SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the schedule and proposed agenda of the forthcoming meetings by teleconference of the Executive Committee and the full membership of the National Assessment Governing Board. This notice also describes the functions of the Board. Notice of these meetings is required under Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

Dates: September 14, September 24, and possibly September 25, 1998.

Time: 11 a.m.–1 p.m.

Location: National Assessment Governing Board, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mary Ann Wilmer, Operations Officer, National Assessment Governing Board, Suite 825, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., Washington, DC, 20002–4233, Telephone: (202) 357–6938.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The National Assessment Governing Board is established under section 412 of the National Education Statistics Act of 1994 (Title IV of the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994), (Pub. L. 103–382).

The Board is established to formulate policy guidelines for the National Assessment of Educational Progress. The Board is responsible for selecting subject areas to be assessed, developing assessment objectives, identifying appropriate achievement goals for each grade and subject tested, and establishing standards and procedures for interstate and national comparisons. Under P.L. 105–78, the National Assessment Governing Board is also granted exclusive authority over developing Voluntary National Tests pursuant to contract number RJ97153001.

On September 14, from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m., the Executive Committee of the National Assessment Governing Board will hold a closed teleconference meeting. The Executive Committee will prepare a document outlining the conditions for renewal of the Voluntary National Tests contract. The information and discussion will relate to the source selection criteria by which government contracts may be modified or awarded. Not only would the disclosure of such data implicate proscriptions set forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulations, but also such disclosure would significantly frustrate a proposed agency action. Specifically, disclosure of the Executive Committee's discussion may affect private decisions made by the contractor. Such matters are protected by exemption 9B of Section 552b(c) of Title 5 U.S.C.

On September 24, the Executive Committee will meet in closed session to review the contractor's response to the Governing Board's decisions of the options for renewal of the Voluntary National Tests contract. If unable to reach agreement or substantive changes are required given the contractor's response to the options for renewal of the contract, the Executive Committee will formulate recommendations to the Governing Board. This teleconference must be conducted in closed session because public disclosure of this information would likely have an adverse financial effect on the Voluntary National Tests program. The discussion of this information would be likely to significantly frustrate implementation of a proposed agency action if conducted in open session. Such matters are protected by exemption 9B of Section 552b(c) of Title 5 U.S.C.

On September 25, 1998, if needed, the Governing Board will meet in a closed teleconference to take final action on substantive changes in the Voluntary National Tests contract. This teleconference must be conducted in closed session because public disclosure of this information would likely have an adverse financial effect on the Voluntary National Tests program. The discussion of this information would be likely to significantly frustrate implementation of a proposed agency action if conducted in open session. Such matters are protected by exemption 9B of Section 552b(c) of Title 5 U.S.C.

Records are kept of all Board proceedings and are available for public inspection at the U.S. Department of Education, National Assessment Governing Board, Suite 825, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., Washington, DC, from 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.

Roy Truby,

Executive Director, National Assessment Governing Board.

[FR Doc. 98–22689 Filed 8–24–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4000–01–M

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Nevada Operations Office; Notice Inviting Research Grant Applications

AGENCY: Nevada Operations Office, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice inviting research grant applications under Financial Assistance Program Notice 98–01.

SUMMARY: The Office of Research and Development (NN–20), of the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security (NN), U.S. Department of Energy, in keeping with its mission to strengthen the Nation's capabilities in the areas of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and national security through the support of science, engineering, and mathematics, announces its interest in receiving grant applications from academic researchers, preferably in a corroborative partnership with one of the DOE National Laboratories. The purpose of this program is to enhance our national capability to detect illicit proliferation activities and our national capabilities to protect critical information and materials through research and development.

DATES: All applications, referencing Program Notice NN–98–01, should be received not later than 4:30 PM, PST, on or before September 24, 1998 in order to be accepted for merit review and to permit timely consideration for award.

ADDRESSES: Applications should be sent to U.S Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, Contracts Management Division, ATTN: Darby A. Dieterich, P.O. Box 98518, Las Vegas, NV 89193–8518.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Questions of a technical nature should be addressed to the following personnel: Peter G. Mueller, DOE/NV Emergency Management Division, (702) 295–1777; or Carolyn R. Roberts, DOE/NV Emergency Management Division, (702) 295–2611. Other questions should be addressed to Darby A. Dieterich, Contracts Management Division, (702) 295–1560.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION—RESEARCH TOPIC AREAS: It is anticipated that awards resulting from this notice will be made in the November 1998 timeframe. Another notice will be published in the near future setting forth a schedule for future submittals and associated reviews. In addition, an Internet address will be established containing Office of Research and Development (NN–20) program information for use in preparing and submitting future applications.

