

Frequency	Field strength (volts per meter)*	
	Peak	Average
400 MHz–700 MHz .....	700	50
700 MHz–1 GHz .....	700	100
1 GHz–2 GHz .....	2000	200
2 GHz–4 GHz .....	3000	200
4 GHz–6 GHz .....	3000	200
6 GHz–8 GHz .....	1000	200
8 GHz–12 GHz .....	3000	300
12 GHz–18 GHz .....	2000	200
18 GHz–40 GHz .....	600	200

\* The field strengths are expressed in terms of peak root-mean-square (rms) values.

or,

(2) The applicant may demonstrate by a system test and analysis that the electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions can withstand a minimum threat of 100 volts per meter peak electrical field strength from 10 kHz to 18 GHz. When using this test to show compliance with the HIRF requirements, no credit is given for signal attenuation due to installation.

A preliminary hazard analysis must be performed by the applicant, for approval by the FAA, to identify either electrical or electronic systems that perform critical functions. The term “critical” means those functions whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane. The systems identified by the hazard analysis that perform critical functions are candidates for the application of HIRF requirements. A system may perform both critical and non-critical functions. Primary electronic flight display systems, and their associated components, perform critical functions such as attitude, altitude, and airspeed indication. The HIRF requirements apply only to critical functions.

Compliance with HIRF requirements may be demonstrated by tests, analysis, models, similarity with existing systems, or by any combination of these. Service experience alone is not acceptable since normal flight operations may not include an exposure to the HIRF environment. Reliance on a system with similar design features for redundancy as a means of protection against the effects of external HIRF is generally insufficient since all elements of a redundant system are likely to be exposed to the fields concurrently.

#### Applicability

As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to one modification to the airplane models listed under the heading “Type Certification Basis.” Should S-TEC

Corporation apply to extend this modification to include additional airplane models, the special conditions would extend to these models as well under the provisions of § 21.101.

#### Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features of one modification to several models of airplanes. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane.

The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. For this reason, and because a delay would significantly affect the certification of some airplane models, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described above.

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and symbols.

#### Citation

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, and 44701; 14 CFR part 21, §§ 21.16 and 21.101; and 14 CFR part 11, §§ 11.38 and 11.19.

#### The Special Conditions

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for airplane models

listed under the “Type Certification Basis” heading modified by S-TEC Corporation to add an EFIS.

1. *Protection of Electrical and Electronic Systems from High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)*. Each system that performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operations, and operational capabilities of these systems to perform critical functions, are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to high intensity radiated electromagnetic fields external to the airplane.

2. For the purpose of these special conditions, the following definition applies: *Critical Functions*: Functions whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on December 18, 2002.

**Michael Gallagher,**

*Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 02–33131 Filed 12–31–02; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910–13–P**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2002–NM–216–AD; Amendment 39–12912; AD 2002–21–06]

**RIN 2120–AA64**

**Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC–9–81 (MD–81), (DC–9–82 (MD–82), DC–9–83 (MD–83), DC–9–87 (MD–87), and MD–88 Airplanes**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule; correction.

**SUMMARY:** This document corrects information in an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC–9–81 (MD–81), DC–9–82 (MD–82), DC–9–83

(MD-83), DC-9-87 (MD-87), and MD-88 airplanes. That AD currently requires revisions to the Airplane Flight Manual; installation of inspection aids on the wing upper surfaces; and, among other actions, installation of an overwing heater blanket system or primary upper wing ice detection system, and installation of a heater protection panel or an equipment protection device on certain overwing heater blanket systems. That AD also requires disabling the anti-ice systems for the upper wing surface on certain airplanes. This document corrects incorrect paragraph references in two paragraphs. This correction is necessary to ensure that operators are aware of an incorrect reference in paragraphs (1)(2)(i) and (1)(2)(ii) of the existing AD.

**DATES:** Effective November 8, 2002.

In incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of November 8, 2002, (67 FR 65298, October 24, 2002).

The incorporation by reference of certain publications, as listed in the regulations, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as January 17, 1992 (57 FR 2014, January 17, 1992).

