

to be accurate than older information based on economic conditions that no longer exist. Therefore, it is the opinion of the domestic parties that a newly calculated dumping margin based on exports of Hungarian TRBs to the European Union should be used to determine a new rate. Without explanation, the domestic parties project the new dumping margin to be 45.96 percent (see May 3, 1999, Substantive Response of the domestic parties at 11-12).

As noted in the *Sunset Regulations* and *Sunset Policy Bulletin*, only under the most extraordinary circumstances will the Department rely on dumping margins other than those it calculated and published in its prior determinations. The *Sunset Regulations* at 19 CFR 351.218(e)(2)(i) explain that "extraordinary circumstances" may be considered by the Department in the context of a full sunset review, where the substantive response from both domestic and respondent interested parties are adequate. In this case, however, the Department determined to conduct an expedited review because respondent interested parties waived participation. While only in full reviews will the Department consider the calculation of new margins, it must be further noted that even if the Department had determined to conduct a full review of this order, we are not persuaded by the evidence presented by the domestic parties that such extraordinary circumstances exist in this case as to warrant the calculation of a new dumping margin.

Further, we are not persuaded that calculation of a new margin is appropriate based on the assertions by the domestic parties concerning the state of the Hungarian economy, alleged changes in the Hungarian bearings industry, and the accessibility of the U.S. market for Hungarian producers/exporters.

Therefore, consistent with the *Sunset Policy Bulletin*, the Department determines that the margin calculated in the original investigation is probative of the behavior of Hungarian producers/exporters if the order were revoked as it is the only rate that reflects the behavior of these producers and exporters without the discipline of the order. As such, the Department will report to the Commission the country-wide rate from the original investigation as contained in the Final Results of Review section of this notice.

Final Results of Review

As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of the antidumping order would likely lead to

continuation or recurrence of dumping at the margins listed below.

Manufacturer/ Exporter	Margin (percent)
Country-wide rate	7.42

This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to administrative protective order ("APO") of their responsibility concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations. Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable violation.

This five-year ("sunset") review and notice are in accordance with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

Dated: October 28, 1999.

Richard W. Moreland,

Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.

[FR Doc. 99-28769 Filed 11-3-99; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-588-804]

Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Antifriction Bearings From Japan

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of final results of expedited sunset reviews: antifriction bearings from Japan.

SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the U.S. Department of Commerce ("the Department") initiated sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders on ball bearings ("BBs"), cylindrical roller bearings ("CRBs"), and spherical plain bearings ("SPBs") (collectively, antifriction bearings) from Japan pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended ("the Act"). On the basis of a notice of intent to participate and an adequate response filed on behalf of a domestic interested party and inadequate response from respondent interested parties in each of these reviews, the Department conducted expedited sunset reviews. As a result of these reviews, the Department finds that revocation of the antidumping duty orders would be

likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at the levels indicated in the Final Result of Review section of this notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott E. Smith or Melissa G. Skinner, Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20230; telephone (202) 482-6397 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

These reviews were conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year ("Sunset") Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516 (March 20, 1998) ("Sunset Regulations"), and 19 CFR 351(1998) in general. Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to the Department's conduct of sunset reviews is set forth in the Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3—Policies Regarding the Conduct of Five-year ("Sunset") Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) ("Sunset Policy Bulletin").

Scope

The products covered by these orders, antifriction bearings (other than tapered roller bearings), mounted or unmounted, and parts thereof (AFBs), constitute the following three types of subject merchandise:

Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof: These products include all AFBs that employ balls as the roller element. Imports of these products are classified under the following categories: antifriction balls, ball bearings with integral shafts, ball bearings (including radial ball bearings) and parts thereof, and housed or mounted ball bearing units and parts thereof. Imports of these products are classified under the following Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) subheadings: 3926.90.45, 4016.93.00, 4016.93.10, 4016.93.50, 6909.19.5010, 8431.20.00, 8431.39.0010, 8482.10.10, 8482.10.50, 8482.80.00, 8482.91.00, 8482.99.05, 8482.99.35, 8482.99.2580, 8482.99.6595, 8483.20.40, 8483.20.80, 8483.50.8040, 8483.50.90, 8483.90.20, 8483.90.30, 8483.90.70, 8708.50.50, 8708.60.50, 8708.60.80, 8708.70.6060, 8708.70.8050, 8708.93.30, 8708.93.5000, 8708.93.6000, 8708.93.75, 8708.99.06, 8708.99.31, 8708.99.4960,

8708.99.50, 8708.99.5800, 8708.99.8080, 8803.10.00, 8803.20.00, 8803.30.00, 8803.90.30, and 8803.90.90.

Cylindrical Roller Bearings, Mounted or Unmounted, and Parts Thereof:

These products include all AFBs that employ cylindrical rollers as the rolling element. Imports of these products are classified under the following categories: antifriction rollers, all cylindrical roller bearings (including split cylindrical roller bearings) and parts thereof, housed or mounted cylindrical roller bearing units and parts thereof. Imports of these products are classified under the following HTS subheadings: 3926.90.45, 4016.93.00, 4016.93.10, 4016.93.50, 6909.19.5010, 8431.20.00, 8431.39.0010, 8482.40.00, 8482.50.00, 8482.80.00, 8482.91.00, 8482.99.25, 8482.99.35, 8482.99.6530, 8482.99.6560, 8482.99.70, 8483.20.40, 8483.20.80, 8483.50.8040, 8483.90.20, 8483.90.30, 8483.90.70, 8708.50.50, 8708.60.50, 8708.93.5000, 8708.99.4000, 8708.99.4960, 8708.99.50, 8708.99.8080, 8803.10.00, 8803.20.00, 8803.30.00, 8803.90.30, and 8803.90.90.

