pressure must be maintained below the PORV setpoint.

In addition, to prevent damage to reactor coolant pump seals, the operator must maintain a minimum differential pressure across the reactor coolant pump seals. Hence, the licensee must operate the plant in a pressure window that is defined as the difference between the minimum required pressure to start a reactor coolant pump and the operating margin to prevent lifting of the PORVs due to normal operating pressure surges. The 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, safety margin adds instrument uncertainty into the LTOP setpoint. The licensee's current LTOP analysis indicates that using this 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, safety margin to determine the PORV setpoint would result in an operating window between the LTOP setpoint and the minimum pressure required for reactor coolant pump seals which is significantly restricted when physical conditions such as PORV overshoot, RCP pump > Ps, and static head corrections are taken into account in setpoint determination. Operating with these limits could result in the lifting of the PORVs or damage to the reactor coolant pump seals during normal operation. Using Code Case N-514 would allow the licensee to recapture most of the operating margin that is lost by factoring in the instrument uncertainties in the determination of the LTOP setpoint. The net effect of using Code Case N-514 is that the setpoint will not change significantly with the next setpoint analysis. Therefore, the licensee proposed that in determining the PORV setpoint for LTOP events for Byron, the allowable pressure be determined using the safety margins developed in an alternate methodology in lieu of the safety margins required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G. The alternate methodology is consistent with ASME Code Case N-514. The content of this Code Case has been incorporated into Appendix G of Section XI of the ASME Code and published in the 1993 Addenda to Section XI.

An exemption from 10 CFR 50.60 is required to use the alternate methodology for calculating the maximum allowable pressure for LTOP considerations. By application dated March 14, 1996, the licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR 50.60 to allow it to utilize the alternate methodology of Code Case N-514 to compute its LTOP setpoints.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

Appendix G of the ASME Code requires that the P/T limits be

calculated: (a) using a safety factor of two on the principal membrane (pressure) stresses, (b) assuming a flaw at the surface with a depth of one quarter (1/4) of the vessel wall thickness and a length of six (6) times its depth, and (c) using a conservative fracture toughness curve that is based on the lower bound of static, dynamic, and crack arrest fracture toughness tests on material similar to the Byron reactor vessel material.

In determining the PORV setpoint for LTOP events, the licensee proposed the use of safety margins based on an alternate methodology consistent with the proposed ASME Code Case N-514 guidelines. ASME Code Case N-514 allows determination of the setpoint for LTOP events such that the maximum pressure in the vessel will not exceed 110% of the P/T limits of the existing ASME Appendix G. This results in a safety factor of 1.8 on the principal membrane stresses. All other factors, including assumed flaw size and fracture toughness, remain the same. Although this methodology would reduce the safety factor on the principal membrane stresses, use of the proposed criteria will provide adequate margins of safety to the reactor vessel during LTOP transients.

The change will not increase the probability or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no significant increase in the allowable individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed action does involve features located entirely within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

### Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded there is no measurable environmental impact associated with the proposed action, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental impact need not be evaluated. As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff considered denial of the proposed action. Denial of the application would result in no change in current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of

the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.

#### Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use of any resources not previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for the Byron Station, Units 1 and 2.

#### Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy, on June 19, 1996, the staff consulted with the Illinois State official, Mr. Frank Niziolek; Head, Reactor Safety Section; Division of Engineering; Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety; regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.

#### Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the licensee's letter dated March 14, 1996, which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Byron Public Library District 109 N. Franklin, P. O. Box 434, Byron, Illinois 61010.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of July 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. George F. Dick, Jr.,

Project Manager, Project Directorate III-2, Division of Reactor Project—III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 96–18137 Filed 7–16–96; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

#### **Biweekly Notice**

Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations

### I. Background

Pursuant to Public Law 97-415, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. Public Law 97-415 revised section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), to require the Commission to publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued, under a new provision of section 189 of the Act. This provision grants the

Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license upon a determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person.

This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or proposed to be issued from June 22, 1996, through July 5, 1996. The last biweekly notice was published on July 3, 1996 (61 FR 34884).

Notice Of Consideration Of Issuance Of Amendments To Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, And Opportunity For A Hearing

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown below.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will consider all public and State comments received before action is taken. Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules Review and Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC. The filing of requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below.

By August 16, 1996, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's "Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC and at the local public document room for the particular facility involved. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible

effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine

witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective,

notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Docketing and Services Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington DC, by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-(800) 248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the following message addressed to (Project Director): petitioner's name and telephone number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for a hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room for the particular facility involved.

Carolina Power & Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, Brunswick County, North Carolina

Date of amendments request: April 4, 1996

Description of amendments request: The proposed amendments would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) to add an allowance to complete a TS-

required surveillance within 24 hours of discovery of a missed surveillance in accordance with the guidance of Generic Letter (GL) 87-09, "Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) on the Applicability of Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements" and NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants, BWR/4, Revision 1, April 1995. Typographical errors are being corrected and wording adjustments are being incorporated for consistency between plant TS terminology and the associated Bases.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

The proposed amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The operational flexibility resulting from the proposed revision to Technical Specification 3.0.4 is consistent with that allowed by the existing individual LCO [limiting condition for operation] and their associated ACTION requirements, which provide an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. A delay of up to 24 hours or the time of the surveillance interval, whichever is less, provided by Technical Specification 4.0.3 to complete a missed surveillance reduces the probability of a transient occurring when the affected system or component is either out of service to allow performance of the surveillance test, or there is a lower level of confidence in the operability because the normal surveillance was exceeded. The revision to Technical Specification 4.0.4 makes it clear that Technical Specification 4.0.4 does not prevent passage through or to OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS as required to comply with ACTION requirements. The revision to the wording in Unit 2 Technical Specification Table 3.12.1-1, Notation (h), revisions to the Bases of the Technical Specifications, and the elimination of specific exemptions to Technical Specifications 3.0.4 are administrative in nature.