The incorporation by reference of certain other publications, as listed in the regulations, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of May 7, 2001 (66 FR 17499, April 2, 2001).

The comment period specified for the existing rule remains December 23, 2002.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:**

*Technical Information:* Daniel Bui, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5339; fax (562) 627-5210.

*Other Information:* Judy Golder, Airworthiness Directive Technical Editor/Writer; telephone (425) 687-4241, fax (425) 227-1232, Questions or comments may also be sent via the Internet using the following address: [judy.golder@faa.gov](mailto:judy.golder@faa.gov). Questions or comments sent via the Internet as attached electronic files must be formatted in Microsoft Word 97 for Windows or ASCII text.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** On October 9, 2002, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued AD 2002-21-06, amendment 39-12912 (67 FR 65298, October 24, 2002), which applies to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-

81 (MD-81), DC-9-82 (MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD-83), DC-9-87 (MD-87), and MD-88 airplanes. That AD requires revisions to the Airplane Flight Manual; installation of inspection aids on the wing upper surfaces; and, among other actions, other actions, installation of an overwing heater blanket system or primary upper wing ice detection system, and installation of a heater protection panel or an equipment protection device on certain overwing heater blanket systems. That AD also requires disabling the anti-ice systems for the upper wing surface on certain airplanes. The actions required by that AD are intended to prevent ice ingestion into one or both engines and consequent loss of thrust from one or both engines; and damage to the upper wing skin surface and its structure, due to prolonged short-circuit electrical arcing of certain anti-ice systems.

**Need for the Correction**

The FAA notes that an inadvertent transposition of paragraph identifiers occurred in paragraphs (1)(2)(i) and (1)(2)(ii) of AD 2002-21-06. Paragraph (1) of that AD specifies information regarding alternative methods of compliance (AMOCs) for the requirements of that AD. Specifically, paragraph (1)(2)(i) states that installation of a non-skid, striped triangular symbol per Option 5 of McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD80-30-059, Revision 4 through Revision 7, is approved as an AMOC with paragraphs (b) and (i)(2) of that AD. While paragraph (i)(2) of that AD is a correct reference, the reference to paragraph (b) is incorrect and should read paragraph "(c)" of the AD. Conversely, paragraph (1)(2)(ii) of that AD states that revision of the Configuration Deviation List (CDL) Appendix of the AFM by inserting a copy of CDL Appendix, Section I, Page 2A, dated March 10, 1993, into the AFM, is approved as an AMOC with paragraphs (c) and (i)(3) of the AD. While paragraph (i)(3) of that AD is correct reference, the reference to paragraph (c) is incorrect and should read paragraph "(b)" of that AD.

The FAA has determined that a correction to AD 2002-21-06 is necessary to revise incorrect paragraph references in paragraphs (1)(2)(i) and (1)(2)(ii) of that AD. This correction specifies the appropriate paragraphs for which the specified AMOCs apply.

**Correction of Publication**

This document corrects the errors and correctly adds the AD as an amendment to section 39.13 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39.13).

The AD is reprinted in its entirety for the convenience of affected operators. The effective date of the AD remains November 8, 2002.

Since this action only corrects two incorrect paragraph references for AMOCs, it has no adverse economic impact and imposes no additional burden on any person. Therefore, the FAA has determined that notice and public procedures are unnecessary.

**List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39**

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

**Adoption of the Correction**

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

**PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES**

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

**§ 39.13 [Corrected]**

2. Section 39.13 is amended by correctly adding the following airworthiness directive (AD):

**2002-21-06 McDonnell Douglas:**

Amendment 39-12912. Docket 2002-NM-216-AD.

*Applicability:* All Model DC-9-81 (MD-81), DC-9-82 (MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD-83), DC-9-87 (MD-87), and MD-88 airplanes; certificated in any category.

**Note 1:** This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (1)(1) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

*Compliance:* Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

The prevent damage to the upper wing skin surface and its structure, due to prolonged short-circuit electrical arcing of the anti-ice system; accomplish the following:

**Restatement of AD 2001-06-16 COR**

*Airplane Flight Manual Revision*

(a) Within 10 days after January 17, 1992 (the effective date of AD 92-03-02,

amendment 39–8156), revise the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include the following. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM.