If the academic research entity does not have a current relationship with a National Laboratory, this partnership may be set up after the award of the grant with the aid of NN–20 at Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, NN–20, Office of Research and Development, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20585. General research program and related topic areas include, but are not limited to the following:

Radiation Detection Technology Program

The *Radiation Detection Technology Program* (RDTP) provides for basic research on new detectors and technology, advanced applications, prototype demonstrations, and field testing to analyze signatures associated with Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), nuclear weapons and weapon components and radioactive materials. The focus areas include Improved Instrumentation for Man-portable Analysis Systems, Development of New Materials as Detectors, and Advances in Algorithms and Onboard Decision-Making.

Improved instrumentation performance for man-portable analysis systems is focused on reducing the size, cost, and dependence on the skill of the operator; providing sensor selectivity; improving the quality of detectors; increasing sensitivity of detection; improving the selectivity and automating the analyses; and increasing the speed and accuracy of detection. R&D programs should also exploit advances in all emerging technologies to incorporate the flexibility of fieldable systems, e.g., advanced micro circuitry and thin film batteries.

Development of new materials as detectors seeks to improve detection capability through the utilization of new sensor materials. Classical efforts to detect radiation relied on ionization (e.g., Geiger counter) or reactions such as fission (fission counter) or absorption (boron trifluoride). Relatively recent advances in materials have resulted in breakthroughs in sensitivity and accuracy (e.g., lithium drifted germanium) at the expense of the requirement to cool the crystal to liquid nitrogen temperatures. New work is aimed at employing materials such as cadmium zinc telluride (CdZnTe), bismuth iodide, and lead iodide which offer the possibility of increased sensitivity and accurate spectral analysis without the need for external cooling. In addition to the use of these new materials to achieve a room temperature capability, the use of miniature mechanical coolers offers another route to the goal of improved sensitivity with portability.

Advances in algorithms and onboard decision making are focused on providing analytical capabilities in real time. Advances in computer technology, reduction of the size and power requirements, and micro miniaturization provide the capability to incorporate advanced algorithms for real time data analysis into fieldable instruments. These capabilities are becoming essential to effective SNM detection and control.

Cooperative Monitoring Program

The Cooperative Monitoring Program is focused in the topic areas of chemical sensors, arrays, and networks for detection of signature species in environmental samples indicative of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons activities; data fusion methodologies to interpret large quantities of data from heterogeneous sensor networks; microanalytical technologies for chemical analyses of signature species; and tags and seals for arms control applications. The applications emphasis is on a cooperative and collaborative environment in which stakeholders are participating appropriately in the monitoring to enhance confidence, trust, and transparency.

Advanced Chemical Sensors, Arrays, and Networks are required for cooperative monitoring of facilities for treaty verification, IAEA safeguards, personnel protection, etc. These may be used either in a permanent system of monitor sensors or in periodic on-site inspections of declared activities. Both approaches require rugged and sensitive chemical instruments that will analyze the environment for specific signature compounds to verify that the facility (e.g., a chemical manufacturing plant or a nuclear fuel storage repository) is performing as declared. In other non-cooperative instances, it may be desirable to determine if signature compounds are present for illicit or undeclared operations at an industrial facility. Both qualitative identification of signature species and quantitative amounts of the species are needed. Chemical signature species must be detectable at trace levels such as ppb or ppt, and near-real-time analysis is desirable. Biochemical and metabolic phenomena offer opportunities for innovative sensors, both in terms of the receptor side of the sensor and the potential suite of analytes that can be monitored.

Data Fusion Methodologies are vital to the analysis of data from arrays and networks of sensors. Such systems are capable of generating huge quantities of data, most of which portray normal events and conditions. When a rare event or a potential threat condition occurs, it is critical to be able to recognize this occurrence in near-real time.

Therefore, data analysis techniques are needed that can manage large quantities of differing types of data and can subject these data to complex filters and algorithms to detect abnormal or threat conditions with very low incidences of false alarms. Data management systems that can learn the patterns of normal data by analysis of real (noisy) data and continually update the definition of normal through self-learning processes are desirable.

Microtechnologies for Chemical Analyses are needed to make routine laboratory analysis methods available in the field. Conventional workhorse tools for chemical analysis such as gas chromatography, mass spectrometry, and various other spectroscopic methods are powerful and well accepted in a laboratory environment, but usually are not amenable in their laboratory format for flexible monitoring and surveillance activities in a field environment.

In recent years, the technologies used to make microelectronic devices are being adapted to make miniature analogs of classical laboratory instruments for chemical analysis. Biochemical phenomena and analytical techniques are also amenable to miniaturization via microtechnologies. This revolution in chemical analysis instrumentation is in its relative infancy, and there appear to be many opportunities to miniaturize the bench- and laboratory-scale instruments. The benefits of miniaturization for chemical analysis are similar to the benefits for electronics products—low power requirements, lightweight for portability, and enhanced ruggedness and reliability. New sampling technologies are needed to take advantage of the real-time potential of miniaturized instruments.

Tags and Seals are enjoying a renewed interest as a result of domestic and international arms control applications.

Broad Area Search and Analysis Program

The Broad Area Search and Analysis (BASA) program addresses the difficulties associated with the detection and classification of proliferation facilities, particularly those that are located underground. Sensor development and analysis activities fall into several research topic areas: Multispectral/Hyperspectral/Ultraspectral imaging, Synthetic Aperture Radar, Advanced Airborne Systems, Power Line Monitoring, and Geophysical Methods. The potential for false alarms as a result of any single technique may be quite high. Hence, the final BASA research area is Data Fusion to optimize the facility characterization while minimizing the false alarm probability.

Multispectral/Hyperspectral/Ultraspectral Systems include imaging throughout the visible, infrared, and ultraviolet spectral bands. Nominally, multispectral systems contain 2–19 bands of data and are relatively mature. Hyperspectral systems include 20–299 bands and are relatively new sensors. Ultraspectral systems have 300 or more bands. Correspondingly, data from the multispectral systems have been used for decades and is mature while the exploitation of the data from hyperspectral is in its adolescence and ultraspectral data analysis is in its infancy.

The thrust of the research in this area is in algorithm development for new exploration tools to interpret alterations of the natural patterns that occur as the result of man's activities. The alterations may be the result of perturbations in drainage patterns, development of vegetation stress, deposition of effluents and their effects, overt or covert construction, etc. Such alterations can often be observed from great distances such as satellite orbits. Thus there is great potential for exploiting alterations by systems that cover large or nationwide areas. Significant issues include calibration, removal of atmospheric effects and the ability to find information of interest. The algorithms must be able to distill large quantities of data to the essential, proliferation-relevant information for data transmission and effective visualization by decision-makers.

New concepts are also welcome for 1) specialized, deployable, adaptive or reconfigurable processor hardware; 2) combined passive/active optical systems; or 3) self-unfolding/adjusting optics to package large systems in small satellites.

Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) technology is advancing rapidly as we develop the systems and the processing means to utilize this technology. The Interferometric SAR has shown great potential for digital terrain mapping, coherent change detection, motion detection, and other uses. The thrust of research in this area for the future will be in increasing our processing capabilities, particularly near-real time processing, so that we can then push forward with plans for increased systems capabilities. The great advantage which radar systems have over optical systems is their ability to image under any weather conditions. The primary disadvantage is that they provide a monochromatic image of reflective surfaces rather than a full or false color imaging. However, future dual or multiband SAR systems offer the potential of textural or polarization information that may correlate with surface types.

New concepts for using passive microwave sensors and imaging arrays are also welcome.

Power Line Monitoring includes several technology thrusts that utilize data either obtained from or derived from power line systems. Engineering principles and grid modeling of power line configurations may be used together with observable line configurations to determine the likelihood of missing or buried elements. Transient pulses may be introduced into the lines to confirm or refute the modeled behavior. The passive electromagnetic fields emanating from the power lines may be mapped, modeled, and analyzed.

