

indefinitely. Since there is some residual radioactivity with very long half lives such as nickel-59 in the defueled reactor plant, this alternative would leave this radioactivity at the Windsor Site indefinitely.

#### 4. Other Alternatives Considered

These alternatives include permanent on-site disposal. Such on-site disposal could involve building an entombment structure over the S1C Prototype reactor plant or developing a below ground disposal area at the Windsor Site. Another alternative would be to remove the S1C Prototype reactor plant as a single large reactor compartment package for offsite disposal. Each of these alternatives was considered but eliminated from detailed analysis.

#### Public Hearing

The purpose of the hearing is to receive comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement. The meeting will be chaired by a presiding officer and will not be conducted as an evidentiary hearing; speakers will not be cross-examined, although the presiding officer and Naval Reactors representatives present may ask clarifying questions of those who provide oral comments. To ensure that everyone has an adequate opportunity to speak, five minutes will be allotted for each speaker. Depending on the number of persons requesting to speak, the presiding officer may allow more time for elected officials, or speakers representing multiple parties, or organizations. Persons wishing to speak on behalf of organizations should identify the organization. Persons wishing to speak may either notify Mr. Overton in writing at the address below or register at the meeting. As time permits, individuals who have spoken subject to the five minute rule will be afforded additional speaking time. Written comments also will be accepted at the meeting.

#### Availability of Copies of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement

Copies of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement are being distributed to interested Federal, State, and local agencies, and to individuals who have expressed interest. Copies of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement and its supporting references are available for inspection at the Windsor Public Library at 323 Broad Street, Windsor, CT 06095. Copies of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement may be requested from Mr. Overton at the above phone number.

Issued at Arlington, VA this 20th day of June 1996.

B. DeMars,

*Admiral, U.S. Navy, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.*

[FR Doc. 96-16680 Filed 6-28-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

#### Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials—Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment

**AGENCY:** Department of Energy.

**ACTION:** Notice of intent; request for public comment.

**SUMMARY:** The Department of Energy intends to conduct a Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of the weapons-usable fissile materials storage and disposition alternatives contained in the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Draft PEIS) (February 1996, DOE/EIS-0229-D). While not conducted as part of the formal National Environmental Policy Act process, the study will be performed to provide the fullest possible public involvement in the Department's consideration of weapons-usable fissile materials storage and plutonium disposition. The Assessment will be considered in identifying preferred alternatives for storage of weapons-usable fissile materials and disposition of plutonium. The goals of the proposed Assessment will be to help identify the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control benefits and vulnerabilities associated with each of the storage and disposition alternatives considered in the Draft PEIS and identify potential steps to maximize nonproliferation and arms control benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities associated with the various alternatives.

**DATES:** All comments on the outline are due by August 9, 1996 and those received by that time will be considered by DOE in drafting the nonproliferation and arms control assessment. Comments received after that date will be considered by DOE to the extent practicable.

Meetings will be held in following locations:

July 23, 1996, 2:00pm–4:30pm (local time), University of Texas at Austin, Texas Union, North Entrance, 3.304, Quadrangle Room, 24th and Guadalupe, Austin, Texas 78712.  
July 25, 1996, 2:00pm–4:30pm (local time), Stanford University, Galvez House Conference Room, 320 Galvez Street, Stanford, CA 94305.

July 29, 1996, 2:00pm–4:30pm (local time), Northwestern University, Norris Student Center, Louis South, 2nd Floor, 1999 South Campus Drive, Evanston, IL 60208.

July 31, 1996, 2:00pm–4:30pm (local time), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stratton Student Center, Mezzanine Lounge, 3rd Floor, 84 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02139.

August 1, 1996, 2:00pm–4:30pm, Department of Energy Headquarters, Forrestal Building, Room 1E245, Washington, DC 20585.

**ADDRESSES:** The Department of Energy invites interested agencies, organizations, and the general public to provide oral and/or written comments on the outline of the proposed Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment as set forth in this Notice. Written and oral comments will be accepted at the public meetings to be held at the times and locations listed above. Persons desiring to participate in the meetings are requested to pre-register by calling the toll-free number listed no later than one week prior to the meeting.

Written comments on the outline, requests for the President's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy Statement, the National Academy of Sciences report, or the Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement should be sent to: Mr. Jon B. Wolfsthal, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (NN-42), Attn.: Assessment, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Ave, S.W., Washington, DC 20585-0001. Electronic mail comments can be sent to Jon.Wolfsthal@HQ.DOE.GOV. Comments are due by August 9, 1996.

Persons wanting additional information or to pre-register for any of the public meetings can do so by calling 1-800-835-8009. Additional information can be obtained by visiting the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security's world wide web homepage at HTTP://WWW.NN.DOE.GOV/NN/.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** There are a number of reasons behind the Department's effort to identify and implement safe, secure and timely storage and disposition of these weapons-usable materials. Many of these reasons relate to U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations or sub-national groups, and to encourage safe and secure storage and disposition of weapons-usable materials by other countries. Identifying the various implications for these goals presented

by the alternatives being evaluated by the Department is the central goal of the proposed Assessment.

The end of the Cold War and the east-west confrontation have significantly affected the way in which the United States and other countries approach the management of weapons-usable fissile materials (primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium). The reductions of nuclear weapons agreed to by the United States and Russia in bilateral treaties and through other initiatives has reduced U.S. national security requirements for fissile materials and, as a result, substantial amounts of weapons-usable fissile materials have been declared surplus to U.S. defense needs, and decisions about the storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials and the disposition of plutonium will therefore be required. The national policy, as outlined by the President on September 27, 1993 (White House Press Release), is to seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles of HEU and plutonium, and to ensure that where these materials already exist they are subject to the highest standards of safety, security and international accountability.

In addition, the President in September 1993 initiated a comprehensive review of long-term options for plutonium disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary and economic considerations. The proposed Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment represents a vital part of that review.

In early 1994, the National Academy of Sciences published a report, *Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium*. This study, commissioned by the President's National Security Council, provides information regarding management and disposition of surplus nuclear materials, in particular plutonium.

In the United States, weapons-usable fissile nuclear materials are currently stored at several DOE sites, including the Pantex Plant (Amarillo, Texas), the Hanford Site (Richland, Washington), Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (Idaho Falls, Idaho), the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Golden, Colorado), the Savannah River Site (Aiken, South Carolina), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore, California), Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos, New Mexico), and the Oak Ridge Reservation (Oak Ridge, Tennessee).

Recent nuclear arms reduction agreements and pledges, along with Presidential decisions concerning what

stocks of nuclear materials are surplus to national defense and defense-related program needs, will largely determine how much material will be available for disposition, and when.

The outline will be used to draft a Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment, which will then be reviewed and commented on by a panel of experts. This panel, which will be convened as a sub-committee of the Secretary of Energy's Advisory Board (SEAB), will include members of the SEAB and other experts and will be chaired by a SEAB member. The comments by the SEAB panel will be incorporated into the draft assessment, which will then be published and made available for public comment and additional public meetings in the fall. Following those meetings and comments, a final assessment will be prepared and published by the end of 1996.

#### Alternatives Considered

The Department is evaluating the following reasonable long-term storage alternatives: (1) Upgrade or replacement of current Plutonium and HEU storage facilities at multiple DOE sites, (2) consolidation of Plutonium at a single DOE site, and (3) collocation of Plutonium and HEU at a single DOE site. The six candidate storage sites are: the Hanford Site, Washington; the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), Idaho; the Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada; the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), Tennessee; the Pantex Plant, Texas; and the Savannah River Site (SRS), South Carolina. For disposition, the Draft PEIS analyzes broader, programmatic strategies and technologies. The reasonable disposition alternatives fall into three categories: (1) The Deep Borehole Category consisting of two alternatives—Direct Disposition, and Immobilized Disposition; (2) the Immobilization Category consisting of three alternatives—Vitrification, Ceramic Immobilization, and Electrometallurgical Treatment; and (3) the Reactor Category consisting of four alternatives—Existing Light Water Reactors (LWRs), Evolutionary LWRs, Partially Completed LWRs, and the Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) Reactor. In addition, No Action Alternatives are analyzed, in which no change in storage and/or no disposition would occur.

The outline and the subsequent study will review the nonproliferation and arms control implications of the reasonable alternatives under evaluation, assess the relative nonproliferation and arms control

benefits and vulnerabilities of each alternative, and identify potential steps that could be taken to maximize the associated benefits and to minimize the associated liabilities. The report will be used in conjunction with environmental impact analyses, analyses of the cost, schedule and technical viability assessments of each option, other reports and public comments in making a final decision on how to store weapons-usable fissile materials and dispose of surplus plutonium.

Dated: June 26, 1996.