#### *“Ice on Wing Upper Surfaces*

##### *Caution*

Ice shedding from the wing upper surface during takeoff can cause severe damage to one or both engines, leading to surge, vibration, and complete thrust loss. The formation of ice can occur on wing surfaces during exposure of the airplane to normal icing conditions. Clear ice can also occur on the wing upper surfaces when cold-soaked fuel is in the main wing fuel tanks, and the airplane is exposed to conditions of high humidity, rain, drizzle, or fog at ambient temperatures well above freezing. Often, the ice accumulation is clear and difficult to detect visually. The ice forms most frequently on the inboard, aft corner of the main wing tanks. [End of Cautionary Note]

The wing upper surfaces must be physically checked for ice when the airplane has been exposed to conditions conducive to ice formation. Takeoff may not be initiated unless the flight crew verifies that a visual check and a physical (hands-on) check of the wing upper surfaces have been accomplished, and that the wing is clear of ice accumulation when any of the following conditions occur:

(1) When the ambient temperature is less than 50 degrees F and high humidity or visible moisture (rain, drizzle, sleet, snow, fog, etc.) is present;

(2) When frost or ice is present on the lower surface of either wing;

(3) After completion of de-icing.

When inspection aids (*i.e.*, tufts, decals, mount pads, painted symbols, and paint stripes) are installed in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD–80 Service Bulletin 30–59, the physical check may be made by assuring that all installed tufts move freely.

##### *Note*

This limitation does not relieve the requirement that aircraft surfaces are free of frost, snow, and ice accumulation, as required by Federal Aviation Regulations Sections 91.527 and 121.629. [end of Note]”

#### *AFM Configuration Deviation List Revision*

(b) Within 10 days after January 17, 1992, revise the Configuration Deviation List (CDL) Appendix of the FAA-approved AFM to include the following. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM.

#### *“30–80–01 Triangular Decal and Tuft Assemblies*

Up to two (2) decals or tufts per side may be missing, provided:

(a) At least one decal and tuft on each side is located along the aft spar line; and

(b) The tufts are used for performing the physical check to determine that the upper wing is free of ice by observing that the tufts move freely.

Up to eight (8) decals and/or tufts may be missing, provided:

(a) Takeoff may not be initiated unless the flight crew verifies that a physical (hands-on)

check is made of the upper wing in the location of the missing decals and/or tufts to assure that there is no ice on the wing when icing conditions exist; or

(b) When the ambient temperature is more than 50 degrees F.”

#### *Installation of Inspection Aids*

(c) Within 30 days after January 17, 1992, install inspection aids (*i.e.*, tufts, decals, mount pads, painted symbols, and paint stripes) on the inboard side of the wings’ upper surfaces, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 30–59, dated September 18, 1989; Revision 1, dated January 5, 1990; or Revision 2, dated August 15, 1990.

#### *Repetitive Tests and One-Time Inspection*

(d) For airplanes on which an overwing heater blanket system was installed without installation of a heater protection panel (HPP) or an equipment protection device (EPD) prior to May 7, 2001 (the effective date of 2001–06–16 COR, amendment 39–12163): Within 60 days after May 7, 2001, accomplish the actions specified in paragraph (d)(1) or (d)(2) of this AD, as applicable.

(1) For airplanes on which the overwing heater blanket system was installed in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD80–30–071, Revision 02, dated February 6, 1996; or McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD80–30–078, Revision 01, dated April 8, 1997: Accomplish paragraphs (d)(1)(i) and (d)(1)(ii) of this AD.

(i) Remove secondary access covers, and perform a one-time detailed visual inspection to detect discrepancies (mechanical damage or punctures in the upper skin of the blanket, prying damage on the panel, and fuel leakage) of the overwing heater blanket, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin MD80–30A087, dated September 22, 1997. And,

(ii) Accomplish paragraph (d)(1)(ii)(A) or (d)(1)(ii)(B) of this AD.

