- (7) Marine Radiodetermination Stations (see 47 CFR part 80, subpart M);
- (8) Personal Radio Services (see 47 CFR part 95), except applications filed after July 26, 1993, in the Interactive Video Data Service (see 47 CFR part 95, subpart F);
- (9) Public Safety, Industrial/Land Transportation, General and Business Radio categories above 800 MHz, including finder's preference requests for frequencies not allocated to the SMR service (see 47 CFR 90.173), and including, until further notice of the Commission, the Automated Vehicle Monitoring Service (see 47 CFR 90.239);
- (10) Private Land Mobile Radio Services between 470-512 MHz (see 47 CFR part 90, subparts B-F), including those based on finder's preferences, (see 47 CFR 90.173):
- (11) Private Land Mobile Radio Services below 470 MHz (see 47 CFR part 90, subparts B-F) except in the 220 MHz band (see 47 CFR part 90, subpart T), including those based on finder's preferences (see 47 CFR §90.173); and
- (12) Private Operational Fixed Services (see 47 CFR part 94).

NOTE TO §1.2102: To determine the rules that apply to competitive bidding, specific service rules should also be consulted.

[59 FR 44293, Aug. 26, 1994, as amended at 60 FR 40718, Aug. 9, 1995; 62 FR 23163, Apr. 29, 1997; 63 FR 10780, Mar. 5, 1998]

EFFECTIVE DATE NOTE: At 79 FR 48528, Aug. 15, 2014, §1.2102 was amended by removing and reserving paragraph (c), effective Oct. 14, 2014

§ 1.2103 Competitive bidding design options.

- (a) The Commission will choose from one or more of the following types of auction designs for services or classes of services subject to competitive bidding:
- (1) Simultaneous multiple-round auctions (using remote or on-site electronic bidding);
- (2) Sequential multiple round auctions (using either oral ascending or remote and/or on-site electronic bidding);
- (3) Sequential or simultaneous single-round auctions (using either sealed paper or remote and/or on-site electronic bidding); and
- (4) Combinatorial (package) bidding auctions.

- (b) The Commission may combinatorial bidding, which would allow bidders to submit all or nothing bids on combinations of licenses or authorizations, in addition to bids on individual licenses or authorizations. The Commission may require that to be declared the high bid, a combinatorial bid must exceed the sum of the individual bids by a specified amount. Combinatorial bidding may be used with any type of auction. The Commission may also allow bidders to submit contingent bids on individual and/or combinations of licenses.
- (1) Apportioned package bid. The apportioned package bid on a license is an estimate of the price of an individual license included in a package of an licenses in auction with combinatorial (package) bidding. Apportioned package bids shall be determined by the Commission according to a methodology it establishes in advance of each auction with combinatorial bidding.
- (2) Substitute for bid amount. The apportioned package bid on a license included in a package shall be used in place of the amount of an individual bid on that license when the bid amount is needed to determine the size of a designated entity bidding credit (see §1.2110(f)(1) and (f)(2)), a new entrant bidding credit (see §73.5007), a bid withdrawal or default payment obligation (see §1.2104(g)), a tribal land bidding credit limit (see 1.2110(f)(3)(iv)), or a size-based bidding credit unjust enrichment payment obligation (see $\S1.2111(d)$, (e)(2) and (e)(3)), or for any other determination required by the Commission's rules or procedures.
- (c) The Commission may use single combined auctions, which combine bidding for two or more substitutable licenses and award licenses to the highest bidders until the available licenses are exhausted. This technique may be used in conjunction with any type of auction.
- (d) The Commission may use real time bidding in all electronic auction designs.

[59 FR 44293, Aug. 26, 1994, as amended at 62 FR 13542, Mar. 21, 1997; 63 FR 2341, Jan. 15, 1998; 68 FR 42995, July 21, 2003; 71 FR 6226, Feb. 7, 2006]

§ 1.2104

EFFECTIVE DATE NOTE: At 79 FR 48528, Aug. 15, 2014, §1.2103 was revised, effective Oct. 14, 2014. For the convenience of the user, the revised text is set forth as follows:

§1.2103 Competitive bidding design options.

- (a) Public notice of competitive bidding design options. Prior to any competitive bidding for initial licenses, public notice shall be provided of the detailed procedures that may be used to implement auction design options.
- (b) Competitive bidding design options. The public notice detailing competitive bidding procedures may establish procedures for collecting bids, assigning winning bids, and determining payments, including without limitation:
- (1) Procedures for collecting bids. (i) Procedures for collecting bids in a single round or in multiple rounds.
- (ii) Procedures allowing for bids for specific items, bids for generic items in one or more categories of items, or bids for one or more aggregations of items.
- (iii) Procedures allowing for bids that specify a price, indicate demand at a specified price, or provide other information as specified by competitive bidding policies, rules, and procedures.
- (iv) Procedures allowing for bids that are contingent on specified conditions, such as other bids being accepted or for packages of licenses being awarded.
- (v) Procedures to collect bids in one or more stages, including procedures for transitions between stages.
- (vi) Procedures for whether, when, and how bids may be modified during the auction.
- (2) Procedures for assigning winning bids. (i) Procedures that take into account one or more factors in addition to the submitted bid amount, including but not limited to the amount of bids submitted in separate competitive bidding.
- (ii) Procedures to assign specific items to bidders following bidding for quantities of generic items.
- (iii) Procedures to incorporate public interest considerations into the process for assigning winning bids.
- (3) Procedures for determining payments. Procedures to determine the amount of any payments made to or by winning bidders consistent with other auction design choices.

§1.2104 Competitive bidding mechanisms.

- (a) Sequencing. The Commission will establish the sequence in which multiple licenses will be auctioned.
- (b) Grouping. In the event the Commission uses either a simultaneous multiple round competitive bidding design or combinatorial bidding, the Commission will determine which li-

censes will be auctioned simultaneously or in combination.

- (c) Reserve Price. The Commission may establish a reserve price or prices, either disclosed or undisclosed, below which a license or licenses subject to auction will not be awarded. For any auction of eligible frequencies described in section 113(g)(2) of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization Act (47 U.S.C. 923(g)(2)) requiring the recovery of estimated relocation costs, the Commission will establish a reserve price or prices pursuant to which the total cash proceeds from any auction of eligible frequencies shall equal at least 110 percent of the total estimated relocation costs provided to the Commission by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration pursuant to section 113(g)(4)such Act (47 U.S.C. of 923(g)(4)).
- (d) Minimum Bid Increments, Minimum Opening Bids and Maximum Bid Increments. The Commission may, by announcement before or during an auction, require minimum bid increments in dollar or percentage terms. The Commission also may establish minimum opening bids and maximum bid increments on a service-specific basis.
- (e) Stopping Rules. The Commission may establish stopping rules before or during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auctions within a reasonable time.
- (f) Activity Rules. The Commission may establish activity rules which require a minimum amount of bidding activity.
- (g) Withdrawal, Default and Disqualification Payment. As specified below, when the Commission conducts an auction pursuant to §1.2103, the Commission will impose payments on bidders who withdraw high bids during the course of an auction, or who default on payments due after an auction closes or who are disqualified.
- (1) Bid withdrawal prior to close of auction. A bidder that withdraws a bid during the course of an auction is subject to a withdrawal payment equal to the difference between the amount of the withdrawn bid and the amount of the winning bid in the same or subsequent auction(s). In the event that a bidding