between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

# List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

#### The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

# PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

### § 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

Fokker Services B.V.: Docket 99–NM–220–AD.

Applicability: Model F.28 Mark 1000, 2000, 3000 and 4000 series airplanes; serial numbers 11003 through 11091 inclusive, 11094 through 11171 inclusive, 11991, and 11992; certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (f) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the

effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To detect and correct cracks in the upper girder of the main landing gear (MLG) bracket, which could progress into the vertical stiffeners of the MLG bracket and result in reduced structural integrity of the landing gear, accomplish the following:

#### **One-Time Inspection and Corrective Actions**

(a) Within 12 months after the effective date of this AD, perform a one-time eddy current inspection of the upper girder of the MLG brackets on the left and right sides of the airplane for cracks, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker Service Bulletin F28/57–90, dated March 1, 1999.

(1) If no cracks are found, no further action is required by this AD.

(2) Except as provided by paragraph (c) of this AD, if any crack is found, prior to further flight, repair as specified in paragraph C.(1) of the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin, in accordance with the service bulletin. Thereafter, repeat the eddy current inspection at intervals not to exceed 1 year, until accomplishment of paragraph (d) of this AD.

### Reporting Requirement

(b) Within 10 days after accomplishing each inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, submit a report of the inspection results to: Fokker Services B.V., Technical Services, Attn: Manager Airline Support, P.O. Box 231, 2150 AE Nieuw-Vennep, The Netherlands. Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120–0056.

## Replacement

(c) For airplanes on which a crack greater than 0.591 inch (15 mm) in length is found: Except as provided by paragraph (e) of this AD, prior to further flight, replace the cracked MLG bracket with a new, improved bracket (including measuring the position of the existing MLG bracket, removing the existing bracket and attachment fittings, checking alignment of the fastener holes, measuring gaps, installing a shim, and aligning the new bracket); in accordance with Fokker Proforma Service Bulletin F28/57-92, dated July 1, 1999. Such replacement constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraph (a)(2) of this AD.

## **Optional Terminating Action**

(d) Except as provided by paragraph (e) of this AD, replacement of the MLG bracket with a new, improved bracket (including measuring the position of the existing MLG bracket, removing the existing bracket and attachment fittings, checking alignment of the fastener holes, measuring gaps, installing a shim, and aligning the new bracket), in accordance with Fokker Proforma Service Bulletin F28/57–92, dated July 1, 1999; constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections specified in paragraph (a)(2) of this AD for the replaced bracket.

(e) If any discrepancy is detected during accomplishment of the replacement procedures, and the service bulletin or any appendix to the service bulletin specifies to contact Fokker for appropriate action: Prior to further flight, repair in accordance with a method approved by either the Manager, International Branch, ANM–116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate; or the Rijksluchtvaartdienst (or its delegated agent). For a repair method to be approved by the Manager, International Branch, ANM–116, as required by this paragraph, the Manager's approval letter must specifically reference this AD.

#### **Alternative Methods of Compliance**

(f) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, International Branch, ANM–116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, International Branch, ANM–116.

**Note 2:** Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the International Branch, ANM–116.

### **Special Flight Permits**

(g) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

**Note 3:** The subject of this AD is addressed in Dutch airworthiness directive 1999–045, dated March 31, 1999.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 5, 1999.

## D.L. Riggin,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 99–29743 Filed 11–12–99; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

#### **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

**Federal Aviation Administration** 

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 98-NM-316-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767 Series Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all Boeing Model 767 series airplanes. This proposal would require repetitive inspections to detect discrepancies of the wiring and surrounding Teflon sleeves of the fuel tank boost pumps and override/jettison pumps; replacement of the sleeves with new sleeves, for certain airplanes; and repair or replacement of the wiring and sleeves with new parts, as necessary. This proposal is prompted by reports of chafing of Teflon sleeves that surround and protect electrical wires inside conduits installed in the fuel tanks. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to ensure adequate protection to the fuel pump wire insulation. Such chafing of the wire insulation could eventually result in exposure of electrical conductor, permit arcing from the wire to the conduit, and create a potential for a fuel tank fire or explosion.

