DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security

15 CFR Parts 732, 736, 740, 742, 744, 746, 762, and 772

[Docket No. 040422128-4128-01] RIN 0694-AD14

Revision of Export and Reexport Restrictions on Libya

AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.

ACTION: Interim rule with request for comments.

SUMMARY: In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the President's April 23, 2004, decision to revise United States sanctions against Libya. This rule also implements the transfer to the Department of Commerce from the Department of Treasury of the licensing jurisdiction for exports to Libya of items subject to the EAR.

DATES: This rule is effective April 29, 2004. Comments must be received on or before June 1, 2004.

ADDRESSES: Written comments should be sent to Sheila Quarterman, Regulatory Policy Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, P.O. Box 273, Washington, DC 20044, or to e-mail: squarter@bis.doc.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joan Roberts, Director, Foreign Policy Controls Division, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, P.O. Box 273, Washington, DC 20044; Telephone: (202) 482-4252, or e-mail: jroberts@bis.doc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On April 23, 2004, in response to Libya's continued effort to completely dismantle its weapons of mass destruction and missile programs, and adhere to its renunciation of terrorism, the President announced the termination of the application of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act with respect to Libya. Also, the Treasury Department modified sanctions imposed on U.S. firms and individuals under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to allow the resumption of most commercial activities, financial transactions, and investments. This rule sets forth the new export control policy for exports

(and reexports) to Libya under the licensing responsibility of the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).

Previous Licensing Regime

Since January 1986, in response to Libya's repeated use and support of terrorism against the United States, other countries, and innocent persons, the U.S. has maintained economic sanctions against Libya through the Libyan Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 550) and the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR Part 730 et seq.). The Department of the Treasury and the Department of Commerce shared licensing responsibility for proposed U.S. exports and reexports to Libya. The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) had licensing jurisdiction for exports to Libya, including transshipments via third countries. Authorization granted by OFAC constituted authorization under the EAR. BIS had licensing jurisdiction for reexports of U.S.-origin items to Libya.

Overview: New Licensing Policy for Exports and Reexports to Libya

License Requirements for Exports and Reexports to Libya

Under the new policy established by this Rule, BIS will require a license for the export or reexport of most items on the Commerce Control List (CCL) to Libya. This requirement applies to the export or reexport of all items under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce that are on the multilateral export control regime lists: the Wassenaar Arrangement (reason for control: National Security-NS), the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (reason for control: Nuclear Nonproliferation—NP), the Australia Group (reasons for control: Chemical and Biological Weapons—CB) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (reason for control: Missile Technology—MT).

A license requirement also applies to items unilaterally controlled for crime control (CC) or regional stability (RS) reasons.

In addition, a license requirement applies to most U.S.-origin items unilaterally controlled for anti-terrorism (AT) reasons, as set forth specifically in new § 742.20 of the EAR.

The license requirements described above are reflected in the relevant columns of the Country Chart in Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR. BIS also will require a license for certain categories of items that are controlled for reasons not included on the Country Chart: encryption (EI), short

supply (SS), Chemical Weapons (CW), Computers (XP), and Significant Items (SI)

Items subject to the EAR but not specifically listed on the CCL—referred to as EAR99 items—do not require an export or reexport license to Libya. This rule, however, does not relieve exporters and others of their responsibility to comply with obligations under the end-user and enduse controls maintained under the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), as set forth in Part 744 of the EAR.

Licensing Policy

As set forth in new § 742.20 of the EAR, a general policy of denial will apply to applications for exports or reexports of the following items to Libya: items controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons; military-related items controlled for national security reasons; items that are controlled for missile proliferation reasons; cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic items controlled for national security reasons; explosives detection equipment controlled under Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 2A983; "Software" (ECCN 2D983) specially designed or modified for the "development", "production" or "use" of explosives detection equipment controlled by 2A983; "Technology" (ECCN 2E983) specially designed or modified for the "development", "production" or "use" of explosives detection equipment controlled by 2A983; commercial charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992; ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate, controlled under ECCN 1C997; and technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355. All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components will generally be denied, except that parts and components intended to ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with a presumption of approval.

Also, BIS will generally deny all applications for export and reexport to Libya of items controlled for AT (Column 1) reasons, and not described above, if such items are destined to military, police or intelligence end-users in Libya.

BIS will review, on a case-by-case basis, all other applications for exports or reexports to Libya under the applicable licensing policy described in Part 742 of the EAR.

License Exceptions

Libya is presently listed in Country Groups D:2, D:3, D:4, E:1 and E:2, found in Supplement 1 to Part 740. This rule removes Libya from Country Group E:2. As a result, the following License Exceptions may be available, in whole or in part: TMP, RPL, GOV, GFT, TSU, BAG, and AVS. A specific transaction is eligible for a license exception only if it satisfies all of the terms and conditions of the relevant license exception and is not excluded by any of the restrictions that apply to all license exceptions, as set forth in the EAR (including, specifically, § 740.2 Restrictions on all License Exceptions).

Transition for Licenses Granted by OFAC

To facilitate a smooth transition of licensing responsibility from OFAC to BIS, this rule extends the validity of licenses issued by OFAC for exports to Libya. OFAC licenses in effect as of April 29, 2004, are hereby continued in accordance with their terms, except as modified by this Rule or by BIS, as if issued by the Department of Commerce. For those licenses with specified expiration dates, such dates will continue to apply. Licenses without specified expiration dates will be valid through May 1, 2005. Items licensed by OFAC and subsequently returned from Libya to the United States do not require further authorization from BIS. However, persons returning items that were previously exported to Libya under a specific license granted by OFAC to the United States are subject to a recordkeeping requirement set forth in Part 762 of the EAR.