(A) Perform dielectric withstanding voltage and resistance tests in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin MD80–30A087, dated September 22, 1997. Repeat the tests thereafter at intervals not to exceed 150 days, until installation of an HPP in accordance with paragraph (f)(1)(i) or (f)(1)(ii) of this AD, as applicable.

(B) Deactivate the overwing heater blanket system until accomplishment of dielectric withstanding voltage and resistance tests specified in paragraph (d)(1)(ii)(A). If the overwing heater blanket system is deactivated as provided by this paragraph, continue to accomplish the requirements of paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this AD.

**Note 2:** For the purposes of this AD, a detailed visual inspection is defined as: “An intensive visual examination of a specific structural area, system, installation, or assembly to detect damage, failure, or irregularity. Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at intensity deemed appropriate by the inspector. Inspection aids such as mirror, magnifying lenses, etc., may be used. Surface cleaning and elaborate access procedures may be required.”

(2) For airplanes on which the overwing heater blanket system was installed in accordance with TDG Aerospace, Inc., STC SA6042NM: Accomplish paragraphs (d)(2)(i) and (d)(2)(ii) of this AD.

(i) Remove secondary access covers, and perform a one-time detailed visual inspection to detect discrepancies (mechanical damage or punctures in the upper skin of the blanket, prying damage on the panel, and fuel leakage) of the overwing heater blanket, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin MD80–30A087, dated September 22, 1997. And,

(ii) Accomplish paragraph (d)(2)(ii)(A) or (d)(2)(ii)(B) of this AD.

(A) Perform dielectric withstanding voltage and resistance tests in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin MD80–30A087, dated September 22, 1997. Repeat the tests thereafter at intervals not to exceed 150 days, until installation of an EPD in accordance with paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this AD.

(B) Deactivate overwing heater blanket system until accomplishment of dielectric withstanding voltage and resistance tests specified in paragraph (d)(2)(ii)(A). If the overwing heater blanket system is deactivated as provided by this paragraph, continue to accomplish the requirements of paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this AD.

#### *Corrective Action*

(e) If any discrepancy is detected during any inspection or test performed in accordance with paragraph (d) of this AD, prior to further flight, repair or replace the affected heater blanket, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin MD80–30A087, dated September 22, 1997; except as provided in paragraph (h) of this AD.

**Note 3:** McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin MD80–30A087, dated September 22, 1997, references TDG Aerospace Document E95–451, Revision B, dated January 31, 1996, as an additional source of service information for accomplishment of repair or replacement of the overwing heater blanket.

#### *Installation of Overwing Heater Blanket or Primary Upper Wing Ice Detection System*

(f) Within 3 years after May 7, 2001, do the requirements of either paragraph (f)(1) or (f)(2) of this AD.

(1) Do the actions specified in paragraph (f)(1)(i) or (f)(1)(ii) of this AD, as applicable.

(i) For airplanes listed in Group 1 in McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD80–30–090, dated October 19, 1999: Install n overwing heater blanket system in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD80–30–071, Revision 02, dated February 6, 1996; and modify and reidentify the existing HPP in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD80–30–090. Modification of the existing HPP in accordance with this paragraph constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by (d)(1)(ii)(A) of this AD.

(ii) For airplanes listed in Group 2 in McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD80–30–090, dated October 19, 1999: Install an overwing heater blanket system in

accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD80-30-078, Revision 01, dated April 8, 1997; and install an HPP and associated wiring in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD80-30-090. Installation of an HPP and associated wiring in accordance with this paragraph constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by (d)(1)(ii)(A) of this AD.

**Note 4:** For other airplanes, accomplishment of the requirements of paragraph (f)(1)(i) or (f)(1)(ii) of this AD may be acceptable per paragraph (i)(1) of this AD.

(2) Accomplish the actions specified in either paragraph (f)(2)(i), (f)(2)(ii), or (f)(2)(iii) of this AD.

(i) Install an overwing heater blanket system, and install an EPD that provides a circuit protection function to the overwing heater blanket, in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA. Installation of an EPD in accordance with this paragraph constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by (d)(2)(ii)(A) of this AD.

