

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

**Office of the Secretary**

[Transmittal No. 97-41]

**36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification**

**AGENCY:** Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency.

**ACTION:** Notice.

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**SUMMARY:** The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text of a section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. This is published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-164 dated 21 July 1996.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Ms. J. Hurd, DSAA/COMPT/CPD, (703) 604-6575.

The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of

Representatives, Transmittal 97-41, with attached transmittal, policy justification, and sensitivity of technology pages.

Dated: September 9, 1997.

**L.M. Bynum,**

*Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.*

**BILLING CODE 5000-04-M**



## DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2800

03 SEP 1997

In reply refer to:  
I-51552/97

Honorable Newt Gingrich  
Speaker of the House of  
Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515-6501

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 97-42, concerning the Department of the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) to Korea for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$45 million. Soon after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "MS Davison".

MICHAEL S. DAVISON, JR.  
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USA  
DIRECTOR

Attachments

Same ltr to: House Committee on International Relations  
Senate Committee on Appropriations  
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations  
House Committee on National Security  
Senate Committee on Armed Services  
House Committee on Appropriations

Transmittal No. 97-42

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer  
Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1)  
of the Arms Export Control Act

- (i) Prospective Purchaser: Korea
- (ii) Total Estimated Value:
- |                          |               |
|--------------------------|---------------|
| Major Defense Equipment* | \$ 35 million |
| Other                    | \$ 10 million |
| TOTAL                    | \$ 45 million |
- (iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered:  
Two hundred STINGER RMP missiles less reprogrammable modules (STINGER RMP (-)), 48 fly-to-buy STINGER missiles, 40 weapon rounds, 40 gripstock control group guided missile launchers, Interrogator Friend or Foe, STINGER Night Sight, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, U.S. Government Quality Assurance Teams (QAT), and other related elements of logistics support.
- (iv) Military Department: Army (JBB, Amendment 1; YRS, Amendment 1; and BRJ, Amendment 1)
- (v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: none
- (vi) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold:  
See Annex attached
- (vii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: 03 SEP 1997

\* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATIONKorea - STINGER-RMP Missile System

The Government of Korea has requested the purchase of 200 STINGER RMP missiles less reprogrammable modules (STINGER RMP (-)), 48 fly-to-buy STINGER missiles, 40 weapon rounds, 40 gripstock control group guided missile launchers, Interrogator Friend or Foe, STINGER Night Sight, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, U.S. Government Quality Assurance Teams (QAT), and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$45 million.

This sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country which has been and continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Northeast Asia.

This sale will enable the Korean Air Force and Korean Navy to develop defensive capabilities to protect from unwarranted aggression from the air as well as enhance its interoperability with U.S. forces. Korea will have no difficulty absorbing these missiles into its armed forces.

The sale of this equipment and support will not affect the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be Hughes Missile System Company, Tucson, Arizona. One or more proposed offset agreements may be related to this proposed sale.

Implementation of this sale will require the assignment of three U.S. Government Quality Assurance Teams to Korea for two weeks to assist in the delivery and deployment of the missiles. There will be five U.S. Government personnel and two contractor representatives for one week intervals twice annually to participate in program management and technical reviews. A team of two U.S. Government personnel will be deployed for two week intervals for six training classes.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this sale.

Transmittal No. 97-42

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer  
Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1)  
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Annex  
Item No. vi

(vi) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The STINGER RMP missile system less reprogrammable module (STINGER RMP (-)), gripstock, hardware, software and documentation contain sensitive technology and are classified Confidential. The guidance section of the missile and tracking head trainer contain highly sensitive technology and are classified Confidential. The AN/PPX-3B Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system, technical manuals, and specifications are classified Confidential.

2. Missile system hardware and fire unit components contain sensitive/critical technologies. STINGER critical technology is primarily in the area of design and production know-how and not end-items. This sensitive/critical technology is inherent in the hybrid microcircuit assemblies, microprocessors, magnetic and amorphous metals, purification, firmware, printed circuit boards, laser range finder, dual detector assembly, detector filters, automatic text and associated computer software, optical coatings, ultraviolet sensors, semi-conductor detectors, infrared band sensors, equipment operating instructions, warhead components seeker assembly and the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system.

3. Information on vulnerability to electronic countermeasures and counter-countermeasures, system performance capabilities and effectiveness, and test data are classified up to Secret.

4. Loss of this hardware and/or data could permit development of information leading to the exploitation of countermeasures. Therefore, if a technologically capable adversary were to obtain these devices, the missile system could be compromised through reverse engineering techniques which could defeat the weapon systems effectiveness.