In addition, items exported or reexported to Libya under a specific OFAC license may not be transferred within Libva to a new end-user without further authorization from BIS. Reexports of items to countries other than the United States from Libya including those previously authorized under OFAC licenses must conform with the relevant provisions of the EAR for the country to which the items are being reexported. In certain circumstances, such reexports may be eligible for a License Exception or may not require a license. Such reexports will also be subject to a recordkeeping requirement.

Ålthough the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), as amended, expired on August 20, 2001, Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783) as extended by the Notice of August 7, 2003 (68 FR 47833, August 11, 2003), continues the EAR in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. BIS amends the EAR in this rule under the provisions of the EAA as continued in effect under IEEPA and Executive Order 13222.

Rulemaking Requirements

- 1. This final rule has been determined to be significant for the purposes of Executive Order 12866.
- 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person is required to respond to nor be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information, subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) (PRA), unless that collection of information displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Control Number. This regulation involves collections previously approved by the OMB under control numbers 0694–0088, "Multi-Purpose Application," which carries a burden hour estimate of 58 minutes to prepare and submit form BIS-748.
- 3. This rule does not contain policies with Federalism implications sufficient to warrant preparation of a Federalism assessment under Executive Order 13132.
- 4. The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553) requiring notice of proposed rulemaking, the opportunity for public participation, and a delay in effective date, are inapplicable because this regulation involves a military or foreign affairs function of the United States (see 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1)). Further, no other law requires that a notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for public comment be given for this rule. Because a notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for public comment are not required to be given for this rule by 5 U.S.C. 553, or by any other law, the analytical requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., are not applicable.

However, because of the importance of the issues raised by these regulations, this rule is being issued in interim form and BIS will consider comments in the development of the final regulations. Accordingly, the Department of Commerce (the Department) encourages interested persons who wish to comment to do so at the earliest possible time to permit the fullest consideration of their views.

The period for submission of comments will close June 1, 2004. The Department will consider all comments received before the close of the comment period in developing final regulations. Comments received after the end of the comment period will be considered if possible, but their consideration cannot be assured. The Department will not accept public comments accompanied by a request that a part or all of the material be treated confidentially because of its business proprietary nature or for any other reason. The Department will return such comments and materials to the persons submitting the comments and will not consider them in the development of final regulations. All public comments on these regulations will be a matter of public record and will be available for public inspection and copying. In the interest of accuracy and completeness, the Department requires comments in written form.

Oral comments must be followed by written memoranda, which will also be a matter of public record and will be available for public review and copying. Communications from agencies of the United States Government or foreign governments will not be available for

public inspection.

The public record concerning this regulation will be maintained in the Bureau of Industry and Security Freedom of Information Records Inspection Facility, Room 6881, Department of Commerce, 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230. Records in this facility, including written public comments and memoranda summarizing the substance of oral communications, may be inspected and copied in accordance with regulations published in part 4 of Title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Information about the inspection and copying of records at the facility may be obtained from the Bureau of Industry and Security Freedom of Information Officer, at the above address or by calling (202) 482-0500.

List of Subjects

15 CFR Parts 732 and 740

Administrative practice and procedure, Exports, Foreign trade, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

15 CFR Parts 736, 742, and 772 Exports, Foreign trade.

15 CFR Part 744

Exports, Foreign trade, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

15 CFR Part 746

Embargoes, Exports, Foreign trade, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

15 CFR Part 762

Administrative practice and procedure, Business and industry, Confidential business information, Exports, Foreign trade, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

■ Accordingly, parts 732, 736, 740, 742, 744, 746, 762, and 772 of the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR parts 730–799) are amended as follows:

PART 732—[AMENDED]

■ 1. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 732 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 *et seq.*; 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of August 7, 2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328.

§732.1 [Amended]

- 2. Section 732.1 is amended:
- a. By revising the phrase "Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and Libya." in the next to last sentence of paragraph (d)(2) to read "Cuba, Iran, and Iraq."; and
- b. By revising the phrase "embargoed countries (e.g., Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and Libya)," in (d)(3) to read "countries subject to a comprehensive embargo (e.g., Cuba, Iran, and Iraq),".

§732.2 [Amended]

■ 3. Section 732.2 is amended by revising the phrase "Your export or reexport destination for the direct

product is Cuba, Libya," in paragraph (f)(1)(i) to read "Your export or reexport destination for the direct product is Cuba".

- 4. Section 732.3 is amended:
- a. By revising the phrase "Your export or reexport destination for the direct product is Cuba, Libya," in paragraph (f)(1)(i) to read "Your export or reexport destination for the direct product is Cuba";
- b. By revising the phrase "If your destination for any item is Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya or Rwanda" in paragraph (i) to read "If your destination for any item is Cuba, Iran, Iraq or Rwanda"; and
- c. By revising paragraph (d)(4) to read as follows:

§ 732.3 Steps regarding the ten general prohibitions.

