around the bulk storage tank for facilities not protected by SPCC plans.

Present regulations require that transfer pipelines be hydrostatically tested at 1.5 times the maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) on an annual basis. In August of 1994, the Coast Guard also established guidelines for conducting pneumatic pressure testing as an alternative method. In addition, the Coast Guard has become aware of other, non-destructive testing methods, including acoustic and ultrasonic methods through several alternative requests submitted by industry and discussions with the Office of Pipeline Safety.

The Coast Guard is evaluating these other testing options to assess their suitability as alternative pipeline testing methods for facility operators while maintaining an equivalent level of safety. To accomplish this, Coast Guard is seeking comments on the following issues pertaining to the use of alternative methods for ensuring pipeline safety: (1) Whether using methods other than pressure testing would provide the same or greater level of confidence for ensuring that a pipeline meets safety standards; (2) Whether companies would apply to use other programs, to include using methods such as ultrasonic and acoustic testing, as alternatives to pressure testing; and, (3) Whether use of alternative testing methods would be physically practical and less costly than current requirements. In addition to these, the Coast Guard encourages the submission of comments regarding any other aspects of its pipeline inspection policy.

Dated: May 6, 1996.

J.C. Card,

Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief, Marine Safety And Environmental Protection.

[FR Doc. 96–11775 Filed 5–9–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–14–M

Federal Aviation Administration

[Docket No. 28567]

A Call for the Development of Prototype(s) for a Global Analysis and Information Network (GAIN)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice; request for comments.

SUMMARY: David Hinson, Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), stresses that Zero Accidents is the only acceptable safety goal for the aviation industry and the FAA. This notice offers some ideas for the elements needed to establish an early warning capability for existing and emerging safety concerns that would move the aviation industry towards Zero Accidents, and challenges the aviation industry to participate in developing that capability. Because of an emerging combination of improved cooperation between airline management, labor, and various governments, advancements in information technologies, and the political environment in several countries, the international aviation industry has an unprecedented opportunity, by sharing and analyzing aviation safety information, to reach Zero Accidents.

This notice (a) solicits comments on the Global Analysis and Information Network (GAIN) concept and implementation strategy for collecting and analyzing aviation safety data, and (b) invites participation in the development of proof-of-concept prototypes. All interested parties, whether or not in the aviation community, are invited to comment on the ideas presented, offer alternative solutions, indicate interest in helping to develop a GAIN prototype or the overall system itself, and comment about how government aviation safety agencies can best help the industry reach Zero Accidents.

DATES: Comments in response to this call for action must be received by June 14, 1996.

ADDRESSES: It is requested that *all* comments be submitted via the Internet by sending an e-mail message with your comments (plain text preferred, no graphics please) to: concept __paper@asyweb01.nasdac.faa.gov.

Please include your name and organization. Comments must also be mailed in hard-copy (two copies) via regular mail to: Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Ave., SW., Office of Chief Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket (AGC–200), Docket No. 28567, Washington, DC 20591.

All comments must be marked: ''Docket No. 28567.'' Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments must include a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: ''Comments to Docket No. 28567.'' The postcard will be date stamped and mailed to the commenter.

Comments submitted about this Notice may be examined at the FAA at the above address in room 915G on weekdays, except on Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. In addition, commenters will be able to review all other comments by Internet. Your submission should not contain any proprietary or other information that you do not want to be made available to the public.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Chuck Fluet, Manager, Safety Analysis Division, Office of Aviation Safety, ASY–200, Federal Aviation Administration, 400 7th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590, telephone 202–267–GAIN (202–267–4246).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The aviation industry has made remarkable progress in reducing aviation accident rates. With today's volume of flights, the industry would have suffered *more than 10,000 fatalities* last year worldwide if the accident rate had not improved so dramatically since 1960. Because of this major decline in the accident rate, the industry now suffers an average of *less than 800 fatalities* worldwide per year. However, the rate has remained stubbornly consistent for about the last 10 years; and at today's accident rate, forecast growth in air transportation demand will lead to *more than 4,500 fatalities* worldwide per year by 2025—clearly an unacceptable result.

