FCC Web Documents citing 51.513

as compiled by hallikainen.com/FccRules on 2012 07 01

• http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-11-732A2.pdf http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-11-732A2.txt
  • 0.876 0.873 41.579 45.601 50.296 116.145 114.666 111.191 0.501 0.537 0.566 91.363 92.174 103.861 34.522 36.494 38.549 0.263 0.273 0.267 761.912 780.39 797.844 0.351 0.343 0.353 0.289 0.238 0.276 16.179 16.677 17.658 3,478.123,297.093,423.65 0.415 0.405 0.392 907.599 962.412 996.621 4.306 4.565 4.72 0.564 0.552 0.576 1.29 0.874 1.025 1.734 1.655 1.672 0.979 0.966 1.008 20.935 20.799 21.197 798.101 856.786 925.016 51.513 55.335 58.597 1.918 1.774 1.848 8.621 8.835 8.754 259.342 266.149 273.178 0.579 0.588 0.6 135.172 126.098 157.416 16.587 16.476 16.582 7.852 8.102 8.377 5.863 5.936 6.54 635.21 640.938 749.263 0.446 0.452 0.45 5.017 5.063 5.065 12.775 13.341 15.019 424.333 449.555 472.674 5.349 5.703 5.959 25.444 29.224 33.024 0.877 0.868 0.872 1.582 1.617 1.652 7.31 7.527 7.9 236.325 243.953 249.474 76.734
• http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-96-325A1.pdf
  • of the Act. 51.401 State authority. 51.403 Carriers eligible for suspension or modification under section 251(f)(2) of the Act. 51.405 Burden of proof. Subpart F - Pricing of interconnection and unbundled elements 51.501 Scope. 51.503 General pricing standard. 51.505 Forward-looking economic cost. 51.507 General rate structure standard. 51.509 Rate structure standards for specific elements. 51.511 Forward-looking economic cost per unit. 51.513 Proxies for forward-looking economic cost. 51.515 Application of access charges. Federal Communications Commission 96-325 B-8 Subpart G - Resale 51.601 Scope of resale rules. 51.603 Resale obligation of all local exchange carriers. 51.605 Additional obligations of incumbent local exchange carriers. 51.607 Wholesale pricing standard. 51.609 Determination of avoided retail costs. 51.611 Interim wholesale rates. 51.613 Restrictions on resale. 51.615 Withdrawal
• http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-99-355A1.pdf http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-99-355A1.txt
  • to 27.74, and in Delaware, from $11.68 to $18.21. These prices do not include non-recurring line conditioning costs. Perhaps the most sharply contrasted case is New Hampshire, where Bell Atlantic charges $42.44 per month for an unbundled, conditioned loop, $12.49 above its retail xDSL price. See Covad Comments at 20; Rhythms Reply Comments at 8. See also 47 C.F.R. § 51.513(c)(1), Proxies for Local Loops. Federal Communications Commission FCC 99-355 23 loop as a second line just to obtain access to the high frequency portion of the loop.81 The record indicates that incumbent LECs generally allocate virtually all loop costs to their voice services, then deploy a voice-compatible xDSL service such as ADSL on the same loop, allocating little or no
• http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1999/fcc99355.doc http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1999/fcc99355.txt
  • First Report and Order for this new unbundled network element. We note that US WEST and Covad suggested a different method for setting the price of the line sharing unbundled network element as a fixed percentage of the TELRIC-based unbundled loop rate set by a state commission, or possibly as a percentage of the loop proxy ceilings contained in section 51.513 of our Rules. Covad argued that the price should be ten percent of the unbundled network element rate or the loop proxy. US WEST, in contrast, argued that 50 percent of the state-determined unbundled network element loop rate was a reasonable approximation of the value of the shared lines to the competitive LEC. Both proposals dealt with a scenario in
• http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1996/fcc96325.pdf
  • of the Act. 51.401 State authority. 51.403 Carriers eligible for suspension or modification under section 251(f)(2) of the Act. 51.405 Burden of proof. Subpart F - Pricing of interconnection and unbundled elements 51.501 Scope. 51.503 General pricing standard. 51.505 Forward-looking economic cost. 51.507 General rate structure standard. 51.509 Rate structure standards for specific elements. 51.511 Forward-looking economic cost per unit. 51.513 Proxies for forward-looking economic cost. 51.515 Application of access charges. Federal Communications Commission 96-325 B-8 Subpart G - Resale 51.601 Scope of resale rules. 51.603 Resale obligation of all local exchange carriers. 51.605 Additional obligations of incumbent local exchange carriers. 51.607 Wholesale pricing standard. 51.609 Determination of avoided retail costs. 51.611 Interim wholesale rates. 51.613 Restrictions on resale. 51.615 Withdrawal
• http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1999/fcc99355.doc http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1999/fcc99355.txt
  • First Report and Order for this new unbundled network element. We note that US WEST and Covad suggested a different method for setting the price of the line sharing unbundled network element as a fixed percentage of the TELRIC-based unbundled loop rate set by a state commission, or possibly as a percentage of the loop proxy ceilings contained in section 51.513 of our Rules. Covad argued that the price should be ten percent of the unbundled network element rate or the loop proxy. US WEST, in contrast, argued that 50 percent of the state-determined unbundled network element loop rate was a reasonable approximation of the value of the shared lines to the competitive LEC. Both proposals dealt with a scenario in
• http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/1997/iowa51.html http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/1997/iowa51.wp
  • rules, must then determine the price that an incumbent LEC may charge its competitors, based on the TELRIC-driven cost figure.[8]^(8) The petitioners also challenge the FCC's proxy rates, which, under the provisions of the First Report and Order, are to be used by the state commissions if they do not use the TELRIC method to calculate costs. See id. 51.503(b)(2), 51.513, 51.705(a)(2), 51.707. The incumbent LECs assert that these proxy rates also do not accurately reflect their costs and are artificially low. The petitioners also challenge several other FCC regulations pertaining to the prices that the incumbent LECs are permitted to charge for fulfilling their new duties under the Act. See id. 51.601-51.611, 51.701-51.717. The petitioners' first line of attack against
• http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/1998/iowa51.html
  • rules, must then determine the price that an incumbent LEC may charge its competitors, based on the TELRIC-driven cost figure.[8]^(8) The petitioners also challenge the FCC's proxy rates, which, under the provisions of the First Report and Order, are to be used by the state commissions if they do not use the TELRIC method to calculate costs. See id. 51.503(b)(2), 51.513, 51.705(a)(2), 51.707. The incumbent LECs assert that these proxy rates also do not accurately reflect their costs and are artificially low. The petitioners also challenge several other FCC regulations pertaining to the prices that the incumbent LECs are permitted to charge for fulfilling their new duties under the Act. See id. 51.601-51.611, 51.701-51.717. The petitioners' first line of attack against
• http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/2000/96-3321.doc http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/2000/96-3321.html
  • 1998 WL 396945 (No. 97-831). The proxy prices are also infirm because they rely on the hypothetical most efficient carrier rationale which we have found to be violative of the Act, ante at 5-8, and because they rely on the erroneous definition of "avoided retail costs." We conclude the proxy prices cannot stand and, for the foregoing reasons, vacate rules 51.513, 51.611, and 51.707. D. Unbundling Rules The FCC issued numerous rules to implement the ILECs' duties to provide unbundled access to their network elements under subsection 251(c)(3). Many of these rules were previously challenged. In light of the Supreme Court's opinion, we revisit three of the unbundling rules. 1. Identification of Additional Unbundled Network Elements The Supreme Court vacated 47