**Note 5:** Installation of an overwing heater blanket system and installation of an EPD that provides a circuit protection function to the overwing heater blanket, in accordance with TDG Aerospace, Inc., SA 6042NM, or TDG Master Drawing List (MDL) E93-104, Revision R, dated October 25, 2000; is an approved means of compliance with the requirements of paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this AD.

(ii) Install an overwing heater blanket system in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

(iii) Install an FAA-approved primary upper wing ice detection system in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

**Note 6:** Boeing (McDonnell Douglas) has received FAA approval of a primary upper wing ice detection system that is considered to be an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) with the requirements of paragraph (f)(2)(iii) of this AD. Information concerning such AMOCs may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

#### *AFM Revision*

(g) Except as provided by paragraph (h) of this AD, prior to further flight after accomplishment of the installation required by paragraph (f)(1) or (f)(2) of this AD, revise the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved AFM to include the following. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. After accomplishment of the installation required by paragraph (f)(1) or (f)(2) of this AD and this AFM revision, the AFM revisions required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD may be removed from the AFM, and the inspection aids required by paragraph (c) of this AD may be removed from the airplane.

#### *"Ice on Wing Upper Surfaces"*

##### *Caution*

Ice shedding from the wing upper surface during takeoff can cause severe damage to one or both engines, leading to surge, vibration, and complete thrust loss. The

formation of ice can occur on wing surfaces during exposure of the airplane to normal icing conditions. Clear ice can also occur on the wing upper surfaces when cold-soaked fuel is in the main wing fuel tanks, and the airplane is exposed to conditions of high humidity, rain, drizzle, or fog at ambient temperatures well above freezing. Often, the ice accumulation is clear and difficult to detect visually. The ice forms most frequently on the inboard, aft corner of the main wing tanks. [End of Cautionary Note]"

#### *MMEL Provision*

(h) An airplane may be operated with an inoperative overwing heater blanket or primary upper wing ice detection system for 10 days per the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL), provided that the actions specified in paragraphs (h)(1), (h)(2), and (h)(3) of this AD are done before further flight.

(1) Revise the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved AFM to include the following. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM.

#### *"Ice on Wing Upper Surfaces"*

##### *Caution*

The wing upper surfaces must be physically checked for ice when the airplane has been exposed to conditions conducive to ice formation. Takeoff may not be initiated unless the flight crew verifies that a visual check and a physical (hands-on) check of the wing upper surfaces have been accomplished, and that the wing is clear of ice accumulation when any of the following conditions occur:

(1) When the ambient temperature is less than 50 degrees F and high humidity or visible moisture (rain, drizzle, sleet, snow, fog, etc.) is present;

(2) When frost or ice is present on the lower surface of either wing;

(3) After completion of de-icing.

When inspection aids (i.e. tufts, decals, mount pads, painted symbols, and paint stripes) are installed in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-80 Service Bulletin 30-59, the physical check may be made by assuring that all installed tufts move freely.

##### *Note*

This limitation does not relieve the requirement that aircraft surfaces are free of frost, snow, and ice accumulation, as required by Federal Aviation Regulations Sections 91.527 and 121.629. [End of Note]"

(2) Revise the CDL Appendix of the FAA-approved AFM to include the following. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM.

#### *"30-80-01 Triangular Decal and Tuft Assemblies"*

Up to two (2) decals or tufts per side may be missing, provided:

(a) At least one decal and tuft on each side is located along the aft spar line; and

(b) The tufts are used for performing the physical check to determine that the upper wing is free of ice by observing that the tufts move freely.

Up to eight (8) decals and/or tufts may be missing, provided:

(a) Takeoff may not be initiated unless the flight crew verifies that a physical (hands-on) check is made of the upper wing in the location of the missing decals and/or tufts to assure that there is no ice on the wing when icing conditions exist; or

(b) When the ambient temperature is more than 50 degrees F."

(3) Install inspection aids (i.e., tufts, decals, mount pads, painted symbols, and paint stripes) on the inboard side of the wings' upper surfaces, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 30-59, dated September 18, 1989; Revision 1, dated January 5, 1990; or Revision 2, dated August 15, 1990.

