Agenda: The Army Science Board's (ASB) 1996 Summer Study on ''Army Simulation Implementation and Use'' will meet for briefings and discussions on the study subject. These meetings will be closed to the public in accordance with Section 552b(c) of Title 5, U.S.C., specifically paragraph (1) thereof, and Title 5, U.S.C., Appendix 2, subsection 10(d). The classified matters to be discussed are so inextricably intertwined so as to preclude opening any portion of these meetings. For further information, please contact Michelle Diaz at (703) 695–0781.

Michelle P. Diaz,

Acting Administrative Officer, Army Science Board.

[FR Doc. 96–3873 Filed 2–20–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3710–08–M

Army Science Board; Notice of Closed Meeting

In accordance with Section 10a(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (P.L. 92–463), announcement is made of the following Committee Meeting:

Name of the Committee: Army Science Board (ASB), Special Study Panel on Reengineering the Acquisition and Modernization Processes of the Institutional Army.

Date of Meeting: 27 February 1996.

Time: 1000–1600 hours.

Place: Room 2D731 Pentagon, Washington, DC.

Agenda: The Army Science Board Special Study Panel on Reengineering the Acquisition And Modernization Processes of the Institutional Army will meet to discuss the current status of Army Modernization and to discuss plans to reengineer the Acquisition and Modernization processes. Discussion will include the current shortfalls in modernization and the attendant vulnerabilities to the U.S. Army. This meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with Section 552b(c) of Title 5, U.S.C., specifically subparagraph (1) thereof, and Title 5, U.S.C., Appendix 2, subsection 10(d). The classified and unclassified information to be discussed is so inextricably intertwined so as to preclude opening any portion of the meeting. The ASB Administrative Officer, Ms. Michelle Diaz, may be contacted for further information at (703) 695–0781.

Michelle P. Diaz,

Acting Administrative Officer, Army Science Board.

[FR Doc. 96–3872 Filed 2–20–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3710–08–M

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Savannah River Operations Office; Interim Management of Nuclear Materials at the Savannah River Site

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Supplemental Record of Decision.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared a final environmental impact statement (EIS), ''Interim Management of Nuclear Materials'' (DOE/EIS–0220, October 20, 1995), to assess the potential environmental impacts of actions necessary to manage nuclear materials at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina, until decisions on their ultimate disposition are made and implemented.

On December 12, 1995 (60 FR 65300), DOE issued a Record of Decision (ROD) and Notice of Preferred Alternatives on the interim management of several categories of nuclear materials at the SRS. DOE is now issuing its decisions on actions that will stabilize two additional categories of materials at the SRS, which present environment, safety and health vulnerabilities in their current storage condition or may present vulnerabilities within the next 10 years. The decisions on the stabilization of two additional categories of nuclear materials, neptunium-237 solution and targets, and H-Canyon plutonium-239 solutions, are not being made at this time.

Mark-16 and Mark-22 Fuels

DOE has decided to stabilize the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels by processing them in the SRS canyon facilities and blending down the resulting highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU). The LEU solution will be stored or converted to an oxide in the FA-Line. Neptunium-237 separated during the stabilization processing of the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels will be stabilized with the other SRS neptunium. The Department is still considering which of the management options for neptunium to implement.

Other Aluminum-Clad Targets

DOE has decided to stabilize the ''other aluminum-clad targets'' by dissolving them in the SRS canyon facilities and transferring the resulting nuclear material solution to the high level waste tanks for future vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the interim management of nuclear materials at the SRS or to receive a copy of the Final EIS, the Facility Utilization Strategy study, the initial ROD and Notice, or this supplemental ROD contact: Andrew R. Grainger, NEPA Compliance Officer, U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office, P.O. Box 5031, Aiken, South Carolina 29804–5031, (800) 242–8259, Internet: drew.grainger@srs.gov.

For further information on the DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH–42, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586–4600, or leave a message at (800) 472–2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared the final environmental impact statement (EIS), ''Interim Management of Nuclear Materials'', (DOE/EIS–0220, October 20, 1995), to assess the potential environmental impacts of actions necessary to manage nuclear materials at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina, until decisions on their ultimate disposition are made and implemented.

The Final EIS identified continued storage (i.e., No Action) as the preferred alternative for the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and the ''other aluminum-clad targets'' until DOE could complete additional reviews of costs, schedules, and technical uncertainties associated with dry storage techniques for failed fuel.

