

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Nancy C. Loftin, Esq., Corporate Secretary and Counsel, Arizona Public Service Company, P.O. Box 53999, Mail Station 9068, Phoenix, Arizona 85072-3999, attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment dated October 6, 1998, which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room, located at the Phoenix Public Library, 1221 N. Central Avenue, Phoenix, Arizona 85004.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day of October 1998.

**Mel B. Fields,**

*Project Manager, Project Directorate IV-2, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.*

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## NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368]

### Entergy Operations, Inc. (Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2); Exemption

#### I

Entergy Operations, Inc., (the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6, which authorize operation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2. The licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.

The facility consists of two pressurized-water reactors at the licensee's site located in Pope County, Arkansas.

#### II

Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, "Criticality Accident Requirements," requires that each licensee authorized to possess special nuclear material (SNM) shall maintain a criticality accident monitoring system in each area where such material is handled, used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 specify detection and sensitivity requirements that these monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that all areas subject to criticality accident monitoring must be covered by two detectors. Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed SNM is handled, used, or stored and provides that (1) the procedures ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the sounding of a criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the procedures must include drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and (3) the procedures designate responsible individuals for determining the cause of the alarm and placement of radiation survey instruments in accessible locations for use in such an emergency. Subsection (b)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to have a means to identify quickly personnel who have received a dose of 10 rads or more. Subsection (b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain personnel decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements for a physician and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies, and to maintain arrangements for the transportation of contaminated individuals to treatment facilities outside the site boundary. Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from the requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for SNM used or to be used in the reactor. Paragraph (d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that any licensee who believes that there is good cause why he should be granted an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 may apply to the Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the reasons for the relief requested.

#### III

The SNM that could be assembled into a critical mass at ANO-1 and ANO-2 is in the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of SNM other than fuel that is stored on site in any given location is small enough to preclude achieving a

critical mass. The Commission's technical staff has evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent criticality of the nuclear fuel at ANO-1 and ANO-2, and has determined that it is extremely unlikely for such an accident to occur if the licensee meets the following seven criteria:

1. Only one new assembly is allowed out of a shipping cask or storage rack at one time.

2. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water.

3. If optimum moderation occurs at low moderator density, then the k-effective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with a moderator at the density corresponding to optimum moderation.

4. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level in the event that the spent fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water.

5. The quantity of forms of special nuclear material, other than nuclear fuel, that are stored on site in any given area is less than the quantity necessary for a critical mass.

6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect excessive radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions.

7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight percent.

By letter dated October 31, 1997, the licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR 70.24. In this request the licensee addressed the seven criteria given above. The Commission's technical staff has reviewed the licensee's submittals and has determined that the applicable criteria are satisfied for ANO-1 and ANO-2. Therefore, the staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely for an inadvertent criticality to occur in SNM handling or storage areas at ANO-1 and ANO-2.

The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of SNM, personnel would be alerted to that fact and would take appropriate action. The staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely

that such an accident could occur; furthermore, the licensee has radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, in fuel storage and handling areas. These monitors will alert personnel to excessive radiation levels and allow them to initiate appropriate safety actions. The low probability of an inadvertent criticality, together with the licensee's adherence to General Design Criterion 63, constitute good cause for granting an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.

#### IV

The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Entergy Operations, Inc., an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 for ANO-1 and ANO-2.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the environment (63 FR 51380).

This exemption is effective upon issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of October 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**Roy P. Zimmerman,**

*Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.*

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## NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323]

### Pacific Gas and Electric Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82, issued to the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E or the licensee), for operation of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (DCPP), located in San Luis Obispo County, California.

The proposed amendment, requested by the licensee in a letter dated June 2, 1997, as supplemented by letters dated January 9, June 25, August 5, and August 28, 1998, would represent a full conversion from the current Technical

Specifications (CTS) to a set of improved Technical Specifications (ITS) based on NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants," Revision 1, dated April 1995. NUREG-1431 has been developed by the Commission's staff through working groups composed of both NRC staff members and industry representatives, and has been endorsed by the staff as part of an industry-wide initiative to standardize and improve the Technical Specifications for nuclear power plants. As part of this submittal, the licensee has applied the criteria contained in the Commission's "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors (Final Policy Statement)," published in the **Federal Register** on July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132), to the CTS, and, using NUREG-1431 as a basis, proposed an ITS for CW. The criteria in the Final Policy Statement were subsequently added to 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical Specifications," in a rule change that was published in the **Federal Register** on July 19, 1995 (60 FR 36953) and became effective on August 18, 1995.

This conversion is a joint effort in concert with three other utilities: Union Electric Company for Callaway Plant, Unit 1 (Docket No. 50-483); TU Electric for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446); and Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation for Wolf Creek Generating Station (Docket No. 50-482). It is a goal of the four utilities to make the ITS for all the plants as similar as possible. This joint effort includes a common methodology for the licensees in marking-up the CTS and NUREG-1431 Specifications, and the NUREG-1431 Bases, that has been accepted by the staff. This includes the convention that, if the words in the CTS specification are not the same as the words in the ITS specification but they mean the same or have the same requirements as the words in the ITS specification, the licensee does not indicate or describe a change to the CTS.

This common methodology is discussed at the end of Enclosure 2, "Mark-Up of Current TS"; Enclosure 5a, "Mark-Up of NUREG-1431 Specifications"; and Enclosure 5b, "Mark-Up of NUREG-1431 Bases", for each of the 14 separate ITS sections that were submitted with the licensee's application. For each of the 14 ITS sections, there is also the following: Enclosure 1, the cross reference table connecting each CTS specification (i.e., limiting condition for operation, required action, or surveillance

requirement) to the associated ITS specification, sorted by both CTS and ITS Specifications; Enclosure 3, the description of the changes to the CTS section and the comparison table showing which plants (of the four licensees in the joint effort) that each change applies to; Enclosure 4, the no significant hazards consideration (NHSC) of 10 CFR 50.91 for the changes to the CTS with generic NHSCs for administrative, more restrictive, relocation, and moving-out-of-CTS changes, and individual NHSCs for less restrictive changes and with the organization of the NHSC evaluation discussed in the beginning of the enclosure; and Enclosure 6, the descriptions of the differences from NUREG-1431 specifications and the comparison table showing which plants (of the four licensees in the joint effort) that each difference applies to. Another convention of the common methodology is that the technical justifications for the less restrictive changes are included in the NHSCs.

The licensee has categorized the proposed changes to the CTS into four general groupings. These groupings are characterized as administrative changes, relocated changes, more restrictive changes and less restrictive changes.

Administrative changes are those that involve restructuring, renumbering, rewording, interpretation and complex rearranging of requirements and other changes not affecting technical content or substantially revising an operating requirement. The reformatting, renumbering and rewording process reflects the attributes of NUREG-1431 and does not involve technical changes to the existing TS. The proposed changes include (a) providing the appropriate numbers, etc., for NUREG-1431 bracketed information (information that must be supplied on a plant-specific basis, and which may change from plant to plant), (b) identifying plant-specific wording for system names, etc., and (c) changing NUREG-1431 section wording to conform to existing licensee practices. Such changes are administrative in nature and do not impact initiators of analyzed events or assumed mitigation of accident or transient events.

Relocated changes are those involving relocation of requirements and surveillances for structures, systems, components, or variables that do not meet the criteria for inclusion in TS. Relocated changes are those current TS requirements that do not satisfy or fall within any of the four criteria specified in the Commission's policy statement and may be relocated to appropriate licensee-controlled documents.