further flight, correct any discrepancy that is found, in accordance with the service letter.

- (b) Within 3,000 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 hours time-in-service: Perform an inspection to detect galling on the input shaft and bearing of the standby rudder PCU by accomplishing paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(10) of this AD.
 - (1) Shut off all hydraulic power.(2) Gain access to the standby rudder
- (2) Gain access to the standby rudde actuator.
- (3) Disconnect the input rod from the standby actuator.
- (4) Using a push/pull spring scale (minimum +/- 10% accuracy at 1.0 pound; preferably one having a peak load memory function), push on the standby rudder actuator input lever with sufficient force to move the lever from the neutral position up to, but not touching, the aft stop. The scale must be contacting the input lever at approximately the clevis bolt centerline. While applying the load required to move the lever, the scale must be maintained at an angle perpendicular to the lever arm (not to exceed 20 degrees from perpendicular). The force required to move the input lever throughout this range of motion must not exceed one pound.
- (5) Repeat the test specified in paragraph (b)(4) of this AD, moving the lever arm from the aft stop position up to the forward stop, but not touching. The force required to move the input lever throughout this range of motion must not exceed one pound.

(6) Repeat the test specified in paragraph (b)(4) of this AD, moving the lever arm from the forward stop position back to the neutral position. The force required to move the input lever throughout this range of motion must not exceed one pound.

(7) If the actuator force encountered during any of the procedures required by paragraph (b)(4), (b)(5), or (b)(6) of this AD exceeds one pound, prior to further flight, replace the standby rudder actuator with a serviceable actuator, and test the standby rudder actuator in accordance with the procedure specified in paragraph (b)(9) of this AD.

(8) If the actuator force encountered during any of the procedures required by paragraph (b)(4), (b)(5), or (b)(6) of this AD is one pound or less, prior to further flight, reconnect the input rod to the standby rudder actuator, and test the standby rudder actuator in accordance with the procedure specified in paragraph (b)(9) of this AD.

(9) Perform a functional test of the standby rudder actuator in accordance with Maintenance Manual 737–100/–200, Chapter 27–21–141, removal/installation (for Model 737–100 and –200 series airplanes); or maintenance Manual 737–300/–400/–500, Chapter 27–21–24, removal/installation (for Model 737–300, –400, and –500 series airplanes).

(10) Restore the airplane to its normal condition

(c) Within 3 years after the effective date of this AD, replace the input bearing of the standby rudder PCU with an improved bearing in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Accomplishment of the replacement terminates the repetitive inspections required by paragraph (b) of this AD.

(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 21, 1996.

Ronald T. Wojnar,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 96–21879 Filed 8–23–96; 9:01am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 96-NM-148-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737–300 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-300 series airplanes. This proposal would require an inspection to detect fatigue cracking, base trim, and upper flange over-trim of the pulley brackets of the aileron control cables. It also would require, if necessary, replacement of the pulley brackets with new pulley brackets, and replacement of the two button-head rivets with flush-head rivets. This proposal is prompted by a review of the design of the flight control systems on Model 737 series airplanes. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent fatigue cracking or fracturing of the pulley brackets, which could result in slack in the cables and consequent reduced ability of the flightcrew to control the aileron.

DATES: Comments must be received by October 24, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM–103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 96–NM–148–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056. Comments may be inspected at this location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Don Kurle, Senior Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM–130S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056; telephone (206) 227–2798; fax (206) 227–1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket Number 96–NM–148–AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 96-NM-148-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

Discussion

In October 1994, the FAA organized a team to conduct a Critical Design Review (CDR) of the flight control systems installed on Boeing Model 737 series airplanes in an effort to confirm the continued operational safety of these airplanes. The formation of the CDR team was prompted by questions that arose following an accident involving a Model 737–200 series airplane that occurred near Colorado Springs, Colorado, and one involving a Model 737-300 series airplane that occurred near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The CDR team's analysis of the flight control systems was performed independent of the investigations of these accidents, which are conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The cause of the accidents has not yet been determined.

The CDR team was composed of representatives from the FAA, the NTSB, other U.S. government organizations, and foreign airworthiness authorities. The team reviewed the service history and the design of the flight control systems of Model 737 series airplanes. The team completed its review in May 1995. The recommendations of the team include various changes to the design of the flight control systems of these airplanes, as well as correction of certain design deficiencies. This proposed AD is one of nine rulemaking actions being issued by the FAA to address the recommendations of the CDR team.

Report Received by FAA

The FAA has received a report indicating that some pulley brackets of the aileron control cables were trimmed to clear adjacent structure when the brackets were installed on the airplane during manufacture. In this case, the fatigue life of the pulley brackets can be compromised and the pulley brackets could crack or fracture. Fatigue cracking or fracturing of the pulley brackets, if not detected and corrected in a timely manner, could result in slack in the cables and consequent reduced ability of the flightcrew to control the aileron.

