

cumulative occupational radiation exposures.

3. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant construction impact.

Since the proposed changes do not involve any construction, therefore, there will be no construction impacts.

4. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant increase in the potential for, or radiological or chemical consequences from, previously analyzed accidents.

The proposed changes which involve evacuating UF6 from the compression loop to the cascade (low pressure sink) in the Standby Operational Mode will not result in a significant increase in the potential for UF6 releases. In fact, venting the compression loop to the cascade may enhance safety by minimizing the potential for over-pressurization of the UF6 withdrawal loop with subsequent confinement rupture. To avoid enrichment losses, UF6 is vented back to the A-suction of a compressor in the cascade that has UF6 of similar enrichment. All A-suction pressures in lines that would receive the vented UF6 are subatmospheric. Therefore, any confinement failure would likely result in inleakage as opposed to outleakage. In addition, cascade units that would receive vented UF6 would likely be comprised of relatively smaller sized equipment containing relatively smaller quantities of UF6 since they would be located near the top and at the bottom of the cascade. Therefore, the proposed change will not result in a significant increase in the potential for UF6 releases.

Going from a closed compression loop vent path to an open compression loop vent path will not result in a significant increase for, or radiological consequences from, previously evaluated criticality accidents. The likelihood of an accidental criticality in the cascade due to wet-air (moderator) inleakage would not be increased significantly for the following reasons:

a. This amendment involves a valve that is internal to several valves even when the pigtail is not attached to the withdrawal manifold. These valves would be in the closed position. Therefore, several misvalving errors would be required to permit significant wet-air inleakage into the cascade through the compression loop vent valve.

b. To maintain the integrity of the UF6 pressure boundary, USEC is committed to applying appropriate quality assurance requirements to process gas piping and equipment

(including valves) with diameters of 2 inches or larger.

c. Formation of UO2F2 in the cascade due to significant inleakage of wet-air would result in compressor vibration and would reduce barrier permeability thus affecting cascade compressor performance which would be observed in the control rooms via motor load indications. Changes in compressor A-suction pressures would also be detected.

d. Introduction of wet-air into the cascade would be detected on the line recorders that continuously indicate nitrogen and oxygen concentrations.

Based on the primary reasons provided above, the proposed TSR change will also not significantly raise the probability or consequences of a criticality accident.

5. The proposed amendment will not result in the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

For similar reasons provided in the assessment of criterion 4, evacuating UF6 from the compression loop to the cascade in the Standby Operational Mode will not result in a new potential accident involving UF6 releases or criticality. In fact, venting the compression loop to the cascade may enhance safety by minimizing the potential for over-pressurization of the UF6 withdrawal loop with subsequent confinement rupture.

6. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant reduction in any margin of safety.

As discussed above, from a UF6 release accident standpoint, venting to the cascade may enhance safety, and from a criticality accident standpoint, the safety impact is insignificant. This procedure, which is routine operation at PORTS, will not result in the violation of any limiting condition of operation. Therefore, the opening of the vent pathway in the Standby Operational Mode will not significantly reduce any margin of safety.

7. The proposed amendment will not result in an overall decrease in the effectiveness of the plant's safety, safeguards, or security programs.

As discussed above, from a UF6 confinement standpoint venting to the cascade may enhance the plant's safety program and from a criticality safety program standpoint, the safety impact is insignificant.

The staff has not identified any safeguards or security related implications from the proposed amendment. Therefore, the opening of the vent pathway in the Standby Operational Mode will not result in an overall decrease in the effectiveness of

the plant's safety, safeguards, or security programs.

Effective date: This amendment becomes effective at 12:00 noon on the day following the day issued.

Certificate of Compliance No. GDP-2: Amendment will revise the Technical Safety Requirements.

Local Public Document Room location: Portsmouth Public Library, 1220 Gallia Street, Portsmouth, Ohio 45662.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of February 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Carl J. Paperiello,

Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 97-3322 Filed 2-10-97; 8:45 am]

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[Docket 70-7001]

Notice of Amendment to Certificate of Compliance GDP-1 for the U.S. Enrichment Corporation, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah, KY

The Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, has made a determination that the following amendment request is not significant in accordance with 10 CFR 76.45. In making that determination the staff concluded that (1) there is no change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; (2) there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure; (3) there is no significant construction impact; (4) there is no significant increase in the potential for, or radiological or chemical consequences from, previously analyzed accidents; (5) the proposed changes do not result in the possibility of a new or different kind of accident; (6) there is no significant reduction in any margin of safety; and (7) the proposed changes will not result in an overall decrease in the effectiveness of the plant's safety, safeguards or security programs. The basis for this determination for the amendment request is shown below.