Based on the above, the proposed license amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed amendments do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed license amendments do not introduce any new equipment nor do they require any existing equipment or systems to perform a different type of function than they are presently designed to perform. The proposed changes result in improved Technical Specifications by removing unnecessary restrictions on changes in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and facility operation, removing unnecessary shutdowns caused by inadvertently

exceeding surveillance intervals, and removing conflicts between various Technical Specifications. The revision to the wording in Unit 2 Technical Specification Table 3.12.1-1, Notation (h), revisions to the Bases of the Technical Specifications, and the elimination of specific exemptions to Technical Specification 3.0.4 are administrative in nature.

Based on the above, the proposed license amendments do not create a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. The proposed license amendments do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The operational flexibility that results from the proposed revision to Technical Specification 3.0.4 is consistent with that allowed by the existing individual LCO and associated ACTION requirements, which provide an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. Therefore, there is no change in the margin of safety associated with this change. A delay of up to 24 hours or the length of the surveillance interval, whichever is less, provided by Technical Specification 4.0.3 to complete a missed surveillance reduces the probability of a transient occurring when the affected system or component is either out of service to allow performance of the surveillance test, or there is a lower level of confidence in the operability because the normal surveillance was exceeded. In addition, the proposed change acknowledges that the most common outcome of the performance of a surveillance is the successful demonstration that acceptance criteria are met. The proposed change provides the potential benefit of avoiding a shutdown transient when required equipment is still capable of performing its function, and variables are still within limits. The revision to Technical Specification 4.0.4 makes it clear that Technical Specification 4.0.4 does not prevent passage through or to OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS as required to comply with ACTION requirements. This change is considered to be a clarification to achieve consistency with existing Technical Specification requirements. The revision to the wording in Unit 2 Technical Specification Table 3.12.1-1, Notation (h), revisions to the Bases of the Technical Specifications, and the elimination of specific exemptions to Technical Specification 3.0.4 are administrative in nature.

The proposed changes would result in improved Technical Specifications and eliminate unnecessary plant challenges. Based on the above, the proposed license amendments do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: University of North Carolina at Wilmington, William Madison Randall Library, 601 S. College Road, Wilmington, North Carolina 28403-3297 Attorney for licensee: William D. Johnson, Vice President and Senior Counsel, Carolina Power & Light Company, Post Office Box 1551, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

NRC Project Director: Eugene V.

Imbro Consumers Power Company, Docket No. 50-255, Palisades Plant, Van Buren

Date of amendment request: December 6, 1995

County, Michigan

Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would
relocate the crane operation and
movement of heavy loads requirements
and their bases from the Technical
Specifications (TS) to other plant
documents.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

The change moves the requirements from TS to other plant documents controlled under 10 CFR 50.59 without affecting their technical content. Since this change does not alter the technical content of any requirements, the operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change cannot involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previous evaluated, or involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Van Wylen Library, Hope College, Holland, Michigan 49423.

Attorney for licensee: Judd L. Bacon, Esquire, Consumers Power Company, 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201

NRČ Project Director: Mark Reinhart

Duke Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-269, 270 and 50-287, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3, Oconee County, South Carolina

Date of amendment request: June 6,

Description of amendment request: The proposed change would remove the Engineered Safeguard (ES) signals that presently open the outlet valves on the Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) System coolers, LPSW-4 and LPSW-5, on high reactor coolant system pressure

or high reactor building pressure. The valves will continue to be operable from the control room when needed. The proposed change to Technical Specification (TS) 4.5.1.1.2.a.(2) would require that the refueling outage test signal be applied to the LPSW pumps, but no longer to LPSW-4 and LPSW-5, and that the operability of the valves be verified by cycling them from the control room. A note would be added to reflect that the refueling outage test of LPSW-4 and LPSW-5 response to the ES signal will continue to be verified until the signal is removed from the ES system for each unit during the specified refueling outages. In addition, TS 4.5.1.1.2.b would be clarified to differentiate between test acceptance criteria for automatic actuation of the appropriate LPSW pumps and valves in response to the ES signal, and completion of travel of LPSW-4 and LPSW-5 in response to manual operation of the valves. A proposed change to the Bases would also reflect these changes.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Pursuant to 10CFR50.91, Duke Power Company (Duke) has made the determination that this amendment involves a No Significant Hazards Consideration by applying the standards established by NRC regulations in 10CFR50.92. The following discusses the basis for our analysis:

Will operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment:

A. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

No. Eliminating the automatic signal that opens Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) System valves, LPSW-4 and LPSW-5, upon an Engineered Safeguards (ES) actuation does not increase the probability of any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change would involve a delay in providing cooling water to the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) System coolers after a design basis accident. Cooling water flow to the LPI coolers is isolated during normal power operation. During normal cold shutdown conditions, cooling water flow to the LPI coolers is normally open without relying on the ES actuation signal. This cooling water flow is needed to mitigate certain accidents, but a delay in providing this cooling water flow after a design basis accident does not significantly increase the probability of any accident previously evaluated.

Eliminating the ES actuation signal for LPSW-4 and LPSW-5 will not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. After a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), operators will operate the appropriate valves from the control room in

sufficient time to provide adequate cooling water flow to maintain containment temperature and pressure within acceptable limits. Duke has also evaluated the delay of LPSW cooling flow's impact on core cooling and concluded that there are no adverse impacts on the capability to maintain core cooling. Since the containment temperature and pressure limits after a LOCA will not be exceeded, this change will not increase any potential off-site dose consequences after a LOCA. Due to the time available for operator action (approximately one hour), there is no significant increase in operator burden during this accident scenario.

B. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from the accidents

previously evaluated?

No. As stated above, due to the time available for operator action (approximately 1 hour), there is no significant increase in operator burden during this accident scenario. Eliminating the ES signal that automatically opens valves LPSW-4 and LPSW-5 results in significantly lower flow demand on the LPSW pumps. If all LPSW pumps are successfully started, this could result in a stronger pump causing deadhead conditions on a weaker pump since the pumps feed into the same piping system. To prevent any potential adverse effects on the LPSW pumps due to inadequate flow during the initial stages of a LOCA, minimum flow piping will be installed for the LPSW pumps to provide adequate flowpaths for pump minimum flow. Testing will be performed to validate that the LPSW pumps can operate at the chosen design value for pump minimum flow. In addition, Duke conducted an evaluation, based on manufacturer input, of the thermal effects on the LPI coolers due to delaying LPSW cooling flow. This evaluation concluded that the 30 minute delay of LPSW cooling flow has no adverse thermal effects on the LPI coolers. Therefore, because there is no significant increase in operator burden and because there will be no adverse effects on the LPSW pumps, LPI coolers, and associated piping caused by the delayed LPSW cooling flow, the proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from the accidents previously evaluated.

C. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

No. There are no safety limits or limiting safety system settings associated with the LPSW System in the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications. The proposed change will not affect any existing safety limits or limiting safety system settings. The proposed change will not affect any existing Limiting Conditions for Operation in the Technical Specifications. The proposed change involves an alternative method of initiating cooling water flow to the LPI coolers after a LOCA. This alternative method will achieve the required results since there will be no significant change in the containment temperature and pressure after a LOCA.

Duke has concluded based on the above that there are no significant hazards considerations involved in this amendment request.

The NRC has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it

appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Oconee County Library, 501 West South Broad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina 29691

Attorney for licensee: J. Michael McGarry, III, Winston and Strawn, 1200 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036 NRC Project Director: Herbert N. Berkow

Entergy Operations, Inc., et al., Docket No. 50-416, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS), Unit 1, Claiborne County, Mississippi

Date of amendment request: June 20, 1996

Description of amendment request: The amendment would redefine the secondary containment boundary to allow the enclosure building to be inoperable during the upcoming refueling outage 8 (RFO 8) scheduled to begin in October 1996. The amendment would add a condition to the license that the enclosure building may be inoperable during core alterations and movement of non-recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has not occupied part of a critical reactor core for 12 days) during RFO 8 and the standby gas treatment (SGT) system may be unable to automatically start or achieve and maintain the required vacuum, provided the following conditions exist:

a. All dampers communicating between the auxiliary building and the enclosure building are closed.

b. The access door between the auxiliary building and the enclosure building is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit.

 c. The SGT system is blocked from automatic initiation.

d. SGT system is available for manual initiation or the actions for Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.4.3 in the Technical Specifications for GGNS are complied with.

The non-recently irradiated fuel is spent fuel that has decayed at least 12 days after the reactor was shut down for refueling.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed changes do not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The equipment affected by the proposed change is not considered an initiator to any previously analyzed accident, therefore, inoperability of the equipment does not increase the probability of any previously evaluated accident.

As described in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report [for GGNS,] Chapter 15, the accidents postulated to occur during core alterations in addition to fuel handling accidents are [the following]: inadvertent criticality due to a control rod removal error or continuous control rod withdrawal error during refueling and the inadvertent loading of a fuel assembly in an improper location. These events are not postulated to result in fuel cladding integrity damage. The only accident postulated to occur during core alterations that results in a significant radioactive release is the fuel handling accident. The proposed requirements in conjunction with existing administrative controls on light loads, bounds the conditions of the current design basis fuel handling accident analysis which concludes that the radiological consequences are within the acceptance criteria of NUREG 0800, Section 15.7.4 and General Design Criteria [GDC] 19 [of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50]. Therefore, the proposed changes do not significantly increase consequences of any previously evaluated accident.

Based on the above, the proposed changes do not significantly increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed changes would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previous analyzed.

The leaktightness of the enclosure building does not affect the function of any plant system other than the ability of the SGT System to ensure the secondary containment is at the specified pressure. The proposed change in [the] normal SGT System alignment[,] by defeating the automatic start feature of the SGT System and the inability to ensure secondary containment is at the specified pressure[,] does not affect the operation of any [other] plant system or component. The SGT System is not relied upon to provide normal or accident cooling to plant systems or components. The function of the enclosure building and the SGT System is only to mitigate the release of radioactivity to the environment in the event of an accident.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.

3. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes continue to ensure that the radiological consequences are at or below the current GGNS licensing limit. Safety margins and analytical conservatisms have been evaluated and are well understood. Substantial margins are retained to ensure that the analysis adequately bounds all postulated event scenarios. The current margin of safety is retained.

Specifically, the margin of safety for the fuel handling accident is the difference between the 10CFR100 [dose consequence guidelines of 300 rem thyroid and 25 rem

whole-body] and the licensing limit defined by NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4. With respect to the control room personnel doses, the margin of safety is the difference between the 10CFR100 [guidelines] and the licensing limit defined by 10CFR50 [10 CFR Part 50], Appendix A, Criterion 19 (GDC 19). The proposed applicability continues to ensure that the whole-body and thyroid doses at the exclusion area and low population zone boundaries[,] as well as control room doses[,] are at or below the corresponding licensing limit. The margin of safety is unchanged; therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

In excess to the margin of safety supplied by the licensing limits of NUREG-0800 and GDC 19, the proposed change incorporates an additional layer of conservative requirements. The proposed change leaves in effect a redefined secondary containment boundary which will provide a low leakage boundary (consisting of the primary containment and the auxiliary building) by automatically isolating in the event of the design basis fuel handling accident and requires that the SGT System be available for manual initiation when desired. These requirements will ensure that doses will be even lower than those calculated.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not result in a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above evaluation, operation in accordance with the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards considerations.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Judge George W. Armstrong Library, 220 S. Commerce Street, Natchez, MS 39120

Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, 1400 L Street, N.W., 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20005-3502

*NRC Project Director:* William D. Beckner

Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Burke County, Georgia

Date of amendment request: June 17, 1996

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would revise Technical Specification Section 5.3.1 to allow use of fuel assemblies containing fuel rods clad with ZIRLO<sup>TM</sup>.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because:

The methodologies used in the accident analyses remain unchanged. The proposed change does not change or alter the design assumptions for the systems or components used to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Use of ZIRLOTM fuel cladding does not adversely affect fuel performance or impact nuclear design methodology. Therefore, accident analysis results are not significantly impacted.

The operating limits will not be changed and the analysis methods to demonstrate operation within the limits will remain in accordance with NRC-approved methodologies. Other than the changes to the fuel assemblies cladding, there are no physical changes to the plant associated with this Technical Specification change. A safety analysis will continue to be performed for each specific reload cycle to demonstrate compliance with all fuel safety design bases.