**DATES:** Comments must be received by December 30, 1999.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM–114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 98–NM–316–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056. Comments may be inspected at this location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Holly Thorson, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–1357; fax (425) 227–1181.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

## **Comments Invited**

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications

received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket Number 98–NM–316–AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

### **Availability of NPRMs**

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 98-NM-316-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

#### Discussion

Inspections of Boeing Model 747 series airplanes were performed in accordance with AD 96–26–06, amendment 39–9870 (62 FR 304, January 3, 1997), and AD 97–26–07, amendment 39–10250 (62 FR 65352, December 12, 1997), to detect damage of the sleeving and wire bundles of certain fuel tank boost pumps and auxiliary jettison pumps. The inspections revealed significant chafing through the Teflon sleeves that enclose wire bundles inside the conduits located in the fuel tanks.

As on Model 747 series airplanes, the Model 767 fuel pumps for the main fuel tanks and the center wing tank (auxiliary tank) are supplied electrical power by wiring encased in metal conduits inside the fuel tanks; a wire bundle is separated from its associated conduit by two concentric Teflon sleeves. Moreover, the vibration environments in the wing fuel tanks of Model 747 and 767 series airplanes are similar. Therefore, the wear rate of the Teflon sleeves surrounding the electrical wires could be similar for Model 747 and 767 series airplanes.

Because the unsafe condition identified in AD 96–26–06 and AD 97– 26–07 for Model 747 series airplanes

(the potential for fuel tank fire or explosion due to chafing) is also likely to occur on Model 767 series airplanes, procedures were developed (and are described below) for the inspection of fuel tank wire bundles and Teflon sleeves on Model 767 series airplanes. As part of the validation process for the development of the service bulletin for those procedures, the wire bundles and sleeves were inspected on several Model 767 series airplanes. The inspections revealed numerous cases of chafing through the outer Teflon sleeves and three cases of chafing through both Teflon sleeves. There were no reports of damage to the wire insulation or jacket. Several variations in the sleeve installations were reported, including one report of a missing outer sleeve and another report of sleeves too thin to meet required criteria. Numerous occurrences of spliced sleeve sections were noted; several of those spliced sections were separated, leaving 1- to 2inch gaps in the sleeves and exposing the wires. All of the operators that conducted the preliminary inspections reported that lacing ties were installed at approximately 6-inch intervals around the outside of the sleeves. Lacing ties installed on the outside of the sleeves (except at the conduit ends) may contribute to the degradation of the sleeves. Damaged or spliced Teflon sleeves could result in chafing of the electrical wiring in the fuel tank conduits and thereby expose the electrical conductor. Exposure of the electrical conductor, if not corrected, could permit arcing from the wire to the conduit and create a potential for a fuel tank fire or explosion.

# **Explanation of Relevant Service Information**

The FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-28A0053, Revision 1, dated August 5, 1999, which describes procedures for repetitive visual inspections to detect damage of the Teflon sleeves surrounding fuel tank boost pump and override/jettison pump wiring; and a follow-on visual inspection to detect damage of the wiring and corrective actions, if necessary. The corrective actions include replacing discrepant Teflon sleeves (having splices, cuts, splits, holes, worn areas, or lacing ties installed on the outside of the sleeves) with new Teflon sleeves, replacing wiring that has been damaged due to arcing, and repairing or replacing wiring that has been damaged for reasons other than arcing. Accomplishment of the actions specified in the alert service bulletin is intended to adequately address the identified unsafe condition.

#### FAA's Findings

The FAA has determined that splicing the Teflon sleeves at any location along the length of the wire bundle is unacceptable because spliced sections may pull apart, leaving gaps in the sleeves and portions of the wires unprotected from chafing against the conduit. Additionally, the FAA has determined that lacing ties installed around the sleeves may contribute to the chafing of the sleeves. In light of these findings and the demonstrated need for protective Teflon sleeves between the wires and the conduits inside the fuel tanks, the FAA has concluded that an inspection of all Model 767 series airplanes is required to determine the integrity of the installed Teflon sleeves and wire bundles.