Spherical Plain Bearings, Mounted or Unmounted, and Parts Thereof:

These products include all spherical plain bearings that employ a spherically shaped sliding element and include spherical plain rod ends. Imports of these products are classified under the following HTS subheadings: 3926.90.45, 4016.93.00, 4016.93.10, 4016.93.50, 6909.50.10, 8483.30.80, 8483.90.30, 8485.90.00, 8708.93.5000, 8708.99.50, 8803.10.00, 8803.10.00, 8803.20.00, 8803.30.00, and 8803.90.90.

The Department notes that the HTS subheadings are provided for convenience and customs purposes. The written description of the scope of this proceeding is dispositive. Furthermore, we note that the size or precision grade of a bearing does not influence whether the bearing is covered by the orders. These orders cover all the subject bearings and parts thereof (inner race, outer race, cage, rollers, balls, seals, shields, etc.) outlined above with certain limitations. With regard to finished parts, all such parts are included in the scope of these orders. For unfinished parts, such parts are included if (1) they have been heat-treated, or (2) heat treatment is not required to be performed on the part. Thus, the only unfinished parts that are not covered by these orders are those that will be subject to heat treatment after importation.

The ultimate application of a bearing also does not influence whether the bearing is covered by the orders. Bearings designed for highly specialized applications are not excluded. Any of

the subject bearings, regardless of whether they may ultimately be utilized in aircraft, automobiles, or other equipment, are within the scopes of these orders.¹

History of the Orders

The Department published its less-than-fair-value ("LTFV") determination of antifriction bearings from Japan on May 3, 1989.² In this determination, the Department published the following weighted-average dumping margins for these companies with respect to BBs: 73.55 for Koyo; 106.61 for Minebea; 48.69 for Nachi; 42.99 for NSK; 21.36 for NTN; and 45.83 for all other producers and/or exporters. The Department also published the following weighted-average dumping margins for these companies with respect to CRBs: 51.21 for Koyo; 4.00 for Nachi; 12.28 for NSK; 9.30 for NTN; and 25.80 for all other producers and/or exporters. In addition, the Department published the following weighted-average dumping margins for these companies with respect to SPBs: 84.26 for Minebea; 92.00 for NTN; and 84.33 for all other producers and/or exporters. Since that time, the Department has conducted nine administrative reviews.³ With respect to

¹ There have been a number of clarifications to the scopes of these orders. For a complete listing, see Appendix A.

² See *Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Japan*, 54 FR 19101 (May 3, 1989).

³ See *Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Japan*, 54 FR 19101 (May 3, 1989); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Japan; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 56 FR 31754 (July 11, 1991); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Germany; et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 62 FR 32755 (June 17, 1997); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France; et al.; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 57 FR 28360 (June 24, 1992); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 57 FR 59080 (December 14, 1992); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 63 FR 8908 (February 23, 1998); *Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Revocation in Part of an Antidumping Duty Order*, 58 FR 39729 (July 26, 1993); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and the United Kingdom; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 58 FR 42288 (August 9, 1993); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Japan; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 59 FR

duty absorption, the Department issued duty absorption findings in the 1995–1996 and 1997–1998 administrative reviews.⁴

Background

On April 1, 1999, the Department initiated sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders on AFBs from Japan, pursuant to section 751(c) of the Act. By April 16, 1999, within the deadline specified in section

9469 (February 28, 1994); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 63 FR 18877 (April 16, 1998); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, et al.; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, Partial Termination of Administrative Reviews, and Revocation in Part of Antidumping Duty Orders*, 60 FR 10900 (February 28, 1995); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Japan and Germany; Amendment to Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 60 FR 10967 (February 28, 1995); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Japan; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review*, 60 FR 65264 (December 19, 1995); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Partial Termination of Administrative Reviews*, 61 FR 66472 (December 17, 1996); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 62 FR 3003 (January 21, 1997); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 62 FR 2081 (January 15, 1997); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Singapore; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 62 FR 14391 (March 26, 1997); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Japan and the United Kingdom; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 62 FR 45795 (August 29, 1997); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 1997); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore; Sweden and the United Kingdom; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 62 FR 61963 (November 20, 1997); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 63 FR 33320 (June 18, 1998); *Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).

⁴ See *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 62 FR 54043 (October 17, 1997); *Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 64 FR 35590 (July 1, 1999).