The 10 CFR 50.46 criteria are applied to the ZIRLO<sup>TM</sup> clad fuel rods. The use of these fuel assemblies will not result in a change to the reload design and safety analysis limits. Since the original design criteria are met, the ZIRLO™ clad fuel rods will not be an initiator for any new accident. The clad material is similar in chemical composition and has similar physical and mechanical properties as Zircaloy-4. Thus, the cladding integrity is maintained and the structural integrity of the fuel assembly is not affected. ZIRLO<sup>TM</sup> cladding improves corrosion performance and dimensional stability. Since the dose predictions in the safety analyses are not sensitive to the fuel rod cladding material used, the radiological consequences of accidents previously evaluated in the safety analysis remain valid.

The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because:

The possibility for a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated is not created since the fuel assemblies containing ZIRLOTM clad fuel rods will satisfy the same design bases as that currently used for Zircaloy-4 clad fuel assemblies. All design and performance criteria will continue to be met and no new single failure mechanisms have been defined. In addition, the use of ZIRLO<sup>TM</sup> fuel assemblies does not involve any alterations to plant equipment or procedures which would introduce any new or unique operational mode or accident precursor. Therefore, the possibility for a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated is not created.

The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because:

The margin of safety is not significantly reduced since the ZIRLO<sup>TM</sup> clad fuel assemblies will not change the reload design and safety analysis limits. Their use will take

into consideration the normal core operating conditions allowed for in the Technical Specifications. Each specific cycle's reload core will continue to be specifically evaluated using NRC approved reload design methods and approved fuel rod design models. This will include consideration of the core physics analysis peaking factor and core average linear heat rate effects.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: BurkeCounty Public Library, 412 Fourth Street, Waynesboro, Georgia 30830

Attorney for licensee: Mr. Arthur H. Domby, Troutman Sanders, NationsBank Plaza, Suite 5200, 600 Peachtree Street, NE., Atlanta, Georgia 30308

*NRC Project Director:* Herbert N. Berkow

Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Burke County, Georgia

Date of amendment request: June 17, 1996

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would clarify the requirement of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.j(2) that requires a pressure test of those portions of the diesel fuel-oil system that are designed to Section III, Subsection ND of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code. The system pressure test would be performed at a pressure of 110% of the design pressure, at least once per 10 years and only on those sections of piping that are isolable.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

The proposed clarification of T/S [Technical Specification] 4.8.1.1.2.j(2) does not involve a significant hazards consideration because operation of [the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant] with this change would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The configuration of the diesel fuel-oil system as currently installed and operated is such that a pressure test of 110% of design pressure would be impractical to perform. The system contains

tanks designed for atmospheric pressure and isolation of them and their vent lines from the specified pressure test is not practical. The ASME Code, Section XI, provides alternate test methods to use when storage tanks are involved in a system pressure test. By clarifying this T/S requirement, the requirements set forth in ASME Section XI can be utilized as guidance for testing requirements to ensure the integrity of the diesel fuel-oil system to perform its intended safety function.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. There are no design changes being made that would create a new type of accident or malfunction and the method and manner of plant operation remain unchanged. Using ASME Section XI as guidance for pressure testing the isolable sections of piping provides assurance that the fuel oil supply system will perform its intended function.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. There are no changes being made to the safety limits or safety system settings that would adversely impact plant safety. Utilizing ASME Section XI as guidance for determining those sections of piping that should be pressure-tested and atmospheric-tested will ensure proper operation of the diesel generator fuel oil supply system.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Burke County Public Library, 412 Fourth Street, Waynesboro, Georgia 30830

Attorney for licensee: Mr. Arthur H. Domby, Troutman Sanders, NationsBank Plaza, Suite 5200, 600 Peachtree Street, NE., Atlanta, Georgia 30308

*NRC Project Director:* Herbert N. Berkow

GPU Nuclear Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-289, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania

Date of amendment request: April 10, 1996

Description of amendment request: The proposed changes bring the surveillance requirements to conformance with Amendment No. 196 issued September 19, 1995. Additionally, this request changes frequency notation for a group of surveillance requirements.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration (SHC), which is presented

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence of the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendment extends the interval between successive refueling interval surveillances to once every 24 months for those surveillances evaluated herein, and to make administrative changes serving to conform the Technical Specifications to Amendment No. 196. Except for the administrative changes, the proposed surveillance interval changes do not involve any change to the actual surveillance requirements, nor does it involve any

change to the limits and restrictions on plant operations. The reliability of systems and components relied upon to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents previously evaluated is not degraded by the proposed change to the surveillance interval. Assurance of system and equipment availability is maintained. This change does not involve any change to system or equipment configuration. Therefore, this change does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendment extends the interval between successive refueling interval surveillances to once every 24 months for those surveillances evaluated herein, and to make administrative changes serving to conform the Technical Specifications to Amendment No. 196. Except for the administrative changes the proposed surveillance interval changes do not involve any change to the limits and restrictions in plant operation. This change does not involve any change to system or equipment configuration. Therefore, this change is unrelated to the possibility of creating a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed amendment extends the interval between successive refueling interval surveillances to once every 24 months for the surveillances evaluated herein, and to make administrative changes serving to conform the Technical Specifications to Amendment No. 196. Except for the administrative changes the proposed surveillance interval changes do not involve any change to the actual surveillance requirements, nor does it involve any change to the limits and restrictions on plant operation. The reliability of systems and components is not degraded by the proposed change to the surveillance interval. Assurance of system and equipment availability is maintained. Therefore, it is concluded that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Law/Government Publications Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, (REGIONAL DEPOSĬTORY) Walnut Street and Commonwealth Avenue, Box 1601, Harrisburg, PA 17105.

Attorney for licensee: Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), Docket No. 50-245, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, New London County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: May 2, 1996

Description of amendment request: The proposed change would remove Technical Specification Figure 5.1, which is used in maintaining K<sub>eff</sub> values, and substitute in its place a defined requirement for maximum Kinfinity for any fuel placed in the Millstone Unit 1 spent fuel pool.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Pursuant to 10CFR50.92, NNECO [Northeast Nuclear Energy Company] has reviewed the proposed change and concludes that the change does not involve a significant hazards consideration (SHC) since the proposed change satisfies the criteria in 10CFR50.92(c). That is, the proposed change does not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

There are no spent fuel pool accident conditions discussed in Chapter 15 of the FSAR [Final Safety Analysis Report]. FSAR section 15.8 discusses a fuel handling accident which drops a fuel assembly into the core during refueling. Changing the maximum allowed fuel reactivity or allowing gaps in the Boraflex

panels will have no effect on the probability or consequences of a fuel assembly drop onto the core.

Therefore, based on the above, the proposed change to the Technical Specifications does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any previously analyzed accident.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The reduction in the allowable fuel reactivity in the SFP [spent fuel pool] is conservative and does not create the possibility of a new or different type of accident. Allowing boraflex gaps does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The margin to safety, for this proposed technical specification change, is to maintain the SFP K<sub>eff</sub> to be less than or equal to 0.90. As described in the HOLTEC analysis, gaps in the Boraflex of up to 5 inches can exist in every boraflex panel of every rack with Boraflex in the SFP, with K<sub>eff</sub> still less than 0.90. This is true even if all of the gaps are uniformly lined up at the same elevation. These calculations conservatively assumed 4% Boraflex width shrinkage as well as the axial Boraflex gaps. Older fuel designs were also considered to ensure that they had not become limiting with the reduced allowable K-infinity limit of 1.24. With no boraflex gaps, the maximum Keff is less than .844. With 5 inch Boraflex gaps in every panel at the same elevation, the maximum K<sub>eff</sub> is 0.896, which is less than 0.90. NNECO has implemented a 1 year decay time requirement to minimize gamma irradiation damage to the Boraflex, and will continue to measure via "blackness testing" the actual gap size to ensure the margin of safety in

Therefore, this change has no impact on the margin to safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360, and the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, CT 06385

Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq., Senior Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, P.O. Box 270, Hartford, CT 06141-0270 NRC Project Director: Phillip F.

McKee

Power Authority of The State of New York, Docket No. 50-286, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3, Westchester County, New York

Date of amendment request: March 29, 1996

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would add limits associated with Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) to the Indian Point 3 (IP3) Technical Specifications.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Consistent with the criteria of 10 CFR 50.92, the enclosed application is judged to involve no significant hazards based on the following information:

(1) Does the proposed license amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed?

Response:

The proposed amendment makes no changes to the way in which the plant is operated and has no effect on accident initiators associated with analyzed transients. The probability of previously analyzed accidents is not increased. The proposed amendment clarifies the relationship between measurable parameters (RCS [reactor coolant system] temperature, pressure, and flow rate) and the resulting heat transfer regime in the reactor core, as characterized by the Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) ratio. This clarification ensures that safety analysis initial conditions regarding heat transfer remain valid, so that the consequences of previously analyzed accidents are not increased. The changes ensure that RCS pressure, temperature, and flow are within analytical bounds. This ensures that the plant is operated in a manner that will not increase the probabilities of previously analyzed accidents nor the consequences of previously analyzed accidents.

(2) Does the proposed license amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response:

The proposed amendment does not involve any modifications to plant systems, structures, or components. The proposed change clarifies existing limits on RCS parameters and makes no changes to plant setpoints or operating limits. The amendment does not involve any physical mechanism which could contribute to a new or different kind of accident. The changes ensure that RCS pressure, temperature, and flow are within analytical bounds. This ensures that the plant is operated in a manner that will not create the possibility of a new [or] different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

(3) Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response:

The proposed amendment clarifies existing limits on the measurable parameters (RCS temperature, pressure, and flow rate) so that the resulting DNB value is consistent with initial condition assumptions used in existing safety analyses. Maintaining these limits during normal plant operation ensures that the existing margins of safety remain valid. The proposed amendment does not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied.

Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: White Plains Public Library, 100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York 10601.

Attorney for licensee: Mr. Charles M. Pratt, 10 Columbus Circle, New York, New York 10019.

NRC Project Director: Jocelyn A. Mitchell, Acting

Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey

Date of amendment request: June 18, 1996

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would change Technical Specification (TS) 5.2.2, "Design Pressure and Temperature," by adding design parameters for Main Steam Line Break (MSLB). The MSLB analysis results in a higher containment air temperature than the current value in TS 5.2.2.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The accidents considered for this change are the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and the Main Steam Line Break (MSLB). The proposed change ensures the design limiting containment pressure and temperature data specified in the TS is consistent with the [Updated Final Safety Analysis Report] UFSAR. Since no physical changes to the containment are being made there will be no change in the probability of either accident occurring.

Detailed structural analysis presented in Supplement 1 of Licensee Event Report (LER) 272/95-016 shows that the Design Basis LOCA combination of pressure and temperature result in more severe loading for the containment concrete structure and, therefore, bounds the temperature and pressure scenario associated with a MSLB accident. The pressure retaining capability of the liner is governed by the loads generated in the MSLB. Since containment leakage is maintained within the limits assumed in the Accident Analysis for either scenario there is no change in the consequences of either accident.

Therefore the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of

accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The changes proposed affect the post-accident condition of the containment, and have no impact on the pre-accident condition. Since there is no physical change proposed the containment and all systems in the containment will continue to perform as designed. With no physical changes being proposed and no change to the pre-accident condition of the containment it can be concluded that there will be no change in the probability of a new or different accident being created.

Therefore the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Although calculations indicate that some yielding of the liner plate could occur during a MSLB, loading is transferred to the containment concrete structure and leakage from the containment is maintained within the limits assumed in the Accident Analysis. Since containment leakage is maintained within the limits assumed in the Accident Analysis the proposed change does not involve a significant change the margin of safety provided by the containment for the MSLB.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Salem Free Public library, 112 West Broadway, Salem, NJ 08079

Attorney for licensee: Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-3502

NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz

Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Hamilton County, Tennessee

Date of amendment request: June 7, 1996 (TSC 95-19)

Description of amendment request:
The proposed change would revise
Section 6 of the plant Technical
Specifications to be more closely
aligned with the Revised Standard
Technical Specifications for
Westinghouse-designed nuclear plants
(NUREG-1431). Additionally, the
proposed changes would be consistent
with the guidance provided in
Administrative Letter 95-06,
"Relocation of Technical Specification
Administrative Controls Related to
Quality Assurance."

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the

licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] has concluded that operation of SQN [Sequoyah Nuclear Plant] Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the proposed changes to the TS [Technical Specification] does not involve a significant hazards consideration. TVA's conclusion is based on its evaluation, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a)(1), of the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c).

A. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed TS change is administrative. TVA has evaluated the proposed TS changes and has determined that the proposed changes are administrative in nature. Certain sections are being relocated into other licensee documents for which those provisions are adequately controlled by regulatory requirements. These changes do not affect any of the design basis accidents. They do not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

B. The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated

The proposed TS change is administrative. TVA has evaluated the proposed TS changes and has determined that the proposed changes are administrative in nature. Certain sections are being relocated into other licensee documents for which those provisions are adequately controlled by regulatory requirements. These changes do not affect any of the design-basis accidents. No modifications to any plant equipment are involved. There are no effects on system interactions made by these changes. They do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated.

C. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed TS change is administrative. TVA has evaluated the proposed TS changes and has determined that the proposed changes are administrative in nature. Certain sections are being relocated into other licensee documents for which those provisions are adequately controlled by regulatory requirements. The margin of safety as reported in the basis for the TSs is not reduced. The proposed change is administrative and does not impact any technical information contained in the bases of the TS.

The NRC has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on thisreview, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Chattanooga-Hamilton County Library, 1001 Broad Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 Attorney for licensee: General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, 400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET 11H, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902

*NRC Project Director:* Frederick J. Hebdon

Previously Published Notices Of Consideration Of Issuance Of Amendments To Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, And Opportunity For A Hearing

The following notices were previously published as separate individual notices. The notice content was the same as above. They were published as individual notices either because time did not allow the Commission to wait for this biweekly notice or because the action involved exigent circumstances. They are repeated here because the biweekly notice lists all amendments issued or proposed to be issued involving no significant hazards consideration.

For details, see the individual notice in the Federal Register on the day and page cited. This notice does not extend the notice period of the original notice.

North Atlantic Energy Service Company, Docket No. 50-443, Seabrook Plant Unit No. 1, Rockingham County, New Hampshire

Date of amendment request: June 20, 1996

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would increase the allowed time for an inoperable service water cooling tower loop electrical supply to be the same as the allowed outage time for an operable service water cooling tower loop.

Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: June 26, 1996 (61 FR 33142)

Expiration date of individual notice: July 26, 1996

Local Public Document Room location: Exeter Public Library, Founders Park, Exeter, New Hampshire

Northeast Utilities Service Company, Docket No. 50-336, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, New London County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: June 3, 1996

Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendments would
provide a one-time change to Technical
Specification 3.9.1, "Refueling
Operations, Boron Concentration." This
change would remove the requirement
that the boron concentration in all filled
portions of the Reactor Coolant System
be "uniform" and would only be

applicable during Millstone 2 Cycle 13 mid-cycle core offload.

Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: June 12, 1996 (61 FR 29771)

Expiration date of individual notice: July 12, 1996

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, Connecticut, and the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50-423, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, New London County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: May 23, 1996

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Overtemperature delta T time constants in TS Table 2.2-1 and the Steam Line Pressure Negative Rate High Steam Line Isolation time constant in TS Table 3.3-4. Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: June 17, 1996 (61 FR 30639)

Expiration date of individual notice: July 17, 1997

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, Connecticut, and the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut

Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey

Date of amendment request: June 10, 1996

Brief description of amendment request: The amendment proposes changes to Technical Specification 3/4.7.6, "Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System," to reflect a control room design in which the common Salem Unit 1 and 2 control room envelope is supplied by 2 one hundred percent capable Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System trains. Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: June 24, 1996 (61 FR 32468)

Expiration date of individual notice: July 24, 1996

Local Public Document Room location: Salem Free Public Library, 112 West Broadway, Salem, NJ 08079 Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Houston County, Alabama

Date of amendment request: June 24, 1996

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would revise Technical Specification Table 4.3.1 to delete the requirement for surveillance of the manual safety injection to the reactor trip circuitry until the next unit shutdown, following which, this testing will be performed prior to Mode 2 entry. This change is applicable only to Unit 1, Cycle 14 and Unit 2, Cycle 11. Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: July 3, 1996 (61 FR 34880)

Expiration date of individual notice: August 2, 1996

Local Public Document Room location: Houston-Love Memorial Library, 212 W. Burdeshaw Street, P. O. Box 1369, Dothan, Alabama

Notice Of Issuance Of Amendments To Facility Operating Licenses

During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for A Hearing in connection with these actions was published in the Federal Register as indicated.

Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, it is so indicated.

For further details with respect to the action see (1) the applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3)

the Commission's related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document rooms for the particular facilities involved.

Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455, Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Ogle County, Illinois Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457, Braidwood Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois

Date of application for amendments: September 16, 1994, as supplemented January 31, 1996.

Brief description of amendments: The amendments revise the technical specifications to eliminate periodic response time testing requirements for selected pressure and differential pressure sensors in the reactor trip system and engineered safety features actuation instrumentation channels.

Date of issuance: June 26, 1996 Effective date: Immediately, to be implemented within 30 days.

Amendment Nos.: 84, 84, 76 and 76 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37, NPF-66, NPF-72 and NPF-77: The amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: March 13, 1996 (61 FR 10393). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated June 26, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: For Byron, the Byron Public Library District, 109 N. Franklin, P.O. Box 434, Byron, Illinois 61010; for Braidwood, the Wilmington Public Library, 201 S. Kankakee Street, Wilmington, Illinois 60481.

Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Grundy County, Illinois Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Rock Island County, Illinois

Date of application for amendments: November 14, 1995, as supplemented by letters dated February 23, March 1, March 13, March 25, March 26, May 10, June 10, June 14, two letters dated June 25 and a letter dated June 26, 1996.

Brief description of amendments: The proposed amendments closed out additional open items identified in the NRC staff's review of the upgrade of the Dresden and Quad Cities Technical

Specifications (TS) to the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) contained in NUREG-0123. The **Technical Specification Upgrade** Program (TSUP) is not a complete adaptation of the STS. The TS upgrade focuses on (1) integrating additional information such as equipment operability requirements during shutdown conditions, (2) clarifying requirements such as limiting conditions for operation and action statements utilizing STS terminology, (3) deleting superseded requirements and modifications to the TS based on the licensee's responses to Generic Letter (GL), and (4) relocating specific items to more appropriate TS locations.

Date of issuance: June 28, 1996 Effective date: June 28, 1996 Amendment Nos.: 150, 145, 171, and

Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19, DPR-25, DPR-29 and DPR-30. The amendments revised the Technical Specifications and operating licenses.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: November 29, 1995 (60 FR 61272) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated June 28, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: for Dresden, Morris Area Public Library District, 604 Liberty Street, Morris, Illinois 60450; for Quad Cities, Dixon Public Library, 221 Hennepin Avenue, Dixon, Illinois 61021.

Detroit Edison Company, Docket No. 50-341, Fermi-2, Monroe County, Michigan

Date of application for amendment: November 22, 1995 (NRC-95-0124)

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises the Technical Specifications to remove accelerated testing frequencies and special reporting requirements for Fermi 2 emergency diesel generators (EDGs) in accordance with guidance contained in Generic Letter 94-01, dated May 31, 1994. NRC will issue a separate safety evaluation on extending the allowed outage time for the EDGs at a later date.

Date of issuance: June 20, 1996 Effective date: June 20, 1996, with full implementation within 60 days Amendment No.: 107

Facility Operating License No. NPF-43. Amendment revises the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: February 28, 1996 (61 FR 7550) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is

contained in a Safety Evaluation dated

June 20, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: Monroe County Library System, 3700 South Custer Road, Monroe, Michigan 48161

Duke Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina

Date of application for amendments: December 12, 1995, as supplemented by letter dated June 10, 1996

Description of amendment request: The amendments revise the absolute values in the Axial Flux Difference (AFD) Equations to reflect the proper AFD limit reduction in the current Technical Specifications.

Date of issuance: July 2, 1996 Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

Amendment Nos.: 167 and 149 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17: Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: April 24, 1996 (61 FR 18166) The June 10, 1996, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the scope of the December 12, 1995, application and the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 2, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: Atkins Library, University of North Carolina, Charlotte (UNCC Station), North Carolina 28223

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-382, Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana

Date of amendment request: August 11, 1995, as supplemented by letter dated February 12, 1996

Brief description of amendment: The amendment reduced the minimum reactor coolant cold leg temperature to 541 °F from 544 °F in Technical Specification Section 3.2.6, "Reactor Coolant Cold Leg Temperature."

Date of issuance: June 24, 1996 Effective date: June 24, 1996 Amendment No.: 120

Facility Operating License No. NPF-38. Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: June 5, 1996 (61 FR 25706) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated June 24, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Local Public Document Room location: University of New Orleans Library, Louisiana Collection, Lakefront, New Orleans, LA 70122.

Florida Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251, Turkey Point Plant Units 3 and 4, Dade County, Florida

Date of application for amendments: March 20, 1996, as supplemented by letter date April 23, 1996.

Brief description of amendments: These amendments relocate the requirements for surveillance testing of the water level and pressure channel instrumentation for the reactor coolant system accumulators. These amendments also modify the existing action statements of TS 3.5.1 for accumulators to reflect the requirements of NUREG-1431 by requiring a 72- hour period to restore boron concentration if it is not within the limits, and a 1-hour period to restore any other condition rendering the accumulators inoperable.

Date of issuance: June 24, 1996 Effective date: June 24, 1996

Amendment Nos. 185 and 179Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41: Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 22, 1996 (61 FR 25707) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated June 24, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: Florida International University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199.

Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Appling County, Georgia

Date of application for amendments: February 21, 1996, as supplemented by letters dated May 1 and June 4, 1996.

Brief description of amendments: The amendments revise the Technical Specifications to change the Drywell Air Temperature Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) from less than or equal to 135°F to less than or equal to 150°F. The proposed change would provide a margin for the primary containment Drywell Air Temperature LCO when prolonged summer and high river temperatures are experienced. Also, a strictly editorial correction to a Final

Safety Analysis Report reference would be made.

Date of issuance: 201 and 142 Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

Amendment Nos.: 201 and 142 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5: Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: April 24, 1996 (61 FR 18167) The May 1 and June 4, 1996, letters provided clarifying information that did not change the scope of the February 21, 1996, application and the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated June 27, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: Appling County Public Library, 301 City Hall Drive, Baxley, Georgia 31513

Indiana Michigan Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Berrien County, Michigan

Date of application for amendments: May 19, 1995, and supplemented October 20, 1995, and April 8, 1996 (AEP:NRC:1213A)

Brief description of amendments: The amendments modify the neutron flux high setpoints for one or more main steam safety valves inoperable in response to Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter 94-001. The associated action statements are also revised and an exemption to TS 4.0.4 is added to support the operability surveillance.

Date of issuance: June 28, 1996 Effective date: June 28, 1996, with full implementation within 45 days.

Amendment Nos.: Unit 1 - 210, Unit 2 - 195

Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74. Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: December 20, 1995 (60 FR 65681) The April 8, 1996, submittal provided information clarifying the location of the TS 4.0.4 exemption statement. This information was within the scope of the original application and did not alter the staff's no significant hazards considerations determination. Therefore renoticing was not warranted. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated June 28, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Local Public Document Room location: Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library, 500 Market Street, St. Joseph, Michigan 49085

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Docket No. 50-410, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Oswego County, New York

Date of application for amendment: January 17, 1996

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises the Technical Specifications (TSs) and associated Bases by relocating certain response time limit tables from the TSs to the Updated Safety Analysis Report in accordance with the guidance of NRC Generic Letter 93-08. The relocated tables are for instrumentation for the Reactor Protection System, Isolation Actuation System, Emergency Core Cooling System, and the Recirculation Pump Trip System.

Date of issuance: June 25, 1996 Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 30

Amendment No.: 73

Facility Operating License No. NPF-69: Amendment revises the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 8, 1996 (61 FR 20850) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated June 25, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: Reference and Documents Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50-336, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, New London County, Connecticut

Date of application for amendment: December 18, 1995

Brief description of amendment: The amendment changes the Reactor Coolant Flow - Low Flow in Technical Specification Table 2.2-1, "Reactor Instrumentation Protective Trip Setpoint Limits." The proposed change increases the allowable value from greater than or equal to 90.1% to greater than or equal to 90.9% of the reactor coolant flow with four pumps operating. As an editorial change for clarification, the word "flow" is added after "reactor coolant" in the above sentence.

Date of issuance: July 2, 1996 Effective date: As of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.

Amendment No.: 199

Facility Operating License No. DPR-65: Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: February 14, 1996 (61 FR 5815) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 2, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360, and the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, CT 06385

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50-423, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, New London County, Connecticut

Date of application for amendment: June 27, 1995, as supplemented July 21, 1995

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises the Technical Specifications (TS) to relocate TS requirements for the containment purge exhaust and supply valves, and to remove a duplicate testing requirement for the safety injection input from engineered safety features from the TS.

Date of issuance: June 27, 1996 Effective date: As of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.

Amendment No.: 129

Facility Operating License No. NPF-49. Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: December 6, 1995 (60 FR 62494) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated June 27, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360, and the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, CT 06385

Pennsylvania Power and Light Company, Docket No. 50-387, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania

Date of application for amendment: January 26, 1996

Brief description of amendment: The amendment deletes three residual heat removal (RHR) system relief valves from Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.6.3-1, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves." These valves are no longer needed to support the steam condensing

mode of RHR and are being removed from the plant during the Unit 1 ninth refueling outage.

Date of issuance: June 24, 1996 Effective date: As of date of issuance to be implemented within 60 days. Amendment No.: 157

Facility Operating License No. NPF-14: This amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: March 27, 1996 (61 FR 13531) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated June 24, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: Osterhout Free Library, Reference Department, 71 South Franklin Street, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18701.

Pennsylvania Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania

Date of application for amendments: February 29, 1996

Brief description of amendments:
These amendments relocate
Specification 3/4.9.6, "Refueling
Platform," to the Susquehanna Steam
Electric Station Technical Requirements
Manual, a document which is controlled
under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.

Date of issuance: July 2, 1996 Effective date: July 2, 1996 Amendment Nos.: 158 and 129 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-14 and NPF-22. The amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: April 10, 1996 (61 FR 15992) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 2, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: Osterhout Free Library, Reference Department, 71 South Franklin Street, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18701.

Power Authority of The State of New York, Docket No. 50-286, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3, Westchester County, New York

Date of application for amendment: March 12, 1996

Brief description of amendment: The proposed changes would remove a requirement to cross tie safety injection accumulators.

Date of issuance: July 3, 1996 Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days. Amendment No.: 167

Facility Operating License No. DPR-64: Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 8, 1996 (61 FR 20853) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated July 3, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: White Plains Public Library, 100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York 10610.

Power Authority of the State of New York, Docket No. 50-333, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Oswego County, New York

Date of application for amendment: April 24, 1996

Brief description of amendment: The amendment proposes to relocate Specification 3.11.B/4.11.B "Crescent Area Ventilation" and associated Bases from the TS to an Authority controlled procedure.

Date of issuance: June 28, 1996
Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

Amendment No.: 231

Facility Operating License No. DPR-59: Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 22, 1996 (61 FR 25710) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated June 28, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: Reference and Documents Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey

Date of application for amendments: February 6, 1996

Brief description of amendments: The amendments change the Technical Specifications to lower the 125 Volt Battery Charger surveillance amperage from at least 200 amps to at least 170 amps.

Date of issuance: June 27, 1996
Effective date: As of date of issuance, to be implemented within 30 days.
Amendment Nos. 183 and 164
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75. The amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: February 28, 1996 (61 FR 7556) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated June 27, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No

Local Public Document Room location: Salem Free Public Library, 112 West Broadway, Salem, New Jersey 08079

Union Electric Company, Docket No. 50-483, Callaway Plant, Unit 1, Callaway County, Missouri

Date of application for amendment: June 26, 1995, as supplemented by letter dated February 2, 1996.

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised the allowed outage time for component cooling water motor operated containment isolation valves, moved the list of containment isolation valves from the technical specifications to the final safety analysis report, and allowed containment penetration check valves to be used as isolation devices.

Date of issuance: June 28, 1996 Effective date: June 28, 1996, to be implemented within 30 days of the date of issuance.

Amendment No.: 113

Facility Operating License No. NPF-30: The amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 30, 1995 (60 FR 45187) The February 2, 1996, supplemental letter provided additional clarifying information and did not change the staff's original no significant hazards consideration determination. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated June 28, 1996. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Local Public Document Room location: Callaway County Public Library, 710 Court Street, Fulton, Missouri 65251.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of July 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Steven A. Varga,

Director, Division of Reactor Projects - I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[Doc. 96–18007 Filed 7–16–96; 8:45 am]

## [Docket No. 55-21849-OT; ASLBP No. 96-716-01-OT]

## Emerick S. McDaniel; Notice of Reconstitution of Board

Pursuant to the authority contained in 10 CFR § 2.721, the Presiding Officer for Emerick S. McDaniel, with the above-identified Docket Number, is hereby reconstituted by appointing

Administrative Judge Peter B. Bloch as Presiding Officer in place of Chief Administrative Judge B. Paul Cotter, Jr. who is unavailable to serve. Administrative Judge Peter A. Morris will continue to assist the Presiding Officer in taking evidence and preparing the record.

All correspondence, documents and other material shall be filed with Judge Bloch and Judge Morris in accordance with 10 CFR § 2.701 (1980). Their addresses are:

Administrative Judge Peter B. Bloch, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 Administrative Judge Peter A. Morris, 10825 South Glen Road, Potomac, MD 20854

Issued at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of July 1996.

B. Paul Cotter, Jr.,

Chief Administrative Judge, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel.

[FR Doc. 96–18136 Filed 7–16–96; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

# SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 37420; File No. SR-MBSCC-96-03]

## Self-Regulatory Organizations; MBS Clearing Corporation; Notice of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Eliminating the Monthly Audit Package Requirements

July 11, 1996.

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Act"),¹ notice is hereby given that on June 18, 1996, the MBS Clearing Corporation ("MBSCC") filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II, and III below, which items have been prepared primarily by MBSCC. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.

I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Proposed Rule Change

MBSCC proposes to modify its rules and procedures to eliminate the requirement that it provide a monthly audit package to each participant and the requirement that such participant review and respond to the package.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (1988).