Geophysical Methods include gravity, magnetics, and electromagnetic induction (EMI). Gravity and magnetics look for variations in the earth's natural fields due to the presence of clandestine facilities. The deficiency of mass due to excavation of an underground facility generates a gravity low and the presence of ferromagnetic materials such as iron in the reinforced concrete and machinery of the facility generates a magnetic high. Thus one may look for a localized perturbation of the normal fields as an indication of an underground facility. The field perturbations generated by such facilities decay rapidly and generally must be observed within a few thousand meters. Effective use of these technologies may require the development of both improved instruments and stabilized airborne platforms. These development tasks are formidable and require a demonstration of the utility of the techniques, modeling to show the potential at extended distances, and an evaluation of the merits of such technology.

Data Fusion is needed to merge the information from the disparate technologies cited in the previous sections. Each individual sensor measures some phenomenology that may be indicative of proliferation activity. The false alarm rate for any given technique may be quite high. e.g. there are numerous reasons why there may be a gravity low or why vegetation may be stressed, etc. But combined with other techniques, the false positive rate is expected to be significantly lower.

Remote Chemical Detection Program

The goal of the Remote Chemical Detection Program is to be able to detect chemicals from a stack/vent plume at a distance. Innovative algorithms which can quickly analyze large volumes of hyperspectral or ultraspectral data are needed. The goal is to process data from passive and/or active sensors into usable information. Key issues include removal of atmospheric effects, backgrounds and other interferences in the mid-wave infrared (3–5 microns) or in the long-wave infrared (8–14 micron) regions. Algorithms which require a pixel-by-pixel removal of these effects are too computationally intensive and will not be considered. Proposals should be tied to specific sensors and contain benchmarks for how new algorithms improve on the state-of-the-art.

Counter Nuclear Smuggling Program

The primary technical goals of the Counter Nuclear Smuggling Program are to improve capabilities to detect and intercept diverted nuclear materials, and to provide improved analytical tools to aid forensics and attribution assessment. The primary technical challenges that arise from these goals are: to develop operationally useful, automated and cost-effective nuclear material detectors; to develop robust techniques to detect highly enriched uranium; to develop systems to detect nuclear materials in transit; to develop technologies to search for nuclear material; and to develop the tools and the data bases for forensic and attribution assessment of foreign nuclear material. To address these challenges the Counter Nuclear Smuggling R&D program is organized into the following program elements: Fundamental Detection Technology; Highly Enriched Uranium Detection; Nuclear Material Tracking and Search; and Forensics and Attribution Assessment.

Fundamental Detection Technology is aimed at means for detecting the intrinsic and/or stimulated radiation from concealed Special Nuclear Materials (SNM). This type of technology would allow technical barriers to be employed for detecting and deterring illicit movement of nuclear materials. The overall objective is to develop new sensors that are intelligent, provide automated response, operate at room temperature, consume little power, have good resolution, are cost effective, and have a low false alarm rate. This can be accomplished at many levels including basic and applied research on detection materials, integration of current high resolution room temperature materials (in particular cadmium zinc telluride) into fieldable detector systems, development of alternative cooling systems for high resolution detectors, and miniaturization by exploiting Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) and microfabrication technology.

Highly Enriched Uranium Detection is extremely difficult in a passive mode, and HEU is the most likely material a terrorist would use for a nuclear device. For this reason, there is interest in advancing active interrogation technologies into prototype HEU detection systems. The primary emphasis is on developing systems for choke point monitoring of luggage, small packages, large containers, trucks, rail cars and sea-going containers. Novel techniques to improve passive or active detection of HEU are encouraged.

Nuclear Material Tracking and Search capabilities need to be improved for materials and/or weapons in transit. Possible methods to improve material tracking include data fusion techniques to improve the capability of integrated networks of sensors and the tagging of materials. The goal is to develop systems which can be deployed in areas around key facilities to detect and track in-coming or out-going nuclear materials to facilitate interception. Tagging techniques to improve the ability to monitor the movement of nuclear materials are also feasible. These measures are typically expected to be extrinsic devices, e.g. RF transmitters integrated into storage or shipping containers to track material while in transit or moving inside storage/handling facilities.

Nuclear material search is extremely important and difficult when diversion is suspected or known but location and recovery have not yet occurred. Search requires cueing, e.g. by INTEL or tip-off, to reduce the search region to a feasible size. DOE Emergency Response, Radiological Assistance Program and Nuclear Emergency Search Teams have the pre-eminent nuclear search capability. This program element involves the development of techniques, systems, and devices to improve the capabilities of this community. Both passive and active techniques will be explored.