Sound methods for certifying the safety of new aviation products and procedures, as well as surveillance activities that help to ensure safe operation and maintenance of these products and procedures, have contributed significantly to the current safety levels of the aviation industry. Within the framework of these regulatory methods, technological advances in engine performance and reliability, airframes and materials, air traffic control, cockpit automation, and simulator training have contributed to the safety of the aviation system. Compliance inspections, accident and incident investigations, special studies, and program evaluations are the fundamental methods of continuing surveillance in the operating environment, and safety has improved significantly over the years in part because of the lessons learned by using these methods to understand the mistakes and oversights of the past.

Yet all too often, the industry has not been able to use data about accidents, incidents and other system anomalies to become aware of existing or emerging safety problems in time to take preventive measures. Just as traditional product design and manufacturing methods eventually gave way to new, improved principles and methods, a new safety information paradigm, with much greater sensitivity to anomalies in daily aviation system operations, could help the industry reach Zero Accidents. Just as aviation product improvements of the past have been fostered by technological advances, improvements in aviation safety monitoring and alerting will become possible as a result of major advances in information management technology.

An Outline of a New Safety Monitoring Paradigm

The industry must develop a significantly improved operational early warning capability that is sensitive enough to detect and alert the aviation community to existing and emerging problems. A major aspect of this capability is the *sharing of safety information,* both *within* categories in the industry, e.g., carriers must share with other carriers and manufacturers with other manufacturers; and *across* categories, e.g., labor, management, carriers, manufacturers, air traffic controllers, airport operators, and others must share with each other. Creating useful information, however, generally requires the collection of large amounts of data, and it also involves the careful analysis of that data. Rarely would there be any need or desire to share any raw data, but the sharing of the *analysis* of the data—the information—could be mutually beneficial. Gathering and analyzing large amounts of qualitative and quantitative aviation safety data to better understand routine system operations is the foundation of the Global Analysis and Information Network (GAIN) concept.

The GAIN system would be more sensitive to conditions that signal increased safety risks because it would contain information about normal aviation system operations. The statistical baseline for normal aviation operations, constructed with digital flight and ATC radar data, among other major and currently untapped sources, would be the plumb line from which deviations are measured. The importance of obtaining information about a far greater percentage of aircraft operations has been illustrated repeatedly by all-too-typical accident investigation findings of earlier flights that experienced problems similar to the accident aircraft. A truly effective early warning capability would involve significant improvements in information feedback and analysis for aviation operations. At a minimum, the GAIN concept would add the following new elements to the existing monitoring systems to improve sensitivity:

—New data sources *that would improve risk assessment and provide a baseline for normal flight operations, thus improving the chances of early anomaly detection.*

—New and innovative data management and analytical techniques and methodologies *that quickly reveal obscure and/or infrequent data patterns and associations.*

—New methods to *disseminate the findings quickly and globally to all who could use them to improve aviation safety.*

Analytical Strategies and Automated Tools

The proposed analysis process would be based upon new sources of information and new information technology capabilities. First, information from voluntary reporting programs (such as the confidential Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), or the Air Safety Reports (ASR) used by certain airlines) and mandatory incident reporting systems (such as the Pilot Deviation or Runway Incursion data bases) would be subjected to a range of analysis tools. These include advanced data pattern searches—which can be performed autonomously on the data by ''intelligent agent'' automation tools to discover patterns or associations, finding the ''needle in the haystack.'' ''Intelligent agent'' software would aid analysts in discovering thematic associations in text data bases, and data visualization tools would show the analyst associations in data base elements. Application of such data mining analysis tools would provide a more focused understanding of operational safety concerns much sooner than current analysis techniques. The data management and analysis take place in a ''data warehouse'' where operational data are extracted from existing systems and, through a series of steps that standardize and improve the quality of the data, the data are transformed into a data base designed for targeted analysis. Within a ''data warehouse'' environment, safety analysts can employ various data mining strategies.

Once existing or emerging safety concerns are identified, hypotheses that are developed to explain them can be tested using empirical digital flight data, ATC radar data, or other appropriate data sources. A focus on remedial measures would at times result from an analysis of digital flight data or ATC automated data, both vast sources of empirical data.