#### **New Requirements of This AD**

**Note 7:** The Honeywell Anti-Ice System specified in paragraphs (i), (j), and (k) of this AD, is also known and specified as an overwing heater blanket system installed in accordance with AlliedSignal Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) STC SA6061NM.

#### *For Airplanes Equipped With a Honeywell Anti-Ice System Installed Per STC SA6061NM*

(i) For airplanes equipped with a Honeywell Anti-Ice System installed per STC SA6061NM: Accomplish the actions specified in paragraphs (i)(1), (i)(2), (i)(3), and (i)(4) of this AD, at the times specified in those paragraphs.

(1) Within 72 hours after the effective date of this AD, disable the Honeywell Anti-Ice System installed per STC SA6061NM, per Honeywell Alert Service Bulletin 109XXXX-30-38, dated August 8, 2002.

(2) Within 72 hours after the effective date of this AD, revise the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved AFM to include the following (this may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM):

#### *"Ice on Wing Upper Surfaces"*

##### *Caution*

Ice shedding from the wing upper surface during takeoff can cause severe damage to one or both engines, leading to surge, vibration, and complete thrust loss. The formation of ice can occur on wing surfaces during exposure of the airplane to normal icing conditions. Clear ice can also occur on the wing upper surfaces when cold-soaked fuel is in the main wing fuel tanks, and the airplane is exposed to conditions of high humidity, rain, drizzle, or fog at ambient temperatures well above freezing. Often, the ice accumulation is clear and different to detect visually. The ice forms most frequently on the inboard, aft corner of the main wing tanks. [End of Cautionary Note]"

The wing upper surfaces must be physically checked for ice when the airplane has been exposed to conditions conducive to ice formation. Takeoff may not be initiated unless the flight crew verifies that a visual check and a physical (hands-on) check of the wing upper surfaces have been accomplished, and that the wing is clear of ice accumulation when any of the following conditions occur:

(1) When the ambient temperature is less than 50 degrees F and high humidity or

visible moisture (rain, drizzle, sleet, snow, fog, etc.) is present;

(2) When frost or ice is present on the lower surface of either wing;

(3) After completion of de-icing. When inspection aids (*i.e.* tufts, decals, mount pads, painted symbols, and paint stripes) are installed in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-80 Service Bulletin 30-59, the physical check may be made by assuring that all installed tufts move freely.

#### Note

This limitation does not relieve the requirement that aircraft surfaces are free of frost, snow, and ice accumulation, as required by Federal Aviation Regulations Sections 91.527 and 121.629. [End of Note]"

#### AFM Configuration Deviation List Revision

(3) Within 72 hours after the effective date of this AD, revise the CDL Appendix of the FAA-approved AFM to include the following (this may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM):

#### "30-80-01 Triangular Decal and Tuft Assemblies

Up to two (2) decals or tufts per side may be missing, provided:

(a) At least one decal and tuft on each side is located along the aft spar line; and

(b) The tufts are used for performing the physical check to determine that the upper wing is free of ice by observing that the tufts move freely.

Up to eight (8) decals and/or tufts may be missing, provided:

(a) Takeoff may not be initiated unless the flight crew verifies that a physical (hands-on) check is made of the upper wing in the location of the missing decals and/or tufts to assure that there is no ice on the wing when icing conditions exist; or

(b) When the ambient temperature is more than 50 degrees F."

#### Installation of Inspection Aids

(4) Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, install inspection aids (*i.e.*, tufts, decals, mount pads, painted symbols, and paint stripes) on the inboard side of the wings' upper surfaces, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 30-59, dated September 18, 1989; Revision 1, dated January 5, 1990; or Revision 2, dated August 15, 1990.

**Note 8:** Operators should note that certain AMOCs have been approved as acceptable methods of compliance with paragraph (i)(4) of this AD. Information concerning such AMOCs may be obtained from the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

#### Installation of Overwing Heater Blanket or Primary Upper Wing Ice Detection System

(j) For airplanes equipped with disabled Honeywell Anti-Ice Systems installed per STC SA6061NM: Within 3 years after May 7, 2001, accomplish the requirements of paragraph (j)(1), (j)(2), or (j)(3) of this AD.