(d) * * *

(4) Destinations subject to embargo provisions. The Country Chart does not apply to Cuba, Iran, and Iraq; and for those countries you should review the embargo provisions at part 746 of the EAR and may skip this step concerning the Country Chart. For Rwanda, the Country Chart provides for certain license requirements, and part 746 of the EAR provides additional requirements.

PART 736—[AMENDED]

■ 5. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 736 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; E.O. 12938, 59 FR 59099, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 950; E.O. 13020, 61 FR 54079, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 219; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of August 7, 2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328; Notice of October 29, 2003, 68 FR 62209, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 347.

§ 736.2 [Amended]

■ 6. Section 736.2 is amended by revising the phrase "General Prohibition Three to Cuba, Libya," in paragraph (b)(3)(i) to read "General Prohibition Three to Cuba".

PART 738—[AMENDED]

■ 7. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 738 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 10 U.S.C. 7420; 10 U.S.C. 7430(e); 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 287c; 22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6004; 30 U.S.C. 185(s), 185(u); 42 U.S.C. 2139a; 42 U.S.C. 6212; 43 U.S.C. 1354; 46 U.S.C. app. 466c; 50 U.S.C. app. 5; Sec. 901–911, Pub. L. 106–387; Sec. 221, Pub. L. 107–56; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of August 7, 2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328.

■ 8. Supplement No. 1 to part 738 is amended by revising the entry for "Libya" to read as follows:

SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 TO PART 738—COMMERCE COUNTRY CHART [Reason for control]

Countries	Chemical & biological weapons			Nuclear non- proliferation		National security		Missile tech	Regi	ional	Firearms conven-	Crime control			Anti-terrorism	
	CB 1	CB 2	CB 3	NP 1	NP 2	NS 1	NS 2	MT 1	RS 1	RS 2	tion	CC 1	CC 2	CC 3	AT 1	AT 2
											FC 1	CC I				
Libya	Х	Х	Х	Х		Х	Х	Х	Х	Х		Х		Х	Х	

PART 740—[AMENDED]

■ 9. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 740 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 *et seq.*; 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*; Sec. 901–911, Pub. L. 106–387; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of August 7, 2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328.

§740.2 [Amended]

■ 10. Section 740.2 is amended by revising the phrase "The export or reexport is to an embargoed destination (Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and Libya)," in paragraph (a)(6) to read "The export or

reexport is to an embargoed destination (Cuba, Iran, and Iraq),";

§740.9 [Amended]

- 11. Section 740.9 is amended:
- a. By revising the sentence "No foreign-origin items may be returned to Cuba or Libya." in paragraph (b)(3) to read "No foreign-origin items may be returned to Cuba.";
- b. By revising the phrase "A destination in Cuba or Libya;" in paragraph (b)(4)(i) to read "A destination in Cuba;"; and
- c. By revising the phrase "except Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan" in paragraph (c)(2) to read "except Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and Sudan".

§740.15 [Amended]

■ 12. Section 740.15 is amended by revising the phrase "to a country included in Country Group D:1, Cuba, or Libya," in paragraph (b)(2) to read "to a country included in Country Group D:1, Cuba,".

Supplement No. 1 to Part 740 [Amended]

- 13. Supplement No. 1 to part 740 is amended:
- a. By removing Libya from Country Group E:2; and
- b. By revising footnote 1(a) to Country Group E to read "A comprehensive embargo against Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and Sudan; and".

PART 742—[AMENDED]

■ 14. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 742 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 2139a; Sec. 901–911, Pub. L. 106–387; Sec. 221, Pub. L. 107–56; E.O. 12058, 43 FR 20947, 3 CFR, 1978 Comp., p. 179; E.O. 12851, 58 FR 33181, 3 CFR, 1993 Comp., p. 608; E.O. 12938, 59 FR 59099, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 950; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of November 9, 2001, 66 FR 56965, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 917; Notice of August 7, 2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328.

- 15. Section 742.1 is amended:
- a. By revising the heading "Exports and reexports involving Cuba, Libya, Iraq, Iran, and the Bosnian Serbcontrolled areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina" of paragraph (c) to read "Exports and reexports involving Cuba, Iran, and Iraq";
- b. By revising the parenthetical phrase "(Cuba, Libya, Iraq, Iran and the Bosnian Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina)." in paragraph (c) to read "(Cuba, Iran, and Iraq).";
- c. By revising paragraph (d) to read as set forth below; and
- d. By revising the phrase "certain exports to and for the use of certain foreign vessels or aircraft; and certain exports to all countries for Libya aircraft." in paragraph (e) to read "and certain exports to and for the use of certain foreign vessels and aircraft."

§742.1 Introduction

* * * * *

(d) Anti-terrorism Controls on Cuba. Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. Commerce maintains antiterrorism controls on Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Sudan under section 6(a) of the Export Administration Act. Items controlled under section 6(a) to Iran, Syria, Sudan, North Korea and Libya are described in §§ 742.8, 742.9, 742.10, 742.19 and 742.20, respectively, and in Supplement No. 2 to part 742. Commerce also maintains controls under section 6(j) of the EAA to Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. Items controlled to these countries under EAA section 6(j) are also described in Supplement 2 to part 742. The Secretaries of Commerce and State are required to notify appropriate Committees of the Congress 30 days before issuing a license for an item controlled under section 6(j) to Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Sudan or Syria. As noted in paragraph (c) of this section, if you are exporting or

reexporting to Cuba, Iran, or Iraq you should review part 746 of the EAR, Embargoes and Other Special Controls.

