# **Regulatory Impact**

The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is not a 'significant regulatory action' under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

#### **List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39**

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

# Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

# PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

## § 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

97-09-12 Raytheon Aircraft Company (Formerly Beech, Raytheon Corporate Jets, British Aerospace, Hawker Siddeley, et al.): Amendment 39-10008. Docket 96-NM-190-AD.

*Applicability:* All Model DH 125–1A, –3A, and –400 series airplanes, certificated in any category.

**Note 1:** This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (d) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Note 2: Raytheon Model DH 125–1B, -3B, and -400B series airplanes are similar in design to the airplanes that are subject to the requirements of this AD and, therefore, also may be subject to the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. However, as of the effective date of this AD, those models are not type certificated for operation in the United States. Airworthiness authorities of countries in which the Model DH 125–1B, -3B, and -400B series airplanes are approved for operation should consider adopting corrective action, applicable to those models, that is similar to the corrective action required by this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To detect and correct scoring of the upper fuselage skin around the periphery of the cockpit canopy blister interface, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the fuselage skin, and consequent cabin depressurization; accomplish the following:

(a) Within 90 days after the effective date of this AD, perform a one-time detailed visual inspection to detect scoring of the upper fuselage skin around the periphery of the cockpit canopy blister interface, in accordance with Raytheon Aircraft Service Bulletin SB.53–93, dated May 16, 1996.

(b) If no scoring is detected during the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, no further action is required by this AD.

(c) If any scoring is detected during the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, prior to further flight, determine the maximum location and details of each score, including the edge distance and material thickness, in accordance with Raytheon Aircraft Service Bulletin SB.53–93, dated May 16, 1996.

(1) If any scoring is found that is within the limits specified in the service bulletin, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with the service bulletin.

(2) If any scoring is found that is outside the limits specified in the service bulletin, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Small Airplane Directorate.

(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Wichita ACO. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Wichita ACO.

**Note 3:** Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Wichita ACO.

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(f) The actions shall be done in accordance with Raytheon Aircraft Service Bulletin SB.53-93, dated May 16, 1996. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Raytheon Aircraft Company, Commercial Service Department, P.O. Box 85, Wichita, Kansas 67201–0085. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, Small Airplane Directorate, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington,

(g) This amendment becomes effective on June 6, 1997.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 24, 1997.

# Neil D. Schalekamp,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 97–11198 Filed 5–1–97; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

## **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

## **Federal Aviation Administration**

# 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 96-CE-11-AD; Amendment 39-9963; AD 97-06-06]

## RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Raytheon Aircraft Company 90, 99, 100, 200, and 1900 Series Airplanes; Correction

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule; correction.

SUMMARY: This document makes a correction to Airworthiness Directive (AD) 97-06-06, which was published in the Federal Register on March 13, 1997 (62 FR 11764), and concerns Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon) 90, 99, 100, 200, and 1900 series airplanes (formerly referred to as Beech 90, 99, 100, 200, and 1900 series airplanes). This AD currently has two paragraph (f)'s. The AD currently requires inspecting the pilot and copilot chairs to ensure that the locking pins will fully engage in the seat tracks, and modifying any chair where the locking pin fails to fully engage or is misaligned. This action changes the second paragraph (f) to paragraph (g).

EFFECTIVE DATE: May 9, 1997.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Steve Potter, Aerospace Engineer, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 1801 Airport Road, Wichita, Kansas 67209; telephone (316) 946–4124; facsimile (316) 946–4407.

## SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### Discussion

On March 5, 1997, the FAA issued AD 97–06–06, Amendment 39–9963 (62 FR 11764, March 13, 1997), which applies to Raytheon 90, 99, 100, 200, and 1900 series airplanes (formerly referred to as Beech 90, 99, 100, 200, and 1900 series airplanes). This AD requires currently requires inspecting the pilot and copilot chairs to ensure that the locking pins will fully engage in the seat tracks, and modifying any chair where the locking pin fails to fully engage or is misaligned.

## **Need for the Correction**

This AD currently has two paragraph (f)'s. The second paragraph (f) gives the effective date of the AD and should be referenced as paragraph (g). As written, operators of Raytheon 90, 99, 100, 200, and 1900 series airplanes may inadvertently not notice or miss the second paragraph (f) of the AD because there was already one paragraph (f); thereby, missing the effective date of the AD.

## **Correction of Publication**

Accordingly, the publication of March 13, 1997 (62 FR 11764), of Amendment 39–9963; AD 97–06–06, which was the subject of FR Doc. 97–6255, is corrected as follows:

# § 39.13 [Corrected]

On page 11766, in the third column, § 39.13, in AD 97–06–06, the second paragraph (f) is correctly designated as paragraph (g).

Action is taken herein to correct this reference in AD 97–06–06 and to add this AD correction to section 39.13 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39.13).

The effective date of the AD remains May 9, 1997.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on April 24, 1997.

## Larry A. Malir,

BILLING CODE 4910-13-U

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 97–11196 Filed 5–1–97; 8:45 am]

## **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

### **Federal Aviation Administration**

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 97-NM-66-AD; Amendment 39-10012; AD 97-08-51]

RIN 2120-AA64

# Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767 Series Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule; request for

comments.

**SUMMARY:** This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) T97-08-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Boeing Model 767 series airplanes by individual telegrams. This AD requires an inspection to ensure that all bolts of the hinge fitting assembly support beam on both the left-and right-hand outboard trailing edge flaps are the correct length and type, and correction of any discrepancy found. This action is prompted by a report indicating that a 20-foot section of the right-hand outboard trailing edge flap separated from the airplane due to failure of four bolts of the most inboard hinge fitting. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct such failed bolts, which could result in loss of an outboard trailing edge flap, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.

**DATES:** Effective May 7, 1997, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by telegraphic AD T97–08–51, issued on April 2, 1997, which contained the requirements of this amendment.

The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of May 7, 1997.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before July 1, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM–103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 97–NM–66, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

The applicable service information may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Todd Martin, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM–120S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; telephone (206) 227–2781; Fax (206) 227–1181.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** On April 2, 1997, the FAA issued telegraphic AD T97–08–51, which is applicable to all Boeing Model 767 series airplanes.

That action was prompted by a report indicating that a 20-foot section of the right-hand outboard trailing edge flap separated from a Boeing Model 767 series airplane during approach for landing. During the approach, a "spoiler up flaps 15" configuration was used as part of a high descent rate approach, which is typically associated with high applied loads on the hinge fittings of the outboard trailing edge flap. Additionally, the numbers 9 and 12 spoilers were damaged, which suggests that, upon separation from the airplane, the flap hit the spoilers. Analysis of the flap structure revealed that four bolts of the most inboard hinge fitting had failed.

On-site investigation of the four failed bolts revealed that one bolt had been completely severed due to fatigue that occurred some time prior to the loss of the section of the flap. The investigation also revealed that two of the bolts had been partially severed (roughly 20–30 percent of the bolt diameter), and that one bolt failed from static overload.

Failure of the bolts, if not detected and corrected, could result in loss of an outboard trailing edge flap, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.

# **Explanation of Relevant Service Information**

The FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767– 27A0151, Revision 1, dated April 2, 1997, which describes procedures for the following actions:

- Performing a torque check inspection to ensure that all bolts of the hinge fitting assembly support beam on both the left-and right-hand outboard trailing edge flaps are within specified torque range;
- An inspection to verify the bolt length and type of all the bolts of both hinge fittings, and correction of any discrepancy found;
- Replacing all six assembly bolts with new or serviceable bolts, or performing a dye penetrant inspection