Federal Communications Commission

§1.2103 Competitive bidding design options.

(a) The Commission will choose from one or more of the following types of auction designs for services or classes of services subject to competitive bidding:

(1) Simultaneous multiple-round auctions (using remote or on-site electronic bidding);

(2) Sequential multiple round auctions (using either oral ascending or remote and/or on-site electronic bidding);

(3) Sequential or simultaneous single-round auctions (using either sealed paper or remote and/or on-site electronic bidding); and

(4) Combinatorial (package) bidding auctions.

The Commission may 1186 (b) combinatorial bidding, which would allow bidders to submit all or nothing bids on combinations of licenses or authorizations, in addition to bids on individual licenses or authorizations. The Commission may require that to be declared the high bid, a combinatorial bid must exceed the sum of the individual bids by a specified amount. Combinatorial bidding may be used with any type of auction. The Commission may also allow bidders to submit contingent bids on individual and/or combinations of licenses.

(1) Apportioned package bid. The apportioned package bid on a license is an estimate of the price of an individual license included in a package of licenses in an auction with combinatorial (package) bidding. Apportioned package bids shall be determined by the Commission according to a methodology it establishes in adof each auction with vance combinatorial bidding.

(2) Substitute for bid amount. The apportioned package bid on a license included in a package shall be used in place of the amount of an individual bid on that license when the bid amount is needed to determine the size of a designated entity bidding credit (see 1.2110(f)(1) and (f)(2)), a new entrant bidding credit (see 3.5007), a bid withdrawal or default payment obligation (see 1.2104(g)), a tribal land bidding credit limit (see 1.2110(f)(3)(iv)), or a size-based bidding credit unjust enrichment payment obligation (see

§1.2111(d), (e)(2) and (e)(3)), or for any other determination required by the Commission's rules or procedures.

(c) The Commission may use single combined auctions, which combine bidding for two or more substitutable licenses and award licenses to the highest bidders until the available licenses are exhausted. This technique may be used in conjunction with any type of auction.

(d) The Commission may use real time bidding in all electronic auction designs.

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FR 13542, Mar. 21, 1997; 63 FR 2341, Jan. 15, 1998; 68 FR 42995, July 21, 2003; 71 FR 6226, Feb. 7, 2006]

§1.2104 Competitive bidding mechanisms.

(a) *Sequencing*. The Commission will establish the sequence in which multiple licenses will be auctioned.

(b) *Grouping.* In the event the Commission uses either a simultaneous multiple round competitive bidding design or combinatorial bidding, the Commission will determine which licenses will be auctioned simultaneously or in combination.

(c) Reserve Price. The Commission may establish a reserve price or prices, either disclosed or undisclosed, below which a license or licenses subject to auction will not be awarded. For any auction of eligible frequencies described in section 113(g)(2) of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization Act (47 U.S.C. 923(g)(2)) requiring the recovery of estimated relocation costs, the Commission will establish a reserve price or prices pursuant to which the total cash proceeds from any auction of eligible frequencies shall equal at least 110 percent of the total estimated relocation costs provided to the Commission by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration pursuant to section 113(g)(4) of such Act (47 U.S.C. 923(g)(4)).

(d) Minimum Bid Increments, Minimum Opening Bids and Maximum Bid Increments. The Commission may, by announcement before or during an auction, require minimum bid increments in dollar or percentage terms. The