## Federal Communications Commission

(1) Alaska-Private Fixed Stations (see 47 CFR part 80, subpart O);

(2) Broadcast radio (AM and FM) and broadcast television (VHF, UHF, LPTV) under 47 CFR part 73;

(3) Broadcast Auxiliary and Cable Television Relay Services (see 47 CFR part 74, subparts D, E, F, G, H and L and part 78, subpart B);

(4) Instructional Television Fixed
Service (see 47 CFR part 74, subpart I);
(5) Maritime Support Stations (see 47)

CFR part 80, subpart N);

(6) Marine Operational Fixed Stations (see 47 CFR part 80, subpart L);

(7) Marine Radiodetermination Stations (see 47 CFR part 80, subpart M);

(8) Personal Radio Services (see 47 CFR part 95), except applications filed after July 26, 1993, in the Interactive Video Data Service (see 47 CFR part 95, subpart F);

(9) Public Safety, Industrial/Land Transportation, General and Business Radio categories above 800 MHz, including finder's preference requests for frequencies not allocated to the SMR service (see 47 CFR 90.173), and including, until further notice of the Commission, the Automated Vehicle Monitoring Service (see 47 CFR 90.239);

(10) Private Land Mobile Radio Services between 470-512 MHz (see 47 CFR part 90, subparts B-F), including those based on finder's preferences, (see 47 CFR 90.173);

(11) Private Land Mobile Radio Services below 470 MHz (*see* 47 CFR part 90, subparts B-F) except in the 220 MHz band (*see* 47 CFR part 90, subpart T), including those based on finder's preferences (*see* 47 CFR §90.173); and

(12) Private Operational Fixed Services (see 47 CFR part 94).

NOTE TO §1.2102: To determine the rules that apply to competitive bidding, specific service rules should also be consulted.

[59 FR 44293, Aug. 26, 1994, as amended at 60
 FR 40718, Aug. 9, 1995; 62 FR 23163, Apr. 29, 1997; 63 FR 10780, Mar. 5, 1998]

## §1.2103 Competitive bidding design options.

(a) The Commission will choose from one or more of the following types of auction designs for services or classes of services subject to competitive bidding: (1) Simultaneous multiple-round auctions (using remote or on-site electronic bidding);

(2) Sequential multiple round auctions (using either oral ascending or remote and/or on-site electronic bidding);

(3) Sequential or simultaneous single-round auctions (using either sealed paper or remote and/or on-site electronic bidding); and

(4) Combinatorial (package) bidding auctions.

(h) The Commission may use combinatorial bidding, which would allow bidders to submit all or nothing bids on combinations of licenses or authorizations, in addition to bids on individual licenses or authorizations. The Commission may require that to be declared the high bid, a combinatorial bid must exceed the sum of the individual bids by a specified amount. Combinatorial bidding may be used with any type of auction. The Commission may also allow bidders to submit contingent bids on individual and/or combinations of licenses.

(1) Apportioned package bid. The apportioned package bid on a license is an estimate of the price of an individual license included in a package of licenses in an auction with combinatorial (package) bidding. Apportioned package bids shall be determined by the Commission according to a methodology it establishes in advance of each auction with combinatorial bidding.

(2) Substitute for bid amount. The apportioned package bid on a license included in a package shall be used in place of the amount of an individual bid on that license when the bid amount is needed to determine the size of a designated entity bidding credit (see §1.2110(f)(1) and (f)(2)), a new entrant bidding credit (see §73.5007), a bid withdrawal or default payment obligation (see §1.2104(g)), a tribal land bidding credit limit (see §1.2110(f)(3)(iv)), or a size-based bidding credit unjust enrichment payment obligation (see §1.2111(d), (e)(2) and (e)(3)), or for any other determination required by the Commission's rules or procedures.

## §1.2104

(c) The Commission may use single combined auctions, which combine bidding for two or more substitutable licenses and award licenses to the highest bidders until the available licenses are exhausted. This technique may be used in conjunction with any type of auction.

(d) The Commission may use real time bidding in all electronic auction designs.

[59 FR 44293, Aug. 26, 1994, as amended at 62
FR 13542, Mar. 21, 1997; 63 FR 2341, Jan. 15, 1998; 68 FR 42995, July 21, 2003; 71 FR 6226, Feb. 7, 2006]

## §1.2104 Competitive bidding mechanisms.

(a) Sequencing. The Commission will establish the sequence in which multiple licenses will be auctioned.

(b) *Grouping*. In the event the Commission uses either a simultaneous multiple round competitive bidding design or combinatorial bidding, the Commission will determine which licenses will be auctioned simultaneously or in combination.

(c) Reserve Price. The Commission may establish a reserve price or prices, either disclosed or undisclosed, below which a license or licenses subject to auction will not be awarded. For any auction of eligible frequencies described in section 113(g)(2) of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization Act (47 U.S.C. 923(g)(2)) requiring the recovery of estimated relocation costs, the Commission will establish a reserve price or prices pursuant to which the total cash proceeds from any auction of eligible frequencies shall equal at least 110 percent of the total estimated relocation costs provided to the Commission by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration pursuant to section of such Act (47 U.S.C. 113(g)(4)923(g)(4)).

(d) Minimum Bid Increments, Minimum Opening Bids and Maximum Bid Increments. The Commission may, by announcement before or during an auction, require minimum bid increments in dollar or percentage terms. The Commission also may establish minimum opening bids and maximum bid increments on a service-specific basis. 47 CFR Ch. I (10–1–08 Edition)

(e) *Stopping Rules*. The Commission may establish stopping rules before or during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auctions within a reasonable time.

(f) Activity Rules. The Commission may establish activity rules which require a minimum amount of bidding activity.

(g) Withdrawal, Default and Disqualification Payment. As specified below, when the Commission conducts an auction pursuant to §1.2103, the Commission will impose payments on bidders who withdraw high bids during the course of an auction, or who default on payments due after an auction closes or who are disqualified.

(1) Bid withdrawal prior to close of auction. A bidder that withdraws a bid during the course of an auction is subject to a withdrawal payment equal to the difference between the amount of the withdrawn bid and the amount of the winning bid in the same or subsequent auction(s). In the event that a bidding credit applies to any of the bids, the bid withdrawal payment is either the difference between the net withdrawn bid and the subsequent net winning bid, or the difference between the gross withdrawn bid and the subsequent gross winning bid, whichever is less. No withdrawal payment will be assessed for a withdrawn bid if either the subsequent winning bid or any of the intervening subsequent withdrawn bids equals or exceeds that withdrawn bid. The withdrawal payment amount is deducted from any upfront payments or down payments that the withdrawing bidder has deposited with the Commission. In the case of multiple bid withdrawals on a single license, the payment for each bid withdrawal will be calculated based on the sequence of bid withdrawals and the amounts withdrawn in the same or subsequent auction(s). In the event that a license for which there have been withdrawn bids subject to withdrawal payments is not won in the same auction, those bidders for which a final withdrawal payment cannot be calculated will be assessed an interim bid withdrawal payment of between 3 and 20 percent of their withdrawn bids, according to a percentage (or percentages) established by the Commission in advance of the auction.