# Explanation of Requirements of Proposed Rule

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require accomplishment of the actions specified in the alert service bulletin described previously, except as discussed below. The proposed AD also would require that operators report positive inspection findings (findings of discrepancies only) to the FAA.

# Differences Between Proposed AD and Relevant Service Information

Operators should note that, while Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767–28A0053 limits its effectivity to Boeing Model 767 series airplanes having certain line numbers, this proposed AD would be applicable to all Model 767 series airplanes. The FAA has determined that all Model 767 series airplanes are subject to the unsafe condition.

#### **Clarification of Service Bulletin Figure**

The FAA finds it necessary to clarify the note inserted between steps 6 and 7 in Figure 2, Sheet 4, of the alert service bulletin. Where the alert service bulletin refers to "damage" as "more than one piece of sleeve," this type of "damage" is intended to refer to splices in the protective Teflon sleeves. Splices are considered "damage" because they may become pulled apart, potentially exposing the underlying wires and leaving them unprotected from chafing against the conduit.

#### Cost Impact

There are approximately 716 airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 253 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD. It would

take approximately 5 work hours per airplane (for airplanes with jettison pumps) or 3 work hours per airplane (for airplanes without jettison pumps) to accomplish the proposed inspection/replacement, at an average labor rate of \$60 per work hour. Parts, if required, would cost \$336 for the sleeve replacement proposed by this AD.

Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$636 or \$516 per airplane, if required to accomplish the replacement action; and \$300 or \$180 per airplane, per inspection cycle.

The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

### **Regulatory Impact**

The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption "ADDRESSES."

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

# The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

# PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

#### § 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

Boeing: Docket 98–NM–316–AD. *Applicability:* All Model 767 series airplanes, certificated in any category.

**Note 1:** This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (e) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

*Compliance:* Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent exposure of the electrical conductor, which could permit arcing from the wire to the conduit and create a potential for a fuel tank fire or explosion, accomplish the following:

## Inspection

- 1(a) Perform a detailed visual inspection to detect discrepancies—including the presence of splices, cuts, splits, holes, worn areas, and lacing ties installed on the outside of the sleeves (except at the sleeve ends) of the Teflon sleeves surrounding the wiring of the fuel tank boost pumps and override/jettison pumps, at the earlier of the times specified in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767–28A0053, Revision 1, dated August 5, 1999. Repeat the inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 60,000 flight hours or 30,000 flight cycles, whichever occurs first.
- (1) Prior to the accumulation of 50,000 total flight hours, or within 90 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later.
- (2) Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD.

**Note 2:** For the purposes of this AD, a detailed visual inspection is defined as: "An intensive visual examination of a specific structural area, system, installation, or assembly to detect damage, failure, or irregularity. Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at intensity deemed appropriate by the inspector. Inspection aids such as mirror, magnifying lenses, etc. may be used. Surface cleaning and elaborate access procedures may be required."

