as a part of the program evaluation process. No sensitive information is being requested in the survey.

Burden on the Public: The Foundation estimates that, on average, two hours will be required to prepare the narratives, or a total of 400 hours for all PIs. In addition, it anticipates 4 hours of interviews for each of 20 case studies, or 80 hours. Thus, total burden is estimated at 480 hours.

Send comments to Herman Fleming, Clearance Office, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 485, Arlington, VA 2230. Written comments should be received by January 22, 1997.

Dated: November 19, 1996.

Herman G. Fleming,

Reports Clearance Officer.

[FR Doc. 96–29876 Filed 11–21–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–483]

Callaway Plant, Unit 1, Union Electric Company; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering approval under 10 CFR 50.80(a) of the application concerning the corporate merger agreement between Union Electric Company (the licensee), holder of Facility Operating License No. NPF–30, issued for operation of the Callaway Plant, Unit 1, located in Callaway County, Missouri, and CIPSCO Incorporated.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The proposed action would approve the application concerning the merger agreement between Union Electric Company (UEC) and CIPSCO Incorporated (CIPSCO), which would provide for UEC to become a wholly-owned operating company of Ameren Corporation (Ameren), which is now owned equally by UEC and CIPSCO. Ameren would hold all common stock in UEC upon completion of the merger. UEC would continue to remain the owner/operator of Callaway Plant, Unit 1. The proposed action is in accordance with UEC's application dated February 23, 1996, as supplemented by letter dated April 24, 1996.

The Need for the Proposed Action

The proposed action is required to enable UEC to consummate the merger agreement with CIPSCO as described above. UEC has submitted that the merger will enable UEC and CIPSCO to reduce the combined operating costs for UEC and CIPSCO, that both companies have been aggressively pursuing cost reductions to remain competitive, and have reached the practical limits of that strategy, and that by combining utility operations, both companies have an opportunity to achieve more cost efficiency than either company could achieve independently.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed corporate merger and concludes that there will be no physical or operational changes to the Callaway Plant. The corporate merger will not affect the qualifications or organization affiliation of the personnel who operate the facility, as UEC will continue to be responsible for the operation of the Callaway Plant, Unit 1.

The Commission has evaluated the environmental impact of the proposed action and has determined that the probability or consequences of accidents would not be increased by the merger, and that post-accident radiological releases would not be greater than previously determined. Further, the Commission has determined that the corporate merger would not affect routine radiological plant effluents and would not increase occupational radiological exposure. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the merger would not affect nonradiological plant effluents and would have no other environmental impact. Therefore, the Commission concludes that there are no significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternative to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission concluded that there are no significant environmental effects that would result from the proposed action, any alternative with equal or greater environmental impacts need not be evaluated.

The principal alternative would be to deny the requested action. Denial of the application would result in no change in current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action are identical.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use of any resources not previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for the Callaway Plant, dated March 1975.

Agencies and Persons Contacted

In accordance with its stated policy, on October 30, 1996, the staff consulted with the Missouri State official, Tom Lange, for the Department of Natural Resources, regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the licensee's application dated February 23, 1996, as supplemented by letter dated April 24, 1996, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Callaway County Public Library, 710 Court Street, Fulton, Missouri 65251.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day of November 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Kristine M. Thomas,

Project Manager, Project Directorate IV–2, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 96–29899 Filed 11–21–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

[Dockets Nos. 50–335 and 50–389]

Florida Power & Light Co., St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2; Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has taken action with regard to a Petition for action under 10 CFR 2.206 dated June 12, 1996, by Mr. Thomas J. Saporito, Jr. and on behalf of the National Litigation Consultants. The Petition pertains to St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2.

The Petitioners requested the Commission (1) to issue a confirmatory order requiring that the Florida Power and Light Company (Licensee) not operate the St. Lucie Nuclear Station, Unit 1 above 50% of its power level

capacity, (2) to require the Licensee to specifically identify the ''root cause'' for the premature failure of the steam generator tubing, and (3) to require the Licensee to specifically state what corrective measures will be implemented to prevent recurrence of steam generator tube failures in all the steam generators in Unit 1 and Unit 2.