As a result of new information technologies, we have the capability, for the first time, to monitor and analyze the parameters of safe and normal flight. Until very recently, it has been very difficult to obtain accurate and reliable information on normal flight operations. Now, thanks to new computer technologies, we can use flight data recorder and radar information to generate large amounts of very accurate and detailed information about flight performance. For example, the Boeing 777 records information on 700 flight parameters 8 times a second. Several countries, mostly in Europe, have programs in which a carrier or civil aviation agency routinely monitors and analyzes operational data captured on flight data recorders.

Statistical analysis of digital data or ATC automated data from normal flights would yield a baseline of routine operations that can be used to detect variations from norms. In addition, baseline statistics would help safety analysts quantify operating risks within, as well as beyond, the envelope of normal operations. By collecting and analyzing information primarily about what went wrong, we are missing the opportunity to learn what was done right to avoid an accident or incident in earlier situations. The likelihood of detecting problems and developing remedies is significantly greater from studying large numbers of normal daily operations than from relying primarily upon a far smaller number of periodic inspections or accident and incident investigations.

Analysis of digital flight data can provide several types of information, including aircraft path analysis, derivation of environmental conditions, aircraft configuration time histories, aerodynamic coefficients (analysis of coefficients can reveal degradation in aerodynamic performance), engine performance, aircraft attitude, automated flight control modes and status, warning parameters, takeoff and landing distances, and flight loads. Digital flight data can be used to detect single anomalies—alerting operators when criteria values for selected parameters have been exceeded or when particular events occur. Such data also can be used to develop descriptive statistics across fleets, to detect deviations from statistical norms in the aviation system, or to measure the effects of design, procedure, or equipment changes.

ATC automated data could be used to analyze airplane motion and relative position, important factors in analyzing issues such as wake vortex and environmental effects. An analysis of air traffic control automated data for normal operations could provide insight into methods for improving ATC system operations or potential problem areas. Flight data anomalies from accidents could be compared to similar anomalies of flights that did not crash to learn what was done differently to avoid an accident. These findings might suggest guidelines on pilot training or aircraft design. The same autonomous ''intelligent agent'' analysis techniques used to find patterns in data from incident reporting also can be applied to digital flight data and ATC radar data—or information derived from this data such as paths, flight loads, or aerodynamic coefficients—to determine if any otherwise unobserved associations exist within the data.

Human Factors Analysis

This analytical process and the new sources of data under consideration could significantly improve our ability to describe what is happening in the aviation system, and a comparable human factors analysis capability must also be developed. Without a reliable human factors analysis tool that addresses the underlying causes or factors associated with emerging safety concerns, remedial measures may only be temporary ''band aids.'' An effective human performance analysis capability developed for use on digital flight data or ATC automated data—augmented by feedback from voluntary disclosure systems—is an essential part of an early warning system.

A Proposed Architecture for Sharing

As noted above, for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the very large quantity of data, there will probably be little or no sharing of raw data, but only of information from the analysis of data. Moreover, because of improved networking technologies and capabilities, information would not necessarily all be sent to a massive computer at one location, but would probably be available to different users to different extents by networking—sometimes known as a ''virtual database.'' For example, this networking capability makes it possible for each carrier, manufacturer, or union to have separate GAIN-type systems, or they could do it collectively with one or more others or through trade associations, or any combination of them, and the information sharing could occur over the network to the extent desired or permitted by the owner of each system.

The information that results from GAIN analyses would ideally be available immediately to all recipients who could use it to improve aviation safety. The dissemination of vital information can be accomplished with existing infrastructure—using the Internet, for example, if adequate safeguards can be provided to protect the security and confidentiality concerns of the information providers regarding identified or identifiable data. The GAIN network would have to accommodate different requirements in a user-friendly way, and be able to notify automatically all appropriate recipients about potential problems without requiring them to know to query the system.

Examples of Proactive Use of Aviation Safety Data

There are several examples in various countries that demonstrate how effectively proactive safety measures can be implemented as a result of industry/labor/government partnership sharing of such information. When one air carrier's data indicated that pilots were frequently disregarding their Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), the carrier discovered that the frequent disregard was due to a high false alarm rate, and further analysis of the data provided the basis for developing a software remedy. As a result, that GPWS system was improved (to the benefit of *all* carriers that used it), the false alarm rate dropped, and pilots ignored the warning much less.

