electrical power sources inoperative, as prescribed by paragraphs 1.a. and 1.b., below. For purposes of these special conditions, normal sources of electrical power generation do not include any alternate power sources such as the battery, ram air turbine, or independent power systems such as the flight control permanent magnet generating system. In showing capability for continued safe flight and landing, the applicant must account for systems capability, effects on crew workload and operating conditions, and the physiological needs of the flightcrew and passengers for the longest diversion time for which the applicant is seeking approval.

a. In showing compliance with this requirement, the applicant must account for common-cause failures, cascading failures, and zonal physical threats.

b. The applicant may consider the ability to restore operation of portions of the electrical power generation and distribution system if it can be shown that unrecoverable loss of those portions of the system is extremely improbable. The design must provide an alternative source of electrical power for the time required to restore the minimum electrical power generation capability required for safe flight and landing. The applicant may exclude unrecoverable loss of all engines when showing compliance with this requirement.

2. Regardless of any electrical generation and distribution system recovery capability shown under paragraph 1 of these special conditions, sufficient electrical system capability must be provided to:

a. Allow time to descend, with all engines inoperative, at the speed that provides the best glide distance, from the maximum operating altitude to the top of the engine restart envelope, and

b. Subsequently allow multiple start attempts of the engines and auxiliary power unit (APU). The design must provide this capability in addition to the electrical capability required by existing part 25 requirements related to operation with all engines inoperative.

<sup>3</sup>. The airplane emergency electrical power system must be designed to supply:

a. Electrical power required for immediate safety, which must continue to operate without the need for crew action following the loss of the normal electrical power, for a duration sufficient to allow reconfiguration to provide a non-time-limited source of electrical power.

b. Electrical power required for continued safe flight and landing for the maximum diversion time.

4. If the applicant uses APU-generated electrical power to satisfy the

requirements of these special conditions, and if reaching a suitable runway for landing is beyond the capacity of the battery systems, then the APU must be able to be started under any foreseeable flight condition prior to the depletion of the battery or the restoration of normal electrical power, whichever occurs first. Flight test must demonstrate this capability at the most critical condition.

a. The applicant must show that the APU will provide adequate electrical power for continued safe flight and landing.

b. The operating limitations section of the airplane flight manual (AFM) must incorporate non-normal procedures that direct the pilot to take appropriate actions to activate the APU after loss of normal engine-driven generated electrical power.

5. As part of showing compliance with these special conditions, the tests to demonstrate loss of all normal electrical power must also take into account the following:

a. The assumption that the failure condition occurs during night instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) at the most critical phase of the flight, relative to the worst possible electrical power distribution and equipment-loads-demand condition.

b. After the un-restorable loss of normal engine generator power, the airplane engine restart capability is provided and operations continued in IMC.

c. The airplane is demonstrated to be capable of continued safe flight and landing. The length of time must be computed based on the maximum diversion time capability for which the airplane is being certified. The applicant must account for airspeed reductions resulting from the associated failure or failures.

d. The airplane must provide adequate indication of loss of normal electrical power to direct the pilot to the non-normal procedures, and the operating limitations section of the AFM must incorporate non-normal procedures that will direct the pilot to take appropriate actions.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 2, 2017.

### Michael Kaszycki,

Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2017–09441 Filed 5–9–17; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

# DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### **Federal Aviation Administration**

### 14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. FAA-2017-0215; Special Conditions No. 25-669-SC]

### Special Conditions: Textron Aviation Inc. Model 700 Airplane; Design Roll Maneuver Condition

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. **ACTION:** Final special conditions; request for comments.

**SUMMARY:** These special conditions are issued for the Textron Aviation Inc. (Textron) Model 700 airplane. This airplane will have a novel or unusual design feature when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transportcategory airplanes. This design feature is an electronic flight-control system that provides control through pilot inputs to the flight computer. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

**DATES:** This action is effective on Textron on May 10, 2017. We must receive your comments by June 26, 2017.

**ADDRESSES:** Send comments identified by docket number FAA–2017–0215 using any of the following methods:

• *Federal eRegulations Portal:* Go to *http://www.regulations.gov/* and follow the online instructions for sending your comments electronically.

