FCC Web Documents citing 51.505

as compiled by hallikainen.com/FccRules on 2012 07 01

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  • TELRIC purposes, the Commission defined forward-looking cost in terms of long run incremental cost, with the term ``long run'' being ``a period long enough that all costs are treated as variable and avoidable.'' Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15845, 15851, paras. 677, 692. See, e.g., Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15848-49, para. 685; 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1) (requiring long run incremental cost measurement to be based on the lowest cost network configuration (emphasis added)). See, e.g., Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15849-49, para. 685; 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1). Remote switches are serving end offices that do not support interoffice trunks. Interoffice traffic originating or terminating at the remote switch is routed over an umbilical connection
• http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-12-870A1.doc http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-12-870A1.pdf http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-12-870A1.txt
  • (b)(7) as follows: § 51.911 Access reciprocal compensation rates for competitive LECs. * * * * * (b) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(7) of this section, beginning July 3, 2012, notwithstanding any other provision of the Commission's rules, each Competitive LEC that has tariffs on file with state regulatory authorities shall file intrastate access tariff provisions, in accordance with §51.505(b)(2), that set forth the rates applicable to Transitional Intrastate Access Service in each state in which it provides Transitional Intrastate Access Service. Each Competitive Local Exchange Carrier shall establish the rates for Transitional Intrastate Access Service using the following methodology. (6) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(7) of this section, nothing in this section obligates or allows a Competitive LEC
• http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-266208A1.pdf
  • Washington. Under the Act, Covad must pay Verizon for every "facility" and every piece of "equipment" the former requests from the latter on an unbundled basis. See id. § 153(29); id. § 252(d)(1). After a hard-fought litigation battle, the Commission concluded that UNE prices must be based on each element's Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost ("TELRIC"). See 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b); Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 523 (2002) (upholding the FCC's TELRIC pricing methodology for UNEs as "a reasonable policy" choice). TELRIC rates are akin to wholesale prices because CLECs are supposed to be economically able to rent UNEs and then use them to sell telecom services to their retail customers. The ILECs unsurprisingly dislike seeing their own
• http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-287377A1.pdf
  • that goal, the Act gave the FCC the power to require ILECs to give CLECs access to network elements on an unbundled basis. 47 U.S.C. §251(c)(3). CLECs would also receive this access at a low cost, the so-called TELRIC pricing, which stands for Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 523 (2002); 47 C.F.R. §51.505(b) (defining TELRIC pricing). Before the FCC could require unbundling, however, the Act directed the FCC to consider whether failure to provide unbundled access would impair CLECs from entering the market. 47 U.S.C. §251(d)(2). Obviously, CLECs desired widespread unbun- dled access, and the lower costs associated with it, while ILECs did not want to provide it. Covad, 450 F.3d at 532-33.
• http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-314596A1.doc http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-314596A1.pdf http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-314596A1.txt
  • (b)(7) as follows: § 51.911 Access reciprocal compensation rates for competitive LECs. * * * * * (b) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(7) of this section, beginning July 3, 2012, notwithstanding any other provision of the Commission's rules, each Competitive LEC that has tariffs on file with state regulatory authorities shall file intrastate access tariff provisions, in accordance with §51.505(b)(2), that set forth the rates applicable to Transitional Intrastate Access Service in each state in which it provides Transitional Intrastate Access Service. Each Competitive Local Exchange Carrier shall establish the rates for Transitional Intrastate Access Service using the following methodology. (6) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(7) of this section, nothing in this section obligates or allows a Competitive LEC
• http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-01-170A1.doc http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-01-170A1.pdf http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-01-170A1.txt
  • electric utilities' entry into telecommunications may change this situation in the future. See 1977 Senate Report. In the 1977 Senate Report, Congress also noted that poles owned by cable companies were less than 0.1 percent of the total number of poles nationwide. There is nothing in the record to suggest that this percentage has markedly changed. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1) (forward-looking cost "should be measured based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available and the lowest cost network configuration"). See Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 1585 (¶ 705) (stating that it cannot be determined in the abstract whether a forward-looking cost approach or a historical approach will produce higher cost figures in a particular
• http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-01-181A1.doc http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-01-181A1.pdf http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-01-181A1.txt