The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has determined to deny the Petition. The reasons for this denial are explained in the ''Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD–96–19), the complete text of which follows this notice, and is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.

A copy of the Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided by this regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision within that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day of November 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,

Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

On June 12, 1996, Mr. Thomas J. Saporito, Jr., on behalf of himself and the National Litigation Consultants (Petitioners), filed a Petition with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. The Petitioners requested the Commission (1) to issue a confirmatory order requiring that the Florida Power & Light Company (FP&L or licensee) not operate St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1, above 50 percent of its power-level capacity, (2) to require the Licensee to specifically identify the ''root cause'' for the premature failure of the steam generator tubing, and (3) to require the licensee to specifically state what corrective measures will be implemented to prevent recurrence of steam generator tube failures in all the steam generators in Unit 1 and Unit 2.

The Petitioners' requests are based on assertions that (1) the licensee's Unit 1 steam generator tubes have degraded to the extent that more than 2,500 of the tubes have been plugged, (2) the licensee has not identified the root cause for the premature failure of the steam generator tubing, (3) the licensee will most likely experience similar tube ruptures on other steam generators at the station, and (4) the licensee's ''FSAR's [Final Safety Analysis Reports] and the NRC's CFR's [Code of Federal Regulations] require that the integrity of the primary systems on Unit 1 and Unit 2 not be breached.

The Petition has been referred to my office pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations. By letter dated July 8, 1996, an acknowledgement of receipt of the Petition was sent to the Petitioners. In that letter, the Petitioners were informed that the NRC would take appropriate action within a reasonable time. I have completed my evaluation of the matters raised by the Petitioners and have determined that, for the reasons stated below, the Petition is denied.

II. Discussion

The NRC staff's evaluation of the Petitioners' requests follows.

(a) Issue a confirmatory order requiring that the licensee not operate Unit 1 above 50 percent of its power-level capacity.

In a meeting held at NRC Headquarters on July 3, 1996, the licensee presented the inspection and repair history for the Unit 1 steam generator tubes.[1] The licensee has performed 15 inspections since commercial operation began in December 1976. For the most recent inspection, completed in June 1996, the licensee inspected the full length of all active tubes using a bobbin coil.[2] In addition, the licensee used a motorized rotating pancake coil [3] (MRPC) to inspect all expansion transition joints and drilled support intersections in the hot and cold legs, all free-span locations having bobbin coil indications,[4] and free-span tube regions in the upper two support areas in the hot legs. The inspection was based on the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) report ''PWR Steam Generator Examination Guidelines,'' dated November 1992. Defective tubes having circumferential indications, axial indications, or volumetric indications [5] were plugged and removed from service.

Including tubes plugged during earlier outages, 2,159 of 8,519 tubes (25.3 percent) in the ''A'' steam generator and 1,834 of 8,519 tubes (21.5 percent) in the ''B'' steam generator have been plugged and removed from service. The licensee performed an evaluation that showed that the plant could be safely operated at full power with the reduced reactor coolant flow resulting from the increased number of plugged tubes.[6] The NRC reviewed the licensee's evaluation and concluded that it was acceptable and that the units could be operated at full power. The staff's evaluation is documented in a safety evaluation dated July 9, 1996.

In the meeting on July 3, 1996, the licensee presented a preliminary run-time analysis for Unit 1, which was used to determine the length of steam generator operation before the need for further tube inspections to ensure adequate tube integrity. The licensee stated that the preliminary results of its analysis support a tube inspection interval of 15 months for the current Unit 1 cycle that started in July 1996. The licensee also stated that in situ pressure testing of the steam generator tubes during the spring 1996 outage indicated that the most severely degraded tubes had adequate structural integrity and satisfied the safety margins in NRC's Regulatory Guide 1.121, ''Bases for Plugging Degraded PWR Steam Generator Tubes.'' On the basis of the results of the *in situ* pressure tests, the staff concluded that adequate assurance of tube integrity existed to allow operation pending completion of the licensee's run-time analysis. The NRC is currently reviewing the licensee's analysis, which was submitted October 24, 1996.

The plant Technical Specifications for each of the units specify leakage limits for the reactor coolant pressure boundary, including steam generator tube leakage. If a tube leaks beyond the allowed limits, the unit must be shut down. The plant off-normal operating procedures for St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 also include criteria for shutdown based on EPRI TR–104788, ''PWR Primary to Secondary Leak Guidelines,'' dated May 1995, which are more conservative than the limits in the plant Technical Specifications. Finally, if a tube fails, the plant's Emergency Operating Procedures contain the specific actions necessary for the operators to shut down

[1] NRC Meeting Summary, Subject: ''Steam Generator Inspection, Repair and Operating Issues—St. Lucie Unit 1,'' dated July 16, 1996.

[2] The bobbin coil is used for a general screening of tubes for indications of possible defects, while the motorized rotating pancake coil (MRPC) probe is used to further characterize bobbin coil indications. The MRPC is also used to inspect regions susceptible to circumferentially orientated degradation.

[3] See note 2.

[4] See note 2.

[5] Circumferential indications are crack-like indications orientated on the diameter of the tube. Axial indications are crack-like indications orientated on the long axis of the tube. Volumetric indications are areas of general reduction in tube wall thickness with no specific orientation.

[6] FP&L letter, ''Thermal Margin and RCS Flow Limits,'' dated June 1, 1996.

and cool down the plant to mitigate the consequences of the event.

Thus, as required, the licensee has implemented measures for both units to protect public health and safety in the unlikely event that tube integrity is compromised. These measures include a primary-to-secondary leakage monitoring program and emergency operating procedures. The leakage monitoring program provides early warning of tube leakage. The steam generator blowdown monitor and condenser air ejector monitor at each of the units continuously monitors the radioactivity level in the main steamline. A significant increase in the instrument readings, which would result from a relatively small tube leak, will cause an alarm to alert the operators to the change in radioactivity levels and potential tube leakage.

On the basis of the information submitted, the NRC staff has concluded that the operation of the Unit 1 steam generators at full power poses no undue risk to public health and safety.

(b) Require the licensee to specifically identify the ''root cause'' for the premature failure of the steam generator tubing.

It is not clear how the Petitioners define ''premature failure''; however, since there have not been any steam generator tube ruptures at St. Lucie Units 1 or 2, it is assumed the reference is to tube degradation. Many of the tubes in the Unit 1 steam generators have degraded as a result of corrosion and/or mechanical conditions. The root cause of tube degradation in steam generators is the interaction of water chemistry, thermal-hydraulic design, materials selection, fabrication methods, and operating conditions. The causes of tube degradation are well understood by the industry and are documented in the public record. The root causes for the St. Lucie steam generator tube degradations were presented to the NRC staff in a meeting on August 27, 1986.[7]

The licensee has identified to the NRC modes of degradation that have affected the steam generator tubes in both St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 in its response of June 23, 1995, to NRC Generic Letter 95–03, ''Circumferential Cracking of Steam Generator Tubes,'' and in the meeting of July 3, 1996. The degradation modes identified include intergranular attack, stress-corrosion cracking and denting. Intergranular attack refers to localized attack at and adjacent to grain boundaries of tube material, with relatively little corrosion of the grains. Intergranular stress-corrosion cracking refers to cracking caused by the simultaneous presence of stress and a specific corrosive medium. Denting is the accumulation of corrosion products at the tube-to-tube support plate that causes plastic deformation of the tube. The licensee has identified locations of these degradations in the tubes during the most recent steam generator inspection of St. Lucie Unit 1.[8] They include egg crate and drilled tube support plates, free spans, expansion transition regions, and sludge pile areas. In every case, the root cause of tube degradation can be attributed to material selection, water chemistry, fabrication methods, or residual stresses at the affected location.

The staff concludes that the licensee understands and has identified the root cause of tube degradation at St. Lucie Units 1 and 2.

(c) Require the licensee to specifically state what corrective measures will be implemented to prevent recurrence of steam generator tube failures in all the steam generators in Unit 1 and Unit 2.

As previously discussed, degradation of the steam generator tubing is caused by the interaction of water chemistry, thermal-hydraulic design, materials selection, fabrication methods, and operating conditions. The licensee has applied corrective measures in order to reduce the rate of tube degradation. For example, the rate of tube degradation may be reduced through improvements in water chemistry. The licensee follows industry guidelines[9] on secondary water chemistry for both units, and these guidelines represent a significant improvement over the guidelines followed when Unit 1 began operating. The guidelines have stringent requirements and limitations on specific types and amounts of chemicals in the primary and secondary water to mitigate corrosion. Replacement steam generators having improved design, for example, better material selection and tube support configuration, have had much better operating experience than the earlier steam generators, such as those at St. Lucie. The licensee plans to replace the Unit 1 steam generators in October 1997 with steam generators that incorporate these design improvements.

The NRC staff focuses on ensuring adequate tube integrity by requiring licensee compliance with applicable regulations and Technical Specification requirements. The staff uses its field inspections, meetings with the licensee, and licensing reviews to ensure that the licensee satisfies the regulations[10] and plant Technical Specifications as they apply to steam generator tube integrity and that appropriate inspection methods and repair criteria are used to address specific forms of degradation. Plant Technical Specifications define degraded and defective tubes, specify the scope of inspections and reporting requirements and set forth tube plugging criteria and limits for allowable leakage in the reactor coolant system. NRC regulations and plant Technical Specifications require that steam generator tube degradation be managed through a combination of inservice inspection, repair of tubes exceeding the plugging criteria in the plant Technical Specifications, primary-to-secondary leakage monitoring, and structural and run-time analyses to ensure that safety objectives are met. On the basis of the information provided by the licensee in the meeting on July 3, 1996, and the staff's onsite inspection, the staff has concluded that the licensee is in compliance with these requirements.

In summary, the licensee's corrective measures to reduce the rate of steam generator tube degradation and continued compliance with NRC regulations and plant Technical Specification requirements provide reasonable assurance that steam generator tube integrity at St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 will be maintained.

III. Conclusion

On the basis of the fact that (1) the licensee has performed adequate steam generator tube inspections that identified areas of degradation, (2) the licensee has completed analyses and repairs of degraded tubes, (3) the licensee's in situ pressure testing of degraded tubes indicated adequate structural integrity remains, (4) the licensee is monitoring primary-to-secondary leakage on a continuing basis, and (5) the licensee is complying with NRC regulations and plant Technical Specifications, I have concluded that a confirmatory order limiting St. Lucie Unit 1 to 50 percent of its power-level capacity is not warranted and that the

[7] NRC Meeting Summary, Subject: ''Summary of August 27, 1986 Meeting with FP&L and NRC Staff Regarding Steam Generator Tube Degradation Mechanism,'' dated September 12, 1986.

[8] See note 1.

[9] FP&L letter, ''Generic Letter 95–03 Response,'' dated June 23, 1995.

[10] The NRC regulations that require steam generator tube integrity be maintained include 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, Criterion 1—Quality Standards and Records, Criterion 14—Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary, Criterion 30—Quality of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary, Criterion 31—Fracture Prevention of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary, and Criterion 32—Inspection of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants; and 10 CFR Part 50.55a, which specifies codes and standards for nuclear power plants.

licensee has identified the root cause of tube degradation and implemented adequate corrective measures to provide reasonable assurance that steam generator tube integrity will be maintained at St. Lucie Units 1 and 2.

For the reasons previously discussed, no basis exists for taking any further action in response to the Petition. As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of the Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review. This Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision within that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day of November 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,

Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 96–29898 Filed 11–21–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD

Privacy Act; Systems of Records

AGENCY: Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board.

ACTION: Annual Notice of Systems of Records.

SUMMARY: Each Federal agency is required by Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, to publish annually a description of the systems of records it maintains containing personal information. In this notice the Board provides the required information on two systems of records.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Carroll, Director of Administration, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, 1100 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 910, Arlington, VA 22209, (703) 235–4473.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Board currently maintains two systems of records under the Privacy Act. Each system is described below.

NWTRB–1

SYSTEM NAME:

Administrative and Travel Files

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION:

Unclassified.

SYSTEM LOCATION:

Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, 1100 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 910, Arlington, VA 22209.

CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS COVERED BY THE SYSTEM:

Employees and applicants for employment with the Board, including NWTRB contractors and consultants.

CATEGORIES OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM:

Records containing the following information:

(1) Time and attendance;

(2) Payroll actions and deduction information requests;

(3) Authorizations for overtime and night differential;

(4) Credit cards and telephone calling cards issued to individuals;

(5) Destination, itinerary, mode and purpose of travel;

(6) Date(s) of travel and all expenses;

(7) Passport number;

(8) Request for advance of funds and voucher with receipts;

(9) Travel authorizations;

(10) Name, address, social security number, and birth date; and,

(11) Employee public transit subsidy applications and vouchers.

AUTHORITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE SYSTEM:

Pub. L. 100–203, Part E.

ROUTINE USES OF RECORDS MAINTAINED IN THE SYSTEM, INCLUDING CATEGORIES OF USERS AND THE PURPOSES OF SUCH USES:

Information is used ''in house.'' Notwithstanding the above, access may also be gained under the following conditions:

(a) In the event that a system of records maintained by this agency to carry out its functions indicates a violation or potential violation of law, whether civil, criminal or regulatory in nature, and whether arising by general statute or particular program statute, or by regulation, rule or order issued pursuant thereto, the relevant records in the system of records may be referred, as a routine use, to the appropriate agency, whether Federal, State, local or foreign, charged with the responsibility of investigating or prosecuting such violation or charged with enforcing or implementing the statutes, or rule, regulation or order issued pursuant thereto.

(b) A record from the system of records may be disclosed as a ''routine use'' to a Federal, State or local agency maintaining civil, criminal or other relevant enforcement information or other pertinent information, such as current licenses, if necessary to obtain information relevant to an agency decision concerning the hiring or retention of an employee, the issuance of a security clearance, the letting of a contract, or the issuance of a license, grant or other benefit.

(c) A record from this system of records may be disclosed to a Federal agency, in response to this request, in connection with the hiring or retention of an employee, the issuance of a security clearance, the reporting of an investigation of an employee, the letting of a contract, or the issuance of a license, grant or other benefits by the requesting agency, to the extent that the information is relevant and necessary to the requesting agency's decision on the matter.

POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR STORING, RETRIEVING, ACCESSING, RETAINING, AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM:

STORAGE:

Paper records and computer disk.

RETRIEVABILITY:

By type of document, then name.

SAFEGUARDS:

Access is limited to employees having a need to know. Records are stored in locked file cabinets in a controlled access area in accordance with Federal guidelines or in password protected electronic databases.

RETENTION AND DISPOSAL:

Records retention and disposal authorities are contained in the ''General Records Schedules'' published by national Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC. Records within NWTRB are destroyed by shredding or purging.

SYSTEM MANAGER AND ADDRESS:

Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, 1100 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 910, Arlington, VA 22209, Attention: Director of Administration.

NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE:

Requests by an individual to determine if NWTRB–1 contains information about him/her should be directed to the system Manager listed above. Required identifying information: complete name, social security number, and date of birth.

RECORD ACCESS PROCEDURE:

Same as notification procedures above, except individual must show official photo identification before viewing records.

CONTESTING RECORD PROCEDURE:

Same as notification procedure.

RECORD SOURCE CATEGORIES:

Subject individuals, timekeepers, travel officers, official personnel records, GSA for accounting and payroll, and travel agency contract.