#### **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

#### Office of the Secretary

[Transmittal No. 97-17]

#### 36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification

**AGENCY:** Department of Defense, Defense

Security Assistance Agency.

**ACTION:** Notice.

**SUMMARY:** The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text of a section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. This is published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of P.L. 104–164 dated 21 July 1996.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ms. J. Hurd, DSAA/COMPT/CPD, (703) 604–6575.

The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittal 97–17, with attached transmittal, policy justification, and sensitivity of technology pages.

Dated: June 17, 1997.

#### L.M. Bynum,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

BILLING CODE 5000-04-M



### DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON DC 20301-2800

09 JUN 1997

In reply refer to: I-04517/97

Honorable Newt Gingrich Speaker of the House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515-6501

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 97-17, concerning the Department of the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) to Korea for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$307 million. Soon after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media.

Sincerely,

H. Diehl McKalip
Acting Director

Jul Britalip

Attachments

Same ltr to:

House Committee on International Relations Senate Committee on Appropriations Senate Committee on Foreign Relations House Committee on National Security Senate Committee on Armed Services House Committee on Appropriations Transmittal No. 97-17

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

- (i) Prospective Purchaser: Korea
- (ii) Total Estimated Value:

  Major Defense Equipment\* \$246 million
  Other \$61 million
  TOTAL \$307 million
- One thousand sixty-five STINGER RMP missiles less reprogrammable modules (STINGER RMP (-)), 213 weapon rounds, 213 gripstock control group guided missile launchers, Interrogator Friend or Foe, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, U.S. Government Quality Assurance Teams (QAT), and other related elements of logistics support.
  - (iv) Military Department: Army (JBB, YRS, BOW, and OFS)
  - (v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None
  - (vi) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold:
    See Annex attached.
- (vii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: 09 JUN 1997

as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

## POLICY JUSTIFICATION

# Korea - STINGER-RMP Missile System

The Government of Korea has requested the purchase of 1,065 STINGER RMP missiles less reprogrammable modules (STINGER RMP (-)), 213 weapon rounds, 213 gripstock control group guided missile launchers, Interrogator Friend or Foe, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, U.S. Government Quality Assurance Teams (QAT), and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$307 million.

This sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country which has been and continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress in Northeast Asia.

This is the first sale of STINGER RMP (-) missiles to Korea, and it will enable the Korean Army to develop a defense capability with an ability to protect itself from unwarranted aggression from the air as well as enhance its interoperability with U.S. forces. Korea will have no difficulty absorbing these missiles into its armed forces.

The sale of this equipment and support will not affect the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be Hughes Missile System Company, Tucson, Arizona. One or more proposed offset agreements may be related to this proposed sale.

Implementation of this sale will require the assignment of several U.S. Government Quality Assurance Teams to Korea for two weeks to assist in the delivery and deployment of the missiles. There will be five U.S. Government personnel and two contractor representatives for one week intervals twice annually to participate in program management and technical reviews. Also, several U.S. Government personnel will be conducting training classes for two week intervals to Korea.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this sale.

Transmittal No. 97-17

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer
Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1)
of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vi

# (vi) Sensitivity of Technology:

- 1. The STINGER RMP missile system less reprogrammable module (STINGER RMP (-)), gripstock, hardware, software and documentation contain sensitive technology and are classified Confidential. The guidance section of the missile and tracking head trainer contain highly sensitive technology and are classified Confidential.
- 2. Missile system hardware and fire unit components contain sensitive/critical technologies. STINGER critical technology is primarily in the area of design and production know-how and not end-items. This sensitive/critical technology is inherent in the hybrid microcircuit assemblies, microprocessors, magnetic and amorphous metals, purification, firmware, printed circuit boards, laser range finder, dual detector assembly, detector filters, automatic text and associated computer software, optical coatings, ultraviolet sensors, semi-conductor detectors, infrared band sensors, equipment operating instructions, warhead components seeker assembly and the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system with Mode 4 capabilities.
- 3. Information on vulnerability to electronic countermeasures and counter-countermeasures, system performance capabilities and effectiveness, and test data are classified up to Secret.
- 4. Loss of this hardware and/or data could permit development of information leading to the exploitation of countermeasures. Therefore, if a technologically capable adversary were to obtain these devices, the missile system could be compromised through reverse engineering techniques which could defeat the weapon systems effectiveness.
- 5. A determination has been made that the recipient country can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.