Explanation of Relevant Service Information

The FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Service Bulletin 737–27–1154, dated August 25, 1988, which describes procedures for a visual inspection to detect fatigue cracking, base trim, and upper flange over-trim of the pulley brackets of the aileron control cables. It also describes procedures for replacing the pulley brackets with new pulley brackets, and replacing the two buttonhead rivets with flush-head rivets, if

necessary. Installation of flush-head rivets will prevent interference between the pulley brackets and the adjacent structure

Explanation of Requirements of Proposed Rule

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require a visual inspection to detect fatigue cracking, base trim, and upper flange over-trim of the pulley brackets of the aileron control cables. It also would require, if necessary, replacement of the pulley brackets with new pulley brackets, and replacement of the two button-head rivets with flush-head rivets. The actions would be required to be accomplished in accordance with the service bulletin described previously.

Explanation of Proposed Compliance Time

In developing an appropriate compliance time for the proposed inspection, the FAA's intent is that it be performed during a regularly scheduled maintenance visit for the majority of the affected fleet, when the airplanes would be located at a base where special equipment and trained personnel would be readily available, if necessary. In addition, the FAA considered the availability of replacement pulley brackets and rivets that may be needed if fatigue cracking, base trim, or upper flange over-trim is detected. The FAA finds that 18 months corresponds closely to the interval representative of most of the affected operators' normal maintenance schedules. The FAA considers that this interval will provide an acceptable level of safety.

Cost Impact

There are approximately 262 Model 737–300 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 169 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD, that it would take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish the proposed inspection, and that the average labor rate is \$60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$10,140, or \$60 per airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

Should an operator be required to accomplish the necessary replacement of pulley brackets and rivets, it would

take approximately 15 work hours per airplane to accomplish those actions, at an average labor rate of \$60 per work hour. Required parts would cost approximately \$713 per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of any necessary replacement action is estimated to be \$1,613 per airplane.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

Boeing: Docket 96-NM-148-AD.

Applicability: Model 737–300 series airplanes; as listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 737–27–1154, dated August 25, 1988; certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent fatigue cracking or fracturing of the pulley brackets, which could result in slack in the cables and consequent reduced ability of the flightcrew to control the aileron, accomplish the following:

- (a) Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD: Perform a visual inspection to detect fatigue cracking, base trim, or upper flange over-trim of the pulley brackets, part number (P/N) 65C25555-3, 65C25555-501, or 69-73479-1, of the aileron control cables, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-27-1154, dated August 25, 1988.
- (b) If any cracking or over-trim of the pulley brackets is detected: Prior to further flight, replace the pulley brackets with new pulley brackets; and replace the two existing button-head rivets with flush-head rivets; in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737–27–1154, dated August 25, 1988.
- (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.

(d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 21, 1996.

Ronald T. Wojnar,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 96–21880 Filed 8–23–96; 9:01 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-U

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 96-NM-149-AD] RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all Boeing Model 737 series airplanes. This proposal would require revising the FAA-approved maintenance program to prohibit the use of pressure washing within the wheel well or on the landing gear and to prohibit the use of pumps and/or nozzles for washing wheel wells or the landing gear. This proposal is prompted by a review of the design of the flight control systems on Model 737 series airplanes. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent corrosion of certain equipment due to the use of inappropriate pressure washing techniques. Corrosion of bearings, cables, electrical connectors, or other equipment in the main wheel well, if not detected and corrected in a timely manner, could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.

DATES: Comments must be received by October 24, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM–103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 96–NM–149–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056. Comments may be inspected at this location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Herron, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM– 130S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056; telephone (206) 227–2672; fax (206) 227–1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket Number 96–NM–149–AD." The postcard will be date stamped and

Availability of NPRMs

returned to the commenter.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 96-NM-149-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

Discussion

In October 1994, the FAA organized a team to conduct a Critical Design Review (CDR) of the flight control systems installed on Boeing Model 737 series airplanes in an effort to confirm the continued operational safety of these airplanes. The formation of the CDR team was prompted by questions that arose following an accident involving a Model 737-200 series airplane that occurred near Colorado Springs, Colorado, and one involving a Model 737-300 series airplane that occurred near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The CDR team's analysis of the flight control systems was performed independent of the investigations of these accidents, which are conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The cause of the accidents has not yet been determined.

The CDR team was composed of representatives from the FAA, the NTSB, other U.S. government organizations, and foreign airworthiness authorities. The team reviewed the service history and the design of the