On December 12, 1995 (60 FR 65300), DOE issued a Record of Decision (ROD) and Notice of Preferred Alternatives on the interim management of several categories of nuclear materials at the SRS. At that time, DOE announced new preferred alternatives for the management of the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels (processing and blending down to LEU) and the ''other aluminum-clad targets'' (processing and storage for vitrification in the DWPF). In addition, DOE indicated that neptunium-237 solution and targets would be stabilized through either processing to oxide or vitrification, and that plutonium-239 solutions in H-Canyon would be stabilized through processing to metal, processing to oxide, or vitrification. For each of these material categories, only one stabilization method will be implemented. The stabilization alternative chosen is dependent upon whether the materials would be stabilized in the SRS's F- or H-Canyon, as discussed in a DOE staff study, Facility Utilization Strategy for the Savannah River Site Chemical Separation Facilities (December 1995). DOE is still considering the facility utilization strategy study and other related information.

II. Alternatives Evaluated in the Final EIS

DOE evaluated the following alternatives for managing the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and the other aluminum-clad targets at the SRS: (A) Continuing Storage (i.e., ''No Action'' within the context of NEPA), (B) Processing to Oxide, (C) Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium, (D) Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the DWPF, and (E) Improving Storage. The following is a brief description of the alternatives evaluated.

A. Continuing Storage (No Action)

This alternative was evaluated for the fuels and targets considered in this supplemental ROD. Under this alternative, DOE would continue to store the materials in their current physical and chemical form. DOE would relocate, repackage, or re-can materials stored in basins to consolidate the material or to respond to an immediate safety problem. Periodic sampling, destructive and non-destructive examination, weighing, visual inspection and similar activities would continue in order to monitor the physical and chemical condition of the nuclear material. Repackaging would include removing materials from a damaged storage container and placing them in a new container or placing the damaged container in a larger container. Re-canning would primarily entail placing damaged or degraded fuel or targets in metal containers, sealing the containers, and keeping them in wet storage.

Many activities would be required by DOE irrespective of the management alternative used. For example, DOE would maintain facilities in good working condition and would continue to provide utilities (water, electricity, steam, compressed gas, etc.) and services (security, maintenance, fire protection, etc.) for each facility. Training activities would ensure that personnel maintain the skills necessary to operate the facilities and equipment. DOE would continue with ongoing projects to alleviate facility-related vulnerabilities associated with storage of the materials and projects to upgrade or replace aging equipment (ventilation fans, etc.).

B. Processing to Oxide

For purposes of this supplemental ROD, this alternative is only relevant to the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels. DOE would dissolve and process the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels containing HEU in the H-Canyon and would convert the resulting HEU solution to HEU oxide. To provide conversion capability, DOE would complete the partially constructed Uranium Solidification Facility (USF) in H-Canyon. The HEU oxide would be packaged and stored in a vault in USF.

C. Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium

This alternative is only relevant to the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels. Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels containing HEU would be transported to H-Canyon and/or F-Canyon by rail casks, and dissolved in nitric acid. If processed through F-Canyon, due to criticality constraints, the dissolved fuel material would be blended down to LEU prior to separation from fission products and other materials. If processed through H-Canyon, the dissolved fuel material would be separated from fission products and other materials and subsequently blended down to LEU. In either case, the HEU would be blended at the SRS with existing depleted or natural uranium to produce LEU solutions. The LEU solutions would be stored or converted to an oxide using FA-Line. The oxide would be stored in drums in existing facilities or in a new warehouse to be constructed at the SRS. Decisions on a potential new warehouse at the SRS will be made after or coincident with the ROD for the disposition of surplus HEU. The Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Final EIS is expected to be issued in mid 1996.

D. Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the DWPF

This alternative could apply to both the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and the other aluminum-clad targets considered in this supplemental ROD. DOE would perform research and development work to develop a method for chemically adjusting solutions that would result from the dissolution of the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, and the other aluminum-clad targets in order to transfer them to the high level waste tanks in F- or H-Area. The research and development work would be to ensure nuclear criticality safety due to the large amounts of uranium-235 contained in the fuels, and to evaluate the effects of the nuclear materials on the systems and facilities used to store and treat the liquid high level waste.

Upon completion of the studies, DOE would transport the fuel and targets stored in the water-filled basins by rail casks to F- or H-Canyon and would dissolve them in nitric acid. The resulting solutions from dissolution would be chemically adjusted and transferred to the high level waste tanks via underground pipelines. The solutions would be mixed with the existing volume of high level waste stored in the F- and H-Area tanks. The bulk of the radioactivity in the solutions would eventually be immobilized in borosilicate glass by the DWPF. The glass would be contained within stainless steel canisters that would be stored in a facility adjacent to the DWPF pending geologic disposal by DOE. The bulk of the liquid would be immobilized by the Saltstone facility into a grout containing very low levels of radioactivity. The grout would be poured into concrete vaults located at the Saltstone facility.

E. Improving Storage

This alternative could be applicable to both the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and the other aluminum-clad targets. For this alternative, DOE would remove the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and the other aluminum-clad targets from the basins and place them in dry storage. Because of technical uncertainties (e.g., potentially pyrophoric hydrides of uranium, elimination of potential reactive material) associated with the dry storage of failed fuel and targets, DOE would perform additional research to demonstrate the feasibility of drying and placing the materials into canisters for storage. Work related to the dry storage of LEU and commercial spent nuclear fuel has already been done in the United States and other countries. This work has not been focused on the storage of aluminum-clad HEU fuels. In conjunction with this work, DOE would design and construct a Dry Storage Facility at SRS.

A typical dry storage facility would be a Modular Dry Storage Vault. This facility would consist of four major components: a receiving/unloading area, fuel storage canisters, a shielded container handling machine, and a modular vault for storing the fuel in storage canisters. As a variation, canisters could be stored in dry storage casks rather than a vault. The degraded fuel and target materials would be removed from the basins and dried, canned or placed directly in canisters; the cans or canisters would be filled with an inert gas to inhibit further corrosion; if cans were used they would be loaded into storage canisters. This process could be varied as dictated by the condition of the material. After the fuel or targets were loaded in a canister, a machine would transport the canister to the modular storage vault. The vault would consist of a large concrete structure with an array of vertical tubes to hold the canisters. The canister

transport machine would move into the vault and load the canister into a storage tube. A shielded plug would be placed on top of the tube. The transport machine and the vault storage tubes would be heavily shielded to reduce the effects of radiation from the canister. To use dry storage casks, the machine would transport the canister to a cask (horizontal or vertical) and discharge the canister into the cask, and then the cask would be sealed.

DOE evaluated the potential environmental impacts associated with two variations for implementing this alternative. The first involved the use of a traditional project schedule for the design and construction of the Dry Storage Facility, estimated to take about ten years. The second was an accelerated schedule for design and construction, estimated to take about five years. Until the Dry Storage Facility was completed, DOE would store the materials in existing basins, as described under Continued Storage (No Action).

III. Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

The Final EIS for the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials analyzed the potential environmental impacts that could result from implementation of the candidate management alternatives. DOE has concluded that there would be minimal environmental impact from implementation of any of the alternatives for any of the material groups in the areas of geologic resources, ecological resources (including threatened or endangered species), cultural resources, aesthetic and scenic resources, noise, and land use. Impacts in these areas would be limited because facility modifications or construction of new facilities would occur within existing buildings or industrialized portions of the SRS. DOE anticipates that the existing SRS workforce would support any construction projects and other activities required to implement any of the alternatives. As a result, DOE expects negligible socioeconomic impacts from implementation of any of the alternatives.

Management alternatives requiring the use of the large chemical separations facilities (the canyons) would have greater environmental impacts (e.g., radiological, waste generation) during the time dissolving, processing or conversion activities are underway than when these facilities are storing nuclear materials. After materials have been stabilized, impacts of normal facility operations related to management of those materials would decline, and potential impacts of accidents associated with those materials would be reduced with certain kinds of accidents eliminated (e.g., solution spills or releases). Potential health effects from normal operations from any of the alternatives, including those involving the operation of the canyon facilities, would be low and well within regulatory limits. Alternatives requiring the use of the canyons are: Processing to Oxide, Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium, and Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the DWPF.

The Improving Storage alternatives generally have lower impacts in the near term because they involve only heating, drying and repackaging the nuclear materials. These alternatives involve the use of new facilities, such as a Dry Storage Facility. New facilities would incorporate improved designs for remote handling, shielding, containment, air filtration, etc.; these improvements could reduce worker exposures and releases to the environment below levels associated with existing storage basins and vaults.

Annual impacts from normal operations and potential accidents associated with nuclear material storage would be reduced after material stabilization alternatives are implemented. Due to the substantial influence actively operating facilities have upon potential environmental impacts, stabilization alternatives requiring longer periods of time to complete are estimated to have relatively higher impacts from normal operation and potential accidents than alternatives requiring less time to complete.

Continuing Storage (or ''No Action'') alternatives would result in low annual environmental impacts, but the impacts would continue for an indefinite period of time. Stabilization alternatives typically would result in slightly higher annual environmental impacts than ''No Action'' in the near-term, but upon completion of the stabilization action would result in lower annual impacts. Under Continuing Storage alternatives, no actions would be taken to chemically or physically stabilize the storage conditions and reduce the potential for accidents. All of the stabilization alternatives, upon completion of the actions required, would reduce the potential for accidents and associated consequences. Several of the stabilization alternatives would involve a short-term increase in the risks from accidents until the required actions are completed.

Emissions of hazardous air pollutants and releases of hazardous liquid effluents for any of the alternatives would be within applicable federal standards and existing regulatory permits for the SRS facilities. Similarly, high level liquid waste, transuranic waste, mixed hazardous waste and low level solid waste generated by implementation of any of the alternatives would be handled by existing waste management facilities. All of the waste types and volumes are within the capability of the existing SRS waste management facilities for storage, treatment or disposal.

SRS facilities that will be used to stabilize and store the nuclear materials incorporate engineered features to limit the potential impacts of facility operations to workers, the public and the environment. All of the engineered systems and administrative controls are subject to DOE Order requirements to ensure safe operation of the facilities. No other mitigation measures have been identified; therefore DOE need not prepare a Mitigation Action Plan.

IV. Other Factors

In addition to comparing the environmental impacts of implementing the various alternatives, DOE considered other factors in making the decisions announced in this supplemental ROD. These other factors included: (1) the need to construct and operate modified or new facilities (e.g., a Dry Storage Facility) and the reliability of old facilities, (2) nonproliferation concerns, involving potential impacts to U.S. nonproliferation policy as affected by both the operation of certain facilities and the attractiveness of the managed nuclear materials for potential weapons use, (3) implementation schedules, (4) technology availability, (5) labor availability and core competency, (6) level of custodial care for the continued safe management of the nuclear materials, (7) cost and budget considerations, (8) technical uncertainty (i.e., dry storage of failed HEU fuels), and (9) comments received during the scoping period for the EIS on the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials, and comments received on the Draft and Final EISs.

V. Environmentally Preferable Alternatives

As described in the Final EIS for Interim Management of Nuclear Materials, certain management alternatives are expected to result in lower environmental impacts than others. However, a single alternative was rarely estimated to have lower impacts for all environmental factors evaluated by DOE. For example, an

alternative might be expected to result in lower releases of hazardous pollutants to air or water than the other alternatives, but might generate slightly higher amounts of radioactive waste. DOE reviewed the environmental impacts estimated for the alternatives evaluated for the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and the other aluminum-clad targets, and identified the following as the environmentally preferable alternative for each material category. The health and environmental effects from any of the alternatives are all low and well within regulatory limits.

Mark-16 and Mark-22 Fuels and Other Aluminum-Clad Targets—Improving Storage (Accelerated Schedule)

Improving Storage, on an accelerated schedule, is the environmentally preferable alternative for the fuels and targets. This alternative is estimated to result in the lowest radiological doses to the offsite public with doses to the SRS workers comparable to the other alternatives; has the lowest estimates of air and water emissions; and, results in the generation of the least amount of high level, transuranic, mixed, and low level waste.

VI. Decision

As indicated in the ROD and Notice issued December 12, 1995, DOE received several comments from stakeholders on issues related to the interim management of nuclear materials at the SRS. These comments dealt principally with: (1) The method to be used for the management of spent nuclear fuel, and (2) the operational status and potential plans for the F- and H-Canyon processing facilities. Subsequent to issuing the initial ROD and Notice, DOE received a letter from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Region IV, on the Final EIS offering additional comments for consideration in making the decisions on the stabilization of the SRS nuclear materials. EPA identified, as did the Final EIS, processing to oxide as the preferred alternative for stabilizing the neptunium-237 and plutonium-239 materials. EPA stated that the principal advantage over the environmentally preferable vitrification alternative is that shipping nuclear material solutions across the SRS would not be required. For the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, EPA recommended that the fuels be blended to LEU and processed to an oxide. EPA recommended that DOE proceed with the construction of a dry storage facility on an accelerated basis for storing the other aluminum-clad targets because this alternative would take a shorter time to implement.

After careful consideration of the issues and public comments, along with the analyses of environmental impacts and other factors, DOE has made the following decisions for the interim management of Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, and other aluminum-clad targets:

Mark-16 and Mark-22 Fuels—Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium

DOE has decided to stabilize the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels through processing in the canyon facilities, blending down the HEU to LEU. DOE will dissolve depleted uranium oxide in the FA-Line as necessary to blend down the HEU to LEU.

DOE will remove the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels from the water-filled basins in which they are stored and transport them to the canyon facilities using the existing SRS rail casks. All of the cask shipments will be confined within the boundaries of the SRS, occurring near the center of the site. The fuel assemblies will be dissolved in nitric acid. If processed through the F-Canyon, the resulting HEU solution will be blended down to LEU and then separated from fission products and other materials. If processed through the H-Canyon, the resulting HEU solution from dissolution will be separated from fission products and other materials and then blended down to LEU. DOE will transfer depleted or natural uranium solutions to the canyon facilities for blending with the HEU from the fuels. The LEU solution will be stored or converted to an oxide in FA-Line. The LEU solution or oxide will be stored at the SRS until disposition decisions are made. Dependent upon the timing of future DOE decisions, the uranium from the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels could be dealt with in conjunction with the disposition of other HEU (by commercial sale, etc.).

Neptunium-237 will be separated from the fuel during the stabilization process. This material will be managed in conjunction with the other neptunium at the SRS. The Department is still considering which of the management options for neptunium-237 and plutonium-239 to implement.

DOE selected this stabilization alternative for several reasons. Stabilization of the fuels with their removal from basin wet storage and elimination of the wet storage vulnerabilities through processing can be accomplished two to seven years earlier than the improved storage alternative. Improving storage on an accelerated schedule is the environmentally preferable alternative. Blending down to LEU reduces the HEU inventory and eliminates nonproliferation and security issues associated with the indefinite storage of HEU fuel which is not self-protecting. (Self-protecting fuel is highly radioactive, so that substantial shielding (or distance) is required to prevent unhealthy radiological effects from handling or storage conditions; non self-protecting fuel could be contact-handled and therefore is of greater theft or sabotage concern.) Cost and cost uncertainties also have played a significant role in the selection of this stabilization action. Near-term annual costs to process and blend down the HEU to LEU are estimated at $20 million to $95 million less than for the improved storage alternatives. Substantial uncertainty exists concerning the disposition of dry-stored (improved storage) HEU spent fuel, while less uncertainty exists with the stabilization of the fuels through blending down to LEU and the storage and disposition of the resulting waste through the DWPF. Life-cycle cost evaluations favor blending down to LEU ($38 million to greater than $1 billion advantage)[Facility Utilization Strategy, Attachment 2]. Although potential safety, health and environmental impacts evaluated in the Final EIS are lower in the interim period for the improved storage alternatives than the selected blending down to LEU alternative, the potential impacts from any of the stabilization alternatives are shown to be very low and well below any regulatory or management control limits. It is anticipated, however, that the secondary impacts associated with the eventual or periodic need to handle stored spent fuel for management or disposal purposes may increase over time the potential impacts of the improved storage alternatives.

Other Aluminum-Clad Targets—Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the DWPF

DOE has decided to implement the processing and storage for vitrification in the DWPF alternative for the —other aluminum-clad targets— stored in the reactor disassembly basins at the SRS. DOE will remove the targets stored in the reactor disassembly basins and transport them to the canyon facilities by SRS rail casks. The targets will be dissolved in a canyon, the resulting solutions chemically adjusted and transferred to the adjacent underground high level waste tanks. The solutions will be stored in the high level waste tanks until they are processed in conjunction with the other high level waste in the tanks. The high level waste will eventually be vitrified in the DWPF. The resulting stainless steel

canisters of glass produced from the DWPF process will be stored in a facility adjacent to the DWPF pending geological disposal by DOE.

DOE selected this stabilization alternative for several reasons. These targets are in a variety of physical forms and shapes and contain no or small amounts of fissile materials; primarily they contain such materials as thorium, cobalt, and thulium. Their dissolution and transfer for vitrification in the DWPF will place these physically and chemically diverse materials into a uniform medium suitable for future emplacement in a geologic repository. Improved storage (the environmentally preferable alternative) would require the development of one or more packaging configurations for repository emplacement. Although vitrification in the DWPF will not occur for several years, processing and storage for vitrification in the DWPF can be implemented one to six years earlier than the improved storage alternatives. This will remove the targets in their deteriorating condition from the reactor disassembly basins, precluding further release of radioactivity to the basin water. Near-term costs are considerably less for the processing alternative as compared with the improved storage alternative. As with the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, potential safety, health and environmental impacts for the improved storage alternatives are lower than the selected stabilization alternative of processing and storage for vitrification in the DWPF. However, the potential impacts from any of the stabilization alternatives are acceptable and well below any regulatory or management control limits.

VII. Conclusion

While the Final EIS focuses on the interim management of nuclear materials at the SRS, the decisions associated with the safe management of these materials directly affect the operational status of the nuclear material processing facilities at the Site. The decisions in this supplemental ROD and the initial ROD and Notice are structured to effect the earliest completion of actions necessary to stabilize or convert nuclear materials into forms suitable for safe storage and prepare the facilities for subsequent shutdown and deactivation. The actions being implemented will support efficient, cost-effective consolidation of the storage of nuclear materials and, to a great extent, will result in stabilization of the nuclear materials and alleviation of associated vulnerabilities within the timeframe recommended by the DNFSB.

The stabilization decisions utilize existing facilities and processes to the extent practical; can be implemented within expected budget constraints and with minimal additional training to required personnel; rely upon proven technology; use an integrated approach; and represent the optimum use of facilities to stabilize the materials in the shortest amount of time. Only minor modifications of the canyon facilities will be required, and these were also supported by the decisions made in the initial ROD and Notice.

Several years will be required to achieve stabilization of the nuclear materials within the scope of this and the initial ROD. Stabilization of the candidate nuclear materials at SRS will entail the operation of many portions of the chemical processing facilities. Consistent with DNFSB Recommendation 94–1, this will preserve DOE's capabilities related to the management and stabilization of other nuclear materials until programmatic decisions are made.

In summary, the Department has structured its decisions on interim actions related to management of the nuclear materials at SRS to achieve stabilization as soon as possible.

Issued at Washington, DC, February 8, 1996.

Thomas P. Grumbly,

Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.

[FR Doc. 96–3884 Filed 2–20–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. RP96–46–000]

Algonquin Gas Transmission Corporation, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, Trunkline Gas Company; Notice Cancelling Technical Conference

February 14, 1996.

Take notice that the technical conference in this docket that was scheduled for Tuesday, February 20, 1996 (61 FR 3691, February 1, 1996), is being cancelled. On February 14, 1996, the subject pipelines filed a request that the Commission hold the processing of the proposed tariff sheets in abeyance so that the pipelines can consider revisions based on the standardization recommendations being formulated by the Gas Industry Standards Board pursuant to the Commission's order in Docket No. RM96–1–000.

Lois D. Cashell,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 96–3775 Filed 2–20–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717–01–M

Central Maine Power, Swans Falls Power Corporation; Notice of 10(j) Meeting

[Project Nos. 2528–ME; 2527–ME; 2194–ME; 2531–ME; 2529–ME; 2530–ME; and 11365–ME]

February 14, 1996.

a. Date and Time of meeting: February 28, 1996, from 10:00 AM to 11:00 AM.

b. Place: FERC, Room 52–40, 888 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20426.

c. FERC Contact: Rich McGuire (202) 219–3084; Robert Bell (202) 219–2806.

d. Purpose of the Meeting: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the United States Department of the Interior intend to have a Section 10(j) discussion and negotiation meeting for the Saco River Projects listed above.

e. Proposed Agenda:

A. Introduction
   Recognition of meeting participants
   Conference or meeting procedures
B. Section 10(j) issues discussion
   Run-of-river operation and minimum flows—Bonny Eagle and Skelton
   Monitoring DO levels—Skelton
   Aquatic invertebrate monitoring studies—Bonny Eagle and Skelton
   Impoundment Drawdown—Bonny Eagle
   Fish population monitoring—Bonny Eagle
C. Section 10(j) conflict resolution
D. Issues outside 10(j) discussion
E. Follow-up actions.

f. All local, State and Federal agencies, Indian Tribes, and interested parties, are hereby invited to attend this meeting as attendant. If you want to be an attendant by teleconference, please contact Rich McGuire or Robert Bell at the numbers listed above no later than February 23, 1996.

Lois D. Cashell,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 96–3776 Filed 2–20–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717–01–M

[Docket No. GP94–2–006]

Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation; Notice of RIA Account Refund Report

February 14, 1996.

Take notice that on January 26, 1996, Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation