

considered, but off-site doses from these release points were found to be negligible.

SMC submitted March 1996 measurement data from stack emissions showing doses less than 1 millirem (mrem) per year at the fence line under nominal conditions. Conservative estimates of the expected effluent release rates were calculated by the NRC staff using assumptions, including the following: (1) the use of conservative values for the efficiencies of baghouse filters based upon the possibility of undetected filter bag breakages and (2) a ground-level release point for both baghouses. The radiation doses resulting from atmospheric releases were estimated using the CAP88-PC (Clean Air Assessment Package 1988) Version 1.0 computer code. The maximally exposed individual was located at the fence line, which was 250 meters (820 feet) south of the SMC facility. The Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) to the nearest resident is estimated to be less than 9 mrem per year from all pathways. Inhalation intakes accounted for greater than 85 percent of the total radiation dose. Thorium-232 was the dominant dose contributor, accounting for about 30 percent of the total dose. This estimated radiation dose is less than the 100 mrem per year limit established by NRC in 10 CFR 20.1301 and the 10 millirem per year dose constraint for air emissions in 10 CFR 20.1101.

The population within 80 km (50 miles) of SMC's facility is about 6,766,961 people, based on 1994 census data. The collective dose to the surrounding population is expected to be less than 7 person-rem per year. Based on an average background radiation dose of about 0.3 rem per year for individuals in the U.S. from natural sources, the same population would receive about 2,00,000 person-rem per year from background radiation. Thus, the collective radiation dose associated with atmospheric releases from the SMC's facility is a small percentage of the collective radiation dose from natural background radiation for these same people.

#### *Accident Evaluation*

In the EA, NRC staff evaluated one accident as the bounding accident: the release of dust from a baghouse or silo. This accident assumed that 10,000 kg of dust were released from structural failure of a baghouse. Calculated release fractions were 4 to  $5 \times 10^{-3}$ . Other accidents were determined to be within the bounds of this accident because both quantities and form of the material made larger dispersals unlikely. This

bounding accident was calculated as a result in an exposure of less than 6 mrem TEDE to the nearest resident. The expected population dose from this accident would be no greater than 0.9 person-rem.

#### *Agencies and Persons Consulted*

Discussions were held with representatives from the State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency at various times throughout the preparation of the EA. NRC consulted SMC representatives in preparing this document.

#### *Conclusion*

On the basis of this Environmental Assessment, NRC has concluded that the environmental impacts from the proposed action would not be significant.

#### **Finding of No Significant Impact**

The NRC has prepared an EA related to the renewal of Source Material License SMB-743. On the basis of the assessment, the NRC has concluded that environmental impacts that would be created by the proposed action would not be significant and do not warrant the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement. Accordingly, NRC has determined that a Finding of No Significant Impact is appropriate.

The EA, the license renewal application dated September 15, 1995, and the documents related to this proposed action are available for public inspection and copying at the Commission's Public Document Room at the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street NW, Washington, DC. Anyone with questions or comments about this proposed action should contact Ms. Heather Astwood, NRC's Project Manager for the facility, at Mail Stop T-8D-14, U.S. NRC, Washington, D.C. 20555 or in (301) 415-5819.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of September, 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  
**Michael F. Weber,**  
*Chief, Licensing Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.*  
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## **NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

[Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366]

### **Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact**

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an exemption from certain requirements of its regulations with respect to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-57 and NPF-5 issued to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., et al. (Southern Nuclear, or the licensee) for operation of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, located in Appling County, Georgia.

#### **Environmental Assessment**

##### *Identification of Proposed Action*

The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's application dated July 2, 1997, for exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55, "Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage." The exemption would allow photo identification badges to be taken offsite by individuals not employed by the licensee who have been granted unescorted access into protected and vital areas, in light of the implementation of a hand geometry biometrics system to control site access at Hatch.

##### *The Need for the Proposed Action*

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, paragraph (a), Southern Nuclear shall establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization. Regulation 10 CFR 73.55(d), "Access Requirements," paragraph (1), specifies that the "licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area." Regulation 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) specifies that, "A numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escort." Section 73.55(d)(5) also states that an individual not employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access to protected areas without escort provided the individual, "receives a picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be returned upon exit from the protected area...." Currently, unescorted access into protected areas at the Hatch plant is controlled through the use of a photograph on a badge/keycard (hereafter referred to as a "badge"), which is stored at the access

point when not in use. The security officers at each entrance station use the photograph on the badge to visually identify the individual requesting access. The badges for Southern Nuclear employees and contractor personnel who have been granted unescorted access are given to the individuals at the entrance location upon entry and are returned upon exit. In accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5), the badges are not allowed to be taken offsite.

The licensee proposes to implement an alternate unescorted access control system that would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve badges at the entry point and would allow all individuals with unescorted access to keep their badges when departing the site. An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to permit contractors to take their badges offsite instead of returning them when exiting the site.

#### *Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action*

Because the proposed action involves administrative matters within the protected area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, the Commission concludes that this proposed action would result in no significant radiological impacts. With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed action does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Therefore, the Commission concludes that there are no significant environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

#### *Alternative to the Proposed Action*

As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff considered denial of the proposed action. Denial of the application would result in no change in current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.

#### *Alternative Use of Resources*

This action does not involve the use of any resources not previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement related to operation of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 dated October 1972, and Unit 2 dated March 1978.

#### *Agencies and Persons Consulted*

In accordance with its stated policy, on August 22, 1997, the staff consulted with the Georgia State official, Mr. James Setser of the Environmental Protection Division, Georgia Department of Natural Resources, regarding the environmental impact of the proposed

action. The State official had no comments.

#### **Finding of No Significant Impact**

Based upon the foregoing environmental assessment, the Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed exemption. Accordingly, the Commission has concluded that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.

For further details with respect to this action, see the request for exemption dated July 2, 1997, which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Burke County Public Library, 412 Fourth Street, Waynesboro, Georgia.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day of September 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**Herbert N. Berkow,**

*Director, Project Directorate II-2, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.*

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#### **NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

[Docket Nos. 50-338 AND 50-339]

#### **Virginia Electric and Power Company; North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact**

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an exemption from the provisions of 10 CFR 70.24(a) to Virginia Electric and Power Company (the licensee) for North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (NPS1&2), located in Louisa County, Virginia.

#### **Environmental Assessment**

##### *Identification of Proposed Action*

The proposed action would exempt the licensee from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a), which require a monitoring system that will energize clear audible alarms if accidental criticality occurs in each area in which special nuclear material (SNM) is handled, used, or stored. The proposed action would also exempt the licensee from the requirements to maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed SNM is handled, used, or stored to ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety

upon sounding of the alarm, to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and to designate responsible individuals for determining the cause of the alarm, and to place radiation survey instruments in accessible locations for use in such an emergency.

The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's application for exemption dated January 28, 1997, as supplemented March 24, 1997.

#### *The Need for the Proposed Action*

The purpose of 10 CFR 70.24(a) is to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling, use, or storing of SNM, personnel would be alerted to that fact and would take appropriate action. At a commercial nuclear power plant, the inadvertent criticality with which 10 CFR 70.24 is concerned could occur during fuel handling operations. The SNM that could be assembled into a critical mass is in the form of nuclear fuel. The quantity of other forms of special nuclear materials that is stored onsite is small enough to preclude achieving critical mass. Since the fuel is not enriched beyond 4.3 weight percent Uranium-235 and commercial nuclear power plant licensees have procedures and features that are designed to prevent inadvertent criticality, the staff has determined that inadvertent criticality is not likely to occur during the handling of the special nuclear material. The requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a), therefore, are not necessary to ensure the safety of personnel during the handling of special nuclear materials at commercial power plants.

#### *Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action*

The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action and concludes that there is no significant environmental impact if the exemption is granted. Inadvertent or accidental criticality will be precluded through the design of the fuel racks providing geometric spacing of fuel assemblies in their storage locations, compliance with the NPS Technical Specifications (TS), and administrative controls imposed on fuel handling procedures.

Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," Criterion 62, requires that criticality in the fuel storage and handling system shall be prevented by physical systems or processes, preferably by use of geometrically safe configurations. This is met at NPS1&2, as identified in section 5.6 of the TS. Section 5.6.1.1 of the TS states the geometrically safe configurations for