* * * * *

■ 16. Part 742 is amended by adding a new § 742.20 to read as follows:

§742.20 Anti-terrorism: Libya.

(a) License requirements. (1) If AT Column 1 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, BIS requires a license for export and reexport to Libya for anti-terrorism purposes.

(2) The Secretary of State has designated Libya as a country whose government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international

terrorism.

- (3) In support of U.S. foreign policy against terrorism, BIS maintains two types of anti-terrorism controls on the export and reexport to Libya of items described in Supplement No. 2 to part 742.
- (i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742, if destined to military, police, intelligence or other end-users in Libya, are controlled under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as amended (EAA).
- (ii) Items listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 destined to other end-users in Libya, as well as items to all end-users listed in (c)(6) through (c)(8), (c)(10) through (c)(14), (c)(16) through (c)(19), and (c)(22) through (c)(44) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742, are controlled to Libya under section 6(a) of the EAA.
- (b) *Licensing policy.* (1) Applications for export and reexport to all end-users in Libya of the following items will generally be denied:
- (i) Items controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any destination. These are items that contain CB Column 1, CB Column 2, or CB Column 3 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.
- (ii) Military-related items controlled for national security reasons to any destination. These are items that contain NS Column 1 or RS Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section in an ECCN on the CCL and are controlled by equipment or material entries ending in the number "18."
- (iii) Items controlled for missile proliferation reasons to any destination. These are items that have an MT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.

- (iv) All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components, except that parts and components intended to ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with a presumption of approval. These are items controlled to any destination for national security and missile technology reasons and items controlled to Libya for anti-terrorism purposes. Such items contain an NS Column 1, NS Column 2, MT Column 1, or AT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL. Note that, consistent with the general rule that applies to computing U.S. parts and components content incorporated into foreign made products, all aircraft-related items that require a license to Libya will be controlled U.S. content, except for ECCNs 6A998, 7A994, and 9A991.d, for purposes of such licensing requirements.
- (v) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and crypto-logic items controlled to any destination for national security reasons. Such items contain an AT Column 1 and an NS Column 1 or NS Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the "License Requirements" section of an ECCN on the CCL.
- (vi) Explosives detection equipment controlled under ECCN 2A983.
- (vii) "Software" (ECCN 2D983) specially designed or modified for the "development", "production" or "use" of explosives detection equipment controlled by 2A983.
- controlled by 2A983.
 (viii) "Technology" (ECCN 2E983)
 specially designed or modified for the
 "development", "production" or "use"
 of explosives detection equipment
 controlled by 2A983.
- (ix) Commercial charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992.
- (x) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate, controlled under ECCN 1C997.
- (xi) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355.
- (2) Applications for export and reexport to Libya of all other items described in paragraph (a) of this section, and not described by paragraph (b)(1) of this section, will generally be denied if the export or reexport is destined to a military end-user or for military end-use. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2), of this

section, applications for Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis if:

- (i) The U.S. content of foreignproduced commodities is 20% or less by value; or
- (ii) The commodities are medical items.

Note to paragraph (b) of this section: Applicants who wish any of the factors described in paragraph (b) of this section to be considered in reviewing their license applications must submit adequate documentation demonstrating the value of the U.S. content or the specifications and medical use of the equipment.

- (4) License applications for items reviewed under 6(a) controls will also be reviewed to determine the applicability of 6(j) controls to the transaction. When it is determined that an export or reexport could make a significant contribution to the military potential of Libya, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance Libya's ability to support acts of international terrorism, the Secretaries of State and Commerce will notify the Congress 30 days prior to issuance of a license.
- 17. Supplement No. 2 to part 742 is revised to read as follows:

SUPPLEMENT NO. 2 TO PART 742— ANTI-TERRORISM CONTROLS: IRAN, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, SYRIA AND SUDAN CONTRACT SANCTITY DATES AND RELATED POLICIES

Note: Exports and reexports of items in performance of contracts entered into before the applicable contract sanctity date(s) will be eligible for review on a case-by-case basis or other applicable licensing policies that were in effect prior to the contract sanctity date. The contract sanctity dates set forth in this Supplement are for the guidance of exporters. Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on specific items and are the relevant dates for the purpose of licensing determinations involving such items. If you believe that a specific contract sanctity date is applicable to your transaction, you should include all relevant information with your license application. BIS will determine any applicable contract sanctity date at the time an application with relevant supporting documents is submitted.

(a) Terrorist-supporting countries. The Secretary of State has designated Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as countries whose governments have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA).

(b) Items controlled under EAA sections 6(j) and 6(a). Whenever the Secretary of State determines that an export or reexport to any of these countries could make a significant contribution to the military potential of such country, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance the ability of

such country to support acts of international terrorism, the item is subject to mandatory control under EAA section 6(j) and the Secretaries of Commerce and State are required to notify appropriate Committees of the Congress 30 days before a license for such an item may be issued.