  • electric utilities' entry into telecommunications may change this situation in the future. See 1977 Senate Report. In the 1977 Senate Report, Congress also noted that poles owned by cable companies were less than 0.1 percent of the total number of poles nationwide. There is nothing in the record to suggest that this percentage has markedly changed. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1) (forward-looking cost "should be measured based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available and the lowest cost network configuration"). See Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 1585 (¶ 705) (stating that it cannot be determined in the abstract whether a forward-looking cost approach or a historical approach will produce higher cost figures in a particular
• http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-01-29A1.doc http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-01-29A1.pdf http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-01-29A1.txt
  • paras. 59-63. See, e.g., Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15847, 15849, 15856, paras. 682, 686, 702. See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 220 F.3d at 615; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC at 4084, para. 244. AT&T Comments at 15-16. Id. at 15. Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 167. Id. 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(3). See AT&T Baranowski/Flappan Aff. at 26, n.16. See Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15849, para. 686. AT&T Baranowski/Flappan Aff. at paras. 59-60; see also Department of Justice Evaluation at 18-19. Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 162-63. The ALJ's decision contrasts with the New York Commission's decision to assume a lower switch discount for future purchases than
• http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-02-25A1.doc http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-02-25A1.pdf http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-02-25A1.txt
  • asserts that the Bureau Order mandates the exclusive use of the TELRIC pricing methodology and that this mandate is improper. The Bureau Order, however, contains no such directive. Indeed, the Bureau Order states that the LECs should use a forward-looking methodology that is ``consistent'' with the Local Competition Order. TELRIC is the specific forward-looking methodology described in 47 C.F.R. § 51.505 and required by our rules for use by states in determining UNE prices. States often use ``total service long run incremental cost'' (TSLRIC) methodology in setting rates for intrastate services. It is consistent with the Local Competition Order for a state to use its accustomed TSLRIC methodology (or another forward-looking methodology) to develop the direct costs of payphone line service
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  • 6237, paras. 79-80. AT&T Comments at 4; WorldCom Comments at 3-4. Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4085-86, para. 247. AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 607, 617-18 (D.C. Cir. 2000). AT&T Comments at 8, 12; WorldCom Comments at 5-7. Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15848-49, para. 685, 15845, n.1682; see also 47 C.F.R. § 51.505. Rhode Island TELRIC Order at 35. AT&T Comments at 42-43; WorldCom Comments at 6-7. Id. Rhode Island TELRIC Order at 36-37. Id. at 36. Id. at 37-38. See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6276, para. 82. See SWBT Missouri/Arkansas Order at para. 56; Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17457, para. 63. We note, however, that in
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  • of a competitive market.''). Id. at 15848-49, para. 685; 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.501 - 51.511. Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15848-49, para. 685 (the assumption of existing wire centers ``mitigates incumbent LECs' concerns that a forward-looking pricing methodology ignores existing network design, while basing prices on efficient new technology that is compatible with existing infrastructure''); 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1). Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15856, para. 703. Id. at 15850, para. 690. Id. at 15874, para. 743. Id. at 15874-75, para. 745-48. Id. at 15875-76, paras. 749-50 AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 378-85. Id. at 378. Id. at 384 (``The FCC's prescription, through rulemaking, of a requisite pricing methodology no more prevents the States
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  • 2002 Ex Parte Letter at 2 (stating that the current regime ``permits telephone companies to earn back their costs (or less under TELRIC) and requires them to bear the full downside risk of investments that fail, while leaving others to capture any upside of investments that succeed.''). Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15849, para. 686. 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(3). AT&T, for example, states that ``if a competitive environment makes it more likely that an incumbent's capital will be devalued (say by entry or by more rapid technical progress), TELRIC depreciation will reflect this.'' AT&T Dec. 23, 2002 Lawson Ex Parte Letter at 17. This statement appears to be consistent with the basic approach advocated by the incumbent LECs. See,
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  • with those facilities) available to requesting competitive carriers on an unbundled basis. See Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15624, 15631, paras. 241, 258. See Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15844-56, paras. 672-703. See Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15851-54, paras. 694-98; 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.503, 51.505. The term ``common costs'' refers to ``costs that are incurred in connection with the production of multiple products or services, and remains unchanged as the relative proportion of those products or services varies.'' Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15845, para. 676. In its rules, the Commission defines forward-looking common costs as ``economic costs efficiently incurred