The NRC staff has reviewed the certificate amendment application and concluded that it provides reasonable assurance of adequate safety, safeguards, and security, and compliance with NRC requirements. Therefore, the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, is prepared to issue an amendment to the Certificate of Compliance for the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The staff has prepared a Compliance Evaluation Report which provides details of the staff's evaluation.

The NRC staff has determined that this amendment satisfies the criteria for a categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for this amendment.

USEC or any person whose interest may be affected may file a petition, not exceeding 30 pages, requesting review of the Director's Decision. The petition must be filed with the Commission not later than 15 days after publication of this Federal Register Notice. A petition for review of the Director's Decision shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner and how that interest may be affected by the results of the decision. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why review of the Decision should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) The interest of the petitioner; (2) how that interest may be affected by the Decision, including the reasons why the petitioner should be permitted a review of the Decision; and (3) the petitioner's areas of concern about the activity that is the subject matter of the Decision. Any person described in this paragraph (USEC or any person who filed a petition) may file a response to any petition for review, not to exceed 30 pages, within 10 days after filing of the petition. If no petition is received within the designated 15-day period, the Director will issue the final amendment to the Certificate of Compliance without further delay. If a petition for review is received, the decision on the amendment application will become final in 60 days, unless the Commission grants the petition for review or otherwise acts within 60 days after publication of this Federal Register Notice.

A petition for review must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Docketing and Services Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC, by the above date.

For further details with respect to the action see (1) the application for amendment and (2) the Commission's Compliance Evaluation Report. These items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC, and at the local public document room.

Date of amendment request: September 30, 1996.

Brief description of amendment: The amendment changes the Technical Safety Requirement for the cascade cell trip function and revises limiting specific values for battery performance.

Basis for finding of no significance:

1. The proposed amendment will not result in a change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

The proposed changes to TSR 2.4.4.12 and SAR section 3.9.1.3.2 provide limits for battery voltage and air circuit breaker air pressure, improve the surveillance requirements for measuring battery cell specific gravity, as well as improved bases for the limits. These changes provide improved assurance that the cell trip function will be available, if required. As such, these changes enhance the ability of the cascade trip function to deenergize the process motors ("tripping the cell"), thus bringing the cell below atmospheric pressure. By enhancing the ability to perform the cell trip function, the ability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents has been improved. As such, these changes have no impact on plant effluents and will not result in any impact to the environment.

2. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The proposed changes provide enhanced assurance that the cell trip function will be available if necessary. The changes will not increase exposure.

3. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant construction impact.

The proposed changes will not result in any construction, therefore, there will be no construction impacts.

4. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant increase in the potential for, or radiological or chemical consequences from, previously analyzed accidents.

The proposed changes enhance the availability of the cascade cell trip function and affect no other equipment functions. The cascade cell trip function is not involved in any precursor to an evaluated accident; therefore, the potential of occurrence of an evaluated event is unaffected. The cell trip function is involved in the mitigation of the consequences of previously evaluated accidents by deenergizing the process motors, thus bringing the cell below atmospheric pressure. Revising the limiting specific values for battery performance and the air pressure requirements for the "000" air circuit breakers enhances the ability of the cell

trip function by ensuring that adequate DC voltage and air pressure are available to effect cell trip. Since the proposed changes provide enhanced assurance that the function will be available if required, the consequences of previously evaluated accidents are not increased.

5. The proposed amendment will not result in the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

The proposed changes establish new operating limits for plant equipment that are within the existing operating ranges of that equipment. The changes create no new operating conditions or new plant configuration that could lead to a new or different type of accident.

6. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant reduction in any margin of safety.

The minimum air pressures and battery voltages established by these proposed changes are within the existing operating ranges of the equipment and have been increased to enhance the cell trip function, which is the only safety function affected by these parameters. The proposed changes cause no reductions in the margins of safety.

7. The proposed amendment will not result in an overall decrease in the effectiveness of the plant's safety, safeguards or security programs.

The proposed changes enhance the availability of the cascade cell trip function and do not affect any other equipment functions or administrative requirements. The cell trip function is not addressed in the safeguards and security programs. The effectiveness of the safety, safeguards, and security programs is not decreased.

Effective date: 60 days after issuance.

Certificate of Compliance No. GDP-1: Amendment will revise the Technical Safety Requirements.

Local Public Document Room location: Paducah Public Library, 555 Washington Street, Paducah, Kentucky 42003.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of February 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Carl J. Paperiello,
Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

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Sunshine Act Meeting

AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETING: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

DATE: Weeks of February 10, 17, 24, and March 3, 1997.