

external inspection, in accordance with the de Havilland DHC-8 Structural Repair Manual; or in accordance with a method approved by Transport Canada; or in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate. Repeat the internal inspection thereafter at intervals specified in accordance with the Dash 8 Maintenance Program Manual.

(ii) If any crack is detected during the internal inspection, prior to further flight, repair all cracks found during both the external and internal inspections, in accordance with the de Havilland DHC-8 Structural Repair Manual, or in accordance with a method approved by Transport Canada Aviation; or in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, New York ACO, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate. Repeat the internal inspection thereafter at intervals specified in accordance with the Dash 8 Maintenance Program Manual.

(b) Prior to the accumulation of 31,000 flight cycles, or within 12 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform an internal visual inspection to detect cracking of the fuselage frames, in accordance with de Havilland Service Bulletin S.B. 8-53-48, dated August 26, 1994. Accomplishment of the internal visual inspection constitutes terminating action for the repetitive external detailed visual inspections required by paragraph (a)(1) of this AD.

(1) If no cracking is detected during the internal inspection, repeat the internal inspection thereafter at intervals specified in accordance with the Dash 8 Maintenance Program Manual.

(2) If any cracking is detected during the internal inspection, prior to further flight, repair it in accordance with the de Havilland DHC-8 Structural Repair Manual, or in accordance with a method approved by Transport Canada Aviation; or in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, New York ACO, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate. Repeat the internal inspection thereafter at intervals specified in accordance with the Dash 8 Maintenance Program Manual.

(c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, New York ACO.

(d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(e) The inspections shall be done in accordance with de Havilland Service Bulletin S.B. 8-53-48, dated August 26, 1994. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained

from Bombardier, Inc., Bombardier Regional Aircraft Division, Garratt Boulevard, Downsview, Ontario M3K 1Y5, Canada. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, New York Aircraft Certification Office, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 10 Fifth Street, Third Floor, Valley Stream, New York; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

(f) This amendment becomes effective on December 26, 1996.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 8, 1996.

Darrell M. Pederson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 96-29416 Filed 11-19-96; 8:45 am]

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14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 96-CE-55-AD; Amendment 39-9823; AD 96-23-19]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Air Tractor, Inc. AT-300, AT-400, and AT-500 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Air Tractor, Inc. (Air Tractor) Models AT-300, AT-400, and AT-500 series airplanes. This AD requires installing both a new flap actuator overtravel stop and a roll pin through the overtravel stop and jack screw. This AD results from incidents where the flap actuator overtravel stop nut disengaged from the jack screw. The flap pushrod pressed against the aileron pushrod, which caused difficulty in moving the ailerons. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent interference between the flap pushrod and the aileron pushrod caused by the flap actuator overtravel nut disengaging, which could result in loss of aileron control.

DATES: Effective December 18, 1996.

The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of December 18, 1996.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before February 7, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Central Region,

Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket 96-CE-55-AD, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106.

Service information that applies to this AD may be obtained from Air Tractor, Inc., P.O. Box 485, Olney, Texas 76374. This information may also be examined at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket 96-CE-55-AD, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bob May, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Aircraft Certification Office, 2601 Meacham Boulevard, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0150; telephone (817) 222-5156; facsimile (817) 222-5960.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Events Leading to the Issuance of This AD

The FAA has received reports involving Air Tractor Models AT-402 and AT-502 airplanes, where the flap actuator overtravel stop nut disengaged from the jack screw. The flap pushrod pressed against the aileron pushrod, which caused difficulty in moving the ailerons. Snow Engineering Co. (the parent company of Air Tractor) and the FAA have simulated this condition on factory airplanes through a laboratory environment, which resulted in the same difficulty in moving the ailerons.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in loss of aileron control on certain Air Tractor Models AT-300, AT-301, AT-302, AT-400, AT-400A, AT-401, AT-401A, AT-401B, AT-402, AT-402A, AT-402B, AT-501, AT-502, AT-502A, AT-502B, and AT-503A airplanes.

Applicable Service Information

Snow Engineering Co. has issued Service Letter (SL) #140, dated November 27, 1995, Revised October 10, 1996, which applies to certain Air Tractor AT-300, AT-400, and AT-500 series airplanes. This SL specifies procedures for installing both a new flap actuator overtravel stop nut and a roll pin through the overtravel stop and jack screw.

The FAA's Determination

After examining the circumstances and reviewing all available information related to the incidents described above, including the referenced service information, the FAA has determined that AD action should be taken to prevent interference between the flap

pushrod and the aileron pushrod caused by the flap actuator overtravel nut disengaging, which could result in loss of aileron control.

Explanation of the Provision of This AD

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop in other Air Tractor AT-300, AT-400, and AT-500 series airplanes of the same type design, this AD requires installing both a new flap actuator overtravel stop and a roll pin through the overtravel stop and jack screw. Accomplishment of these installations is required in accordance with Snow Engineering Co. SL #140, dated November 27, 1995, Revised October 10, 1996.

Since a situation exists (possible loss of aileron control) that requires the immediate adoption of this regulation, it is found that notice and opportunity for public prior comment hereon are impracticable, and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.

Comments Invited

Although this action is in the form of a final rule that involves requirements affecting immediate flight safety and, thus, was not preceded by notice and opportunity to comment, comments are invited on this rule. Interested persons are invited to comment on this rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications should identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments will be considered, and this rule may be amended in light of the comments received. Factual information that supports the commenter's ideas and suggestions is extremely helpful in evaluating the effectiveness of the AD action and determining whether additional rulemaking action would be needed.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the rule that might suggest a need to modify the rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report that summarizes each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this AD will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this rule must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following

statement is made: "Comments to Docket No. 96-CE-55-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

The FAA has determined that this regulation is an emergency regulation that must be issued immediately to correct an unsafe condition in aircraft, and is not a significant regulatory action under Executive Order 12866. It has been determined further that this action involves an emergency regulation under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). If it is determined that this emergency regulation otherwise would be significant under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures, a final regulatory evaluation will be prepared and placed in the Rules Docket (otherwise, an evaluation is not required). A copy of it, if filed, may be obtained from the Rules Docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding a new airworthiness directive (AD) to read as follows:

96-23-19 Air Tractor Inc: Amendment 39-9823; Docket No. 96-CE-55-AD.

Applicability. The following airplane models and serial numbers, certificated in any category:

Models AT-300, AT-301, AT-302, AT-400, AT-400A, AT-401, AT-401A, AT-401B, AT-402, AT-402A, and AT-402B,

airplanes, serial numbers 300-0001 through 401B-1013;

Models AT-501, AT-502, AT-502A, AT-502B, AT-503A airplanes, serial numbers 502-0001 through 502B-0398;

Note 1. This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed action to address it. Compliance: Required within the next 25 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished.

To prevent interference between flap pushrod and the aileron pushrod caused by the flap actuator overtravel nut disengaging, which could result in loss of aileron control, accomplish the following:

(a) Install both a new flap actuator overtravel stop and a roll pin through the overtravel stop and jack screw in accordance with the *REWORK INSTRUCTIONS* section of Snow Engineering Co. Service Letter #140, dated November 27, 1995, Revised October 10, 1996.

(b) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, FAA, Airplane Certification Office (ACO), 2601 Meacham Boulevard, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0150. The request shall be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Fort Worth ACO.

Note 2. Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Fort Worth ACO.

(d) The installations required by this AD shall be accomplished in accordance with Snow Engineering Co. Service Letter #140, dated November 27, 1995, Revised October 10, 1996. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Air Tractor Inc., P.O. Box 485, Olney, Texas 76374. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

(e) This amendment (39-9823) becomes effective on December 18, 1996.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on November 12, 1996.
 Henry A. Armstrong,
*Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate,
 Aircraft Certification Service.*
 [FR Doc. 96-29492 Filed 11-19-96; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-M

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 96-NM-262-AD; Amendment 39-9825; AD 96-23-16]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Fokker Model F28 Mark 0070 and 0100 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting airworthiness directive (AD) 96-23-16 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Fokker Model F28 Mark 0070 and 0100 series airplanes by individual notices. This AD requires a revision to the Airplane Flight Manual that will enable the flightcrew to determine if the thrust reversers are properly locked prior to take-off. This AD also prohibits dispatch of the airplane, under certain conditions, with both autothrottle channels inoperative. In addition, this AD requires revising the maintenance program to provide instructions to correct thrust reverser malfunctions. This amendment is prompted by preliminary results of an investigation of an accident in which a thrust reverser may have deployed inadvertently during flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent an unannounced failure of the secondary lock of the thrust reversers, which could result in reduced protection against inadvertent deployment of the thrust reversers during flight.

DATES: Effective November 25, 1996 to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by emergency AD 96-23-16, issued November 8, 1996, which contained the requirements of this amendment.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before January 21, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 96-NM-

262-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

Information concerning this rulemaking action may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim Dulin, Aerospace Engineer, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (206) 227-2141; fax (206) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On November 8, 1996, the FAA issued emergency AD 96-23-16, which is applicable to all Fokker Model F28 Mark 0070 and 0100 series airplanes.

That AD was prompted by notification from the Rijksluchtvaartdienst (RLD), which is the airworthiness authority for the Netherlands, that an unsafe condition may exist on all Fokker Model F28 Mark 0070 and 0100 series airplanes. The RLD advised that, on October 31, 1996, a Fokker Model F28 Mark 0100 series airplane was involved in an accident shortly after take-off in Sao Paulo, Brazil.

Preliminary accident investigation results indicate that, during take-off, the thrust reverser of the right-hand engine may have inadvertently deployed. The cause of this possible deployment is unknown at this time.

However, the results of a study conducted by Fokker following the accident revealed that a malfunction of the secondary lock of the thrust reverser may occur without indication to the flightcrew. The secondary lock of the thrust reverser may remain in the unlocked position (i.e., No. 1 relay energized) in conditions when it should be locked. The secondary lock is a backup to the primary actuator lock and is designed to open only when thrust reverser deployment is commanded. If the flightcrew is unaware that the secondary lock is in the unlocked position, the airplane may take off with reduced safety margins. Currently, there are no indications that the secondary lock No. 1 relay failure contributed to the accident that occurred on October 31.

An unannounced failure of the secondary lock of the thrust reversers could result in reduced protection against inadvertent deployment of the thrust reversers in-flight.

The thrust reverser system that is installed on Fokker Model F28 Mark 0100 series airplanes is identical in design to that installed on Fokker Model F28 Mark 0070 series airplanes.

Therefore, the FAA finds that both of these models are subject to the same unsafe condition identified in this AD.

Explanation of Relevant Service Information

Fokker has developed procedural information, for inclusion in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) of the affected airplanes, that will enable the flightcrew to determine if the thrust reversers are properly locked prior to take-off by monitoring proper engagement of the autothrottle system (ATS).

Fokker also has developed procedural information to prohibit dispatch of the airplane with both autothrottle channels inoperative, unless both thrust reversers are deactivated and secured in the stowed position, and no operations are conducted that are predicated on thrust reverser operation.

In addition, Fokker has developed procedural information, for inclusion in the airplane maintenance program of the affected airplanes, that will provide instructions to correct thrust reverser malfunctions.

All of the procedures described in these documents will contribute to preventing the unannounced failure of the secondary lock of the thrust reversers, which could result in reduced protection against inadvertent deployment of the thrust reversers during flight.

The RLD classified these procedures as mandatory, and issued Netherlands airworthiness directive BLA 1996-138 (A), dated November 7, 1996, in order to assure the continued airworthiness of these airplanes in the Netherlands.

FAA's Conclusions

This airplane model is manufactured in the Netherlands and is type certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of section 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to this bilateral airworthiness agreement, the RLD has kept the FAA informed of the situation described above. The FAA has examined the findings of the RLD, reviewed all available information, and determined that AD action is necessary for products of this type design that are certificated for operation in the United States.

Explanation of the Requirements of the AD

Since the unsafe condition described is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of the same type design registered in the United States, the FAA