351.218(d)(1)(i) of the *Sunset Regulation*, we received notices of intent to participate from the following: Link-Belt Bearing Division ("Link-Belt"); The Torrington Company ("Torrington") and MPB Corporation ("MPB"); Koyo Corporation of U.S.A.—Manufacturing Division ("KUCUM"); NTN Bearing Corporation of America ("NBCA"); American NTN Bearing Manufacturing Corporation ("ANBM") and NTN-BCA Corporation ("NTN-BCA") (collectively ("NTN")); Roller Bearing Company of America, Inc. ("RBC"); New Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc. ("NHBB"), and NSK Corporation. Each of these parties claimed status as domestic interested parties on the basis that they are a domestic producer, manufacturer, or wholesaler of one or more of the products subject to these orders.⁵

Within the deadline specified in the *Sunset Regulations* under section 351.218(d)(3)(i), on May 3, 1999, the Department received complete substantive responses from each of these domestic interested parties, with the exception of Link-Belt. In addition, Koyo Seiko Corp. Ltd., and Koyo Corporation of the U.S.A. (collectively "Koyo") notified the Department that they would not file a substantive response in the reviews of the AFB orders. Finally, we received a complete substantive response on behalf of Nippon Pillow Block Manufacturing Company Limited, Nippon Pillow Block Sales Company Limited, and FYH Bearing Units USA, Inc. (collectively "Nippon Pillow Block"). Nippon Pillow Block asserts that it is a foreign manufacturer and exporter of BBs and is, therefore, an interested party within the meaning of section 771(9)(A) of the Act. We received rebuttal comments from Torrington and MPB (collectively "the companies") and from NTN on May 12, 1999, within the deadline.

On May 21, 1999, we informed the International Trade Commission ("Commission") that, on the basis of inadequate response from respondent interested parties, we were conducting expedited sunset reviews of these orders consistent with 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(C)(2). (See Letter to Lynn Featherstone, Director, Office of Investigations from Jeffrey A. May, Director, Office of Policy.)

In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is a

review of a transition order (*i.e.*, an order in effect on January 1, 1995). Therefore, on August 5, 1999, the Department determined that the sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders on AFBs from Japan are extraordinarily complicated and extended the time limit for completion of the final results of these reviews until not later than October 28, 1999, in accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.⁶

Determination

In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department conducted these reviews to determine whether revocation of the antidumping duty orders would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) of the Act provides that, in making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted-average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty order. Pursuant to section 752(c)(3) of the Act, the Department shall provide to the Commission the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail if the order is revoked.

The Department's determinations concerning adequacy, continuation or recurrence of dumping, and magnitude of the margin are discussed below. In addition, the parties' comments with respect to adequacy, the continuation or recurrence of dumping, and the magnitude of the margin are addressed within the respective sections below.

Adequacy

As noted above, we notified the Commission that we intended to conduct expedited reviews of these orders. On June 10, 1999, we received comments on behalf of MPB and Torrington supporting our determination to conduct expedited reviews. NHBB and NSK Corporation also submitted comments on whether expedited sunsets review were warranted. In their submissions, both parties assert that most of the domestic interested parties that submitted substantive responses are in favor of revocation of the orders. These parties also offered new argument regarding the likely effect of revocation of the orders.

The magnitude of domestic support for continuation or revocation of an order, however, does not enter into the Department's determination of adequacy

of participation nor, for that matter, the Department's determination of likelihood. The Department made clear in its regulations that a complete substantive response from one domestic interested party would be considered adequate for purpose of continuing a sunset review (see section 351.218(e)(1)). Nowhere in the statute or legislative history is there reference to consideration of domestic industry support during the course of a sunset review (other than the statutory provision that, if there is *no* domestic industry interest in continuation of the order, the Department will revoke the order automatically). In fact, the Senate Report (at Rep. No. 103-412 at 46 (2nd Session)) makes clear that the purpose of adequacy determinations in sunset reviews is for the Department to determine whether to issue a determination based on the facts available without further fact-gathering. Further, the statute, at section 751(c)(1), specifies that the Department is to determine whether revocation of an order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c) specifies that the Department is to consider the weighted-average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent reviews, as well as the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of the order.

Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act ("URAA"), specifically the Statement of Administrative Action ("the SAA"), H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt. 1 (1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-412 (1994), the Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin providing guidance on methodological and analytical issues, including the basis for likelihood determinations. In its Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department indicated that determinations of likelihood will be made on an order-wide basis (see section II.A.2). In addition, the Department indicated that normally it will determine that revocation of an antidumping duty order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above *de minimis* after the issuance of the order, (b) imports of the subject merchandise ceased after the issuance of the order, or (c) dumping was eliminated after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the

⁵ Torrington, RBC, and NHBB filed with respect to BBs, CRBs, and SPBs. Link-Belt, MPB, and NTN filed with respect to BBs and CRBs. KUCUM and NSK filed with respect to BBs only.

⁶ See *Tapered Roller Bearings, 4 Inches and Under From Japan, et. al.: Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Five-Year Reviews*, 64 FR 42672 (August 5, 1999).

subject merchandise declined significantly (see section II.A.3).

In their substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that revocation of the antidumping duty orders on the subject merchandise would be likely to lead to continuation of dumping. They base this conclusion on the fact that dumping continued at levels above *de minimis* levels after the issuance of the orders. RBC also argues that given that dumping margins continue to exist after the issuance of the orders, the Department must conclude that dumping would be likely to continue or recur if the orders were revoked. Torrington and MPB also assert that an examination of import volumes is not necessary because dumping continued. Using pre-and post-order statistics for complete unmounted BBs, which Torrington and MPB assert is the only category for which statistics are available on a consistent basis, they nonetheless argue that post-order declines in import volume provide strong additional support for a determination the dumping is likely to continue or recur were the orders revoked. In conclusion, Torrington and MPB assert that no "good cause" exists to consider other factors, such as sales below the cost of production. However, if the Department were to consider other factors, it should acknowledge that, in each review period, it has found that home market sales by Japanese producers were below the cost of production, requiring that such sales be disregarded for purposes of determining foreign market value or normal value.