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  • and the date at which they are superseded by the transition specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(5) of this section. (2) An incumbent LEC's rates for transport and termination of telecommunications traffic shall be established, at the election of the state commission, on the basis of: (i) The forward-looking economic costs of such offerings, using a cost study pursuant to §§51.505 and 51.511; or (ii) A bill-and-keep arrangement, as provided in §51.713. (3) In cases where both carriers in a Non-Access Reciprocal Compensation arrangement are incumbent LECs, state commissions shall establish the rates of the smaller carrier on the basis of the larger carrier's forward-looking costs, pursuant to §51.711. (c) Except as provided by paragraph (a) of this section, and notwithstanding
• http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-96-325A1.pdf
  • the Act. 51.323 Standards for physical collocation and virtual collocation. Subpart E - Exemptions, suspensions, and modifications of requirements of section 251 of the Act. 51.401 State authority. 51.403 Carriers eligible for suspension or modification under section 251(f)(2) of the Act. 51.405 Burden of proof. Subpart F - Pricing of interconnection and unbundled elements 51.501 Scope. 51.503 General pricing standard. 51.505 Forward-looking economic cost. 51.507 General rate structure standard. 51.509 Rate structure standards for specific elements. 51.511 Forward-looking economic cost per unit. 51.513 Proxies for forward-looking economic cost. 51.515 Application of access charges. Federal Communications Commission 96-325 B-8 Subpart G - Resale 51.601 Scope of resale rules. 51.603 Resale obligation of all local exchange carriers. 51.605 Additional obligations of incumbent local
• http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-99-355A1.pdf http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-99-355A1.txt
  • of loop costs the incumbent LEC allocated to ADSL services when it established its interstate retail rates for those services. This is a straightforward and practical approach for establishing rates consistent with the general pro-competitive purpose underlying the TELRIC principles. We find that establishing the TELRIC of the shared line in this manner does not violate the prohibition in section 51.505(d)(1) of our rules against considering embedded cost in the calculation of the forward looking economic cost of an unbundled network element.325 We also note that this approach was recently approved by the Minnesota PUC.326 140. We find it reasonable to presume that the costs attributed by LECs in the interstate tariff filings to the high-frequency portion of the loop cover
• http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1999/fcc99355.doc http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1999/fcc99355.txt
  • of loop costs the incumbent LEC allocated to ADSL services when it established its interstate retail rates for those services. This is a straightforward and practical approach for establishing rates consistent with the general pro-competitive purpose underlying the TELRIC principles. We find that establishing the TELRIC of the shared line in this manner does not violate the prohibition in section 51.505(d)(1) of our rules against considering embedded cost in the calculation of the forward looking economic cost of an unbundled network element. We also note that this approach was recently approved by the Minnesota PUC. We find it reasonable to presume that the costs attributed by LECs in the interstate tariff filings to the high-frequency portion of the loop cover the
• http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/2001/fcc01029.doc http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/2001/fcc01029.pdf http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/2001/fcc01029.txt
  • paras. 59-63. See, e.g., Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15847, 15849, 15856, paras. 682, 686, 702. See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 220 F.3d at 615; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC at 4084, para. 244. AT&T Comments at 15-16. Id. at 15. Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 167. Id. 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(3). See AT&T Baranowski/Flappan Aff. at 26, n.16. See Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15849, para. 686. AT&T Baranowski/Flappan Aff. at paras. 59-60; see also Department of Justice Evaluation at 18-19. Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 162-63. The ALJ's decision contrasts with the New York Commission's decision to assume a lower switch discount for future purchases than
• http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1996/fcc96325.pdf
  • the Act. 51.323 Standards for physical collocation and virtual collocation. Subpart E - Exemptions, suspensions, and modifications of requirements of section 251 of the Act. 51.401 State authority. 51.403 Carriers eligible for suspension or modification under section 251(f)(2) of the Act. 51.405 Burden of proof. Subpart F - Pricing of interconnection and unbundled elements 51.501 Scope. 51.503 General pricing standard. 51.505 Forward-looking economic cost. 51.507 General rate structure standard. 51.509 Rate structure standards for specific elements. 51.511 Forward-looking economic cost per unit. 51.513 Proxies for forward-looking economic cost. 51.515 Application of access charges. Federal Communications Commission 96-325 B-8 Subpart G - Resale 51.601 Scope of resale rules. 51.603 Resale obligation of all local exchange carriers. 51.605 Additional obligations of incumbent local
• http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1999/fcc99355.doc http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1999/fcc99355.txt
  • of loop costs the incumbent LEC allocated to ADSL services when it established its interstate retail rates for those services. This is a straightforward and practical approach for establishing rates consistent with the general pro-competitive purpose underlying the TELRIC principles. We find that establishing the TELRIC of the shared line in this manner does not violate the prohibition in section 51.505(d)(1) of our rules against considering embedded cost in the calculation of the forward looking economic cost of an unbundled network element. We also note that this approach was recently approved by the Minnesota PUC. We find it reasonable to presume that the costs attributed by LECs in the interstate tariff filings to the high-frequency portion of the loop cover the