Similarly, a carrier that was experiencing frequent altitude capture excursions and deviations in one of its aircraft types found from the data that the problem was a combination of inadequate pilot training and poor altitude capture logic. Analysis of the data provided the basis for improving both the training and the logic. Again, the logic fix benefited *all* users of that autopilot around the world, not just the carrier that discovered the problem.

Other examples include improvements to training programs and/or operations manuals as a result of high pitch angle takeoffs, more rapid that desirable takeoff rotation rates, inadvertent flap/slat retraction out of the proper speed range, and unstabilized approaches; design fixes for equipment that did not perform as designed or anticipated (e.g., an aircraft that was developing cracks from hard landings at less than the 2 g cutoff beyond which inspection was mandated); and improvements in airport signs and markings to help pilots more accurately follow their taxi clearances.

Also important, of course, is that without the data, it is very difficult for carriers, manufacturers, or governments to *evaluate* whether new programs and other fixes are having the desired result.

Concept Implementation Issues

Collection and Analysis of Aviation Safety Data

In *developing* an analytical process for an early warning capability that would monitor the system and alert the aviation community to existing and emerging safety concerns, please consider what data requirements, analysis methods, and information dissemination methods you would propose. In relation to the analytical process, please consider and comment on issues such as the following:

— What aviation safety data and information are needed to support your analysis plan and what, of those needs, is not now being collected?
—Should large quantities of data be collected on a wide range of safety issues, or less data on fewer targeted safety issues?
—To what extent is standardization of the data collection or of analysis techniques necessary? How should the necessary standardization be accomplished?
—How could existing data, such as information from voluntary reporting and correction, ASRS, AQP, FOQA, and other such programs, be analyzed better to provide meaningful and useful information?
—What could industry and government do to improve existing means for data collection?
—Are incentives needed to stimulate the submission of information that is not derived from accidents or incidents, as opposed to merely removing the disincentives, in order to encourage reporting?
—To what extent can international information sharing occur with a ''virtual database'' instead of a physically centralized data base?
—What techniques and capabilities are you aware of in the aviation industry or in other industries to analyze data effectively and generate statistically significant results, with predictive value, from large quantities of data describing normal operations?
—What analytical techniques and capabilities are you aware of in the aviation industry or in other industries to respond effectively to the myriad of human factors issues that arise in operational monitoring analysis?

Dissemination of Aviation Safety Information

—To what extent are security measures needed, and what security measures are available, to protect information confidentiality while still assuring that it reaches all in the industry who could use it to improve aviation safety?
—What alerting methods are available to ensure that information is automatically distributed to all recipients who could use it to

improve aviation safety without their having to know to ask?

General

—Will an analysis and dissemination system such as GAIN help the aviation industry reach Zero Accidents?
—Are there better ways to help the industry reach Zero Accidents?
—What concerns, if any, do you have about the existence of an analysis and dissemination system such as GAIN?
—What should the relationship be between government regulators and GAIN for it to be most effective ?
—Although commercial aviation is the initial target for this effort, how can other sectors of the aviation industry, including the military, help with this initial effort?
—How can the program be expanded to include input from, and the development of remedies in relation to information provided by, manufacturing personnel, mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers, ramp personnel, and other aviation industry professionals whose input could help with the proactive effort?

Considerations for Developing Prototypes

General

Ultimately GAIN could develop into a comprehensive international network of systems for analysis and sharing of aviation safety information. However, that development would have to occur incrementally, starting with one or more prototypes of various pieces of the network. Among the areas that should be evaluated from prototype development are: international data standardization, data collection protocols, analytical methods, data sharing, alerting mechanisms, and the potential value of emerging technologies. By prototyping key elements of GAIN, it will be possible to obtain operational proof of the most significant new capabilities being incorporated in this early warning system. With a minimal initial commitment of resources, risks and costs would be reduced, while allowing the overall operational feasibility of the concept to be assessed. It would help define obstacles and issues associated with the development of GAIN, and provide valuable information for future implementation planning. Because more types of data, more types of analyses, and more users should not generally be added unless experience demonstrates that such additions would be useful, prototypes would help to provide the experience to determine the desirability of such additions.