Forensics and Attribution Assessment focuses on the development of relevant databases and forensics tools to aid in attribution assessment. The goal of attribution assessment is to identify the diversion point, the original source of the material, and the perpetrators. Recently, a laboratory exercise on a blind sample of seized nuclear material indicated that the DOE laboratories have extensive analytical capabilities to characterize such materials. Lacking is the ability to identify the diversion point, the original source of the material, and the perpetrator. To improve these capabilities, research on trace detection and attribution assessment is needed. This will require research into potential unique characteristics (isotopes, isotope ratios, etc.) and the relevant databases to attribute the nuclear material to the original source, which in turn will help identify the perpetrator.

Issuance: Issued in Las Vegas, Nevada, on August 13, 1998.

G. W. Johnson,

Head of Contracting Activity.

[FR Doc. 98–22780 Filed 8–24–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

[Docket No. FE C&E 98–06—Certification Notice—161]

Office of Fossil Energy: El Dorado Energy, LLC; Notice of Filing of Coal Capability Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act

AGENCY: Office of Fossil Energy, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of filing.

SUMMARY: On July 31, 1998, El Dorado Energy, LLC submitted a coal capability self-certification pursuant to section 201 of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, as amended.

ADDRESSES: Copies of self-certification filings are available for public inspection, upon request, in the Office of Coal & Power Im/Ex, Fossil Energy, Room 4G–039, FE–27, Forrestal Building, 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20585.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ellen Russell at (202) 586–9624.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Title II of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (FUA), as amended (42 U.S.C. 8301 *et seq.*), provides that no new baseload electric powerplant may be constructed or operated without the capability to use coal or another alternate fuel as a primary energy source. In order to meet the requirement of coal capability, the owner or operator of such facilities proposing to use natural gas or petroleum as its primary energy source shall certify, pursuant to FUA section 201(d), to the Secretary of Energy prior to construction, or prior to operation as a base load powerplant, that such powerplant has the capability to use coal or another alternate fuel. Such certification establishes compliance with section 201(a) as of the date filed with the Department of Energy. The Secretary is required to publish a notice in the **Federal Register** that a certification has been filed. The following owner/operator of the proposed new baseload powerplant has filed a self-certification in accordance with section 201(d).

Owner: El Dorado Energy, LLC.

Operator: El Dorado Energy, or Houston Industries Power Generation, or Enova Power Corp., or an affiliate(s) thereof.

Location: Clark County, Nevada.

Plant Configuration: Combined-Cycle.

Capacity: 492 megawatts.

Fuel: Natural gas.

Purchasing Entities: Unspecified wholesale power purchasers.

In-Service Date: Late 1999.

Issued in Washington, DC, August 18, 1998.

Anthony J. Como,

Director, Electric Power Regulation, Office of Coal & Power Im/Ex, Office of Coal & Power Systems, Office of Fossil Energy.

[FR Doc. 98–22779 Filed 8–24–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket Nos. RP97–99–007 and RP98–308–001]

Algonquin LNG, Inc., Notice of Compliance Filing

August 19, 1998.

Take notice that on August 13, 1998, Algonquin LNG, Inc. (ALNG), tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas Tariff, First Revised Volume No. 1, the following tariff sheets, to become effective on the dates listed:

Effective June 1, 1998

Substitute Second Revised Sheet No. 83

Effective August 1, 1998

Substitute Third Revised Sheet No. 83

ALNG asserts that the purpose to this filing is to comply with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (Commission) Letter Order dated July 29, 1998, in Docket Nos. RP97–99–006 and RP98–308–000 (July 29 Order). ALNG states that Second Revised Sheet No. 83 filed on May 1, 1998, and Third Revised Sheet No. 83 filed on July 1, 1998, inadvertently listed Gas Industry Standards Board (GISB) Standard 5.4.16 as 5.1.16. ALNG also states that the substitute tariff sheets listed above are being filed to correct the reference to GISB Standard 5.4.16 in compliance with the July 29 Order.

ALNG states that copies of the filing were served on all affected customers, interested state commissions and all parties to the proceeding.

Any person desiring to protest this filing should file a protest with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,