• http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/2001/fcc01029.doc http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/2001/fcc01029.pdf http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/2001/fcc01029.txt
  • paras. 59-63. See, e.g., Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15847, 15849, 15856, paras. 682, 686, 702. See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 220 F.3d at 615; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC at 4084, para. 244. AT&T Comments at 15-16. Id. at 15. Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 167. Id. 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(3). See AT&T Baranowski/Flappan Aff. at 26, n.16. See Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15849, para. 686. AT&T Baranowski/Flappan Aff. at paras. 59-60; see also Department of Justice Evaluation at 18-19. Oklahoma ALJ Recommendation at 162-63. The ALJ's decision contrasts with the New York Commission's decision to assume a lower switch discount for future purchases than
• http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/1997/iowa51.html http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/1997/iowa51.wp
  • Legislative Branch of our national government. A. The FCC's Pricing Rules All of the petitioners vehemently challenge the FCC's pricing rules. Their primary target is the FCC's mandate that state commissions employ the "total element long-run incremental cost" (TELRIC) method to calculate the costs that an incumbent LEC incurs in making its facilities available to competitors. See 47 C.F.R. 51.503, 51.505 (1996). After applying the TELRIC method and arriving at a cost figure, the state commissions, according to the FCC's rules, must then determine the price that an incumbent LEC may charge its competitors, based on the TELRIC-driven cost figure.[8]^(8) The petitioners also challenge the FCC's proxy rates, which, under the provisions of the First Report and Order, are to be
• http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/1998/iowa51.html
  • Legislative Branch of our national government. A. The FCC's Pricing Rules All of the petitioners vehemently challenge the FCC's pricing rules. Their primary target is the FCC's mandate that state commissions employ the "total element long-run incremental cost" (TELRIC) method to calculate the costs that an incumbent LEC incurs in making its facilities available to competitors. See 47 C.F.R. 51.503, 51.505 (1996). After applying the TELRIC method and arriving at a cost figure, the state commissions, according to the FCC's rules, must then determine the price that an incumbent LEC may charge its competitors, based on the TELRIC-driven cost figure.[8]^(8) The petitioners also challenge the FCC's proxy rates, which, under the provisions of the First Report and Order, are to be
• http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/1999/iowa.html http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/1999/iowa.wp
  • primary authority to implement the local-competition provisions belonged to the States rather than to the FCC. They thus argued that many of the local- competition rules were invalid, most notably the one requiring that prices for interconnection and unbundled access be based on 'Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost' (TELRIC)--a forward-looking rather than historic measure. [FN3] See 47 CFR 51.503, 51.505 (1997). The Court of Appeals agreed, and vacated the pricing rules, and several other aspects of the Order, as reaching beyond the Commission's jurisdiction. Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, 120 F. 3d 753, 800, 804, 805-806 (1997). It held that the general rulemaking authority conferred upon the Commission by the Communications Act of 1934 extended only to interstate matters, and
• http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/2000/96-3321.doc http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/2000/96-3321.html
  • elements. See First Report and Order ¶ 683. These costs either can be based on the most efficient network configuration and technology currently available, or on the ILEC's existing network infrastructures. See id. The FCC chose an approach which it says combined the two possibilities. See id. ¶ 685. Pursuant t o § 252(d)(1), the FCC promulgated 47 C.F.R. § 51.505 entitled "Forward-looking economic cost." It states in part that "[t]he total element long-run incremental cost of an element should be measured based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available and the lowest cost network configuration, given the existing location of the incumbent LEC's wire centers." 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1). The only nonhypothetical factor in the calculation
• http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/2002/00-511.pdf
  • ìjust and reasonable ratesî must, inter alia, be ìbased on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding) of providing the . . . network element.î ß252(d)(1)(A)(i). Regulations appended to the FCCís First Report and Order under the Act provide, among other things, for the treatment of ìcostî under ß252(d)(1)(A)(i) as ìforward-looking economic cost,î 47 CFR ß51.505, something distinct from the kind of historically based cost previously relied on in valuing a rate base, see, e.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 596ñ598, 605; define the ìforward- looking economic cost of an element [as] the sum of (1) the total ele- ment long-run incremental cost of the element [TELRIC,] and (2) a reasonable
• http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/2004/00-1012-030204.pdf
  • network elements (``UNEs''), see id. § 252(d)(1), and the Commission adopted as its standard ``total element long-run incremental cost,'' or ``TELRIC.'' Under this criterion UNE prices are to be ``based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available and the lowest cost network configuration, given the existing location of the incumbent LEC's wire centers.'' 47 CFR § 51.505(b)(1). In litigation over this pricing rule, which the Supreme Court upheld in Verizon Communications v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002) (``Veri- zon''), it appears to have been common ground that, because of ongoing technological improvement (among other things), prices so determined would fall well below the costs the ILECs had actually historically incurred in constructing the elements. Id. at 503­04,