

*Type of Review:* Re-clearance, without change, of a currently approved collection.

*Title:* Mergers of Federally Insured Credit Unions.

*Description:* Part 708b of NCUA's regulations sets forth the procedures for credit union mergers.

*Respondents:* Federal and State Credit Unions.

*Estimated No. of Respondents/Recordkeepers:* 200.

*Estimated Burden Hours Per Response:* 15.

*Frequency of Response:* On occasion.  
*Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours:* 3,000.

*Estimated Total Annual Cost:* \$44,640.

*OMB Number:* 3133-0035.

*Form Number:* None.

*Type of Review:* Re-clearance, without change, of a currently approved collection.

*Title:* Trustees and Custodians of Pension Plans.

*Description:* A federal credit union acting as trustee for a retirement plan must maintain individual records for each participant and provide each participant with notice of the insurance status of their account.

*Respondents:* Federal Credit Unions.

*Estimated No. of Respondents/Recordkeepers:* 3,877.

*Estimated Burden Hours Per Response:* 1.

*Frequency of Response:* On occasion.  
*Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours:* 193,850.

*Estimated Total Annual Cost:* \$2,884,488.

By the National Credit Union Administration Board on February 6, 1997.  
Becky Baker,  
Secretary of the Board.

[FR Doc. 97-3687 Filed 2-13-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7535-01-P

## NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

### Proposed Generic Communication; Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventory and Associated Potential for Loss of Emergency Mitigation Functions While in a Shutdown Condition (M92635)

**AGENCY:** Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**ACTION:** Notice of opportunity for public comment.

**SUMMARY:** The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to issue a generic letter that will request addressees to (1) assess the

susceptibility of their emergency core cooling system (ECCS) to common-cause failure as a result of reactor coolant system (RCS) draindown while in a shutdown condition, and (2) submit certain information, pursuant to § 50.54(f) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.54(f)), concerning their findings regarding potential pathways for inadvertent RCS drain-down and the suitability of configuration control and operating practices during reactor shutdown cooling. This information will enable NRC staff to verify whether addressees comply and conform with NRC regulatory and license requirements; i.e., are adequately maintaining the residual heat removal safety function to transfer fission product decay heat and other residual heat from the reactor core (General Design Criterion (GDC) 34 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50), and the ECCS to provide abundant emergency core cooling when required (GDC 35 of Appendix A to 10 CFR part 50). The NRC is seeking comment from interested parties regarding both the technical and regulatory aspects of the proposed generic letter presented under the Supplementary Information heading.

The proposed generic letter has been endorsed by the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR). The relevant information that was sent to the CRGR will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. The NRC will consider comments received from interested parties in the final evaluation of the proposed generic letter. The NRC's final evaluation will include a review of the technical position and, as appropriate, an analysis of the value/impact on licensees. Should this generic letter be issued by the NRC, it will become available for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room.

**DATES:** Comment period expires March 17, 1997. Comments submitted after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given except for comments received on or before this date.

**ADDRESSES:** Submit written comments to Chief, Rules Review and Directives Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Mail Stop T-6D-69, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Written comments may also be delivered to 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 am to 4:15 pm, Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, N.W. (Lower Level), Washington, D.C.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Muhammad M. Razzaque (301) 415-2882.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

NRC Generic Letter 97-xx: Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventory and Associated Potential for Loss of Emergency Mitigation Functions While in a Shutdown Condition

#### Addressees

All holders of operating licenses for pressurized-water reactors (PWRs), except those that have certified to the permanent cessation of operations.

#### Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this generic letter to request that addressees (1) assess the susceptibility of their emergency core cooling systems (ECCSs) to common-cause failure as a result of reactor coolant system (RCS) draindown while in a shutdown condition, and (2) submit certain information, pursuant to § 50.54(f) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.54(f)), concerning their findings regarding potential pathways for inadvertent RCS drain-down and the suitability of configuration control and operating practices during reactor shutdown cooling. This information will enable NRC staff to verify whether addressees comply and conform with NRC regulatory and license requirements; i.e., are adequately maintaining the RHR safety function to transfer fission product decay heat and other residual heat from the reactor core (General Design Criterion (GDC) 34 of Appendix A to 10 CFR part 50), and the ECCS to provide abundant emergency core cooling when required (GDC 35 of Appendix A to 10 CFR part 50).

#### Background

The NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 95-03, "Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventory and Potential Loss of Emergency Mitigation Functions While in a Shutdown Condition," on January 12, 1995, to alert addressees to an incident at the Wolf Creek Plant involving the loss of reactor coolant inventory while the reactor was in a shutdown condition. In that event, operators were attempting to reborate residual heat removal (RHR) train B, while at the same time maintenance personnel were repacking an RHR train A-to-train B crossover isolation valve. Train B is reborated by recirculating water through a loop that contains the RHR system piping, the refueling water storage tank (RWST), a containment spray pump, a manual RWST isolation

valve, and an RHR system crossover line. When the RWST isolation valve was opened for the rebaration process and the train A-to-train B crossover isolation valve was opened for stroke testing, a drain-down path was inadvertently created from the reactor coolant system (RCS) to the RWST. This drain-down path included a suction header common to all ECCS pumps.