• *Mail:* Send comments to Docket Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590–0001.

• *Hand Delivery or Courier:* Take comments to Docket Operations in Room W12–140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

• *Fax:* Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202–493–2251.

*Privacy:* The FAA will post all comments it receives, without change, to *http://www.regulations.gov/,* including any personal information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the docket Web site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all comments received into any FAA docket, including the name of the individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement can be found in the **Federal Register** published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478)

Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at http://www.regulations.gov/ at any time. Follow the online instructions for accessing the docket or go to Docket Operations in Room W12–140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Greg Schneider, FAA, Airframe and Cabin Safety Branch, ANM-115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone 425–227–2116; facsimile 425 - 227 - 1320.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** The FAA has determined that notice of, and opportunity for prior public comment on, these special conditions is impracticable because these procedures would significantly delay issuance of the design approval and thus delivery of the affected airplane.

In addition, the substance of these special conditions has been subject to the public-comment process in several prior instances with no substantive comments received. The FAA therefore finds it unnecessary to delay the effective date and finds tthat good cause exists for making these special conditions effective upon publication in the **Federal Register**.

#### **Comments Invited**

We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.

We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for comments. We may change these special conditions based on the comments we receive.

#### Background

On November 20, 2014, Textron applied for a type certificate for their new Model 700 airplane. The Model 700 airplane is low-wing, pressurized, turbofan-powered executive jet airplane with seating for two crewmembers and up to 12 passengers. This airplane will have two Honeywell AS907–2–1S turbofan engines and a maximum takeoff weight of 38,514 pounds.

# **Type Certification Basis**

Under the provisions of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.17, Textron must show that the Model 700 airplane meets the applicable provisions of part 25, as amended by Amendments 25–1 through 25–139, 25–141, and 25–143.

If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations (*i.e.*, 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Textron Model 700 airplane because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of § 21.16.

Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual design feature, these special conditions would also apply to the other model under § 21.101.

In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Model 700 airplane must comply with the fuel-vent and exhaustemission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the noise-certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. The FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy under § 611 of Public Law 92– 574, the "Noise Control Act of 1972." The FAA issues special conditions, as

The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance with § 11.38, and they become part of the type certification basis under § 21.17(a)(2).

# Novel or Unusual Design Features

The Model 700 airplane will incorporate the following novel or unusual design feature: An electronic flight-control system that provides control through pilot inputs to the flight computer.

#### Discussion

The roll control system uses both ailerons and flight spoilers. The aileron control system is a fully mechanical system, and the flight spoilers are flyby-wire. Section 25.349 specifies roll maneuver load conditions that are based on aileron deflection, rather than control-wheel deflection. By specifying the load conditions in terms of aileron deflection, the current requirement does not address electronic flight controls that cause nonlinearities and other loads caused by spoilers. Since this type of system affects flight loads, and therefore the structural capability of the airplane, special conditions are necessary to address these effects.

These special conditions differ from current requirements in that they require the actuation of the cockpit roll control, as opposed to the aileron itself, to perform the roll maneuver. Also, these special conditions require an additional load condition at  $V_A$ , in which the cockpit roll control is returned to neutral following the initial roll input.

These special conditions differ from similar special conditions applied to previous similar technologies. These special conditions are limited to the roll axis only, whereas previous special conditions also included the pitch and yaw axes. Special conditions are no longer necessary for the pitch or yaw axes because Amendment 25–91 takes into account the effects of an electronic flight-control system in those axes (§ 25.331 for pitch and § 25.351 for yaw).

These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

# Applicability

As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Textron Model 700 airplane. Should Textron apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, these special conditions would apply to that model as well.

#### Conclusion

This action affects only one novel or unusual design feature on one model of airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability.

The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. Therefore, because a delay would significantly affect the certification of the airplane, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon publication in the Federal Register. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that

may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described above.

## List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

## The Special Conditions

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for Textron Aviation Inc. Model 700 airplanes.

In lieu of compliance with § 25.349(a), the following conditions, speeds, and cockpit roll control motions (except as the motions may be limited by pilot effort) must be considered in combination with an airplane load factor of zero and of two-thirds of the positive maneuvering factor used in design. In determining the resulting control-surface deflections, the torsional flexibility of the wing must be considered in accordance with § 25.301(b):

1. Conditions corresponding to steady rolling velocities must be investigated. In addition, conditions corresponding to maximum angular acceleration must be investigated for airplanes with engines or other weight concentrations outboard of the fuselage. For the angularacceleration conditions, zero rolling velocity may be assumed in the absence of a rational time history investigation of the maneuver.

2. At  $V_A$ , sudden movement of the cockpit roll control up to the limit is applied. The position of the cockpit roll control must be maintained until a steady roll rate is achieved, and then must be returned suddenly to the neutral position.

3. At  $V_C$ , the cockpit roll control must be moved suddenly and maintained so as to achieve a roll rate not less than that obtained in paragraph 2.

4. At  $V_D$ , the cockpit roll control must be moved suddenly and maintained so as to achieve a roll rate not less than one third of that obtained in paragraph 2.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 24, 2017.

#### Michael Kaszycki,

Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2017–09440 Filed 5–9–17; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

# DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

#### **Federal Aviation Administration**

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2016-6436; Directorate Identifier 2015-SW-037-AD; Amendment 39-18869; AD 2017-09-07]

RIN 2120-AA64

# Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH Helicopters

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. **ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (Airbus Helicopters) Model MBB–BK117 C–2 helicopters. This AD requires inspecting the pilot collective wiring harness and was prompted by a report that the heat-shrinkable sleeve prevented the twist grip on the collective from being fully engaged during a flight test. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent an unsafe condition on these products. **DATES:** This AD is effective June 14, 2017.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain document listed in this AD as of June 14, 2017.

**ADDRESSES:** For service information identified in this final rule, contact Airbus Helicopters, 2701 N. Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052; telephone (972) 641-0000 or (800) 232-0323; fax (972) 641-3775; or at https:// www.airbushelicopters.com/techpub/ FO/scripts/myFO\_login.php. You may review the referenced service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. It is also available on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2016-6436.

# **Examining the AD Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at *http:// www.regulations.gov* by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA–2016– 6436; or in person at the Docket Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, any incorporated-by-reference service information, the economic evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations Office (phone: 800– 647–5527) is U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations Office, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

George Schwab, Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety Management Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222–5110; email george.schwab@faa.gov.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

### Discussion

On December 7, 2016, at 81 FR 88143, the Federal Register published our notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), which proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to Airbus Helicopters MBB-BK 117 C-2 helicopters, serial numbers 9004 through 9708. The NPRM proposed to require visually inspecting the pilot collective wiring harness for proper installation of the heat-shrinkable and transparent sleeves. The proposed requirements were intended to detect an incorrectly installed heat-shrinkable sleeve on the collective lever wiring harness, which if not corrected, could result in chafing of the wiring and subsequent failure of the hoist cable cutter or emergency landing gear flotation systems.

The NPRM was prompted by AD No. 2015-0144, dated July 21, 2015, issued by EASA, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, to correct an unsafe condition for Airbus Helicopters Model MBB-BK117 C-2 helicopters, up to serial number 9708. EASA advises that, during a flight test, the pilot could not fully engage a twist grip on a Model MBB-BK117 C-2 helicopter. According to EASA, further investigation found a transparent sleeve on the collective lever wiring harness damaged because of incorrect installation of the heatshrinkable sleeve. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in chafing of the harness, leading to the malfunction of the affected systems, EASA advises. EASA consequently requires a one-time inspection of the heat-shrinkable and transparent sleeves installed on the collective lever wiring harness.

#### Comments

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD, but we received no comments on the NPRM.