- (1) On December 28, 1993, the Secretary of State determined that the export to Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Sudan, or Syria of items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this Supplement, if destined to military, police, intelligence or other sensitive end-users, are controlled under EAA section 6(j). Therefore, the 30-day advance Congressional notification requirement applies to the export or reexport of these items to sensitive end-users in any of these countries.
- (2) License applications for items controlled to designated terrorist-supporting countries under EAA section 6(a) will also be reviewed to determine whether the Congressional notification requirements of EAA section 6(j) apply.
- (3) Items controlled for anti-terrorism reasons under section 6(a) to Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria are:
- (i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) to non-sensitive end-users, and
- (ii) The following items to all end-users: for Iran, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(44) of this Supplement; for North Korea, items in paragraph (c)(6) through (c)(45) of this Supplement; for Sudan, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(14), and (c)(16) through (c)(44) of this Supplement; for Libya and Syria, items in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(8), (c)(10) through (c)(14), (c)(16) through (c)(19), and (c)(22) through (c)(44) of this Supplement.
- (c) The license requirements and licensing policies for items controlled for antiterrorism reasons to Iran, Syria, Sudan, North Korea, and Libya are generally described in §§ 742.8, 742.9, 742.10, 742.19, and 742.20 of this part, respectively. This Supplement provides guidance on licensing policies for Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan and related contract sanctity dates that may be available for transactions benefitting from pre-existing contracts involving Iran, Syria, and Sudan. Exporters are advised that the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control administers a comprehensive trade and investment embargo against Iran (See Executive Orders 12957, 12959 and 13059 of March 15, 1995, May 6, 1995 and August 19, 1997, respectively.) Exporters are further advised that exports and reexports to Iran of items that are listed on the CCL as requiring a license for national security or foreign policy reasons are subject to a policy of denial under the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of October 23, 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note (1994)). Transactions involving Iran and benefitting from a contract that pre-dates October 23, 1992 may be considered under the applicable licensing policy in effect prior to that date.
- (1) All items subject to national security controls.
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers or end-uses of items valued at \$7 million or more: January 23, 1984.

- (B) Contract sanctity date for military endusers or end-uses of all other national security controlled items: September 28, 1984.
- (C) Contract sanctity date for non-military end-users or end-uses: August 28, 1991, *unless* otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement.
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis, unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available for items valued at \$7 million or more to military endusers or end-uses. The contract sanctity date for all other items for all end-users: December 16, 1986.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or military end-uses in Libya will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis, unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement.
- (2) All items subject to chemical and biological weapons proliferation controls. Applications for all end-users in Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, or Sudan of these items will generally be denied. See Supplement No. 1 to part 742 for contract sanctity dates for Iran and Syria. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993), or unless an earlier date for any item is listed in Supplement 1 to part 742.
- (3) All items subject to missile proliferation controls (MTCR). Applications for all endusers in Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, or Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity provisions for Iran and Syria are not available. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (4) All items subject to nuclear weapons proliferation controls (NRL).
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. No contract sanctity date is available.
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or end-uses to Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military endusers or end-uses will be considered on a

- case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for export and reexport to non-military end-users or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement. No contract sanctity date is available.
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea will generally be denied.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or end-uses to Libya will generally be denied. Applications for non-military endusers or end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis unless otherwise specified in paragraphs (c)(2) through (c)(42) of this Supplement.
- (5) All military-related items, i.e., applications for export and reexport of items controlled by CCL entries ending with the number "18".
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993)
- (iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all endusers in North Korea will generally be denied.
- (v) *Libya*. Applications for all end-users in Libya will generally be denied.
- (6) All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components.
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for helicopters exceeding 10,000 lbs. empty weight or fixed wing aircraft valued at \$3 million or more: January 23, 1984.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for other helicopters and aircraft and gas turbine engines therefor: September 28, 1984.
- (C) Contract sanctity date for helicopter or aircraft parts and components controlled by 9A991.d: October 22, 1987.
- (ii) *Syria.* Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied.
- (A) There is no contract sanctity for helicopters exceeding 10,000 lbs. empty weight or fixed wing aircraft valued at \$3 million or more; except that passenger aircraft, regardless of value, have a contract sanctity date of December 16, 1986, if destined for a regularly scheduled airline with assurance against military use.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for helicopters with 10,000 lbs. empty weight or less: April 28, 1986.

- (C) Contract sanctity date for other aircraft and gas turbine engines therefor: December 16, 1986
- (D) Contract sanctity date for helicopter or aircraft parts and components controlled by ECCN 9A991.d: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
- (iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all endusers in North Korea will generally be denied
- (v) *Libya*. Applications for all end-users in Libya will generally be denied.
 - (7) Heavy duty, on-highway tractors.
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military enduses in Libya will be considered on a caseby-case basis.
- (8) Off-highway wheel tractors of carriage capacity 9t (10 tons) or more.
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military enduses in Libya will be considered on a caseby-case basis.

- (9) Large diesel engines (greater than 400 horsepower) and parts to power tank transporters.
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.
- (ii) Šudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military enduses in Sudan will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
- (iii) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (10) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment.
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers or end-uses of cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.
- (ii) Syria. A license is required for all national security-controlled cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment to all end-users. Applications for all end-users in Syria will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of any such equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of any such equipment will generally be denied.
- (v) Libya. A license is required for all national security-controlled cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic equipment to all end-users. Applications for all end-users in Libya will generally be denied.
- (11) Navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment.
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers or end-uses of navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied.

Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for exports of navigation, direction finding, and radar equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other navigation, direction finding, and radar

equipment: August 28, 1991

- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will be considered on a case-bycase basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military endusers or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(12) Electronic test equipment.

(i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers or end-uses of electronic test equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other electronic test equipment for all end-users:

October 22, 1987.

- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for electronic test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other electronic test equipment: August 28, 1991.

- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-

military end-users or for non-military enduses, or for non-nuclear end-users or nonnuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis
- (13) Mobile communications equipment. (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers or end-uses of mobile communications equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all end-users of all other mobile communications equipment: October 22, 1987.

(ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis

(A) Contract sanctity date for mobile communications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other mobile communications equipment:

August 28, 1991.

- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will be considered on a case-bycase basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military endusers or for non-military end-uses in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (14) Acoustic underwater detection equipment.
- (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers or end-uses of acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other acoustic underwater detection equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.
- (ii) Syria. A license is required for acoustic underwater detection equipment that was

- subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991, to all end-users. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria will generally be denied. Applications for non-military endusers or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for acoustic underwater detection equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses to Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28,
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment of these items will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military enduses in North Korea of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military enduses in Libya will be considered on a caseby-case basis.

(15) Portable electric power generator. (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.

- (ii) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military endusers or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (16) Vessels and boats, including inflatable boats
- (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers or end-uses of vessels and boats that were subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other vessels and boats for all end-users: October 22, 1987.
- (ii) Syria. A license is required for national security-controlled vessels and boats. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military enduses in Syria will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Contract sanctity date for vessels and boats that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied.

- Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of these items will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) Libya. A license is required for national security-controlled vessels and boats. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (17) Marine and submarine engines (outboard/inboard, regardless of horsepower).
- (i) *Îran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers or end-uses of marine and submarine engines that were subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for outboard engines of 45 HP or more for all end-users: September 28, 1984.
- (C) Contract sanctity date for all other marine and submarine engines for all endusers: October 22, 1987.
- (ii) Syria. A license is required for all marine and submarine engines subject to national security controls to all end-users. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for marine and submarine engines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-uses or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in North Korea of these items will be considered on a case-bycase basis
- (v) Libya. A license is required for all marine and submarine engines subject to national security controls to all end-users. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in Libya of these items will

- generally be denied. Applications for nonmilitary end-users or for non-military enduses in Libya will be considered on a caseby-case basis.
- (18) Underwater photographic equipment.
- (i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers or end-uses of underwater photographic equipment that was subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other underwater photographic equipment for all end-users: October 22, 1987.
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for underwater photographic equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other underwater photographic equipment: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-uses or for non-military end-uses in Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
 - (19) Submersible systems.
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such systems will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers or end-uses of submersible systems that were subject to national security controls on October 22, 1987: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other submersible systems for all end-users: October 22, 1987.
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such systems will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for submersible systems that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other submersible systems: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of

- such systems will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies(*e.g.*, items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of such systems will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (20) Scuba gear and related equipment.
 (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied. No contract sanctity is available for such items to Iran.
- (ii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers and end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
- (iii) *North Korea*. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.
- (21) Pressurized aircraft breathing equipment.
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: October 22, 1987.
- (ii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
- (iii) *North Korea*. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.
- (22) Computer numerically controlled machine tools.
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers and end-uses of computer numerically controlled machine tools that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other computer numerically controlled machine tools for all end-users: August 28, 1991.
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for computer numerically controlled machine tools that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other computer numerically controlled machine tools: August 28, 1991.

- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) *North Korea.* Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
 - (23) Vibration test equipment.
- (i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers and end-uses of vibration test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other vibration test equipment for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for vibration test equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other vibration test equipment: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (24) Digital computers with a CTP of 6 or above, assemblies, related equipment, equipment for development or production of magnetic and optical storage equipment, and materials for fabrication of head/disk assemblies.

- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity dates for military endusers and end-uses of items that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other items for all end-users: August 28, 1991.
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity dates for items that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other items: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
 - (iv) North Korea.
- (A) Computers with a CTP above 2000 MTOPS: Applications for all end-users will generally be denied.
- (B) Computers with a CTP at or below 2000 MTOPS: Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (25) Telecommunications equipment.
- (i) A license is required for the following telecommunications equipment:
- (A) Radio relay systems or equipment operating at a frequency equal to or greater than 19.7 GHz or "spectral efficiency" greater than 3 bit/s/Hz;
- (B) Fiber optic systems or equipment operating at a wavelength greater than 1000 nm:
- (C) "Telecommunications transmission systems" or equipment with a "digital transfer rate" at the highest multiplex level exceeding 45 Mb/s.
- (ii) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers and end-uses of telecommunications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other vibration test equipment for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

- (iii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for exports of telecommunications equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other telecommunications equipment: August 28, 1991.
- (iv) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (v) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (vi) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
 - (26) Microprocessors.
 - (i) Operating at a clock speed over 25 MHz.(A) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in
- (A) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.(1) Contract sanctity date for military end-
- (1) Contract sanctity date for military endusers and end-uses of microprocessors that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (2) Contract sanctity dates for all other microprocessors for all end-users: August 28, 1991.
- (B) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (1) Contract sanctity date for microprocessors that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (2) Contract sanctity date for all other microprocessors: August 28, 1991.
- (C) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (D) *Libya*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of

these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

- (ii) With a CTP of 550 MTOPS or above.
- (A) *North Korea.* Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.
 - (B) [RESERVED]
- (27) Semiconductor manufacturing equipment. For Iran, Syria, Sudan, North Korea, or Libya a license is required for all such equipment described in ECCNs 3B001 and 3B991.
- (i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers and end-uses of semiconductor manufacturing equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other microprocessors for all end-users: August 28, 1991.
- (ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for semiconductor manufacturing equipment that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other semiconductor manufacturing equipment: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (28) Software specially designed for the computer-aided design and manufacture of integrated circuits.
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such software will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers and end-uses of such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such software for all end-users: August 28, 1991.
- (ii) *Syria.* Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such