Ownership

For several reasons, the elements of the GAIN network should probably not be owned or operated by the FAA or the aviation regulatory agency of any other country. Instead, they should probably be owned by those members of the international aviation industry that benefit economically from its successful performance, analogous to existing collectively-owned, non-profit joint ventures in the aviation industry that provide services for the owners' mutual benefit. There are several reasons for pursuing this type of ownership. First, GAIN would probably enjoy better acceptance by the industry if it is not viewed as a government effort to gather information for enforcement purposes or to protect its own manufacturers and carriers in an international marketplace. Second, private ownership, as compared with governmental ownership, would facilitate protecting sensitive information from public disclosure. Third, the funding of GAIN should not depend upon the fiscal situation in any one country.

Last, but not least, GAIN's existence would be most assured, and it would perform most effectively and efficiently, if it were owned jointly by those who have a direct economic interest in its success—namely, the insurers, manufacturers, carriers, pilots, mechanics, controllers, and airport operators that make up the industry. Either GAIN *will* improve aviation safety and substantially reduce costs for the entire industry—because prevention costs less than accidents—in which event industry will want to own and operate it; or it will not accomplish these goals, in which event a better way must be developed to reach Zero Accidents.

In determining how GAIN might be owned and structured, we invite your comment about:

—What types of prototypes could best demonstrate the concept at the lowest cost, given existing data collection and analysis techniques and capabilities?
—What entities could help develop prototype projects, how much would they cost, and what sources of funding are available?
—What role can you play in the prototyping effort and subsequent efforts to develop an operational GAIN?

The Role of the FAA

The FAA is already engaged in several activities to demonstrate, in relatively small scale, the utility of safety data collection and analysis, but the GAIN network and its prototypes would probably not be FAA systems. The FAA's Office of System Safety could help facilitate the creation of GAIN by informing potential participants about the concept, and by bringing potential participants together, but the FAA will not own or operate GAIN, and will probably not fund its development. Instead, the FAA would be one of many users of the analytical results and supporting data from GAIN.

Given the numerous proactive accident prevention activities that are already underway in various countries, it is likely that the aviation industry would eventually develop an international cooperative data sharing system, such as the GAIN network, on its own. The problem has been that it is difficult for any one profession, manufacturer, or airline to develop a program that systematically facilitates international sharing of information to the benefit of the entire international aviation community. Thus, in addition to facilitating this development by demonstrating its intent to cooperate more with industry to reach Zero Accidents, the FAA can play a major role in accelerating the progress of private industry by bringing together the entities that can help to develop GAIN prototypes—preferably by building as much as possible upon the systems that are already in place rather than starting anew—and by helping to assure that the prototypes are sufficiently standardized and consistent to work together in the more comprehensive GAIN network as it ultimately develops.

Conclusion: A Call To Action

Please let us know of your ideas regarding the development of a GAIN network, particularly regarding how you can become involved, either in a GAIN prototype or in the more comprehensive permanent effort. This is not an invitation for bids or a request for proposals, but we are soliciting indications of interest, as well as input regarding the viability of this or any other concept to help the industry reach Zero Accidents.

You are encouraged to review the comments (Commenters will be able to review all other comments by Internet) and be creative about how you, individually or together with other commenters, can begin the development of GAIN prototypes. If warranted by the nature and extent of the comments, the FAA will host a conference to bring interested parties together to discuss refinements of the GAIN concept and the development of prototypes.

Issued in Washington, D.C., on May 7, 1996.

Christopher A. Hart,

Assistant Administrator for System Safety, Federal Aviation Administration.

[FR Doc. 96–11725 Filed 5–9–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

Notice of Intent To Rule on Application to Use the Revenue From a Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport and Willow Run Airport, Detroit, Michigan

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of Intent to Rule on Application.

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to rule and invites public comment on the application to use the revenue from a PFC at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport and Willow Run Airport under the provisions of the Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1990 (Title IX of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990) (Public Law 101–508) and Part 158 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR Part 158).