Events of this nature are considered particularly significant because they can result in loss of emergency core cooling capability and involve the potential for containment bypass. On March 25, 1996, the staff issued a supplement to IN 95-03 that further analyzed the event. The NRC has also issued a number of other communications describing events at reactor facilities involving inadvertent loss of reactor coolant inventory while the reactor was in a shutdown condition. The Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) published AEOD/E704, "Discharge of Primary Coolant Outside of Containment at PWRs While on RHR Cooling," in March 1987, which documented six events involving RCS backflow into the RWST. In Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal (DHR) 10 CFR 50.54(f)," dated October 17, 1988, the NRC requested several actions to address loss-of-DHR events that occurred while reactors were in a shutdown condition. In IN 91-42, "Plant Outage Events Involving Poor Coordination Between Operations and Maintenance Personnel During Valve Testing and Manipulations," dated June 27, 1991, the NRC discussed inadvertent loss-of-inventory events.

#### *Discussion*

At Wolf Creek, all ECCS pump suction lines are tied into a common suction header. When the draindown event occurred at Wolf Creek, hot RCS water was introduced into this common suction header between the RWST and the ECCS pumps. This hot water flashed to steam, resulting in a steam/water mixture in the header. In the event of an ECCS actuation, this mixture would have been introduced into the suction of the ECCS pumps. If operators had not been able to terminate the event, the hot water in the RWST suction piping might have led to steam binding, which could have affected all pumps in both ECCS trains. In addition, water flashing to steam in the header and the RWST could have caused serious mechanical damage to the RHR piping and the RWST as a result of water hammer. Finally, steaming through the RWST establishes a containment bypass path.

The licensee estimated (using actual plant conditions) that for an

unmitigated event, the reactor vessel water level could have drained to the bottom of the hot leg within 5 minutes and, as a consequence, RHR pump A would have lost suction, cavitated, and failed. Shortly thereafter, the common ECCS suction header could have reached a 90-percent steam/water ratio. The licensee also estimated that continued boil-off could have caused the pressure vessel water level to drop to the point of core uncover in less than 1 hour.

The AEOD report "Reactor Coolant System Blowdown at Wolf Creek on September 17, 1994," (AEOD/S95-01), dated March 1995, noted 19 events in which RCS water was transferred to the RWST. On the basis of this history and the potential for containment bypass, the staff has concluded that additional information is required to confirm the adequacy of existing ECCS configuration control and operating practices regarding residual heat removal.

#### *Requested Actions*

Addressees are requested to determine whether their ECCSs are susceptible to common-cause failure, e.g., as a result of events similar to the Wolf Creek RCS drain-down event of September 17, 1994.

If ECCSs are found to be susceptible to common-cause failure, addressees are expected to take corrective action, as appropriate, in accordance with the requirements stated in Section XVI of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory and license requirements.

#### *Requested Information*

Within 120 days of the date of this generic letter, addressees are requested to submit a written summary report that includes a description of the evaluation conducted and the conclusions reached concerning the susceptibility of the RCS to drain-down events with a potential for consequential common-cause ECCS failure, and the corrective actions that were taken, or that are planned to be taken, if any, in response to the above requested actions. If the RCS is found to be susceptible to drain-down events, describe each potential drain-down flow path (include piping sizes, identify flow path valves and their normal positions, and identify valve interlocks and provisions for valve position indication in the control room), describe potential valve testing manipulations or uses, and describe any administrative controls that are intended to be used to control valve manipulations to preclude RCS drain-down events.

#### *Required Response*

Within 30 days of the date of this generic letter, addressees are required to submit a written response indicating (1) whether or not the requested actions will be taken, (2) whether or not the requested information will be submitted, and (3) whether or not the requested information will be submitted within the requested time period. Addressees who choose not to complete the requested actions, or choose not to submit the requested information, or are unable to satisfy the requested completion date must describe in their response any alternative course of action that is proposed to be taken, including the basis for establishing the acceptability of the proposed alternative course of action and the basis for continued operability of affected systems and components, as applicable.

Address the required written responses to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, under oath or affirmation under the provisions of Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR 50.54(f). In addition, submit a copy to the appropriate regional administrator.

#### *Backfit Discussion*

The actions requested in this generic letter, if required, would be backfits in accordance with NRC procedures and are necessary to ensure that addressees are in compliance with existing NRC rules and regulations. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.46 requires that the ECCS be designed to provide adequate flow capability to maintain the core temperature at an acceptably low value and to remove decay heat for the extended period of time required by the long-lived radioactivity remaining in the core. The Wolf Creek event has demonstrated that the adequacy of ECCS configuration control and operating practices regarding residual heat removal can adversely impact ECCS performance and could prevent the ECCS from performing its safety function following events at reactor facilities involving inadvertent loss of reactor coolant inventory while the reactor is shut down. Therefore, this generic letter is being issued as if the requested actions were compliance backfits under the terms of 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(i). A full backfit analysis was not performed. However, in accordance with NRC procedures, an evaluation was prepared stating the objectives of and the reasons for the requested actions and the basis for invoking the compliance exception if

the requested actions were to be required. A copy of this evaluation will be made available in the NRC Public Document Room.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of February 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  
Thomas T. Martin,

*Director, Division of Reactor Program Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.*

[FR Doc. 97-3737 Filed 2-13-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

### **Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Joint Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittees on Materials and Metallurgy and on Severe Accidents; Meeting**

The ACRS Subcommittees on Materials and Metallurgy and on Severe Accidents will hold a joint meeting on March 4 and 5, 1997, Room T-2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland.

The entire meeting will be open to public attendance.

The agenda for the subject meeting shall be as follows:

*Tuesday, March 4, 1997—8:30 a.m.*

*until the conclusion of business*

*Wednesday, March 5, 1997—8:30 a.m.*  
*until 12:00 Noon*

The Subcommittees will review the regulatory analysis and technical bases for the steam generator tube integrity rule, as well as an associated regulatory guide. The purpose of this meeting is to gather information, analyze relevant issues and facts, and to formulate proposed positions and actions, as appropriate, for deliberation by the full Committee.

Oral statements may be presented by members of the public with the concurrence of the Subcommittee Chairman; written statements will be accepted and made available to the Committee. Electronic recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the meeting that are open to the public, and questions may be asked only by members of the Subcommittees, their consultants, and staff. Persons desiring to make oral statements should notify the cognizant ACRS staff engineer named below five days prior to the meeting, if possible, so that appropriate arrangements can be made.

During the initial portion of the meeting, the Subcommittees, along with any of their consultants who may be present, may exchange preliminary views regarding matters to be considered during the balance of the meeting.

The Subcommittees will then hear presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC staff and other interested persons regarding this review.

Further information regarding topics to be discussed, whether the meeting has been cancelled or rescheduled, the Chairman's ruling on requests for the opportunity to present oral statements, and the time allotted therefor can be obtained by contacting the cognizant ACRS staff engineer, Mr. Noel F. Dudley (telephone 301/415-6888) between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. (ET). Persons planning to attend this meeting are urged to contact the above named individual one or two working days prior to the meeting to be advised of any potential changes to the agenda, etc., that may have occurred.

Dated: February 7, 1997.

Sam Duraiswamy,

*Chief, Nuclear Reactors Branch.*

[FR Doc. 97-3738 Filed 2-13-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

### **[DD-97-03]**

### **Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206**

In the Matter of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy.

Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, has taken action with regard to the Petition of December 5, 1995, by the Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy, Alice Hirt, Charlene Johnston, Dini Schut, and William Hoops (Petitioners), that the Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards exercise his authority to immediately issue orders to prevent the loading of spent nuclear fuel into the VECTRA Technologies, Inc. (VECTRA) NUHOMS dry-shielded canisters (DSCs) at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station until an NRC rulemaking and/or license modification hearing is conducted on all safety-related changes which have been made to the DSCs, as described in the Safety Analysis Report. Also, the NRC was requested not to authorize any loading of the DSCs until a written procedure for unloading, in both urgent and non-urgent circumstances, was written, approved, and field-tested.

Petitioners contend that the safety of the DSCs has been compromised because of reduction in the thickness of the DSC welds. In addition, they claim that the NRC administrative process by which permission was granted for VECTRA to deliver the DSCs to the

Davis-Besse station and for the DSCs to be used on site are legally suspect, expressing the belief that agency rulemaking or some other public proceeding is necessary for permission for such a transfer and use to be granted.

The Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards has determined that the NRC Certificate of Compliance for VECTRA's standardized NUHOMS should be modified to require a fabrication inspection of the DSC. An agency rulemaking is, therefore, needed and should be conducted to accomplish this modification. However, because the continued storage of spent fuel in the DSCs at Davis-Besse does not pose an unreasonable risk to public health and safety, there is no technical basis to require the DSCs to be unloaded pending completion of this rulemaking. Further, VECTRA has already been cited for a nonconformance with NRC regulations, and there is no basis in the Petition to take other action in this regard. Toledo Edison has developed loading and unloading procedures for handling spent fuels. These procedures have been applied for the dry run testing with NRC's oversight. Therefore, there is no basis in the Petition for requiring halting of the ISFSI operation at Davis-Besse. Accordingly, the Petition from the Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy is granted to the extent that it requests an agency rulemaking and is denied in all other respects. The reasons for this decision are explained in the "Director's Decision under 10 CFR 2.206" (DD-97-03), which is available for public inspection in the Commission's Public Document Room, Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC 20555, and in the Local Public Document Room, William Carlson Library, University of Toledo, 2001 West Bancroft Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43606.

A copy of this Decision will be filed with the Office of the Secretary for the Commission in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c). As provided by this regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of issuance of the Decision unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision within that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of February 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Carl J. Paperiello,

*Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.*

[FR Doc. 97-3739 Filed 2-13-97; 8:45 am]

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