- software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other such software: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-users in Sudan of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (29) Packet switches. Equipment described in ECCN 5A991.c.
- (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of such equipment will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers and end-uses in Iran of packet switches that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other packet switches for all end-users: August 28, 1991.
- (ii) *Syria.* Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for packet switches that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other packet switches: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-uses or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (30) Specially designed software for air traffic control applications that uses any digital signal processing techniques for automatic target tracking or that has a facility for electronic tracking.
- (i) *İran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such software will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers and end-uses of such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such software for all end-users: August 28, 1991
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such software will generally be denied.

 Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for such software that was subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other such software: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-users or for military end-users in Sudan of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of such software will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (31) Gravity meters having static accuracy of less (better) than 100 microgal, or gravity meters of the quartz element (worden) type.
- (i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers and end-uses of gravity meters that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such gravity meters for all end-users: August 28, 1991.
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

- (A) Contract sanctity date for gravity meters that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for exports of all other such gravity meters: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (32) Magnetometers with a sensitivity lower (better) than 1.0 nt rms per square root Hertz.
- (i) *Iran*. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers and end-uses of such magnetometers that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such magnetometers for all end-users: August 28, 1991.
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for such magnetometers that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other such magnetometers: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-uses or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) *Libya*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be denied.
 Applications for non-military end-users or

- for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (33) Fluorocarbon compounds described in ECCN 1C006.d for cooling fluids for radar.
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such compounds will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers and end-uses of such fluorocarbon compounds that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such fluorocarbon compounds for all endusers: August 28, 1991.
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such compounds will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for such fluorocarbon compounds that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other such fluorocarbon compounds: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such compounds will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of such compounds will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (34) High strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210.
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of such fibers will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers and end-uses of high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210 that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210 for all endusers: August 28, 1991.
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of such fibers will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210 that were subject to national security controls on August 28,

- 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other high strength organic and inorganic fibers (kevlar) described in ECCN 1C210: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of such fibers will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-uses or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of such fibers will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (35) Machines described in ECCNs 2B003 and 2B993 for cutting gears up to 1.25 meters in diameter.
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers and end-uses of such machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity dates for all other such machines for all end-users: August 28, 1991.
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other machines: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of

these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(36) Aircraft skin and spar milling machines.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers and end-uses of aircraft skin and spar milling machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity dates for all other aircraft skin and spar milling machines to all

end-users: August 28, 1991.

(ii) Syria. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(A) Contract sanctity date for aircraft skin and spar milling machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other aircraft skin and spar milling machines:

August 28, 1991.

- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993)
- (iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (37) Manual dimensional inspection machines described in ECCN 2B996.
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers or end-uses of manual dimensional inspection machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other manual dimensional inspection machines for all end-users: August 28, 1991.

- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for such manual dimensional inspection machines that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such manual dimensional inspection machines: August 28, 1991.

- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-users or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(38) Robots capable of employing feedback information in real time processing to generate or modify programs.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

(A) Contract sanctity date for military endusers or end-uses of such robots that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraphs (c)(1)(i) of this Supplement.

(B) Contract sanctity date for all other such robots: August 28, 1991.

- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by case basis.
- (A) Contract sanctity date for such robots that were subject to national security controls on August 28, 1991: see paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Supplement.
- (B) Contract sanctity date for all other such robots: August 28, 1991.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-uses or for non-military end-uses in Sudan will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Contract sanctity date for Sudan: January 19, 1996, unless a prior contract sanctity date applies (e.g., items first controlled to Sudan for foreign policy reasons under EAA section 6(j) have a contract sanctity date of December 28, 1993).
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses, or for non-nuclear end-users or non-nuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of

these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Libya will be considered on a case-by case basis.

(39) Explosives detection equipment described in ECCN 2A983.

(i) Explosives detection equipment described in ECCN 2A983, controlled prior to April 3, 2003 under ECCN 2A993.

(A) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.

- (B) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
- (C) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: January 19, 1996.
- (D) *North Korea.* Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.

(E) *Libya*. Applications for all end-users in Libya of these items will generally be denied.

(ii) Explosives detection equipment described in ECCN 2A983, not controlled prior to April 3, 2003 under ECCN 2A993.

(A) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.

(B) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

(C) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.

(D) *North Korea.* Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

(E) Libya. Applications for all end-users in Libya of these items will generally be denied.

(40) "Software" described in ECCN 2D983 specially designed or modified for the "development", "production" or "use" of explosives detection equipment.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

(iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.

(iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

(v) *Libya*. Applications for all end-users in Libya of these items will generally be denied.

(41) "Technology" described in ECCN 2E983 specially designed or modified for the "development", "production" or "use" of explosives detection equipment.

(i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.

(ii) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.

- (iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date for reexports by non-U.S. persons: March 21, 2003.
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003.
- (v) *Libya*. Applications for all end-users in Libya of these items will generally be denied.

(42) Production technology controlled under ECCN 1C355 on the CCL.

(i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.

- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied.
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (v) Libya. Applications for military endusers or for military end-uses in Libya of these items will generally be denied. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses in Libya will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- (43) Commercial Charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992 on the CCL.
- (i) *Iran.* Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.
- (ii) Syria. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. (iii) Sudan. Applications for all end-users
- in Sudan of these items will generally be denied.
- (iv) North Korea. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally be denied.
- (v) *Libya*. Applications for all end-users in Libya of these items will generally be denied.
- (44) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate, under ECCN 1C997 on the CCL.
- (i) Iran. Applications for all end-users in Iran of these items will generally be denied.
- (ii) *Syria*. Applications for all end-users in Syria of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: June 15, 2001.
- (iii) *Sudan*. Applications for all end-users in Sudan of these items will generally be denied.
- (iv) *North Korea*. Applications for all endusers in North Korea of these items will generally be denied. Contract sanctity date: June 15, 2001.
- (v) *Libya*. Applications for all end-users in Libya of these items will generally be denied.
- (45) Specific processing equipment, materials and software controlled under ECCNs 0A999, 0B999, 0D999, 1A999, 1C999, 1D999, 2A999, 2B999, 3A999, and 6A999 on the CCL.
- (i) North Korea. Applications for military end-users or for military end-uses, or for nuclear end-users or nuclear end-uses, in North Korea of such equipment will generally be denied. Applications for non-

military end-users or for non-military enduses, or for non-nuclear end-users or nonnuclear end-uses, in North Korea will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(ii) [Reserved]

PART 744—[AMENDED]

■ 18. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 744 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 2139a; Sec. 901–911, Pub. L. 106–387; Sec. 221, Pub. L. 107–56; E.O. 12058, 43 FR 20947, 3 CFR, 1978 Comp., p. 179; E.O. 12851, 58 FR 33181, 3 CFR, 1993 Comp., p. 608; E.O. 12938, 59 FR 59099, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 950; E.O. 12947, 60 FR 5079, 3 CFR, 1995 Comp., p. 356; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13099, 63 FR 45167, 3 CFR, 1998 Comp., p. 208; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; E.O. 13224, 66 FR 49079, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 786; Notice of November 9, 2001, 66 FR 56965, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 917; Notice of August 7, 2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328.

§744.8 [Removed and reserved]

■ 19. Part 744 is amended by removing and reserving § 744.8.

PART 746—[AMENDED]

■ 20. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 746 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 287c; 22 U.S.C. 6004; Sec. 901–911, Pub. L. 106–387; Sec. 221, Pub. L. 107–56; E.O. 12854, 58 FR 36587, 3 CFR 1993 Comp., p. 614; E.O. 12918, 59 FR 28205, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 899; E.O. 13222, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of August 7, 2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328.

§746.1 [Amended]

- 21. Section 746.1 is amended:
- a. By revising the phrase "currently Cuba, Libya, Iran, and Iraq." in paragraph (a) to read "currently Cuba, Iran, and Iraq."; and
- b. By revising the header "Cuba and Libya." for paragraph (a)(1) to read "Cuba."; and
- c. By revising the phrase "require a license to Cuba or Libya." in paragraph (a)(1) to read "require a license to Cuba."

§746.4 [Removed and reserved]

■ 22. Part 746 is amended by removing and reserving § 746.4.

PART 762—[AMENDED]

■ 23. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 762 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 *et seq.*; 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of August 7, 2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328.

■ 24. Section 762.2 is amended by adding new paragraph (c) to read as follows:

§762.2 Records to be retained.

(c) Special recordkeeping requirement.

- (1) Libya. Persons in receipt of a specific license granted by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for the export to Libya of any item subject to the EAR must maintain a record of those items transferred to Libya pursuant to such specific license and record when the items are consumed or destroyed in the normal course of their use in Libya, reexported to a third country not requiring further authorization from BIS, or returned to the United States. This requirement applies only to items subject to a license requirement under the EAR for export to Libya as of April 29, 2004. These records must include the following information:
- (i) Date of export or reexport and related details (including means of transport);
- (ii) Description of items (including ECCN) and value of items in U.S. Dollars:
- (iii) Description of proposed end-use and locations in Libya where items are intended to be used:
- (iv) Parties other than specific OFAC licensee who may be given temporary access to the items; and
- (v) Date of consumption or destruction, if the items are consumed or destroyed in the normal course of their use in Libya, or the date of reexport to a third country not requiring further authorization from BIS, or return to the United States.
 - (2) [Reserved]

PART 772—[AMENDED]

■ 25. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 772 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 *et seq.*; 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of August 7, 2003, 68 FR 47833, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 328.

§772.1 [Amended]

- 26. Section 772.1 is amended:
- a. By revising the phrase "export license applications to Iran, Sudan and Libya" in Note 3 following the definition of *Agricultural commodities* to read "export license applications to Iran and Sudan";
- b. By revising the phrase "for export to Iran, Libya and Sudan" in the paragraph entitled *Medical devices* to read "for export to Iran and Sudan"; and

 \blacksquare c. By revising the phrase "for export to Iran, Libya and Sudan" in the paragraph Iran and Sudan".

Dated: April 23, 2004. Peter Lichtenbaum,

Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.

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