DATES: Comments must be received on or before June 10, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this application may be mailed or delivered in triplicate to the FAA at the following address:

Federal Aviation Administration, Detroit Airports District Office, Willow Run Airport, East, 8820 Beck Road Belleville, Michigan 48111.

In addition, one copy of any comments submitted to the FAA must be mailed or delivered to Robert C. Braun, Director of Airports of the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport at the following address: Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, Mezzanine, L.C. Smith Terminal, Detroit, MI 48242.

Air carriers and foreign air carriers may submit copies of written comments previously provided to the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport under section 158.23 of Part 158.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Leonard Mizerowski, Program Manager, Federal Aviation Administration, Detroit Airports District Office, Willow Run Airport, East, 8820 Beck Road, Belleville, Michigan 48111 (313–487–7277). The application may be reviewed in person at this same location.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA proposes to rule and invites public comment on the application to use the revenue from a PFC at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport and Willow Run Airport under the provisions of the Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1990 (Title IX of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990) (Public Law 101–508) and Part 158 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR Part 158).

On April 15, 1996, the FAA determined that the application to use the revenue from a PFC submitted by Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport substantially complete within the requirements of section 158.25 of Part 158. The FAA will approve or disapprove the application, in whole or in part, no later than August 8, 1996.

The following is a brief overview of the application.

PFC Application No.: 96–02–C–00–DTW.

Level of the PFC: $3.00.

Actual charge effective date: January 1, 1993.

Estimated charge expiration date: June 21, 2009.

Total approved net PFC revenue: $640,707,000.00.

Brief description of proposed project(s):

Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport

Land Acquisition and Preliminary Design for Fourth Parallel Runway.

Willow Run Airport

Perimeter Property Fencing and Removal of Airport Hazards Class or classes of air carriers which the public agency has requested not be required to collect PFCs: FAR Part 158.23 air taxi/commercial operators (ATCOs) filing from 1800–31 and enplaning fewer than 500 passengers per year at the airport.

Any person may inspect the application in person at the FAA office listed above under **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.**

In addition, any person may, upon request, inspect the application, notice and other documents germane to the application in person at the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport.

Issued in Des Plaines, Illinois, on May 3, 1996.

Benito DeLeon,

Manager, Planning/Programming Branch, Airports Division, Great Lakes Region.

[FR Doc. 96–11730 Filed 5–9–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

Notice of Intent To Rule on Application to Use the Revenue From a Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) at Ford Airport, Iron Mountain, Michigan

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of Intent to Rule on Application.

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to rule and invites public comment on the application to use the revenue from a PFC at Ford Airport under the provisions of the Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1990 (Title IX of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990) (Public Law 101–508) and Part 158 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR Part 158).

DATES: Comments must be received on or before June 10, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this application may be mailed or delivered in triplicate to the FAA at the following address:

Federal Aviation Administration, Detroit Airports District Office, Willow Run Airport, East, 8820 Beck Road, Belleville, Michigan 48111.

In addition, one copy of any comments submitted to the FAA must be mailed or delivered to Mr. William H. Marchetti, Airport Manager, of the Dickinson County Board of Commissioners, at the following address: County Courthouse 701 Stevenson Avenue, P.O. Box 609, Iron Mountain, MI 49802.

Air carriers and foreign air carriers may submit copies of written comments previously provided to the Dickinson County Board of Commissioners, under Section 158.23 of Part 158.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Jon Gilbert, Program Manager, Federal Aviation Administration, Detroit Airports District Office, Willow Run Airport, East, 8820 Beck Road, Belleville, Michigan 48111 (313–487–7281). The application may be reviewed in person at this same location.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA proposes to rule and invites public comment on the application to use the revenue from a PFC at Ford Airport under the provisions of the Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1990 (Title IX of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990) (Public Law 101–508) and Part 158 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR Part 158).

On April 23, 1996, the FAA determined that the application to use the revenue from a PFC submitted by the Dickinson County Board of Commissioners was substantially complete within the requirements of Section 158.25 of Part 158. The FAA will approve or disapprove the application, in whole or in part, no later than July 9, 1996.

The following is a brief overview of the application.

PFC Application No.: 96–02–U–00–IMT.