(1) Install an overwing heater blanket system, and install an EPD that provides a circuit-protection function to the overwing heater blanket, in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO, FAA.

**Note 9:** Installation of an overwing heater blanket system and installation of an EPD that provides a circuit-protection function to the overwing heater blanket, in accordance with TDG Aerospace, Inc., SA60242NM, or TDG Master Drawing List (MDL) E93-104, Revision R, dated October 25, 2000; is an approved means of compliance with the requirements of paragraph (j)(1) of this AD.

(2) Install an overwing heater blanket system in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

(3) Install an FAA-approved primary upper wing ice detection system in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

**Note 10:** Boeing (McDonnell Douglas) has received FAA approval of an acceptable primary upper wing ice detection system, which is considered to be an acceptable method of compliance with the requirements of paragraph (j)(3) of this AD when accomplished in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

#### AFM Revision

(k)(1) For airplanes equipped with a disabled Honeywell Anti-Ice Systems installed per STC SA6061NM: Prior to further flight after accomplishment of the installation required by paragraph (j)(1), (j)(2), or (j)(3) of this AD, revise the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved AFM to include the following (this may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM):

#### "Ice on Wing Upper Surfaces

##### Caution

Ice shedding from the wing upper surface during takeoff can cause severe damage to one or both engines, leading to surge, vibration, and complete thrust loss. The formation of ice can occur on wing surfaces during exposure of the airplane to normal icing conditions. Clear ice can also occur on the wing upper surfaces when cold-soaked fuel is in the main wing fuel tanks, and the

airplane is exposed to conditions of high humidity, rain, drizzle, or fog at ambient temperatures well above freezing. Often, the ice accumulation is clear and difficult to detect visually. The ice forms most frequently on the inboard, aft corner of the main wing tanks. [End of Cautionary Note]"

(2) After accomplishment of the installation required by paragraph (j)(1) of this AD and this AFM revision, the AFM revisions and CDLs required by paragraphs (i)(2) and (i)(3) of this AD may be removed from the AFM, and the inspection aids required by paragraph (i)(4) of this AD may be removed from the airplane.

#### Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1)(1) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO, FAA. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

(2) The following AMOCs were approved previously per AD 92-03-02, amendment 39-8156, and are approved as AMOCs with the indicated paragraphs of this AD:

(i) Installation of a non-skid, striped triangular symbol per Option 5 of McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD80-30-059, Revision 4 though Revision 7, is approved as an AMOC with paragraphs (c) and (i)(2) of this AD; and

(ii) Revision of the Configuration Deviation List (CDL) Appendix of the AFM by inserting a copy of CDL Appendix, Section I, page 2A, dated March 10, 1993, into the AFM, is approved as an AMOC with paragraphs (b) and (i)(3) of this AD.

**Note 11:** Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

#### Special Flight Permits

(m) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with §§ 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

#### Incorporation by Reference

(n) Unless otherwise specified in this AD, the actions shall be done in accordance with the applicable service document identified in the following table:

Service document	Revision level	Date
Honeywell Alert Service Bulletin 109XXXX-30-38 .....	Original .....	August 8, 2002.
McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin MD80-30A087 .....	Original .....	September 22, 1997.
McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 30-59 .....	Original .....	September 18, 1989.
McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 30-59 .....	1 .....	January 5, 1990.
McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 30-59 .....	2 .....	August 15, 1990.
McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD80-30-071 .....	02 .....	February 6, 1996.
McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD80-30-078 .....	01 .....	April 8, 1997.
McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin MD80-30-090 .....	Original .....	October 19, 1999.

(1) The incorporation by reference of Honeywell Alert Service Bulletin 109XXXX-30-38, dated August 8, 2002, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of November 8, 2002 (67 FR 65298, October 24, 2002).

