* section II.A.3. of the *Sunset Policy Bulletin*).

The antidumping finding on stainless steel plate from Sweden was published in the **Federal Register** as Treasury Decision 73–157 (38 FR 15079, June 8, 1973). Since that time, the Department has conducted several administrative reviews.[2] The finding remains in effect for all imports of stainless steel plate from Sweden.

In its substantive response, the petitioners argued that the actions taken by producers and exporters of Swedish stainless steel plate during the life of the finding indicate that ''dumping will

[1] This information is available to the public on the Internet at ''http://www.ita.doc.gov/import_admin/ records/sunset''.

[2] See *Stainless Steel Plate From Sweden: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review*; 47 FR 29867 (July 9, 1982); *Stainless Steel Plate From Sweden: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review;* 47 FR 41151 (September 17, 1982); *Stainless Steel Plate From Sweden: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review;* 49 FR 39885 (October 11, 1984); *Stainless Steel Plate From Sweden: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review*; 63 FR 1824 (January 11, 1998); *Stainless Steel Plate From Sweden: Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review*; 63 FR 8434 (February 19, 1998); and *Stainless Steel Plate From Sweden: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review*; 63 FR 63706 (November 16, 1998).

continue in the event of revocation'' (*see* September 2, 1998, Substantive Response of petitioners). With respect to whether dumping continued at any level above *de minimis* after the issuance of the finding, petitioners argued that, as documented in the final determinations reached by the Department, dumping levels have fluctuated during the life of the finding, with company-specific margins ranging between 0 and 24.67 percent.[3]

With respect to whether imports of the subject merchandise ceased after the issuance of the finding, the petitioners argued that imports of the subject merchandise have fallen dramatically since the issuance of the finding in 1973. Petitioners state that import volumes of the subject merchandise in 1972 were 9,990 short tons and that imports fell rapidly, reaching a low of 291 short tons in 1983 and remaining below 3,250 short tons up to the present, excluding a brief surge in 1996. The petitioners stated, citing U.S. International Trade Commission publications and U.S. Department of Commerce IM146 reports, that imports of the subject merchandise fell dramatically since the issuance of the finding increasing only in 1995, at which time petitioners began requesting administrative reviews. Uddeholm does not dispute that dumping is likely to continue.

In conclusion, the petitioners argued that the Department should determine that there is a likelihood that dumping would continue were the finding revoked because dumping margins have fluctuated above *de minimis* levels over the life of the finding, and because import volumes of the subject merchandise have decreased sharply after the issuance of the finding.

In its substantive response, Uddeholm stated that the likely effects of revocation of the dumping finding are (1) no significant change in the volume of Stavax and Ramax imports and (2) no significant change in the price of Stavax and Ramax sold by Bohler-Uddeholm in the United States.

Uddeholm did not address the fact that dumping margins above *de minimis* continue to exist except to offer a calculated rate from the 1995–1996 administrative review as the dumping margin likely to prevail if the finding were revoked. Uddeholm did address the question of import volumes. It argues that much of the decrease in import volumes after the early 1980's was do to a restructuring of the Swedish stainless steel industry which resulted in Uddeholm discontinuing exports of subject merchandise to the United States. Uddeholm claims that the only products it exports to the United States covered by this finding are Stavax and Ramax (See scope determination dated July 11, 1995). Only after the 1995 scope ruling did Uddeholm again participate in administrative reviews. Furthermore, Uddeholm argues that the demand for Stavax and Ramax is ''driven solely by the market economics of the plastics molding industry'' (*see* Uddeholm's Substantive Response dated September 2, 1998). Uddeholm stated that it did not anticipate any significant increase or decrease in the imports and/or prices of Stavax or Ramax if the Department revokes this finding.

In rebuttal, the petitioners argued that Uddeholm's product mix is irrelevant and the rate from the first administrative review in which Stavax and Ramax are included should not be considered ''the first rate calculated.'' Petitioners cite that there is no statute, regulation, or policy which permits consideration of a company's product mix in the determination of a dumping margin.

We find that the existence of dumping margins above *de minimis* levels and a reduction in export volumes over the life of the finding is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping. As discussed in Section II.A.3 of the *Sunset Policy Bulletin*, the SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63–64, ''[i]f companies continue to dump with the discipline of the order in place, it is reasonable to assume that dumping would continue if the discipline were removed.'' Therefore, given that dumping margins continued after the issuance of the finding, and absent argument and evidence to the contrary, the Department, consistent with Section II.A.3 of the *Sunset Policy Bulletin*, determines that dumping is likely to continue if the finding were revoked.

Magnitude of the Margin

In the *Sunset Policy Bulletin* the Department stated that, in a sunset review of an antidumping finding for which no company-specific margin or all others rate is included in the Treasury finding published in the **Federal Register**, the Department normally will provide to the Commission the company-specific margin from the first final results of administrative review published in the **Federal Register** by the Department. Additionally, if the first final results do not contain a margin for a particular company, the Department normally will provide the Commission, as the margin for that company, the first ''new shipper'' rate established by the Department for that finding. (*See* section II.B.1 of the *Sunset Policy Bulletin*.) Exceptions to this policy include the use of a more recently calculated margin, as appropriate, and consideration of duty absorption determinations. (*See* section II.B.2 and 3 of the *Sunset Policy Bulletin*).

Because Treasury did not publish the weighted-average dumping margins in this finding, the margins determined in the original investigation are not available to the Department for use in this sunset review. Therefore, the Department normally will select the margin from the first administrative review conducted by the Department as the magnitude of the margin of dumping likely to prevail if the finding is revoked. For any company not covered in the first administrative review, the Department will provide to the Commission the first ''new shipper'' rate established for that finding. The Department received a request for a duty absorption determination in the ongoing administrative review covering 1996–1997, however, the Department has not issued a final determination in that review.

In its substantive comments, the petitioners argue that the Department should select the highest company-specific margins from the final results of the most recently completed administrative reviews. For Uddeholm, the petitioners argue that the Department should use the final rate from the 1996–1997 administrative review, unless that rate is lower than Uddeholm's highest rate otherwise in this case.

In its substantive response, Uddeholm argues that the Department should select the margin calculated in the 1995–1996 administrative review as the rate likely to prevail if the Department were to revoke the finding (*see* Uddeholm's Substantive Response dated September 2, 1998). Uddeholm claims that, between the early 1980's and 1995, it did not export any products covered by this finding to the United States. Only after the July 11, 1995 scope clarification, in which the Department clarified that Stavax and

[3] See *Stainless Steel Plate From Sweden: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review*; 47 FR 29867 (July 9, 1982); *Stainless Steel Plate From Sweden: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review*; 47 FR 41151 (September 17, 1982); *Stainless Steel Plate From Sweden: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review*; 49 FR 39885 (October 11, 1984); *Stainless Steel Plate From Sweden: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review*; 63 FR 1824 (January 11, 1998); *Stainless Steel Plate From Sweden: Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review*; 63 FR 8434 (February 19, 1998); and *Stainless Steel Plate From Sweden: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review*; 63 FR 63706 (November 16, 1998).

Ramax were within the scope of the finding, did Uddeholm again export subject merchandise to the United States. Because of the restructuring of the Swedish stainless steel industry and its long absence from the exportation of subject merchandise, Uddeholm argues that the first calculated rate after the inclusion of Stavax and Ramax is the ''first dumping margin established for these products'' (*see* Uddeholm's Substantive Response dated September 2, 1998).

In rebuttal, petitioners argue that product mix should be irrelevant in the Department's choice of margins. The petitioners state that the restructuring of the Swedish stainless steel industry and the inclusion of Stavax and Ramax into the scope of the order should have no bearing on the Department's margin decision. Furthermore, Uddeholm has not confirmed the variation in product mix with any specific or convincing facts. According to petitioners, Uddeholm's data simply demonstrate that its ''volumes and values of imports of subject merchandise into the United States fluctuate and are not stable'' (*see* Petitioner's Rebuttal Comments dated September 11, 1998).

The Department disagrees with the petitioners in part. In the *Sunset Policy Bulletin* the Department stated that ''a company may choose to increase dumping in order to maintain or increase market share'' and that ''the Department may, in response to an argument from an interested party, provide to the Commission a more recently calculated margin for a particular company, where, for that particular company, dumping margins increased after the issuance of the order.'' (*See* section II.B.2 of the *Sunset Policy Bulletin.*) The Department's intent was to establish a policy of using the original investigation margin as a starting point, thus providing interested parties the opportunity and incentive to come forward with data which would support a different estimate. With respect to Uddeholm, the Department finds the petitioners' argument of choosing the highest margin calculated unpersuasive because the increase in imports of stainless steel plate from Sweden did not correspond to an increase in Uddeholm's dumping margin. In fact, during the initial surge in imports in 1995, Uddeholm's dumping margin decreased from 4.46 to 2.95 percent.

As for the alternative choice of the most recent margins, the Department again disagrees with the petitioners. The petitioners argue that, according to the Department's *Sunset Policy Bulletin*, if the original finding by the Treasury Department does not supply a margin, ''the Department normally will provide the Commission the company-specific margin from the first final results of administrative review published in the **Federal Register** by the Department'' *Sunset Policy Bulletin* (63 FR 18873). However, ''the Department may * * * provide to the Commission a more recently calculated margin for a particular company where, for that particular company, dumping margins increased after the issuance of the order'' *Sunset Policy Bulletin* (63 FR 18873). The petitioners argue that both Uddeholm and Avesta have accelerated their rates of dumping considerably over the life of the finding and, therefore, the Department should report to the Commission a more recently calculated rate. With respect to Uddeholm, there has been no consistent pattern of increasing margins. Excluding the most recent administrative review, Uddeholm's margins have decreased since June 1980.

With respect to the petitioners' rebuttal comments, the Department agrees with the petitioners' objection to the 1995–1996 administrative review being considered the ''first calculated rate'' for Uddeholm. In essence, Uddeholm is arguing that the Department view this finding as two separate findings; the first covering material under the original scope of the finding and the second covering Stavax and Ramax, as incorporated into the scope of the finding by the July 11, 1995 scope clarification. Uddeholm is arguing, for the purposes of margin selection, that the Department ignore the margins calculated prior to 1995 in this finding. Scope clarification decisions are meant to clarify what products are covered by the scope of a particular finding; they are not intended to be viewed as new findings in and of themselves. The Department believes that a review of the entire margin history of the finding is essential for understanding a company's behavior with the discipline of the finding in place. Therefore, the Department finds little basis for Uddeholm's assertion that the margin from the 1995–1996 administrative review is the *de facto* first rate calculated for this finding.

As for the choice of the 2.95 percent as the margin likely to prevail if the finding were revoked, the Department disagrees with Uddeholm. First, Uddeholm has provided little or no evidence to support their assertions of a restructuring of the Swedish stainless steel industry, the basis for its suggestion of the 2.95 percent margin. Without such evidence, the Department has no reason to believe that Uddeholm's decrease in exportation during the 1980's and early 1990's was not attributable to its inability to sell subject merchandise in the United States without dumping. Second, other than its assertion that the 2.95 percent rate is the *de facto* first margin calculated, an assertion that the Department finds invalid, Uddeholm has offered no other reason why the Department should report this rate to the Commission. Lastly, Uddeholm has demonstrated a willingness to dump subject merchandise above a *de minimis* level in the United States, regardless of the *type* of subject merchandise or the structure of the Swedish stainless steel market as evidenced by the entire margin history of this finding.

With respect to Avesta, the petitioners argue, in their substantive response, that the Department should select the highest company-specific margin from the final results of the most recently completed administrative review. However, in its rebuttal comments, the petitioners argue, based on Avesta's waiver of participation, that the Department should select the highest margin found in any segment of this proceeding for Avesta. The highest margin calculated for Avesta is 24.67 percent, a rate determined in the 1995–1996 administrative review (63 FR 1834, February 19, 1998).

The Department disagrees with the petitioners, in part, regarding the choice of the highest margin calculated during the life of the finding as the rate to report to the Commission for Avesta. The Department disagrees that a waiver of participation is sufficient cause for the Department to select the highest margin calculated. In fact, both the statute and the regulations provide that respondent interested parties may waive participation in a sunset review before the Department with the intent of reducing the burden on all parties. Waiving participation before the Department does not, therefore, result in the use of an adverse inference by the Department.

However, the Department does agree with petitioners' comments that the 24.67 percent rate calculated in the 1995–1996 administrative review should be for used for Avesta. As noted above, in the *Sunset Policy Bulletin*, the Department stated that ''a company may choose to increase dumping in order to maintain or increase market share'' and that ''the Department may, in response to an argument from an interested party, provide to the Commission a more recently calculated margin for a particular company, where, for that particular company, dumping margins increased after the issuance of the

order.'' (*See* section II.B.2 of the *Sunset Policy Bulletin*.) The Department finds that the recent surge in import volumes of subject merchandise in 1995 and 1996 accompanied by the dramatic increase in dumping margins by Avesta is sufficient cause for the Department to select a more recently calculated margin in this case.

In conclusion, consistent with the policy, we determine that the 5.22 percent rate, the first ''new shipper's'' rate calculated by the Department is probative of the behavior of Uddeholm. With respect to Avesta, the Department determines that a more recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior of Avesta if the finding were to be revoked.

Final Results of Review

As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of the antidumping finding would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at the levels indicated below.

Manufacturer/exporter	Margin (percent)
Avesta	24.67
Uddeholm	5.22
All Others	5.22

This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to administrative protective order (APO) of their responsibility concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations. Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable violation.

This five-year (''sunset'') review and notice are in accordance with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

Dated: December 1, 1998.

Robert S. LaRussa,

Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.

[FR Doc. 98–32538 Filed 12–7–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A–580–811]

Notice of Preliminary Results and Partial Rescission of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: Steel Wire Rope from the Republic of Korea

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce.

SUMMARY: In response to a request by the petitioner, the Committee of Domestic Steel Wire Rope & Specialty Cable Manufacturers, the Department of Commerce is conducting an administrative review of the antidumping duty order on steel wire rope from Korea. The review covers 16 manufacturers/exporters of the subject merchandise. The period of review is March 1, 1997, through February 28, 1998.

We have preliminarily found that, for certain producers/exporters, sales of subject merchandise have been made below normal value. If these preliminary results are adopted in our final results of this administrative review, we will instruct the Customs Service to assess antidumping duties based on the difference between the export price and the normal value.

Interested parties are invited to comment on these preliminary results. Parties who submit case briefs in this proceeding should provide a summary of the arguments not to exceed five pages and a table of statutes, regulations, and cases cited.

EFFECTIVE DATE: December 8, 1998.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Kemp, at (202) 482–1276, or John Brinkmann, at (202) 482–5288, Import Administration, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20230.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The Applicable Statute and Regulations

Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the statute are references to the provisions effective January 1, 1995, the effective date of the amendments made to the Tariff Act of 1930 (the Act) by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA). In addition, unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the Department of Commerce's (the Department's) regulations are to the regulations codified at 19 CFR Part 351, as published in the **Federal Register** on May 19, 1997 (62 FR 27296).

Case History

On March 26, 1993, the Department published in the **Federal Register** an antidumping duty order on steel wire rope from the Republic of Korea. *See* 58 FR 16397. On March 11, 1998, the Department published a notice providing an opportunity to request an administrative review of this antidumping duty order for the period March 1, 1997, through February 28, 1998 (POR). *See* 63 FR 11868. On March 31, 1998, the petitioner requested an administrative review of 19 manufacturers/exporters of steel wire rope from Korea. Since we had revoked the orders for three of the named companies (Chung Woo Rope Co. Ltd., Ssang Yong Cable Manufacturing Co. Ltd., and Sun Jin Company) in a prior segment of this proceeding, we excluded these three companies and initiated a review of the other 16 companies. *See Steel Wire Rope from the Republic of Korea; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Revocation in Part of Antidumping Duty Order*, 63 FR 17986, 17990 (April 13, 1998) (*Steel Wire Rope Fourth Review Final*). We published a notice of initiation of this administrative review on April 24, 1998. *See* 63 FR 20378.

We initiated this administrative review for the following 16 producers and exporters of steel wire rope from Korea: Boo Kook, Dae Heung Industrial (Dae Heung), Dae Kyung Metal (Dae Kyung), Dong Il Steel (Dong Il), Dong Young, Hanboo Wire Rope (Hanboo), Jinyang Wire Rope (Jinyang), Korea Sangsa, Kumho Wire Rope (Kumho), Kwangshin Rope, Myung Jin, Seo Hae Industrial Co. Ltd. (Seo Hae), Seo Jin Wire Rope (Seo Jin), Sungsan Special Steel Processing (Sungsan), TSK Korea, and Yeonsin Metal (Yeonsin).

On May 15,1998, we issued an antidumping questionnaire to each of the respondents, except for Kwangshin Rope and Seo Hae (for whom we did not find addresses). After locating the mailing addresses of Kwangshin Rope and Seo Hae, we issued an antidumping questionnaire to them on May 26, 1998.

Between May 21 and July 7, 1998, we received letters from Korea Sangsa, Myung Jin, Dae Heung, Dae Kyung, and HI–LEX Corporation (on behalf of its Korean affiliate, TSK Korea) stating that they had no shipments of subject merchandise to the United States during the period of review (POR). On June 19, 1998, we received a letter from Sungsan stating that it had purchased steel wire rope in Korea and exported it to the United States during the POR. The Department received a questionnaire