TABLE 2.—SERVICES PERFORMED AT OTHER THAN AN APPLICANT'S FACILITY IN AN FGIS LABORATORY [1,2]—Continued

(d) Soybean protein and oil (one or both)	15.85
(e) Wheat protein (per test)	15.85
(f) Sunflower oil (per test)	15.85
(g) Vomitoxin (per test—qualitative)	36.10
(h) Vomitoxin (per test—quantitative)	41.10
(i) Vomitoxin (per test—HPLC Board Appeal)	128.00
(j) Pesticide Residue Testing [3]:	
(1) Routine Compounds (per sample)	200.00
(2) Special Compounds (per service representative)	100.00
(k) Fees for other tests not listed above will be based on the lowest noncontract hourly rate from Table 1	
(iii) Review of weighing (per hour per service representative)	69.60
(3) Stowage examination (service-on-request) [3]:	
(i) Ship (per stowage space) (minimum $275 per ship)	50.50
(ii) Subsequent ship examinations (same as original) (minimum $175 per ship)	
(iii) Barge (per examination)	40.50
(iv) All other carriers (per examination)	15.50

[1] Fees apply to original inspection and weighing, reinspection, and appeal inspection service and include, but are not limited to, sampling, grading, weighing, prior to loading stowage examinations, and certifying results performed within 25 miles of an employee's assigned duty station. Travel and related expenses will be charged for service outside 25 miles as found in § 800.72 (a).

[2] An additional charge will be assessed when the revenue from the services in Schedule A, Table 2, does not cover what would have been collected at the applicable hourly rate as provided in § 800.72 (b).

[3] If performed outside of normal business, 1½ times the applicable unit fee will be charged.

[4] If, at the request of the Service, a file sample is located and forwarded by the Agency for an official agency, the Agency may, upon request, be reimbursed at the rate of $2.50 per sample by the Service.

TABLE 3.—MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES [1]

(1) Grain grading seminars (per hour per service representative) [2]	$48.00
(2) Certification of diverter-type mechanical samplers (per hour per service representative) [2]	48.00
(3) Special weighing services (per hour per service representative) [2].	
(i) Scale testing and certification	48.00
(ii) Evaluation of weighing and material handling systems	48.00
(iii) NTEP Prototype evaluation (other than Railroad Track Scales)	48.00
(iv) NTEP Prototype evaluation of Railroad Track	48.00
Scales (plus usage fee per day for test car)	110.00
(v) Mass standards calibration and reverification	48.00
(vi) Special projects	48.00
(4) Foreign travel (per day per service representative)	435.00
(5) Online customized data EGIS service.	
(i) One data file per week for 1 year	500.00
(ii) One data file per month for 1 year	300.00
(6) Samples provided to interested parties (per sample)	2.50
(7) Divided-lot certificates (per certificate)	1.50
(8) Extra copies of certificates (per certificate)	1.50
(9) Faxing (per page)	1.50
(10) Special mailing (actual cost).	
(11) Preparing certificates onsite or during other than normal business hours (use hourly rates from Table 1).	

[1] Any requested service that is not listed will be performed at $48.00 per hour.

[2] Regular business hours—Monday thru Friday—service provided at other than regular hours charged at the applicable overtime hourly rate.

Dated: September 28, 1998.

David R. Shipman,

Acting Administrator, Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyard Administration.

[FR Doc. 98–26281 Filed 10–1–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410–EN–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

RIN 3150–AF98

Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors; Meeting

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of public meeting.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is announcing a public meeting on November 13, 1998 to discuss rulemaking to modify power reactor reporting requirements.

DATES: Friday, November 13, 1998.

ADDRESSES: The public meeting will be held in the auditorium of NRC's headquarters at Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dennis P. Allison, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, Washington DC 20555–0001, telephone (301) 415–6835, e-mail dpa@nrc.gov or his alternate, Bennett M. Brady, telephone (301) 415–6363, e-mail bmb1@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On July 23, 1998 (63 FR 39522) the NRC published in the **Federal Register** an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) to announce a contemplated rulemaking that would modify reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors. Among other things, the ANPR requested public comments on whether the NRC should proceed with rulemaking to modify the event reporting requirements in 10 CFR 50.72, ''Immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power reactors,'' and 50.73, ''Licensee event report system,'' and several

concrete proposals were provided for comment.

A public meeting was held to discuss the ANPR at NRC Headquarters on August 21, 1998. The ANPR was also discussed, along with other topics, at a public meeting on the role of industry in nuclear regulation in Rosemont, Illinois on September 1, 1998. The public comment period on the ANPR closed on September 21, 1998. A comment from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) proposed conducting ''table top exercises'' early in the development and review process to test key parts of the requirements and guidance for clarity and consistency. This meeting is being conducted in response to that comment.

Purpose

The purpose of the meeting is to test key aspects of the contemplated amendments to 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 for clarity and consistency, early in the process of drafting them, by discussing how reportability decisions could be made for example events. This discussion will provide insights to NRC staff, which can then be used in drafting the proposed requirements and associated guidance.

Topics

The following topics will be discussed:

Loss of function: As discussed in the ANPR, any design or analysis defect or deviation that results in a system not being capable of performing its specified safety functions would be reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii) and 50.73(a)(2)(v), ''Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'' Comments have raised questions about how to determine when a system is ''not capable of performing.''

An example relevant to this issue is provided in LER #28997001, Three Mile Island 1, ''Potential Overpressurization of Piping Between Closed Reactor Building Isolation Valves Due to Inadequate Design Code Guidance.'' Stresses for postulated accident conditions would exceed the allowable values in the design code (ANSI B 31.1–1967). However, they would remain within the limits of ASME Section III, Appendix F, which demonstrates that the piping is capable of maintaining containment integrity (and, as a result, the piping was considered operable).

Partial loss of function: As discussed in the ANPR, any design or analysis defect or deviation that results in one train of a multi-train system not being capable of performing its specified safety functions for a period of time in excess of that allowed by the plant's TS would be reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), ''Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.'' Comments have raised questions about how to determine the ''specified safety function.''

An example relevant to this issue is provided in LER #26697014, Point Beach 1, ''Auxiliary Feedwater System Inoperability Due to Loss of Instrument Air.'' It was found that a loss of offsite power could cause a loss of instrument air and, as a result, auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow control valves could fail open. Then for low steam generator pressure, such as could occur for certain main steam line breaks, high AFW flow rates could result in tripping the motor driven AFW pumps on thermal overload. The single turbine driven AFW pump would not be affected.

Unanalyzed condition that significantly compromised plant safety: No changes were proposed in the ANPR. However, comments have questioned the clarity of the current requirement with regard to the meaning of the term significant.

The two examples relevant to this issue that are provided in the current guidance in NUREG–1022, Revision 1 are: (a) Accumulation of voids that could inhibit the ability to adequately remove heat from the reactor core, particularly under natural circulation conditions and (b) voiding in instrument lines that results in an erroneous indication causing the operator to misunderstand the true condition of the plant.

Another relevant example would be an unanalyzed condition that warrants declaration of an emergency class, such as an unplanned loss of most or all safety system annunciators for longer than 15 minutes.

Also, a relevant example is provided in LER #24797006, Indian Point 2, ''Open Electric Penetration Area Door Creates Unanalyzed Condition.'' Equipment in the electrical penetration area was not qualified on the basis that a closed door would protect the area from a harsh environment. The door was improperly left open during plant operation; however, the condition lasted less than 6 hours before it was discovered and corrected.

Compliance with technical specification surveillance requirements: As proposed in the ANPR, reporting would be eliminated for events that consist of late TS required surveillance tests *provided* there is no systematic breakdown of compliance with the TS, the oversight is corrected, the testing is performed, and the equipment is still functional or, alternately, the requirements of the TS are implemented. Comments have questioned whether the proposed conditions (i.e., ''provided there is no systematic non-compliance * * *'') are clear and appropriate.

One example of an event relevant to this issue would be a case where review of a surveillance procedure indicates inadequate circuit overlap, so that a relay has not been included in the testing for some time. When tested, the relay is functional.

Another relevant example would be a case where review of a surveillance procedure indicates that a component has not been tested for some time. When tested, the component is not functional; however, upon discovery that the component is not operable, the TS action statements are met by correcting the condition within the allowed time.

A third relevant example would be a case where, because of an oversight, a surveillance test was not performed within the time required. This is the third case of a similar oversight in one calendar quarter.