(2) The incorporation by reference of McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 30-59, dated September 18, 1989; McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 30-59, Revision 1, dated January 5, 1990; and McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 30-59, Revision 2, dated August 15, 1990; was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of January 17, 1992 (57 FR 2014, January 17, 1992).

(3) The incorporation by reference of the remaining service bulletins listed in Table 1 of this AD, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of May 7, 2001 (66 FR 17499, April 2, 2001).

(4) Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Aircraft Group, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024). Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

#### Effective Date

(o) The effective date of this amendment remains November 8, 2002.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 23, 2002.

**Vi L. Lipski,**

*Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 02-32881 Filed 12-31-02; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-U**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2002-NM-271-AD; Amendment 39-12970; AD 2002-24-05]

**RIN 2120-AA64**

#### Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 727 Series Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule; correction.

**SUMMARY:** This document corrects a typographical error that appeared in airworthiness directive (AD) 2002-24-05 that was published in the **Federal Register** on December 3, 2002 (67 FR 71808). The typographical error resulted in identification of certain airplanes in the applicability of the AD as having serial numbers instead of line numbers.

This AD is applicable to certain Boeing Model 727 series airplanes. This AD requires detailed inspections to detect cracking and corrosion of the upper chord of the rear spar of the wing; and repair, if necessary. This action also requires detailed inspections to detect and permanently repair any cracking that has been previously repaired by stop-drilling.

**DATES:** Effective December 18, 2002.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Ivan Li, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM-120S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington, 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-2131; fax (425) 227-1181.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2002-24-05, amendment 39-12970, applicable to certain Boeing Model 727 series airplanes, was published in the **Federal Register** on December 3, 2002 (67 FR 71808). That AD requires detailed inspections to detect cracking and corrosion of the upper chord of the rear spar of the wing; and repair, if necessary. That AD also requires detailed inspections to detect and permanently repair any cracking that has been previously repaired by stop-drilling.

As published, the applicability section of the AD specifies, "Model 727 series airplanes, serial numbers 1 through 1832 inclusive; certificated in any category." Identification of the airplanes was inadvertently specified as "serial numbers 1 through 1832 inclusive." The correct identification is "line numbers 1 through 1832 inclusive."

Since no other part of the regulatory information has been changed, the final rule is not being republished in the **Federal Register**.

The effective of this AD remains December 18, 2002.

#### § 39.13 [Corrected]

On page 71809, in the third column, "Applicability" of AD 2002-24-05 is corrected to read as follows:

\* \* \* \* \*

"*Applicability:* Model 727 series airplanes, line numbers 1 through 1832 inclusive; certificated in any category."

\* \* \* \* \*

Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 23, 2002.

**Vi L. Lipski,**

*Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 02-32882 Filed 12-31-02; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-U**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2002-NM-309-AD; Amendment 39-12992; AD 2002-24-51]

**RIN 2120-AA64**

#### Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 Series Airplanes; Model 747 Series Airplanes; and Model 757 Series Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, (DOT).

**ACTION:** Final rule; request for comments.

**SUMMARY:** This document publishes in the **Federal Register** an amendment adopting airworthiness directive (AD) 2002-24-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of the airplane models described previously by individual notices. This AD requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual to require the flightcrew to maintain certain minimum fuel levels in the center fuel tanks and, for certain airplanes, to prohibit the use of the horizontal stabilizer fuel tank and the certain center auxiliary fuel tanks. This action is prompted by reports indicating that two fuel tank pumps showed evidence of extreme localized overheating of parts in the priming and vapor pump section of the fuel pump; such overheating provides an ignition source in the fuel tank during dry running of the pump, which could result in fire/explosion of the fuel tank. The actions specified by this AD are intended to require the flightcrew to maintain certain minimum fuel levels in the center fuel tanks and, for certain airplanes and, for certain airplanes to prohibit the use of the horizontal stabilizer fuel tank and certain center auxiliary fuel tanks.

**DATES:** Effective January 7, 2003, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by emergency AD 2002-24-51, issued November 23, 2002, which contained the requirements of this amendment.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before March 3, 2003.

**ADDRESSES:** Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2002-NM-309-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this