Kenneth N. Luongo,  
*Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Energy for Nonproliferation Policy and Director, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation,*

#### Outline for Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Disposition Alternatives

##### (A) Introduction and Summary

- I. Current situation and upcoming developments
- II. Need for action
  - (a) Internal U.S. management of materials
  - (b) International imperatives/objectives
- III. Background and previous studies
- IV. Alternatives under consideration
- V. Main nonproliferation considerations (Summary)
  - (a) Technical factors
  - (b) Policy factors

##### (B) Policy Factors

- I. Relevant policy documents
  - (a) Relevant Presidential Decision Directives and statements
  - (b) US/Russian & P-8 summit statements
  - (c) Other documents and guidance
- II. International initiatives/cooperation

##### (C) Long-Term Storage of Fissile Materials

- I. Description of four main storage alternatives (contained in Draft PEIS)
  - (a) Upgrade facilities at multiple sites (separate/multiple HEU and Pu Storage sites)
  - (b) Consolidation of Plutonium storage
  - (c) Collocation of Plutonium and Highly enriched uranium storage
  - (d) No action
- II. Nonproliferation and arms control analysis of four main storage alternatives
  - (a) Nonproliferation and arms control-related benefits
    - Technical
    - Policy
  - (b)—Nonproliferation and arms

control liabilities/vulnerabilities —Technical —Policy	Candu Reactor in Canada (b) Immobilization Vitrification Ceramic Immobilization Electrometallurgical Treatment	Technical Policy
III. Identify/Recommend steps to maximize positive and reduce negative impacts of main storage options	(c) Deep Borehole Review Direct Disposition Immobilized Disposition	III. Identify/Recommend steps to maximize benefits and reduce any negative nonproliferation impacts of options
(D) Disposition Options for Surplus Plutonium	(d) No Action	(E) General Recommendations/Conclusions
I. Description and analysis of four groups of alternatives (See Figure 1 for factors to be considered)	II. Nonproliferation analysis of three main categories of options (See Figure I).	(The Assessment will not rank the alternatives based on nonproliferation criteria, but will recommend possible ways to maximize benefits or mitigate any negative nonproliferation implications associated with particular alternatives.)
(a) Reactor Options (US and/or European MOX fabrication) Evolutionary LWRs Partially Completed LWRs Existing LWRs	(a) Nonproliferation and arms control benefits Technical Policy (b) Nonproliferation and arms control liabilities/vulnerabilities	

FIGURE 1.—TECHNICAL/POLICY FACTORS AND MITIGATING STEPS

Technical factors	Policy factors	Mitigating steps
TIME LINES —Time to Start —Time to Finish RISK OF DIVERSION IN PROCESS —Material form and attractiveness —Material security and accounting —Transport security —Process through-put —Other process issues —Material inventories —Number of facilities and sites —Bilateral and international monitoring —Political and security conditions in countries involved RISK OF RE-USE IN WEAPONS —Final material form and attractiveness —Physical access to material —Cost, time and observability of recovery —Bilateral and international monitoring.	Impacts on foreign programs and activities Impact on current and future U.S. policy Impacts on nonproliferation agreements and regimes Political implementability Impacts on current and future fissile material related negotiations Impact on future dismantlement activities	Safeguards and Security International monitoring and access Implementation variations Stated justifications Bilateral or multilateral agreements or PAGE arrangements

[FR Doc. 96-16679 Filed 6-28-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

**Federal Energy Regulatory Commission**

[Docket No. RP96-282-000]

**Algonquin Gas Transmission Company; Notice of Proposed Changes in FERC Gas Tariff**

June 25, 1996.

Take notice that on June 20, 1996, Algonquin Gas Transmission Company (Algonquin) tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas Tariff, Fourth Revised Volume No. 1, the following revised tariff sheets, with a proposed effective date of July 20, 1996:

Twenty-eighth Revised Sheet No. 20A  
Original Sheet No. 93C  
Fourth Revised Sheet No. 700  
Third Revised Sheet No. 701  
Second Revised Sheet No. 702  
Fourth Revised Sheet No. 703

Algonquin states that the purpose of this filing is to flow through \$177,225.78 of take-or-pay charges billed to Algonquin by National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation under the revised allocation methodology. Algonquin requests that the Commission grant any waiver that may be necessary to place these tariff sheets into effect on the date requested.

Algonquin states that copies of this filing were mailed to all customers of Algonquin and interested state commissions.

Any person desiring to be heard or to protest this filing should file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with 385.214 and 385.211 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations. All such motions or protests must be filed as provided in § 154.210 of the Commission's Regulations. Protests will be considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to be taken, but will

not serve to make protestants parties to the proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a motion to intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and are available for public inspection in the Public Reference Room.

Lois D. Cashell,  
Secretary.

[FR Doc. 96-16631 Filed 6-28-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-M

[Docket No. RP90-95-012]

**Colorado Interstate Gas Company; Notice of Compliance Filing**

June 25, 1996.

Take notice that on June 21, 1996, Colorado Interstate Gas Company (CIG), tendered for filing a semiannual compliance filing consisting of work papers detailing accrued interest payments made by CIG to its affected customers related to the unused portion