Condition that alone could prevent fulfillment of a safety function: In the ANPR it was proposed to clarify this criterion by revising it to require reporting any event or condition that alone or in combination with other existing condition(s) could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, etc. However, comments have suggested that the proposed change would detract from clarity.

An example relevant to this issue is provided in NUREG–1022, Revision 1. While one EDG was out of service for maintenance, the second EDG failed its surveillance test (and, as a result, was declared inoperable).

Nuclear power plant, including its principal barriers, being in a seriously degraded condition: No changes were proposed in the ANPR. However, comments have indicated that this criterion is redundant and should be deleted.

The following guidance and examples are relevant to this issue. The current guidance in NUREG–1022, Revision 1 states that this criterion includes material (e.g., metallurgical or chemical) problems that cause abnormal degradation of the principal safety

barriers (i.e., the fuel cladding, reactor coolant system pressure boundary, or the containment) such as:

(a) Fuel cladding failures in the reactor, or in the storage pool, that exceed expected values, or that are unique or widespread, or that are caused by unexpected factors, and would involve a release of significant quantities of fission products.

(b) Cracks and breaks in the piping or reactor vessel (steel or prestressed concrete) or major components in the primary coolant circuit that have safety relevance (steam generators, reactor coolant pumps, valves, etc).

(c) Significant welding or material defects in the primary coolant system, such as items which cannot be found acceptable under ASME Section XI, IWB–3600, ''Analytical Evaluation of Flaws'' or ASME Section XI, Table IWB–3410–1, ''Acceptance Standards.''

(d) Serious temperature or pressure transients, such as low temperature over pressure transients where the pressure-temperature relationship violates pressure-temperature limits derived from appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 (e.g., TS pressure-temperature curves).

(e) Loss of relief and/or safety valve functions during operation.

(f) Loss of containment function or integrity including: (A) Containment leakage rates exceeding the authorized limits, including containment leak rate tests where the total containment as-found, minimum-pathway leak rate exceeds the limiting condition for operation (LCO) in the facility's TS, (B) loss of containment isolation valve function during tests or operation, (C) loss of main steam isolation valve function during test or operation, or (D) loss of containment cooling capability.

Participation

The meeting is scheduled for 9 a.m. to 3:15 p.m. and is open to the general public. Interested individuals may address relevant remarks or comments to the NRC staff at the meeting. To facilitate the scheduling of available time for and orderly conduct of the meeting, members of the public who wish to request the opportunity to speak and/or introduce particular examples for discussion should contact the cognizant NRC staff member listed in the **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT** section before the meeting. Indicate as specifically as possible the topic(s) of your comment and/or the example(s) you wish to introduce. Provide your name and a telephone number at which you can be reached, if necessary, before the meeting.

Agenda for November 13, 1998

9:00 a.m.-9:30 a.m. Introductory remarks by NRC staff members
9:30 a.m.-10:00 a.m. Introductory comments by industry representatives and members of the general public
10:00 a.m.-12:00 noon Discussion among NRC staff members and public on how reportability decisions could be made for example events
12:00 noon-1:00 p.m. Lunch Break
1:00 p.m.-3:00 p.m. Continued discussion on how reportability decisions could be made for example events
3:00 p.m.-3:15 p.m. Concluding remarks

Note that the discussions may be completed earlier than indicated and, if so, the meeting will be concluded earlier.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of September, 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Patrick W. Baranowsky,

Acting Director, Safety Programs Division, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data.

[FR Doc. 98–26421 Filed 10–1–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 98–NM–189–AD]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737–100, –200, and –200C Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the supersedure of an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Boeing Model 737–100, –200, and –200C series airplanes, that currently requires periodic inspections to detect missing nuts and/or damaged secondary support hardware adjacent to the aft engine mount, and replacement, if necessary. That AD also provides for optional terminating action for certain inspections and a torque check. This action would mandate accomplishment of the previously optional terminating action. This proposal is prompted by the FAA's determination that the repetitive inspections required by the existing AD may not be providing the degree of safety assurance necessary for the transport airplane fleet. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent failure of the secondary support to sustain engine loads in the event of failure of the aft engine mount cone bolt, which could result in the separation of the engine from the wing.

DATES: Comments must be received by November 16, 1998.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM–114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 98–NM–189–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056. Comments may be inspected at this location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Greg Schneider, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM–120S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–2028; fax (425) 227–1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this