#### **Corrective Actions**

- (b) If any discrepancy is detected during any inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD: Prior to further flight, remove the Teflon sleeves and perform a detailed visual inspection to detect damage of the wiring, in accordance with paragraph D. of the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767–28A0053, Revision 1, dated August 5, 1999.
- (1) If no damage to the wiring is detected, prior to further flight, install new Teflon sleeves in accordance with the alert service bulletin.
- (2) If any damage to the wiring is detected, prior to further flight, accomplish the requirements of paragraph (c) of this AD.
- (c) If any damage to the wiring is detected during any inspection required by paragraph (b) of this AD: Prior to further flight, perform a detailed visual inspection to determine if the wiring damage was caused by arcing, in accordance with paragraph D. of the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767–28A0053, Revision 1, dated August 5, 1999.
- (1) If the wire damage was not caused by arcing: Prior to further flight, repair any damaged wires or replace the wires with new or serviceable wires, as applicable, and install new Teflon sleeves; in accordance with the alert service bulletin.
- (2) If any damage caused by arcing is found: Prior to further flight, perform an inspection for signs of fuel inside the conduit or on the wires, in accordance with the alert service bulletin.
- (i) If no sign of fuel is found, accomplish the actions specified by paragraphs (c)(2)(i)(A), (c)(2)(i)(B), (c)(2)(i)(C), and (c)(2)(i)(D) of this AD.
- (A) Prior to further flight, repair the wires or replace the wires with new or serviceable wires, as applicable, in accordance with the alert service bulletin.
- (B) Prior to further flight, install new Teflon sleeves, in accordance with the alert service bulletin.
- (C) Repeat the inspection for signs of fuel inside the conduit thereafter at intervals not to exceed 500 flight hours, until the requirements of paragraph (c)(2)(i)(D) have been accomplished. If any fuel is found inside the conduit during any inspection required by this paragraph, prior to further flight, replace the conduit with a new or serviceable conduit in accordance with the alert service bulletin. Thereafter, repeat the inspection specified in paragraph (a) at intervals not to exceed 60,000 flight hours or 30,000 flight cycles, whichever occurs first.
- (D) Within 6,000 flight hours or 18 months after the initial fuel inspection specified by paragraph (c)(2) of this AD, whichever occurs first, replace the conduit with a new or serviceable conduit, in accordance with the alert service bulletin. Such conduit replacement constitutes terminating action for the repetitive fuel inspections required by paragraph (c)(2)(i)(C) of this AD.

(ii) If any fuel is found in the conduit or on any wire: Prior to further flight, replace the conduit with a new or serviceable conduit, replace damaged wires with new or serviceable wires, and install new Teflon sleeves; in accordance with the alert service bulletin. Thereafter, repeat the inspection specified in paragraph (a) at intervals not to exceed 60,000 flight hours or 30,000 flight cycles, whichever occurs first.

#### **Pump Retest**

(d) For any wire bundle removed and reinstalled during any inspection required by this AD: Prior to further flight after such reinstallation, retest the fuel pump in accordance with paragraph G., H., I., or J., as applicable, of the Accomplishment Instructions, of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767–28A0053, Revision 1, dated August 5, 1999.

#### **Reporting Requirement**

- (e) Submit a report of positive inspection findings (findings of discrepancies only), along with any damaged wiring and sleeves, to the Seattle Manufacturing Inspection District Office (MIDO), 2500 East Valley Road, Suite C-2, Renton, Washington 98055-4056; fax (425) 227-1159; at the applicable time specified in paragraph (e)(1) or (e)(2) of this AD. The report must include the airplane serial number; the number of total flight hours and flight cycles on the airplane; the location of the electrical cable on the airplane; and a statement indicating whether any wire has ever been removed and inspected during maintenance, along with the date (if known) of any such inspection. Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.
- (1) For airplanes on which the initial inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD is accomplished after the effective date of this AD: Submit the report within 10 days after performing the initial inspection.
- (2) For airplanes on which the initial inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD has been accomplished prior to the effective date of this AD: Submit the report for the initial inspection within 10 days after the effective date of this AD.

#### **Alternative Methods of Compliance**

(f) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

**Note 3:** Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.

## **Special Flight Permits**

(g) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 5, 1999.

#### N. B. Martenson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 99–29742 Filed 11–12–99; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

#### DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

#### **Federal Aviation Administration**

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 99-NM-126-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

# Airworthiness Directives; Saab Model SAAB 2000 Series Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB 2000 series airplanes. This proposal would require a measurement of the extension of the piston in the retract actuator of the main landing gear (MLG); and corrective action, if necessary. This proposal also would require repetitive replacement of the retract actuator with a repaired retract actuator, or repetitive replacement of the piston in the retract actuator with a new piston. This proposal is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent fatigue failure of the piston in the retract actuator of the MLG, and reduced structural integrity of the MLG.

**DATES:** Comments must be received by December 15, 1999.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 99-NM-126-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this location between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be obtained from Saab Aircraft AB, SAAB Aircraft Product Support, S–581.88, Linköping, Sweden. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.