NHBB and NSK Corporation assert that revocation of the orders is not likely to result in continuation or recurrence of dumping. NHBB bases its assertion on the fact that dumping would undercut the U.S. domestic price structure, thus causing injury to the very industry of which foreign owners are a part. NSK Corporation appears to support its assertion on the basis that the margin of dumping would be no higher than the margin found in the most recent administrative review (*i.e.*, 2.30 percent). KCUM and NTN argue that revocation of the antidumping duty orders would not be likely to have much of an effect on the U.S. market, prices, or the industry, or would it result in no or minimal impact upon the U.S. market. In addition, the respondent interested party in the review of Bbs, Nippon Pillow Block, asserts that revocation of the order would have minimal or *de minimis* effects on the BB market in the United States and the operations of the domestic producers. Further, Nippon Pillow Block argues that dumping would not be likely to

continue or resume, although it also suggests that, if the order were revoked, the antidumping duty margin likely to prevail is 2.30 percent.

In their rebuttal comment, Torrington and MPB assert that the Department should take into account the submitter's affiliation in its consideration of comments of various parties filing as domestic producers. Further, citing to Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Thailand; Final Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 61 FR 20799, 20800 (May 8, 1996), they argue that the Department has recognized that domestic producers who are affiliated with subject foreign producers and exporters do not have a common "stake" with the petitioner in the maintenance of the order. Additionally, Torrington and MPB argue that other parties' comments addressing issues other than margins and import volumes should not be considered unless such parties establish "good cause" to consider such additional factors, which, in these reviews, they have not done.

In its rebuttal comments, NTN argues that the factors discussed in Torrington's, MPB's, and RBC's responses do not indicate that revocation of the orders would be likely to lead to the continuation or recurrence of dumping. NTN asserts that the inclusion by RBC of margins from companies which do not currently ship to the United States and which have not been the subject of recent reviews is distortive of the current situation. Further, NTN asserts that the responses rely heavily on duty absorption determinations that are the subject of litigation before the Court of International Trade.

As discussed in section II.A.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the SAA at 890, and the House Report at 63-64, existence of dumping margins after the order is highly probative of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping. If companies continue to dump with the discipline of an order in place, the Department may reasonably infer that dumping would continue if the discipline of the order were removed. Thus, as noted above, in determining whether revocation of an order is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping, the Department considers the margins determined in the investigation and subsequent administrative reviews and the volume of imports. Whatever relevance the arguments of NHBB, NSK Corporation, KCUM, and NTN concerning possible disincentives for producers and/or exporters to dump in the U.S. market

might have had is mooted by the evidence that dumping continues and has continued over the lives of the orders.

In the instant proceedings, dumping margins above *de minimis* continue to exist with respect to each of the orders. Therefore, given that dumping has continued over the life of the orders, the Department determines that dumping is likely to continue if the orders were revoked. Because we have based this determination on the fact that dumping continued at levels above *de minimis*, we have not addressed the comments submitted by Torrington and MPB with respect to "good cause," nor have we addressed the arguments of other interested parties regarding the condition of the U.S. market.

Magnitude of the Margin

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that, consistent with the SAA and House Report, the Department will normally provide to the Commission a margin from the investigation because that is the only calculated rate that reflects the behavior or exporters without the discipline of an order in place. Further, for companies not specifically investigated or for companies that did not begin shipping until after the order was issued, the Department will normally provide a margin based on the "all others" rate from the investigation. (See section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.) Exceptions to this policy include the use of a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration of duty absorption determinations. (See sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.)

In their substantive response, Torrington and MPB argue that the margins that are likely to prevail should the orders be revoked are the dumping margins found for each company in the original investigation (as opposed to margins calculated in succeeding annual administrative reviews), including margins based on best information available, except where the most current margin, increased by the Department's duty absorption determination, exceeds the original investigation margin. With respect to BBs, RBC argues that the margins from the original investigation are the margins likely to prevail were the order revoked.

NHBB argues that the dumping margins likely to prevail if the orders were revoked are *de minimis*. NHBB goes on to argue that it would be illogical for companies with significant U.S. bearings investments to undercut that investment by dumping. In

addition, NHBB argues that the Department should not report margins from the original investigation, asserting that the SAA provides that, in certain instances, it is more appropriate to rely on a more recently calculated margin. NHBB also asserts that one such instance is where, as in the AFB cases, dumping margins have declined over the lives of the orders and imports have remained steady or increased. Finally, NHBB argues that, in light of changes in the methodology used to calculate antidumping duty margins introduced by the Uruguay Round, use of margins calculated by the Department prior to the URAA would be unfair and would be contrary to the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.

Similarly, NSK Corporation argues that the margins likely to prevail are *de minimis*. As support, NSK Corporation argues that, were the orders not in existence, the Department would apply the average-to-average methodology used in an investigation as opposed to the transaction-to-average methodology common to administrative reviews to measure the extent of any dumping. In such a case, NSK Corporation states that it believes any margin found would be below the two percent *de minimis* level applicable in investigations. NSK Corporation argues that further that the Department's unorthodox approach during the original investigation, plus the liberal use of best information available, skewed the results of the original investigation seriously, rendering those results inappropriate indicators of the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail were the orders revoked. Finally, NSK Corporation also argues that dumping margins have declined over time with respect to importations of BBs while, at the same time, importations have remained at or around 20 percent of the U.S. market. As support, it cites to The Economic Effects of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900, Inv. No. 332-334, at 14-26—14-31 (June 1995).

KCUM argues that it cannot predict the effect revocation would have on the margins because the existence of the orders does not have much of an effect on prices. Further, KCUM states that any likely margins are dependent on an entirely exogenous factor, such as the fluctuation in the exchange rate between the dollar and the Japanese yen. KCUM asserts that the Department cannot rely on the margins from the original investigation as (1) the final determinations were almost 10 years ago

and thus are far too old to serve as realistic indicators, and (2) Koyo's rate was based in large part on best information available and thus is enormously inflated when compared to actual margins from administrative reviews. KCUM argues that, therefore, the Department must use the results of more recent administrative reviews to determine the margins likely to prevail for Koyo.

NTN argues that, were the orders revoked, the dumping margins that would likely prevail would be zero percent. In the alternative, NTN requests that the Department employ margins that were determined during the more recent administrative reviews.

Nippon Pillow Block argues that, in cases where imports have increased and the magnitude of dumping has declined since the imposition of the order, as is the case with respect to exports of BBs by Nippon Pillow Block, consistent with the Sunset Policy Bulletin the Department should find that a dumping margin no higher than the margin found in the most recent review is likely to prevail. Therefore, Nippon Pillow Block suggests that the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail with respect to its exports if the order on BBs were revoked is the 2.30 percent margin from the administrative review covering May 1, 1996, through April 30, 1997.

In their rebuttal comments, Torrington and MPB argue that other parties' comments ignore the Department's stated policies regarding the selection of margins likely to prevail and ignore the Department's duty absorption findings. Citing to the Sunset Policy Bulletin, Torrington and MPB argue that the Department's policies are clear—normal reliance on the margins from the investigation as the only margins that reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order and rejection of margins from administrative reviews in which the Department found duty absorption. Torrington and MPB argue that the two percent *de minimis* standard is not applicable to sunset reviews. Further, they contend that there is no authority which would authorize or justify the rejection of the investigation rates on the basis of the particular methodology used at the time of the investigation. Additionally, they argue that, with respect to claims that more recent margins should be used based on declining margins accompanied by steady or increasing imports, Torrington and MPB argue that it is the responsibility of such claimants to provide information regarding companies' relative market share. Since no such information was provided, the

Department should not accept these assertions. In fact, imports of certain BBs have actually declined since the imposition of the order.

In their rebuttal comments NTN asserts that the inclusion by RBC of margins from companies which do not currently ship to the United States and which have not been the subject of recent reviews is distortive of the current situation. Further, NTN asserts that the responses rely heavily on duty absorption determinations that are the subject of litigation before the Court of International Trade.

We agree with Torrington, MPB, and RBC that, normally, we will provide a margin from the original investigation because that is the rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the discipline of the order. As noted above, exceptions to this policy include the use of a more recently calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration of duty absorption determinations.

With respect to NSK's argument concerning the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail, we disagree. As discussed above, we do find that there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping. Furthermore, we find the level of dumping likely to prevail is best reflected by our dumping margins calculated in the original investigations. Specifically, the Department finds that there is no basis to reject margins calculated in an investigation because of subsequent changes in methodology. Such changes do not invalidate margins calculated under the prior methodology. Therefore, the dumping margins from the original investigation are the only rates which reflect the behavior of exporters without the discipline of the order, regardless of the methodology used to calculate that margin or the use of best information available (see section 752(c)(3) of the Act).

With respect to NHBB's argument concerning the dumping margin likely to prevail, the Department disagrees. First, NHBB claims that dumping margins have declined over the lives of the orders and imports have remained steady or increased. However, NHBB provided no evidence to support these claims. Nothing submitted in the course of this sunset proceeding indicates that imports have remained steady or increased. In fact, evidence submitted by Torrington and MPB indicate that imports of the subject merchandise have decreased. Regardless of the level of imports, dumping margins above *de minimis* levels continue as do imports of the subject merchandise; dumping continues to exist.

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin we indicated that, consistent with the SAA at 889-90 and the House Report at 63, we may determine, in cases where declining (or no) dumping margins are accompanied by steady or increasing imports, that a more recently calculated rate reflects that companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the United States and, therefore, that dumping is less likely to continue or recur if the order were revoked.

Alternatively, if a company chooses to increase dumping in order to increase or maintain market share, the Department may provide the Commission with a more recently calculated margin for that company. The Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that we will entertain such considerations in response to argument from an interested party. Further, we noted that, in determining whether a more recently calculated margin is probative of an exporter's behavior absent the discipline of an order, we will normally consider the company's relative market share, with such information to be provided by the parties. It is clear, therefore, that in determining whether a more recently calculated margin is probative of the behavior of exporters were the order revoked, the Department considers company-specific exports and company-specific margins. Additionally, although we expressed a clear preference for market share information, in past sunset reviews where market share information was not available, the Department relied on changes in import volumes between the periods before and after the issuance of the order. See, e.g., Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden, 63 FR 67658 (December 8, 1998), and Final Results of Expedited Sunset Reviews: Certain Iron Construction Castings From Brazil, Canada, and the People's Republic of China, 64 FR 30310 (June 7, 1999).

In sunset reviews, although we make likelihood determinations on an order-wide basis, we report company-specific margins to the Commission. Therefore, it is appropriate that our determinations regarding the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail be based on company-specific information. Generic arguments that margins decreased over the life of the orders while, at the same time, exporters' share of the U.S. market remained constant do not address the question of whether any particular company decreased its margin of dumping while at the same time maintaining or increasing market share. In fact, such generic argument may disguise company-specific behavior

demonstrating increased dumping coupled with increased market share.

In these reviews, only Nippon Pillow Block provided statistics regarding its company-specific exports of BBs both prior to the issuance of the order and for the most recent five years. We reviewed the statistics provided and found that, although its export volume and values fluctuated during the period 1994 through 1998, its exports during 1996 were at an all-time high. Coinciding with this increase, the Department calculated margins for Nippon Pillow Block of 7.87 percent for the May 1995 through April 1996 review and 2.30 percent for the May 1996 through April 1997 review. Further, the Department calculated a margin of 1.20 percent for Nippon Pillow Block during the most recently completed review covering the period May 1997 through April 1998. Given the correlation between increased exports and the decreased margin in the 1996/97 administrative review, we agree with Nippon Pillow Block that a more recently calculated margin may be an appropriate indicator of the magnitude of margin likely to prevail were the order revoked.

The SAA at 885 and the House Report at 60 provide, however, that duty absorption is a strong indicator that the current dumping margins calculated in reviews may not be indicative of the margins that would exist in the absence of an order. Once an order is revoked, the importer could achieve the same pre-revocation return on its sales by lowering its prices in the United States in the amount of the duty that was previously being absorbed. Therefore, in the Sunset Policy Bulletin the Department indicated that it normally will determine that a company's current dumping margin is not indicative of the margin likely to prevail were the order revoked. Further, we indicated that we normally will provide to the Commission the higher of the margin that we would otherwise have reported to the Commission or the most recent margin for that company adjusted to account for our findings on duty absorption.

In their comments, Torrington and MPB argue that the Sunset Policy Bulletin requires that the Department report to the Commission the higher of the margin from the original investigation or the margin from a more recent administrative review adjusted to reflect duty absorption findings. We do not agree. As noted above, the Sunset Policy Bulletin provides that, where we have found duty absorption in an administrative review initiated in 1998 (for transition orders such as these) we will normally select the higher of the

margin we would otherwise have reported or the margin adjusted to account for duty absorption findings. With respect to Nippon Pillow Block, as noted above, we would otherwise report to the Commission the margin from the 1996/97 administrative review. The Department was not required to investigate duty absorption during the 1996/97 administrative review; in the 1995/96 and the 1997/98 administrative reviews, the Department found that Nippon Pillow Block was absorbing duties on 55.46 and 9.75 percent of its U.S. affiliate's sales, respectively. Because all of Nippon Pillow Block's U.S. sales were constructed export price sales, total sales and U.S. affiliate's sales are the same. Therefore, for purposes of considering duty absorption, we relied on the level of duty absorption found in the administrative review initiated in 1998. Consistent with the methodology described in the Sunset Policy Bulletin and we used in Preliminary Results of Sunset Review: Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware from Mexico, 64 FR 46651 (August 26, 1999), and Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Brass Sheet and Strip from Germany, 64 FR 49767 (September 14, 1999), we adjusted Nippon Pillow Block's margin from the 1996/97 administrative review (the year corresponding to the highest volume of imports) to account for duty absorption. Because the result is higher than the rate we would otherwise report to the Commission, we will report the adjusted rate.

With respect to all other producers/exporters of the subject merchandise, as noted above, there is no evidence on the record to indicate that the margin of dumping for any particular producer/exporter decreased at the same time that it was increasing or maintaining U.S. market share nor is there evidence on the record to indicate corresponding increases in dumping margins and exports. Therefore, we are relying on the margins from the original investigations as probative of the behavior of producers/exporters without the discipline of the orders.

Based on the above analysis, we will report to the Commission the margins indicated in the Final Results of the Review section of this notice.

Final Results of Review

As a result of these reviews, the Department finds that revocation of the antidumping orders would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at the margins listed below:

Manufacturers/Exporters	Margin (Percent)
Ball Bearings:	
Nippon Pillow Block	2.55
Koyo	73.55
Minebea	106.61
Nachi	48.69
NSK	42.99
NTN	21.36
All Other Producers/Exporters	45.83
Cylindrical Roller Bearings:	
Koyo	51.21
Nachi	4.00
NSK	12.28
NTN	9.30
All Other Producers/Exporters	25.80
Spherical Plain Bearings:	
Minebea	84.26
NTN	92.00
All Other Producers/Exporters	84.33

This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to administrative protective order (APO) of their responsibility concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under APO in accordance with section 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulation. Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is sanctionable violation.

This five-year ("sunset") review and notice are published in accordance with sections 751(c) 777(i)(1) of the Act.

Dated: October 28, 1999.

Richard W. Moreland,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.

Appendix A

*The following includes clarifications to the scopes of the Department's various antidumping duty orders on antifriction bearings.

Scope Determinations Made in the Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From the Federal Republic of Germany, 54 FR 19006, 19019 (May 3, 1989):

Products covered:

- Rod end bearings and parts thereof
- AFBs used in aviation applications
- Aerospace engine bearings
- Split cylindrical roller bearings
- Wheel hub units
- Slewing rings and slewing bearings (slewing rings and slewing bearings were subsequently excluded by the International Trade Commission's negative injury determination (See *International Trade Commission: Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts*

Thereof from the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand and the United Kingdom, 54 FR 21488 (May 18, 1989))

- Wave generator bearings
- Bearings (including mounted or housed units and flanged or enhanced bearings) ultimately utilized in textile machinery

Products excluded:

- Plain bearings other than spherical plain bearings
- Airframe components unrelated to the reduction of friction
- Linear motion devices
- Split pillow block housings
- Nuts, bolts, and sleeves that are not integral parts of a bearing or attached to a bearing under review
- Thermoplastic bearings
- Stainless steel hollow balls
- Textile machinery components that are substantially advanced in function(s) or value
- Wheel hub units imported as part of front and rear axle assemblies; wheel hub units that include tapered roller bearings; and clutch release bearings that are already assembled as parts of transmissions

Scope Rulings Completed Between April 1, 1990, and June 30, 1990 (See Scope Rulings, 55 FR 42750 (October 23, 1990))

Products excluded:

- Antifriction bearings, including integral shaft ball bearings, used in textile machinery and imported with attachments and augmentations sufficient to advance their function beyond load-bearing/friction-reducing capability

Scope Rulings Completed Between July 1, 1990, and September 30, 1990 (See Scope Rulings, 55 FR 43020 (October 25, 1990))

Products covered:

- Rod ends
- Clutch release bearings
- Ball bearings used in the manufacture of helicopters
- Ball bearings used in the manufacture of disk drives

Scope Rulings Published in Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof; Final Results of Antidumping Administrative Review (AFBs I), 56 FR 31692, 31696 (July 11, 1991)

Products covered:

- Load rollers and thrust rollers, also called mast guide bearings
- Conveyor system trolley wheels and chain wheels

Scope Rulings Completed Between April 1, 1991, and June 30, 1991 (See Notice of Scope Rulings, 56 FR 36774 (August 1, 1991))

Products excluded:

- Textile machinery components including false twist spindles, belt guide rollers, separator rollers, damping units, rotor units, and tension pulleys

Scope Rulings Completed Between July 1, 1991, and September 30, 1991 (See Scope Rulings, 56 FR 57320 (November 8, 1991)):

Products covered:

- Snap rings and wire races
- Bearings imported as spare parts
- Custom-made specialty bearings

Products excluded:

- Certain rotor assembly textile machinery components
- Linear motion bearings

Scope Rulings Completed Between October 1, 1991, and December 31, 1991 (See Notice of Scope Rulings, 57 FR 4597 (February 6, 1992))

Products covered:

- Chain sheaves (forklift truck mast components)
- Loose boss rollers used in textile drafting machinery, also called top rollers
- Certain engine main shaft pilot bearings and engine crank shaft bearings

Scope Rulings Completed Between January 1, 1992, and March 31, 1992 (See Scope Rulings, 57 FR 19602 (May 7, 1992))

Products covered:

- Ceramic bearings
- Roller turn rollers
- Clutch release systems that contain rolling elements

Products excluded:

- Clutch release systems that do not contain rolling elements
- Chrome steel balls for use as check valves in hydraulic valve systems

Scope Rulings Completed Between April 1, 1992, and June 30, 1992 (See Scope Rulings, 57 FR 32973 (July 24, 1992))

Products excluded:

- Finished, semiground stainless steel balls
- Stainless steel balls for non-bearing use (in an optical polishing process)

Scope Rulings Completed Between July 1, 1992, and September 30, 1992 (See Scope Rulings, 57 FR 57420 (December 4, 1992))

Products covered:

- Certain flexible roller bearings whose component rollers have a length-to-diameter ratio of less than 4:1
- Model 15BM2110 bearings

Products excluded:

- Certain textile machinery components

Scope Rulings Completed Between October 1, 1992, and December 31, 1992 (See Scope Rulings, 58 FR 11209 (February 24, 1993))

Products covered:

- Certain cylindrical bearings with a length-to-diameter ratio of less than 4:1
- Products excluded:
- Certain cartridge assemblies comprised of a machine shaft, a machined housing and two standard bearings

Scope Rulings Completed Between January 1, 1993, and March 31, 1993 (See Scope Rulings, 58 FR 27542 (May 10, 1993))

Products covered:

- Certain cylindrical bearings with a length-to-diameter ratio of less than 4:1

Scope Rulings Completed Between April 1, 1993, and June 30, 1993 (See Scope Rulings, 58 FR 47124 (September 7, 1993))

Products covered:

- Certain series of INA bearings

Products excluded:

- SAR series of ball bearings
- Certain eccentric locking collars that are part of housed bearing units

Scope Rulings Completed Between October 1, 1993, and December 31, 1993 (See Scope Rulings, 59 FR 8910 (February 24, 1994))

Products excluded:

- Certain textile machinery components

Scope Rulings Completed Between January 1, 1994, and March 31, 1994

Products excluded:

- Certain textile machinery components

Scope Rulings Completed Between October 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994 (See Scope Rulings, 60 FR 12196 (March 6, 1995))

Products excluded:

- Rotek and Kaydon—Rotek bearings, models M4 and L6, are slewing rings outside the scope of the order.

Scope Rulings Completed Between April 1, 1995 and June 30, 1995 (See Scope Rulings, 60 FR 36782 (July 18, 1995))

Products covered:

- Consolidated Saw Mill International (CSMI) Inc.—Cambio bearings contained in CSMI's sawmill debarker are within the scope of the order.
- Nakanishi Manufacturing Corp.—Nakanishi's stamped steel washer with a zinc phosphate and adhesive coating used in the manufacture of a ball bearing is within the scope of the order.

Scope Rulings Completed Between January 1, 1996 and March 31, 1996 (See Scope Rulings, 61 FR 18381 (April 25, 1996))

Products covered:

- Marquardt Switches—Medium carbon steel balls imported by Marquardt are outside the scope of the order.

Scope Rulings Completed Between April 1, 1996 and June 30, 1996 (See Scope Rulings, 61 FR 40194 (August 1, 1996))

Products excluded:

- Dana Corporation—Automotive component, known variously as a center bracket assembly, center bearings assembly, support bracket, or shaft support bearing, is outside the scope of the order.
- Rockwell International Corporation—Automotive component, known variously as a cushion suspension unit, cushion assembly unit, or center bearing assembly, is outside the scope of the order.
- Enkotec Company, Inc.—“Main bearings” imported for incorporation into Enkotec Rotary Nail Machines are slewing rings and, therefore, are outside the scope of the order.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-401-801]

Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Antifriction Bearings From Sweden

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of final results of expedited sunset review: antifriction bearings from Sweden.

SUMMARY: On April 1, 1999, the Department of Commerce (“the Department”) initiated sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders on ball bearings (“BBs”) and cylindrical roller bearings (“CRBs”) (collectively, antifriction bearings) from Sweden (64 FR 15727) pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (“the Act”).¹ On the basis of a notice of intent to participate and adequate substantive comments filed on behalf of domestic interested parties and inadequate response (in these cases, no response) from respondent interested parties, the Department determined to conduct expedited sunset reviews. As a result of these reviews, the Department finds that revocation of the antidumping duty orders on antifriction bearings from Sweden would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at the levels indicated in the Final Results of Review section of this notice. **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Scott E. Smith or Melissa G. Skinner, Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20230; telephone: (202) 482-6397 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 4, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

These reviews were conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews are set forth in *Procedures for Conducting Five-year (“Sunset”) Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders*, 63 FR 13516 (March 20, 1998) (“*Sunset Regulations*”), and 19 CFR Part 351 (1998) in general. Guidance on methodological or analytical issues relevant to the Department's conduct of

¹ The orders on antifriction bearings from Sweden include CRBs and BBs. The Department has no antidumping duty order on spherical plain bearings from Sweden.

sunset reviews is set forth in the Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3—“*Policies Regarding the Conduct of Five-year (“Sunset”) Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders*,” Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16, 1998) (“*Sunset Policy Bulletin*”).

Scope

The products covered by these orders are CRBs and BBs and parts thereof from Sweden. For a detailed description of the products covered by these orders, including a compilation of all pertinent scope determinations, refer to the notice of final results of expedited sunset review on antifriction bearings from Japan (A-588-804), publishing concurrently with this notice.

History of the Order

The Department published its less-than-fair-value (“LTFV”) determination of antifriction bearings from Sweden on May 3, 1989.² In this determination, the Department published a weighted-average dumping margin of 105.92 percent for BBs for SKF Sverige AB (“SKF”) and 105.92 percent for all other producers and/or exporters of Swedish BBs. The Department also published a weighted-average dumping margin of 13.69 percent for CRBs for SKF and 13.69 percent for all other producers and/or exporters of Swedish CRBs. Since that time, the Department has conducted eight administrative reviews.³ These sunset reviews cover

² See *Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Needle Roller Bearings, Spherical Plain Bearings, and Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Sweden; and Final Determinations of Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value: Needle Roller Bearings and Spherical Plain Bearings, and Parts Thereof, From Sweden*, 54 FR 19114 (May 3, 1989); *Notice of Redetermination of Final Margin of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, Pursuant to Court Remand: Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Italy and Sweden*, 58 FR 12932 (March 8, 1993).

³ See *Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Needle Roller Bearings, Spherical Plain Bearings, and Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Sweden; and Final Determinations of Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value: Needle Roller Bearings and Spherical Plain Bearings, and Parts Thereof, From Sweden*, 54 FR 19114 (May 3, 1989); *Notice of Redetermination of Final Margin of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, Pursuant to Court Remand: Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Italy and Sweden*, 58 FR 12932 (March 8, 1993); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Sweden; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review*, 56 FR 31762 (July 11, 1991); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Germany; et al.; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 62 FR 32755 (June 17, 1997); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France; et al.; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews*, 57 FR 28360 (June 24, 1992); *Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered*